Economic disparity yet resulting similarity: The 'double paradox' of Argentina's and Mexico's electric telegraph and telephone diffusion, 1851-1997. by Gonzalez, Arish Tatiana
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The ‘Double Paradox ’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
The London School of Economics and Political Science
ECONOMIC DISPARITY YET RESULTING 
SIMILARITY:
The ‘Double Paradox9 o f Argentina’s and Mexico9s Electric 
Telegraph and Telephone Diffusion, 1851-1997
Arish Tatiana Gonzalez
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economic 
History of the London School of Economics for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, November 2010
i
UMI Number: U613444
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U613444
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Tfles'o
p
Library
British Library of p o h ! c «' 
and Economic Scioncv
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The ‘Double Paradox’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree 
of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own 
work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others 
(in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any 
other person is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not 
be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe 
the rights of any third party.
2
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The ‘Double Paradox ’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
Abstract
The process of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) diffusion today is 
one of the major determinants of a country’s economic growth and development. A 
greater understanding of the factors driving this is therefore critical in developing 
countries. Whilst the literature presents a range of potential factors that explain the 
difference in diffusion rates across countries, it is the relative level of economic 
development in one country compared with another that is cited most frequently. 
This would suggest that the diffusion of the telegraph and the telephone in Argentina 
should have been decidedly faster than in Mexico, given the former’s significant 
inherent economic advantage throughout the period. This was not found to be the 
case. Instead, Argentina underperformed while Mexico outperformed, giving rise to 
an interesting historical episode which I dub the ‘Double Paradox’.
This unexpected result is verified via the application of the ‘Flexible Logistic Growth 
Model’ (FLOG) and linearisation techniques, which demonstrated that both 
technologies diffused at strikingly similar rates. The quantitative and qualitative 
analysis established that the ‘Double Paradox’ is best explained by the role and 
actions of the state, rather than the countries’ economic development, or the intrinsic 
traits of the given technology. The findings showed that state action can act as a 
substitute to the otherwise commonly held prerequisites for fast diffusion, such as 
economic drivers, thus allowing for Gerschenkronian style catch up. Further 
investigation determined that Mexico’s closed political system was supportive of 
successful diffusion while Argentina’s more open, decentralised and quasi- 
democratic structure was not, indicating that the state can act as both a promoter and 
an inhibitor of diffusion. The thesis contributes to the literature on the comparative 
history of traditional ICT diffusion and growth. This is important both in 
understanding the economic history of developing countries, and because it has 
valuable implications for political planning in developing countries regarding future 
ICT diffusion. The thesis concludes that not only is the choice and implementation of 
the right reform paramount in inducing faster diffusion, but also the degrees of 
stability, autonomy and concentration of power within the state. In the discovery and 
examination of the ‘Double Paradox’, the overwhelming impact of the role of the 
state in the traditional ICT diffusion process is illuminated, which lays a framework 
from which to stimulate and develop further research.
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Introduction
This thesis examines the economic history of the diffusion of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs), in the context of Argentina and Mexico, in 
order to demonstrate the dominant role of state action in the process. Through the 
application of the ‘Flexible Logistic Growth’ (FLOG) model and linearisation 
analysis, the rates of diffusion for the electric telegraph and the telephone 
technologies (traditional ICTs) were quantified.1 An interesting and unexpected 
result arose, whereby the two technologies diffused at very similar rates in Argentina 
and Mexico, despite the two country’s differing economic settings (particularly with 
regards to income levels). Given that much of the literature accounts for the 
differences in technology diffusion rates by the role of income, this implies that the 
telegraph and the telephone should have diffused at a relatively faster rate in 
Argentina than in Mexico, yet this was not the case. Rather, the diffusion of the two 
technologies in Argentina seemingly underperformed, while relatively outperforming 
in the case of Mexico. I dubbed this interesting historical episode the ‘Double 
Paradox’ (the Paradox hence). Given the inadequacy of economic rationale in 
accounting for the revealed diffusion rates, the thesis demonstrates that one of the 
main differentiating drivers of diffusion in the two countries was state action. Upon 
extensive analysis of the Paradox and the extent of the Mexican ‘Success Story’, the 
associated implications are explored. In order to give the reader some insight into the 
rationale for the context of the thesis, five important questions are posed below: why 
was ICT, and specifically the telegraph and the telephone, chosen as the basis of 
study? What are the primary issues researched? How did the research process 
develop? Why focus on Argentina and Mexico as regions of analysis? Finally, what 
are the implications of this thesis?
Why study ICT (specifically the telegraph and the telephone) as an economic 
historian?
ICT diffusion has undeniably contributed to the continued advancement of society 
and its importance has increased considerably in the past 20 years, as it has become 
an integral part of our everyday lives. The process of ICT diffusion today is, without
1 ICTs are commonly divided into traditional ICTs (e.g. telegraph, telephone, radio) and modem ICTs (e.g. 
internet, mobile phones).
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doubt, one of the major determinants of economic growth and at the core of a 
country’s development.2 Thus it is understandable why the topic takes on such 
prominence for Economic Historians and is the source of much academic 
deliberation and investigation within the social sciences. For developing economies, 
the opportunity to understand a given diffusion process before embarking upon it, 
provides unrivalled value in the adoption of an ICT, in order to learn from mistakes 
and replicate success stories. Given the premise that ‘history counts’, and that past 
technological achievements influence future ones, examination of a country’s 
traditional ICT diffusion history is also beneficial to the understanding of a country’s 
experience with modem and future ICT diffusion.
ICT diffusion is particularly important in developing countries as it provides them 
with the opportunity to modernise. As the growing literature suggests, there is vast 
potential for using ICT to accelerate economic development, offering developing 
countries a greater opportunity to engage in global economic activity and provide the 
means to industrialise and catch up with global developments.3 Often, many of the 
benefits from ICT observed in the developed world are not always fully realised in 
developing countries due to inherent system inefficiencies and lack of infrastructure, 
though the economic and social benefits are potentially far greater. Technologically, 
the telegraph and the telephone are particularly interesting because they are the 
closest substitutes within traditional ICTs and in fact, the telephone eventually 
rendered the telegraph obsolete, something that rarely occurs. They are fascinating in 
terms of their huge economic and social impact and played an important role in the 
formation and development of Latin American states. Additionally, their common 
characteristics make them ideal for the purposes of a comparative study.
2 Solow R. M., ‘A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth’ Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 70.1 (1956): 
65-94, Anderson D., ‘Energy and the Environment: Technical and Economic Possibilities’ Finance and 
Development 33.2 (1996): 10-13, Porter M. E., The Competitive Advantage o f  Nations London, Macmillan (1990), 
Findlay R., ‘Some Aspects of Technology Transfer and Direct Foreign Investment’ American Economic Review
68.2 (1978b): 275-279.
3 Hanna N., Guy K. and Arnold E., ‘The Diffusion of Information Technologies’ The World Bank Discussion 
Paper 281 Washington D.C., The World Bank (1985), Faye M., ‘Developing National Information and 
Communication Infrastructure (NICI) Policies and Plans in Africa’ Paper presented during the Nigeria NICI 
Workshop, Abuja, Nigeria (2000).
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What are the primary issues researched?
The main concern of the thesis is to establish and then address the logic behind the 
existence of the Paradox. The thesis has four guiding core aims, the first of which is 
to provide a quantitative framework via the application of the FLOG model to show 
the similar diffusion rates across the two technologies in Argentina and Mexico. This 
provides the base for the existence of the Paradox. The second aim is to shed light on 
the factors that could be responsible for the diffusion rates of the two technologies in 
Argentina and Mexico. The third aim of the thesis is to combine the quantifiable 
factors with a qualitative appreciation of the concepts in the literature, to ensure that 
a large range of potential economic, social, natural endowment and institutional 
drivers are examined. This is very necessary in order to assess the arguments 
regarding the importance of the political economy of the two countries, which is 
highlighted as a primary factor behind the Paradox. The fourth aim o f the thesis is to 
assess to what extent the Mexican case study can be regarded as a ‘Success Story’. 
By fulfilling the third and fourth aims of the thesis, five lessons were provided, 
offering potential guidance to future ICT diffusion in developing economies.
How did the research process develop?
Given the role of technology in explaining economic development, I was very 
interested in technology diffusion. During previous research projects (for my master's 
dissertation), I analysed the diffusion of the telephone and the internet across a 
sample of countries in Asia and Africa. The fact that ICT diffusion had become so 
important to the future development of these regions was not the only interesting 
rationale guiding the research, however. I also found that in some of these 
developing economies, where ICT penetration generally had lagged that of many 
developed countries, ICT was being diffused at a much faster rate. Moreover, in 
assessment of the literature, it is clear that relatively less work was carried out on the 
diffusion of ICT in developing economies, hence there was more opportunity to add 
value.
It soon became apparent that the diffusion of the telephone, for instance, did not 
follow the expected s-curve shape in African economies, nor for most of the 
countries I surveyed in Asia. The explanation is that these countries simply 
leapfrogged onto newer technologies, often before the ‘older’ technology reached
12
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saturation. This led me to the examination of Latin America; here surprisingly, I 
found that many of the countries in my sample did follow the usual s-curve pattern of 
diffusion (like developed countries), as theory would predict. Consequently, I 
thought that ICT diffusion within the context of Latin America would be interesting 
to investigate further, and this is how the research process developed. Within Latin 
America, I felt that looking at Argentina was important, because Argentina, 
particularly for the earlier period of the study, was the wealthiest country in the 
region and consequently theoretically best positioned to diffuse the ICTs under 
consideration successfully. Initially my inclination was to compare Argentina, the 
‘best’ performer, against one of the less wealthy and hence, theoretically, less 
successful in diffusing the ICTs under consideration. This led me to look at a range 
of countries in Latin America, among them Mexico. To my surprise, I found that in 
Mexico, the telegraph and the telephone actually diffused at a relatively faster rate 
than in other countries with similar levels of income per capita. Further, the diffusion 
rate of the telegraph and the telephone was similar to that in Argentina, despite the 
disparity in their relative levels of economic development. I was intrigued by this 
unexpected finding, and decided to explore it further, paving a path to the initial 
steps toward what would become the ‘Double Paradox’.
Initially I planned to study a wider range of ICTs, including the telegraph, the 
telephone, the internet and the mobile telephone. As the research developed this 
proved to be impractical, and I decided there was more to be gained from focusing 
on the telegraph and the telephone in more depth to acquire a deeper understanding, 
rather than trying to include all the technologies that I initially hoped to cover. Some 
of the problems that I experienced as the research developed included the fact that I 
had a limited availability of time for fieldwork and a good deal of effort was directed 
toward collecting quantitative data. This was important because it allowed for the 
subsequent elaboration of the main data series to measure the rate of diffusion. 
Unfortunately, extensive focus was directed toward the collection of various 
quantitative data which later turned out to be much less useful than anticipated. 
Another issue which I had to be acutely aware of during the research process was the 
fact that there were various limitations with regard to the data collected and thus I 
tried to bring this to the reader’s attention where relevant throughout the thesis. The 
focus o f the thesis shifted as the research evolved, as the findings provided evidence
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that departed from a more quantitative and socio-economic explanation, to one 
increasingly where the importance of the political economy was demarcated. 
Ultimately, it became clearer that one of the key drivers behind the diffusion of the 
telegraph and the telephone in Argentina and in Mexico was the role of the 
government.
Why focus on Argentina and Mexico as regions o f analysis?
The geographical rationale, as explained above, came from the fact that diffusion of 
both the telegraph and the telephone in many Latin American countries followed the 
same general pattern as that witnessed within the developed world (i.e. s-curve 
shaped), despite experiencing lower income levels. This echoes Gerschenkron’s 
latecomer advantage argument, as Latin America adopted these technologies after the 
developed world, thereby theoretically facilitating their fast diffusion.4 In the context 
of Latin America, the Paradox ultimately provided the overriding rationale for the 
specific country choices of Argentina and Mexico as the base case studies for the 
thesis. During the years of the diffusion of the telegraph and the telephone 
(especially the earlier years), living standards, economic growth and notably GDP 
per capita levels in Argentina were significantly higher than in Mexico.5 Theory 
would predict that diffusion should have been relatively faster in Argentina than in 
Mexico as a result of this economic disparity. Moreover, not only was Argentina 
leading Latin America socio-economically, but Mexico’s GDP per capita was 
actually below the regional average, demonstrating that its performance in 
successfully diffusing the telegraph was yet more impressive. An opportunity is 
presented by the subsequent investigation, to reveal what in fact were important 
drivers of telegraph and telephone diffusion. Further, by comparing the diffusion 
experience in Mexico directly to the wealthiest country in Latin America, it offers 
hope to developing economies around the world.
The thesis demonstrates that ICT diffusion experiences are not necessarily bounded 
by economic limitations, and developed economic means are not a prerequisite for 
successful diffusion, as seemingly other factors may act as substitutes. If this study
4 Gerschenkron A., Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 
(1962).
5 See appendix A for details.
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provides even a modicum of insight into the potential ramifications that various 
strategies can have on the ICT diffusion process in developing countries, then this 
thesis serves a valuable purpose.
What are the implications o f the thesis?
The thesis contributes to the literature on the comparative history of traditional ICT 
diffusion and growth by comparing the telegraph and telephone technologies in 
Argentina and Mexico across the entire period of diffusion for the very first time. 
The findings suggest that purely economic explanations are insufficient in explaining 
ICT diffusion rates, and the thesis refocuses attention on alternative factors, such as 
the role of the government. The analyses in their own right add value to the 
comparative economic histories of the two nations.
The quantification of the diffusion rates in the two countries augments the 
technology diffusion literature: in providing quantitative evidence that the telegraph 
and the telephone technologies diffused at similar rates in Argentina and Mexico 
despite the difference in their socio-economic conditions, opening the door to further 
investigations. The identification of the counter-intuitive result of the Paradox is a 
primary finding of the thesis, providing the fundamental basis for much of the 
analysis, as its existence offers an opportunity to broaden the accepted set of 
explanatory outcomes regarding technology diffusion speed.
A closed political system (as in the case of Mexico) was found to be relatively more 
supportive of successful diffusion than a more open, decentralised and quasi- 
democratic structure (as in the case of Argentina), which were characteristics of 
some of the most important administrations during the critical periods of telegraph 
and telephone diffusion. Moreover, the thesis argues that state action can not only 
positively stimulate diffusion speed, but it can also serve to hinder it, as per the 
inefficiency of telephone service provision under nationalisation in Argentina. In the 
examination of the Mexican case study, it becomes apparent that it was not only the 
choosing but also the implementation and timing of the diffusion conducive reforms 
that were important, often influenced by the characteristics of the state. Additionally, 
the full data series compiled in measuring diffusion rates across the telegraph and 
telephone technologies in Argentina and Mexico are supplied for future use as
15
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benchmarks for comparison with technology diffusion across other developing 
countries.
The findings provide a number of potential learning opportunities for political 
planning in developing countries regarding future ICT diffusion. In consideration of 
whether the Mexican case study was in fact a success story, various implications for 
the execution of future technology diffusion in developing countries are outlined.
The structure o f the thesis
The thesis was organised in the following manner. Chapter one first provides the 
historiography of the political economy and refers the reader to the relevant literature 
during the period of telegraph and telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico. 
Particular attention is directed to the drive toward industrialisation, given the large 
impact that ICT diffusion had upon this process, as well as the structural importance 
it rendered for Latin America. This provides the broader context within which the 
two technologies diffused. The chapter then examines the literature regarding the 
possible explanatory factors behind the different ICT diffusion rates across countries, 
by means of four approaches: the economic approach, the social approach, the 
natural endowments approach and the institutional approach. It presents the main 
empirical findings of the literature, which provide the basis of analysis for the later 
chapters. Chapter two presents the theoretical modelling framework and the 
quantification of the diffusion speeds for the telegraph and the telephone in the two 
countries. The chapter examines the process of ICT diffusion, and analyses the 
observed diffusion patterns to determine the requirements of the chosen model. The 
chapter considers a broad range of theoretical models, before focusing on the FLOG 
model. This chapter provides the basis for the existence of the Paradox.
Chapter three analyses the development of the telegraph and the telephone in 
Argentina and Mexico within the political and economic context set up in chapter 
one. Chapter four examines the main possible diffusion drivers. First it applies a 
quantitative approach, using multiple regression analysis to test for a range of socio­
economic factors highlighted in the literature. In light of the issues in regard to the 
data and the nature of the most significant factors (see appendix A), there is naturally 
a heavier focus regarding the second half of this chapter. The second half of the
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chapter provides a qualitative analysis to explore the essential themes within the 
literature in greater depth, providing a basis from which to assess the argument 
regarding the overall role of the political economy. Chapter five pulls together the 
ideas and results of previous chapters, to answer the three main questions posed by 
the thesis, namely: what were the main drivers behind the observed diffusion rates in 
Argentina and Mexico? What factors caused the Paradox? And, to what extent can 
Mexico’s experience with the diffusion of the two technologies be considered a 
‘Success Story’? This chapter represents the main contribution of the thesis to the 
literature, in specifically highlighting the importance o f the government in ensuring 
successful diffusion. The last section concludes the thesis, summarises the key 
findings, points out a research agenda for future researchers and presents some 
lessons for future ICT diffusion in developing economies in light of the findings. The 
appendices A, B and C, at the end of the thesis, present all o f the data relating to the 
economic indicators and the statistical analysis referred to, in the thesis. They present 
the relevant sources as well as a critical review of the data’s validity. Appendices D, 
E, F and G provide the supplementary information to the modelling work detailed in 
chapter 2. Appendix H portrays the serving presidents throughout the period under 
concern.
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Chapter 1 
Economic History and ICT Diffusion in Argentina and Mexico
Every country is exposed to unique market conditions with ‘...different resource 
endowments and factor costs, and, possibly most important of all, different legal, 
institutional, and cultural milieu’.1 As a result, the process of ICT diffusion has been 
a popular subject in academic circles for some time. The hypothesis in this thesis is 
that the diffusion of the telegraph and the telephone in Argentina and Mexico can be 
explained to a large degree by the role of the government. This chapter presents the 
historiography of the political economy in which the diffusion of these technologies 
took place in the two countries, which is necessary given the perceived importance of 
the political economy in the process. The next section examines the link between 
state formation and the role of technology, followed by an exploration on the joint 
supply of the railways and the telegraph. The second half o f the chapter begins with 
an overview of the historical roots of the research on diffusion of innovations and 
afterwards focuses on the four different approaches that academics have undertaken 
in order to understand the different rates of ICT diffusion across countries. These 
factors are further sub-divided between those which directly influence consumer 
consumption and those that influence the build-out of the infrastructure. The chapter 
ends by looking at the gap within the literature and the proposed methodology for the 
thesis.
1.1 The Historiography of Argentina’s and Mexico’s Political Economy
It is important to place Argentina and Mexico in their political and economic 
historical setting for the period of the telegraph and telephone diffusion, that is, from 
the mid-nineteenth century to the late-twentieth century. This section first 
documents the economic backdrop during the period under consideration, with a 
chronological and simultaneous focus on Argentina and Mexico. Economic growth is
1 Cameron R., ‘The Diffusion of Technology as a Problem in Economic History’ Economic Geography 51.3 
(1975): 217-230, p.218.
2 For a detailed and well balanced account o f Argentina’s economic history over this period, see Rock, and for 
Mexico refer to Meyer and Sherman: Rock D., Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsln 
Berkeley, University of California Press (1987), Meyer M. C. and Sherman W. L., The Course o f  Mexican 
History New York, Oxford University Press (1999). Also see Romero L. A., A History o f  Argentina in the 
Twentieth Century University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press (2002), Della Paolera G. and Taylor A. 
M., A New Economic History o f Argentina Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2003).
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portrayed with relevant acknowledgement in regard to social sensitivities such as 
distribution of income where applicable. Focus then shifts to the examination of the 
political setting.
In the social science literature there has been a lot of discussion on terms and ideas 
that are particularly relevant to this thesis. These include the oligarchic state, 
authoritarianism, populism and industrialisation. Although similar terms (if not 
identical) are used throughout Latin America, as will become apparent from the 
discussion below, the terminology has not only evolved over time but is often also 
interpreted in different ways. Hence these concepts have been at the centre of long 
standing (and at times controversial) academic debates.
1.1.1 The Economics of the Political Economy
The period under consideration is divided into three sections: the years o f export-led 
growth (1870-1930), the years of import substitution industrialisation (1930s-1980s), 
and the years of the debt crisis and the New Economic Model (1982-1990s).3 The 
period of export-led growth saw spectacular growth in Latin America, until the years 
of the Great Depression, which brought the impressive advances in the region to a 
halt.4 The Great Depression caused significant changes in the global economic 
dynamics, which led to the start of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI).5 
During the period of ISI, Mexico, in particular, experienced significant economic 
growth, a period often dubbed the ‘Mexican economic miracle’ years. The final part 
of this period corresponds to the years of the debt crisis and the recovery, with the 
widespread of economic reforms encapsulated in the ‘Washington Consensus’, 
leading to trade liberalisation and privatisation reforms across the region.6 Bulmer-
3 Glade and Furtado provide a useful generic economic history of Latin America for the whole period under 
consideration: Glade W. P., The Latin American Economies New York, American Book (1969), Furtado C., The 
Economic Development o f  Latin America: Historical Background and Contemporary Problems Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press (1977). Also see Cardoso and Faletto, which is a very good read that combines the 
conceptual framework with empirical analysis: Cardoso F. H. and Faletto E., Dependencia y  Desarrollo en 
America Latina Mexico D.F., Siglo Veintiuno Editores (1971).
4 For an authoritative account of Latin American history over this period, see Bethell L., The Cambridge History 
o f  Latin America, volumes IV and V for 1870 to 1930, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1986).
5 Dombusch R. and Helmers F. L., The Open Economy, Tools fo r  Policymakers in Developing Countries Oxford, 
Oxford University Press (1988).
6 Diaz Alejandro C. F., ‘Stories of the 1930s for the 1980s’ in Armella P. A., Dombusch R. and Obstfeld M., 
Financial Policies and the World Capital Market: The Problem o f  Latin American Countries Chicago, University 
of Chicago (1983).
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Thomas and Thorp neatly examine these shifts of economic growth modes, from the 
export-led expansion right through to neo-liberalism.7
Argentina’s average level of GDP per capita exceeded Mexico’s and the rest of Latin 
America for good portions of the whole period under study. In terms of GDP per 
capita growth, Argentina’s average was also much higher than Mexico’s in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century and earliest part of the twentieth century, but growth 
rates converged later (see appendix A, tables A. 1 and A.2, which reflect the relative 
economic development and growth of the region throughout the whole period under 
consideration). As highlighted throughout the argument below, it is not only growth 
that is important, but also the quality of growth. In terms of living standards, 
Argentina also tended to lead the region, with a more educated population and higher 
life expectancy rates (see appendix A, tables A.3 and A.4).8 One must note that the 
period of export-led growth in Latin America neatly coincides with the key period of 
telegraph diffusion (and early diffusion of the telephone).9 At a time when these 
countries were obsessed with state building, the telegraph proved to be a strategic 
tool (see section 1.2 The State and the Role of ICT in Latin America).
The Period o f Export-led Growth (1870-1930)
The evolution of the global economy in the 1850 and 1860s paved the way for a 
brighter future for the countries of Latin America: the expansion of world trade 
meant that strong demand for foodstuffs and raw materials offered them greater 
financial means to fund projects.10 In Argentina and Mexico, institutional stability 
and successful integration into global capital markets facilitated borrowing and led to 
significant levels of foreign investment and domestic capital accumulation. 11
7 See Bulmer-Thomas V., The Economic History o f  Latin America Since Independence Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press (1994), Thorp R., Progress, Poverty and Exclusion: an Economic History o f  Latin America in 
the Twentieth Century Washington D.C., Inter-American Development Bank (1998).
8 Astorga P., Berges A. R. and Fitzgerald E. V. K., ‘The Standard of Living in Latin America during the 
Twentieth Century’ Oxford University Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History 54, Oxford University 
(2004).
9 The ‘key period of diffusion’ refers to the period of 10-90% diffusion. These are the years when the fastest 
telegraph and telephone diffusion took place and the period when the two countries diffused these technologies at 
similar rates - see chapter 2 for details.
10 For some of the most complete work on the economic history of Latin America towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, refer to: Cortes Conde R. and Stein S. J., Latin America: A Guide to Economic History, 1830- 
1930 Berkeley, University of California Press (1977).
11 ECLA examines these issues through foreign capital flows across Latin America. See for instance Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Foreign Capital in Latin America New York, United Nations (1955). A 
later book which gives greater depth and background to these issues during the early twentieth century is 
Marchical C., A Century o f  Debt Crisis in Latin America: From Independence to the Great Depression 1820-
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Features of capitalism and civil society quickly emerged under this new state model. 
Law and administrative institutions strengthened as social investment grew, thereby
1 9directly contributing to political order. Argentina led the region both economically 
and socially, with the highest standards of living. Increasing levels of income per 
capita impacted economic, social and political structures across Latin America, and
helped to resolve the political instability that generally had been the norm after
1 ^Independence.
States were fairly interventionist, although not to the extent they would become in 
the 1930s. Expenditure shifted in favour of infrastructure projects, the railways (and 
in turn the telegraph) was the largest recipient, which would lead to further export 
growth. Telegraph diffusion in Argentina and Mexico benefited not only from 
increased investment but from the realisation by those in power of how important the 
telegraph was in facilitating much needed consolidation of the state and the 
unification of the country.14 In the early 1870s, GDP per capita in Argentina was 
almost 70% of Great Britain’s figure and by the 1880s it was almost on par with the 
U.S. The average rate of growth of GDP per capita in Argentina was more than twice 
that of the world economy as a whole between 1880-1913. Although in 1913
1930 Princeton, Princeton University Press (1989), Taylor A. M., ‘Foreign Capital Flows’ in Bulmer-Thomas V., 
Coatsworth J. H. and Cortes Conde R., The Cambridge Economic History o f  Latin America: Volume II, The Long 
Twentieth Century New York, Cambridge University Press (2006). For a specific account of Argentina see Diaz 
Alejandro C., Essays on the History o f  the Argentine Republic New Haven, Yale University Press (1970), Di 
Telia G. and Zymelman M., Las Etapas del Desarrollo Economico Argentino Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidds 
(1967), Di Telia G. and Platt D.C.M., The Political Economy o f  Argentina 1880-1946 New York, St Martin’s 
Press (1985). For an account o f Mexico, see Womack, who provides a very useful guide, Womack J. Jr., ‘The 
Mexican Economy during the Revolution 1910-1920: Historiography and Analysis’ Marxist Perspectives 1.4 
(1978): 80-123, and Cardenas E., La Industrializacion Mexicana durante la Gran Depresion Mexico D.F., El 
Colegio de Mexico (1987).
12 Oszlak O., ‘The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some Theoretical and Methodological 
Guidelines for its Study’ Latin American Research Review 16.2 (1981): 3-32. Oszlak O., La Formacion del 
Estado Argentino Buenos Aires, Editorial de Belgrano (1982).
13 Halperin Donghi T., The Contemporary History o f  Latin America Durham, Duke University Press (1993). 
Prados de la Escosura L., ‘The Economic Consequences of Independence’ in Bulmer-Thomas V., Coatsworth J. 
H. and Cortes Conde R., The Cambridge Economic History o f  Latin America, Volume I: The Colonial Era and 
the Short Nineteenth Century Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2006). Dye A., ‘The Institutional 
Framework’ in Bulmer-Thomas V., Coatsworth J. H. and Cortds Conde R., The Cambridge Economic History o f  
Latin America: Volume II, The Long Twentieth Century New York, Cambridge University Press (2006).
14 See for example, Diaz Alejandro C. F., ‘No Less than One Hundred Years o f Argentine Economic History, 
Plus Some Comparison’ in Velasco A , Trade, Development and the World Economy Oxford, Basil Blackwell 
(1988). Also see Thorp (1998), Halperin Donghi (1993), Glade W. P., ‘Latin America and the International 
Economy, 1870-1914’ in Bethell L., The Cambridge History o f  Latin America volume IV, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press (1986), Cardenas E., Ocampo J. A. and Thorp R., ‘The Export Age: The Latin 
American Economies in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’ in Cardenas E., Ocampo J. A. and 
Thorp R., An Economic History o f Twentieth-Century Latin America Basingtoke, Palgrave Publishers (2000), 
Cardenas E., ‘A Macroeconomic Interpretation of nineteenth century Mexico’ in Haber S., How Latin America 
Fell Behind, Essays on the Economic Histories o f  Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914 California, Stanford University 
Press (1997).
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Argentina had fallen back to around 60% of absolute U.S. GDP per capita, the 
country experienced considerable overall economic growth and was still well ahead 
of most Latin American countries, including Mexico, not only in terms of income per 
capita, but in more general socio-economic terms.15 Indeed, due to the uniqueness of 
Argentina’s advancement, Diaz Alejandro departs from most earlier analysis on this 
period, claiming that Argentina deserves to be examined within an economic 
framework like the U.S. and Canada.16
Table A.6 in appendix A, shows that in terms of the railway expansion, Argentina 
not only had the highest levels of railroad length per capita in Latin America during 
this period, but for the entirety of the twentieth century. Moreover, tables A.3-A.5 (in 
appendix A) demonstrate that literacy rates, life expectancy ratios, and export growth 
were also among the highest. Mexico, on the other hand, was seriously lagging, 
consistently underperforming the Latin American averages and among the countries 
with the lowest life expectancy and highest illiteracy rates. Indeed during the period 
of export-led growth Argentina and Mexico were markedly different in regard to 
economic development. Argentina had a wealthier population, fertile land, relative 
political stability, judicial security and respect for property rights, as well as a large
1 7degree of foreign investment. Argentina was seemingly in a stronger position than 
Mexico to diffuse a technological innovation, such as the telegraph.
15 In terms of GDP per capita, whereas Argentina’s average GDP per capita was $3,797 in 1913, Mexico’s was 
just $1,732 and the LA8 average was $1,618 (see appendix A, table Al). For Argentina’s relative performance in 
other socio-economic terms see Davies L. E. and Gallam R. E., ‘Argentine Savings, Investment, and Economic 
Growth before WWI’ in Evolving Financial Markets and International Capital Flows: Britain, the Americas and  
Australia, 1865-1914 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2001). Also see Diaz Alejandro C. F., ‘Economia 
Argentina, 1880-1913’ in Ferrari G. and Gallo E., La Argentina del Ochenta al Centenario Buenos Aires, 
Editorial Sudamericana (1980). For an analysis of living conditions during this period, refer to the classic study 
by Bunge or the more modem piece by Cortes Conde: Bunge A., Riqueza y  Rentas en la Argentina Buenos Aires, 
Agencia General de Libreria y Publicaciones (1917), Cortes Conde R., El Progreso Argentino, 1880-1914 
Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana (1979). For a specific analysis of living standards of workers, see Marshall 
A., ‘La Composition del Consumo de los Obreros Industriales de Buenos Aires, 1930-1980’ Desarrollo 
Economico 21.83 (1981): 351-374.
16 See Diaz Alejandro (1970). To understand this further, Halperin Donghi offers a very comprehensive text for 
Argentina for the period 1870 to 1914, while Cortes Conde provides an excellent account of the international 
economy in Argentina during this period. Halperin Donghi T. H., ‘Argentina’ in Cortes Conde and Stein (1977), 
Cortes Conde (1979). For an appreciation of the overall understanding of the nineteenth century, Shumway is an 
excellent starting point, particularly detailing the influential role of liberalism in Argentina, Shumway N., The 
Invention o f  Argentina Berkley, University of California Press (1991).
17 Cortds Conde R., ‘The Vicissitudes of an Exporting Economy: Argentina (1875-1930)’ in Cardenas E., 
Ocampo J. A. and Thorp R., An Economic History o f  Twentieth-Century Latin America Basingtoke, Palgrave 
Publishers (2000), Diaz Alejandro (1970), Lewis C. M., ‘Britain, the Argentine and Informal Empire: Rethinking 
the Role of Railway Companies’ in Brown M., Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commitment and 
Capital Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell (2008), Cardenas et al. (2000).
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The railways was one industry in Argentina that notably expanded helping to 
increase trade and in turn improve government finances. Argentina achieved a 
growing role in the world economy, which was characterised by mass immigration, 
the development of the pampas, and a booming export market of soft commodities. 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Argentina’s social and economic 
landscape was transformed physically and structurally. During this period, 
urbanisation was also on the rise; the national census revealed that one third of the 
population lived in urban areas in 1869, compared to over half the population by the 
First World War.18 General Julio Roca (1880-1886 and 1898-1904) oversaw mass 
immigration and free-flowing foreign capital (especially British). New opportunities 
in the market place induced changes in the use of land and by the 1930s, ‘industry’ 
accounted for a larger proportion of GDP than farming.19 Economic growth was 
tilted more heavily toward the littoral, and the primacy of Buenos Aires began to 
grow strongly. The landowners of the riverine provinces enjoyed newly formed 
alliances with foreign commercial interests. The opportunities offered by the 
international economy, however, were not open to all: for instance, in the less 
modernised provinces, the upper classes dabbled in political affairs to achieve some 
economic prosperity for themselves. Further, workers both urban and rural had little 
say in politics and were not able to secure any benefits from the new regime (as 
discussed below). This would turn out to be an issue that would re-emerge and 
ultimately provoke institutional reform.
The years of export-led growth in Mexico were characterised by the Jose Porfirio 
Diaz regime, the Porfiriato (November -  December 1876, 1877-1880 and 1884- 
1911). By its own admission, the Porfiriato was largely successful in finally bringing 
Mexico overall economic growth and political stability (which lasted 35 years).21 
Porfirio Diaz invoked Mexico’s pursuit of development and liberalisation by placing 
the market at the core, although the role of the state remained vitally supportive, and 
interventionist where deemed necessary. The economy seemingly prospered during
18 Republica Argentina, Comision Nacional del Censo, Primer Censo Nacional, 1869 Buenos Aires, Imprenta del 
Porvenir (1872).
19 Lewis C. M., Argentina: A Short History Oxford, Oneworld Publications (2002).
20 Especially in Buenos Aires and Santa Fe.
21 In the 55 years between Independence and the start of the Porfiriato, Mexico had 75 presidents. Haber S., Razo 
A. and Maurer N., The Politics o f  Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic 
Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2003).
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the Porfiriato, generating an average annual GDP per capita of 2.0% and export 
growth of 5.9% in the latter part of his tenure (1901-1913).22 Mexico also benefited 
from large influxes of foreign investment between 1900 and 1910 (although not as 
large as in Argentina).23 Foreign capital increased by over thirty times during the 
Porfiriato, a third of which went toward the railway build-out (and in turn the 
telegraph development), providing economic foundations for further development.24 
Scholars are divided on the achievements of the Porfiriato. New Institutionalists, for 
example, point to the paradox of growth amid instability, observing a messy process 
of state consolidation resisted by regional power-brokers and elites.25 This revisionist 
view challenges the official accounts of the period which emphasise national 
progress. Sustained growth in the late nineteenth century fostered the consolidation 
of the regime, but most scholars now accept that challenges to the state re-emerged in 
the early twentieth century and there was disagreement within the system about how 
to respond to those challenges and exogenous economic shocks. Most scholars would 
also accept that, especially toward the end of the Porfiriato, political favouritism in 
Mexico resulted in ‘immiserising growth’, as ‘from 1907 to 1911 real wages fell by 
almost 15 percent’.27
This contrasts markedly with Argentina’s ‘welfare enhancing growth’ during this 
same period, where economic advancement was stronger and real wages were 
generally rising. In Porfirian Mexico, social class inequality was a particularly 
pronounced problem, as fast economic growth damaged economic and social 
structures: the rich got richer and spent their wealth on imported luxuries. But the 
boundaries between the peones (the rural and urban underclasses) and the 
‘progressive’ classes became more defined. The unevenness of regional development 
further fragmented the country as domestic markets in central Mexico resisted 
innovation, while the booming export-led markets of the far north and to a lesser
22 See appendix A, tables A.2 and A.5. Note that export growth is for the period 1900-1912.
23 Anderson R., Outcasts in their Own Land: Mexican Industrial Workers, 1906-191 Illinois, Deklab (1976).
24 Buffington R. M. and French W. E., ‘The Culture of Modernity’ in Meyer M. C. and Beezley W. H., The 
Oxford History o f  Mexico New York, Oxford University Press (2000).
25 Haber et al. (2003).
26 Weiner R., Race, Nation, and Markets: Economic Culture in Porfirian Mexico Tucson, University of Arizona 
Press (2004).
27 Gomez-Galvarriato A., ‘Measuring the Impact of Institutional Change in Capital-Labor Relations in the 
Mexican Textile Industry, 1900-1930’ in Bortz J. L. and Haber S., The Mexican Economy, 1870-1930 California, 
Stanford University Press (2002), p.314.
28 Although note that some of this wealth affected the middle classes in the form of government jobs or 
opportunities within the export economy, see Buffington and French in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
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extent those of the south, encouraged modernisation and attracted the bulk of foreign
90capital. ‘The prophets of modernity had promised material wealth and security. The 
former was misdistributed and conditional; the latter was a lie’. For further detail 
on the relative economic divisions, see table A.7 (in appendix A), which compares 
the HLSI across a number of Latin American countries and the U.S., for selected 
stages, during this period. The HLSI is a common measurement of poverty and
T1inequality. According to the table, Argentina’s living standards were consistently 
higher than the level of Mexico’s in this period, making the economic disparity more 
apparent. Hence Mexico’s late and rapid growth during the years of the Porfiriato 
benefited a limited few and ‘...increasingly offended the majority,’ as inequality 
widened.32
At the end of the nineteenth century, Argentina was influenced heavily by an 
ideology of economic liberalism and this paid dividends. By the early twentieth 
century, Argentina had become the tenth largest commercial economy in the world 
and was responsible for around 50% of total South American production and trade (a 
position it would largely retain until at least the Second World War). Except for the 
disruption of the First World War, Argentina’s export-led growth continued 
relatively undisturbed until the late 1920s, although at a much slower rate, given the 
declines in foreign investment; with average growth in GDP per capita of 1.10% 
(1914-1929) versus 2.60% (1901-1913).33 Mexico’s economic growth, however, was 
interrupted even more abruptly (falling to zero average growth [1914-1929]), due to 
the Mexican Revolution (1910), as peasants, workers and urban middle class groups 
became increasingly discontented with the allocation of political power and 
economic resources under the Porfiriato. The Revolution ensured a period of military 
tumult triggering further political instability.34 Yet, in spite of the Revolution there
29 ibid.
30 Ibid., p.401.
31 HLSI is considered to be a superior measurement of the standard of living of an individual in a given country 
than simply using GDP per capita. The HLSI index measures for both economic and social indicators. It assigns 
weights to GDP per capita, life expectancy, and the adult literacy rate. It is a common measurement of poverty 
and inequality: see Astorga et al. (2004). It is similar in nature to the UN’s Human Development Index, used by 
Crafts, see Crafts N., ‘The Human Development Index, 1870-1999: Some Revised Estimates’ European Review 
o f Economic History 6.3 (2002): 395-405.
32 Knight A., ‘Export-led Growth in Mexico, c. 1900-30’ in Cardenas E., Ocampo J. A. and Thorp R,, An 
Economic History o f  Twentieth-Century Latin America England, Palgrave Publisher (2000), p. 131. Also see 
Astorga et al. (2004), and Haber et al. (2003).
33 For data see appendix A, table A. 2. Also see Lewis C. M. (2002).
34 Haber etal. (2003).
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was considerable institutional continuity from the 1900s to the 1930s.35 Politically, 
the 1920s also saw the last change of power for over 60 years in Mexico, as the 
Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) began its long-lasting tenure. Overall, 
for both Argentina and Mexico, the period of export-led growth was a relatively 
successful one in terms of absolute economic growth (which ICTs helped to promote) 
and foreign investment (which ICT harnessed).
The Period o f  Import Substitution Industrialisation (1930s-1980s)
The years of ISI correspond with the key period of telephone diffusion in Argentina 
and Mexico. From 1949, the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) 
gained greater influence, as Raul Prebisch began writing about instigating economic 
reform in various nations. Indeed ISI across Latin America emerged as a direct result 
of his scathing yet commanding critique of liberal doctrines, the arguments of which 
ultimately served as the intellectual foundations of ISI. Indeed, ISI would be the 
mainstay of the Latin American economic framework until the 1980s.37
ISI emerged from the Great Depression, which was a critical time for Latin America 
and had a significant impact on the economies of the region. The Depression 
highlighted Argentina’s and Mexico’s economic vulnerability to changes in the 
external landscape.38 The two economies began to suffer as export prices fell and 
capital inflows reversed, thus public revenues weakened, and the debt servicing costs
TOrose. This all weighed heavily on the state and the political economy, and the
35 Knight A., ‘The Political Economy of Revolutionary Mexico, 1900-1940’ in Abel C. and Lewis C. M. Latin 
America: Economic Imperialism and the State London, Athlone Press (1985). Also see Knight in Cardenas et al. 
(2000), and Haber et al. (2003).
36 Note the PRI was originally the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) party and later the Partido de la 
Revolucion Mexicana (PRM) before it became the PRI. Knight (2000), Haber et al. (2003).
37 See Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Economic Survey o f  Latin America New York, United 
Nations (1950a). Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), The Economic Development o f  Latin 
America and Its Principal Problems New York, United Nations (1950b). Further commentary in Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Developmental Problems in Latin America: An Analysis by the UN 
ECLA Austin, United Nations (1970). There is a substantial amount of research that examines the economic 
policy-making and the immediate economic performance in the 1930s following ECLA’s commentary, see for 
example Diaz Alejandro (1983), or for one of the most comprehensive studies, see Thorp R., Latin America in the 
1930s New York, Macmillan (1984). Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), External Financing in 
Latin America New York, United Nations (1965) is seen as a turning point in some chapters in Furtado (1977).
38 O’Connell A., ‘Argentina into the Depression: Problems of an Open Economy in the 1930s’ in Thorp R., Latin 
America in the 1930s New York, Macmillan (1984), Velasco C., ‘El Desarrollo Industrial de Mexico en la 
Decada 1930-40: las Bases del Proceso de Industrialization’ in Cordera R., Desarrollo y  Crisis de la Economia 
Mexicana: Ensayos de Interpretacion Historica Mexico D.F., Fondo de Cultura Economica (1981).
39 The issues surrounding foreign investment flows into Latin America after the depression are examined in a 
number of books, and although it must be noted that the statistics are not always completely reliable, Rippy and 
ECLA provide a good assessment. Rippy J. F., British Investments in Latin America, 1822-1949 Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press (1959), ECLA (1965).
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evolution of a protectionist and nationalistic ‘centre’ made things worse. Export-led 
growth had had the most positive impact upon the landowning oligarchy and then- 
foreign commercial and financial partners (especially in Argentina). For such 
extensive production to continue it was necessary to maintain the import of capital 
(and labour, for Argentina; Mexico had not championed immigration as Argentina 
had), but this proved to be economically and politically difficult. Before the Second 
World War, Argentina’s economy grew as strongly as anywhere else in the world, 
but afterwards, declining economic performance saw Argentina diverge from global 
economic trends.40 Argentina’s economic growth was impacted by internal policies, 
which negatively affected the profitability of economic factors, as well as savings 
and investment41 Given these changes, the 1930s saw induced ISI-led growth; new 
institutions developed and the role of the state became increasingly more 
interventionist, as investment in infrastructure in both Argentina and Mexico saw 
radical social reform.42
State intervention in the market alleviated the effects of the economic crisis, and the 
period after the 1930s saw a significant recovery in economic growth, especially for 
Mexico, which recovered relatively faster than Argentina. Argentina’s average 
annual GDP per capita growth fell to +0.10% from 1930-1945, versus Mexico’s 
+1.41%.43 ISI, however, was certainly positive for Latin America overall: from the 
Second World War until the 1970s there was widespread economic growth as 
average GDP per capita increased across the region. The extended role of the state 
focused on improving the economic infrastructure and reducing structural 
dependence on other countries. These new nationalistic tendencies manifested in the 
governments’ proclaimed intention to defend and protect domestic supplies in
40 Cortes Conde R., The Political Economy o f  Argentina in the Twentieth Century Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press (2009).
41 Bulmer-Thomas (1994).
42 For some specific insight over this period, see the following. For Argentina see Diaz Alejandro (1970), Lewis 
P. H., The Crisis o f  Argentine Capitalism Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press (1990). Also see Di 
Telia and Dombusch for a particularly useful account of Argentina’s economic problems during 1950-1990. Di 
Telia G. and Dombusch R., The Political Economy o f  Argentina, 1946-1983 London, University o f Pittsburgh 
Press (1989). For Mexico see Cardenas E., ‘The Great Depression and Industrialisation: the Case of Mexico’ and 
Fitzgerald E. V. K., ‘Restructuring through the Depression: the State and Capital Accumulation in Mexico, 1925- 
1940’ in Thorp R., Latin America in the 1930s: The Role o f  the Periphery in the World Crisis New York, 
Macmillan (1984), Medina L., Del Cardenismo al Avilacamachismo Mexico D.F., El Colegio de Mexico (1978), 
Haber S. Industry and Underdevelopment: The Industrialisation o f  Mexico, 1890-1940 Stanford, Stanford 
University Press (2000).
43 See appendix A, table A.2.
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addition to the heavily increased role of public sector enterprises.44 Most countries in 
Latin America, including Mexico, experienced their fastest rate of growth after 1945. 
Argentina’s economic dominance during the period of export-led growth had faded, 
whilst Mexico’s growth continued at a relatively fast pace, narrowing the gap 
between the two countries.45
In Argentina, the period of ISI was characterised by populism under Juan Peron 
(1946-1955 and 1973-1974) which lasted until 1955. Despite a reasonable sense of 
success in his first term in office, the aftermath of 1955 saw significant political 
chaos, as military administrations came (1966-1973), and short-lived new democratic 
administrations followed (1973-1976), only to return to military regimes once again 
(1976-1982). In Mexico, ISI took place against the backdrop of the stabilising 
development strategy (1952-1970), a period often referred to as the years of the 
‘Mexican economic miracle’, which was followed by periods of populism again 
(1970-1981) under the Luis Echeverria administration (1972-1976) and the Jose 
Lopez Portillo administration (1976-1982) - see section 1.1.3 The Politics of the 
Political Economy, for analysis.46 In Mexico, a new alliance of state and capital took 
shape, as the Depression enhanced the state’s power over capital-accumulation. By 
the end of the Second World War, key changes occurred as a wave of 
nationalisations of foreign owned enterprises took place across Latin America 
(including the Argentinian and Mexican telecommunication providers), as various 
factors contributed in strengthening the position of the state in relation to the private 
sector (see chapter 3, section The Period o f  Nationalisation).47 These nationalisations 
coincided with the increased importance attached by the state to the telephone as a 
means of communication, allowing further state consolidation and national security, 
more so than the telegraph ever had. Moreover given the telecom sector’s capacity to 
promote economic growth, effectively populism translated into nationalisation.48 
Potentially the success of telephone diffusion in Argentina and in Mexico from the 
early-1940s is linked to this shift in the political economy, as the increased role of
44 Thorp (1998).
45 See appendix A, table A.2 for data and sources.
46 Dombusch and Helmers (1988).
47 Thorp (1998), Diaz Alejandro (1988), Bulmer-Thomas (1994).
48 Casaus C., ‘Privatisation of Telecommunications: The Case of Mexico’ in Wellenius B. and Stem P. A., 
Implementing Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector: Lessons from Experience Washington D.C., The World 
Bank (1994).
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the state in economic activity led to specific reforms that improved the development 
of the telephone infrastructure.
The ISI period in Argentina was characterised by regimes that fluctuated between 
supporters of deregulation, foreign capital, and free enterprise, and those that desired 
greater state regulation, the suppression of foreign capital, and an expanded state 
economy.49 Argentina experienced reasonable economic growth from around 1947 to 
1951. Although there were already economic problems towards the end of Peron’s 
first tenure, he consolidated his power through ISI policies and strategic 
nationalisations, enhanced government intervention and focused on income 
redistribution through the establishment of a welfare state.50 Like many other sectors 
across the economy, the telephone was nationalised during this period and was made 
into a state monopoly in 1946. This supposedly signalled the end of foreign control. 
It was a period characterised by high real wages and protectionism, as subsidies were 
provided to the industrial sector. Peron came to power with the aim of achieving 
‘economic independence’ and tried to do this by targeting strategic sectors, but in the 
early 1950s (and the beginning of his second term), worryingly for Argentina, there 
was an ideological shift in the strategies of his administration. The Argentinian 
administrations attempted to rebuild the national economy whilst simultaneously 
introducing ‘social justice’. In fairness to Argentina, other governments across the 
world seemed to agree with this strategy, but it was Argentina that suffered and 
diverged economically from its peers.
The aftermath of Peron’s initial tenure was characterised by a heavily subsidised 
manufacturing sector and a military that would not give up its role in industry. 
Peron’s legacy was material economic imbalance, high inflation and an overly 
complex regulatory system, which the subsequent administrations from 1955-1973 (a 
series of relatively ineffective regimes) would attempt to undo, whilst simultaneously
49 Chua A. L., ‘The Privatisation-Nationalisation Cycle: The Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing 
Countries’ Columbia Law Review 95.2 (1995): 223-303.
50 The early Per6n government implemented wage hikes at a time of low unemployment and high capacity 
utilisation (in an attempt to reallocate investment resource to consumption), this saw inflation soar in the early 
1950s and due to the corruption in the system, only a chosen few (some businessmen, the Peronist alliance of the 
military, organised labour and ‘national business’ groups) prospered. Also, Peron had started to focus more on 
importing technology and increasing FDI, which would all ultimately see him overthrown. See Lewis P. H.
(1990), Gerschunoff P. and Llach L., El Ciclo de la Ilusion y  el Desencanto: un Siglo de Politicos Economicas 
Argentinas Buenos Aires, Editorial Ariel (2003).
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trying to deregulate the economy partially to create a more stable macroeconomic 
environment. The new regimes sought to follow a new liberal economic order (as 
envisaged at Bretton Woods), but these goals were not achieved and the immediate 
period after Peron (until the coup of 1966) witnessed continuous policy shifts, which 
exacerbated macroeconomic imbalances.51 The administrations from the mid-1950s 
to the early-1960s found it extremely difficult to remedy the situation and re­
establish the macroeconomic stability necessary for sustained economic growth.52 
Further state intervention was required, especially with regard to fiscal and monetary 
policy, as foreign investment had been lacking, but the closed economy’s low growth 
and minimal role for the market did not help matters.53
Argentina needed fundamental economic change but this could not be achieved with 
continuous internal conflicts, hence economic conditions deteriorated further. 
President Arturo Illia (1963-1966) briefly managed to bring about strong economic 
expansion as he implemented some Keynesian policies, but by mid-1965 economic 
growth slowed again.54 Illia was removed by the military, as Juan Ongania (1966- 
1970) assumed the presidency.55 Ongania’s new economic minister, Adalbert Krieger 
Vasena, introduced new policies abandoning the support for the country’s exports (a 
policy which had been in place for over a decade) and instead focused on the 
strengthening of the state’s fiscal position, by devaluing the currency and taxing the 
now higher earnings of exporters. The plan was successful in 1967-1968, but in 1969 
the Cordobazo changed the political landscape and permanently obscured the longer 
term potential of the economic reforms.56 Ultimately, stabilisation efforts repeatedly 
failed as the necessary reform policies often conflicted with vested interests and thus
cn
the period was characterised by cycles of inflation, devaluation, and recession.
51 Di Telia G. and Dombusch (1989), Rapoport M., Historia Economica, Politico y  Social de la Argentina (1880- 
2000) Buenos Aires, Ediciones Macchi (2000). Also see Black for a discussion of the Bretton Woods pact, Black 
S. W., A Levite among the Priests: Edward M. Bernstein and the Origins o f  the Bretton Woods System Boulder, 
Westview Press (1991).
52 Cortes Conde (2009).
53 Ibid.
54 Halperin Donghi (1993).
55 Collier D., New Authoritarianism in Latin America Princeton, Princeton University Press (1980).
56 The Cordobazo refers to the civil uprising (and general strike) that occured in the city of Cordoba, Argentina, 
in May 1969.
57 With regard to inflation and stabilisation policies in the 1950s and 1960s, see Ferrer and for the 1970s see Di 
Telia and Canitrot. Ferrer A., Los Planes de Estabilizacion en Argentina Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidos (1967a), 
Di Telia G. Argentina under Peron, 1973-1976 London, Macmillan Press (1983), Canitrot A. ‘La Experiencia 
Populista de Redistribution de Ingresos’ Desarrollo Economico 15.59 (1975): 331-351.
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In the 1970s, academic interest shifted toward explaining Argentina’s economic 
weakness.58 This coincided with Peron’s return to power in 1973, which initially 
brought some very short lived optimism as he successfully endeavoured to maintain 
wage hikes through investment and public expenditure and also managed to drive up 
employment growth (especially in the state sector). He focussed on income 
redistribution and, wage and price controls (under the banner of ‘Zero Inflation’). 
Unfortunately, economic expansion soon contracted and inflation rocketed again. In 
response, the government actively micromanaged official wages and prices, as well 
as doubling the currency in circulation, but still failed to prevent deterioration in 
living standards. Arguably, sustained high inflation, a persistent problem in 
Argentina, was the product of a conflictive and relatively unstable political setting.59 
Even during short democratic administrations, economic development was stifled not 
by external conflict but by inter-Peronist confrontation.60 There was a real need to 
disentangle the political complexities, but both the military in the 1960s/1970s and 
Peron in 1973 failed to do so. Despite this, from 1946-1964 GDP per capita growth 
remained just under 2% and it was not until the end of Peron’s tenure, with 100%+ 
inflation per annum that Argentina experienced a particularly painful period of 
negative growth (see appendix A, table A.2).61
After Peron’s death in 1974, his widow, Isabel Peron (1974-1976) tried to engage the 
original Peronist factions on the right, but her husband’s death threw Argentina back 
into relative economic and political disorder. For instance, the terrorists at the 
extremity of the right wing attempted to initiate outright war against the left as they 
tried to exterminate them, murdering industrialists involved in labour disputes along 
the way. Employment, production and output fell sharply as the real economy looked
58 The following are some examples of studies that focused on explaining Argentina’s economic weaknesses. 
Cavallo D. and Mundlak Y. ‘Agriculture and Economic Growth: The Case of Argentina’ Research Report 36 
Washington D.C., International Food Policy Research Institute (1982), and Llach J. J., Reconstruccion o 
Estancamiento Buenos Aires, Editorial Tesis (1987).
59 Argentina had experienced very high inflation and rates had been more volatile there than in other regions 
during the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century, however, in terms of long run averages it 
was not so different. This began to change during the 1940s-1950s, as Argentina’s economy was closed and 
inflation rates soared well above those in comparable countries. There were various stages to Argentina’s 
divergence from world inflation rate averages, but the key shifts came at the end of the 1950s and then through 
the 1970s-1980s. These effects combined to ensure that average inflation in Argentina was over 25% for the 
second half of the twentieth century.
60 The administrations that suffered most from inter-Peronist conflict include those of Campora (1973), Raul 
Lastiri (1973), Per6n (1973-1974) and Isabel Peron (1974-1976).
61 One must note that from the late 1950s to the late 1970s, GDP per capita growth rates were remarkably volatile. 
Moreover each year between 1974 and 1989 saw inflation of 100% or more. See Cortes Conde (2009).
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to be in terminal decline and social tensions mounted. The government was forced to 
lower wages to deal with the ever increasing inflation, and labour unions succeeded 
in halting this stabilisation plan. In 1976 as inflation reached 1,000%, the military 
regime saw their opportunity to regain power. The economic situation worsened and 
the Peronist left united to overthrow Isabel Peron, and the last military regime took 
power and implemented state-sponsored violence during the ‘dirty war’ in 1976-
f \ 91982 (El Proceso). Unlike the militant regimes before them, the military 
government enjoyed relative institutional stability, which enabled them to focus on 
reopening the economy and inducing social reform. Although real wages fell by 
almost half, the military regime oversaw a large inflow of foreign capital and brought 
inflation somewhat under control. However, they refused to give up their financial 
interests (acquired since the Second World War) and suitably were defeated. Despite 
the optimism that followed -  from the healthy criticism voiced by business interests, 
the reorganisation of the union movement and the increased visibility of political 
parties -  the military left Argentina a legacy of indebtedness.63
The efforts by Jorge Videla (1976-1981) to restore economic growth also failed. 
After the proposal to privatise state owned enterprises (SOEs) was abandoned, 
monetary manipulation was seen as the only other solution. The two years of 
austerity improved the trade deficit. It was Martinez de Hoz’s (incumbent minister of 
the economy) hope that a stronger peso would make imports more accessible, put 
pressure on the less efficient industries, and with the modem capital intensive 
industries being protected by high import tariffs, industrial reform could indirectly be 
regained. A strong peso, however, soon undercut agricultural export expansion and it 
was only thanks to a constant flood of easy foreign credit (during the late 1970s) that 
the balance of payments was kept in check and the commercial and financial sectors 
boomed.64 However, political divisions continued and in 1981, international credit 
dried up, inducing a banking crisis and regime change to boot. The military’s attempt 
to use the Malvinas War (1982) to defuse internal conflict failed, and ironically
62 The ‘dirty war’ was a period in which the Argentinian military government killed thousands. See Velasco A., 
Trade, Development and the World Economy: Selected Essays o f  Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell (1988), and Dombusch R. and Edwards S., Reform, Recovery, and Growth: Latin America and the 
Middle East Chicago, University of Chicago Press (1995).
63 Lewis P. H. (1990), GerschunofF and Llach (2003).
64 Halperin Donghi (1993).
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brought down the military regime.65 The structural deficits, massive capital flight and 
periods of hyperinflation followed as no lasting economic growth could be sustained. 
From the 1950s to the 1980s there were several attempts to reverse relative and 
absolute decline. These variously drew on orthodox, structuralist and heterodox 
policy prescriptions. In the long-term all proved largely unsuccessful. There was a 
general failure to resolve distributional conflicts associated with savings and foreign 
exchange crisis. Despite some structural change there was little sustained growth. 
Rather, the economy appeared locked into a sequence of increasingly volatile cycles 
which usually ended in regime changes.66 Before c.1983 the contrast with Mexico’s 
‘stabilised development’ was stark. Even by the time Argentina returned to 
democratic rule with the Radical party under Raul Alfonsm (1983-1989), the 
economy could not be stabilised and the debt crisis ensued.
In 1930s Mexico, the PRI was able to forge the necessary links to the U.S. economy 
and encouraged widespread economic growth through foreign investment and a 
strengthening of industrial protectionism. Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) created a 
development agency of the government, which oversaw this flow of financial support 
to the private sector. Infrastructural build-out was the primary target and the sizeable 
construction of roads fostered domestic integration and increased tourism, which 
improved the nation’s balance of payments. Cardenas wanted to promote the 
working class by creating a nation of prosperous peasants and workers.68 Raising the 
living standards of the masses was a key objective for post revolutionary leaders, and 
redistribution of land was one way to achieve this. From the 1940s, Mexico’s 
fortunes began to change as presidents from Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-1946) 
onwards sought to achieve economic progress and maintained support by committing 
(in rhetoric but not in practice) to the social objectives of the revolution. For Mexico, 
the restructuring of politics in 1946 was a real turning point in economic terms, going
65 Ibid.
66 See for example Di Telia G. and Dombusch (1989), Lewis P. H. (1990), and Gerschunoff and Llach (2003).
67 The transition to democracy in Latin America has recently been covered by Smith P. H., Democracy in Latin 
America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective New York, Oxford University Press (2005). Also see 
Linz J. J. and Stepan A., Problems o f  Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press (1996), Diamond L., Harttlyn 
J., Linz J., Lipset J. J. and Seymore M., Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner (1999), Weyland K., The Politics o f  Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentine, Brazil, Peru, 
and Venezuela Princeton, Princeton University Press (2002)., and Dominguez J. I. and Shifter M., Constructing 
Democratic Governance in Latin America Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press (2003).
68 Hart J., ‘The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1920’ in Meyer M. C. and Beezley W. H., The Oxford History o f  
Mexico New York, Oxford University Press (2000).
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hand in hand with ‘reform’ as Miguel Aleman Valdes (1946-1952) accelerated 
industrialisation, with the help of the state’s new alignment to domestic and foreign 
capital. Mexico’s industrial advancement under the pro-business Aleman Valdes 
regime was quite impressive and the dynamic nature of their economy was 
recognised globally.69 The government embarked on a process of resource transfer 
from agriculture to industry and it was also successful in forging strong alliances
70with the private sector, as international markets for Mexican exports expanded. The 
weakness of his administration, however, was an unfortunate tolerance of high 
inflation and hidden official corruption.71
In 1952, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) succeeded Aleman Valdes and managed 
to put in place measures to ease inflation and limit corruption. His tenure marked the 
beginning of stabilising development in Mexico. Ruiz Cortines fixed the Mexican 
peso exchange rate, a reform that would be unaltered for some 20 years. This was a 
period of low inflation, relative ‘political stability’, protectionism, growth in the 
urban centres, and wage freezes to attract investment were directed towards state- 
owned sectors (e.g. the telephone). There was seeming acceptance that Mexico had 
‘stabilised development’ as foreign capital and economic growth continued, although 
at a slower pace. It was originally thought that Adolfo Lopez Mateos (1958-1964) 
might finally be able to bring the social justice promised by the Mexican Revolution, 
but this was not the case. Under his tenure, authority was exercised quite differently 
across regions, as the state attempted to expand agricultural production in the central 
rural zones to feed the growing urban population, and in the north, capital intensive 
projects were pursued so that sophisticated technologies could be set up to produce a
77range of crops that could be consumed internally and externally. However, the 
benefits of the ‘Mexican economic miracle’ years saw a significant portion of rural 
Mexico lag significantly behind their urban peers, while the middle class (small 
businessmen, bureaucrats and educated professionals) now enjoyed the comforts of
69 For some economic trend analysis over this period, a good source is Reynolds C.W., The Mexican Economy: 
The Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth New Haven, Yale University Press (1970). Also see Solis L., La 
Realidad Economica Mexicana: Retrovision y  Perspectives Mexico D.F., Siglo Veintiuno Editores (1970).
70 Cardenas E., ‘The Process of Accelerated Industrialisation in Mexico, 1929-82’ in Cardenas E., Ocampo J. A. 
and Thorp R., An Economic History o f  Twentieth Century Latin America, Volume 3: Industrialisation and the 
State in Latin America The Post-war Years New York, Pal grave Macmillan (2000).
71 For a contemporary account of Mexican inflation from a structuralist perspective at this point, see Noyola J., 
‘El Desarrollo Economico y la Inflation en Mexico y otros Paises Latinoamericanos’ Investigacion Economica 
16.4(1956): 603-48.
72 Halperin Donghi (1993).
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n'Xconsumerism, although this was not accompanied by an increase in political power. 
The state had instigated wide-reaching welfare policies under the Lopez Mateos 
administration, which caused sizeable debts.
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-70) was the final proponent of the stabilising 
development strategy, and by this time the foreign indebtedness was becoming a real 
problem.74 The ISI policies, deficit spending and market-oriented reforms saw 
extraordinary growth coupled with fiscal discipline, entirely at odds with the 
Argentinian situation. In fact, 1960s Mexico experienced one of the most affluent 
periods of its recent history, boasting annualised GDP per capita increases on 
average o f over 3%, despite increasing population growth of over 3% also (see 
appendix A, table A.1 and appendix C, table C.4). There was no threat of capital
nc
flight, real wages had risen overall and even inflation was below 4.5% on average. 
At the end o f the 1960s, only half the population were still rural dwellers and while 
growth in the agricultural sector slowed, modem manufacturing industries were
7 f \demonstrating impressive growth. However, these policies were not sustainable in 
the long run, and while the growth rate of the overall economy maintained itself, the
77poorer half of the Mexican population became progressively poorer. Social 
inequality remained and living standards still lagged, whilst income distribution 
inequality widened further until the 1970s (see appendix A, table A.7). It is important, 
however, to be aware of the fact that Mexico was catching up in terms of growth (of 
GDP per capita), but in absolute levels Argentina’s dominance still prevailed (see 
appendix A, table A.1). The political crisis that ensued in the latter part of the 1960s 
ended this period of stabilising development for Mexico as industry and agricultural 
expansion began to wane.78
73 Benjamin T., ‘Rebuilding the Nation’ in Meyer M. C. and Beezley W. H., The Oxford History o f Mexico New 
York, Oxford University Press (2000).
74 V£zquez Castillo M. T., Land Privatisation in Mexico, Urbanization, Formation o f  Regions and Globalization 
in Ejidos London, Routledge (2004).
75 Ortiz Mena A. L., El desarrollo estabilizador: reflexiones sobre una epoca Mexico D.F., El Colegio de Mexico, 
Fondo de Cultura Economica (1998).
76 Cardenas (2000).
77 Stevens E. P., ‘Mexico’s PRI: The Institutionalisation of Corporatism?’ in Malloy J. M., Authoritarianism and 
Corporatism in Latin America London, University of Pittsburgh Press (1977).
78 Halperin Donghi (1993).
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Mexico in the 1970s (specifically 1972-1977) saw a period of populism or ‘shared
70development’, under the Echeverria administration. Abroad, external imbalances in 
the early 1970s put pressure on the fixed Mexican exchange rate, which was a critical 
facet of their economic stability, and the economy began to show signs of strain. 
Mexico had become reliant on external investment in remedying social pains and 
expanding industrialisation. Yet, Echeverria’s form of rhetorical radicalism had 
isolated Mexico further from the international investment community and crisis was 
avoided only narrowly in his tenure. At home, there were now more people landless 
than when the land reforms were inaugurated under Cardenas. At this point, Mexico 
imported an increasing amount of its staple food from abroad, which the government 
was already subsidising (see below).80 Under Echeverria, corruption was widespread 
and dated accounting methods meant that cash flows were monitored inadequately; 
and already by 1973 some would argue that his presidency was a shambles.81 When, 
Echeverria left the presidency in 1976, economic crisis followed. The situation 
continued to worsen under the Lopez Portillo administration in the late 1970s.
Initially things started rather fortuitously for Lopez Portillo with the unexpected 
discovery o f sizeable oil deposits just as global oil prices experienced an enormous 
rally. This addressed certain structural issues in the economy but even though he 
offered international investors and the private sector greater freedom, he failed to 
mend these broken relationships. One reason was because crop prices were being 
held artificially low to subsidise the living standards of the urbanised poor, which 
also contributed to the minimal positive effect of the ejido (‘common land’) 
reforms. While stabilising development worked effectively by subsidising private 
sector investment, under the shared development strategies, the public sector was the 
only driver of growth. 83 Despite the protests of various economic groups 
(representing private enterprise), populist policies argued for an increased role of the 
state in the economy. However, rather than solving the economic issues, a surge in 
public spending led to economic imbalances that would finally erupt into the debt
79 Dombusch and Helmers (1988).
80 Halperin Donghi (1993).
81 See for example Benjamin in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
82 Halperin Donghi (1993).
83 Ibid.
84 Stevens (1977).
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crisis of 1982, as the peso was devalued, exports plummeted and capital flight 
ensued.85
Across Latin America, the 1979 oil crisis and the resultant recessions in the 1980s 
crippled the economic feasibility of populism. ISI and welfare policies were 
addressed increasingly negatively and in the 1980s there was a return to a more 
market-oriented economy. This would ultimately diminish the state’s direct control 
of economic activity, with greater emphasis placed upon the privatisation of public 
enterprises, a strategy that was abandoned in the 1930s.
The Debt Crisis and the New Economic Model (1982-1990s)
Although these years represent only a relatively short period in the diffusion of the 
telephone in Argentina and Mexico, it was a critical one. In the 1980s several Latin 
American governments defaulted on their debt, as they no longer had access to 
foreign financing, and were unable to service the borrowings they had accumulated. 
Latin America’s ‘debt-led’ growth was no longer sustainable, and sizeable net 
external transfers needed to flow quickly; funds including domestic savings which 
previously were used to finance domestic investment were reallocated accordingly. 
The debt crisis emerged after Mexico declared a moratorium in 1982. This period, 
often termed the ‘lost decade’, saw Latin America’s economic growth stagnate at 
best, and the distribution of wealth deteriorate further. International investors saw 
this as an opportunity to coerce Latin American governments (who needed domestic 
stability and external financing) out of their bad old ways, and the IMF and the 
World Bank rescheduled their debts, offering finance on the condition that the 
countries would deploy specific market reforms (particularly a reduced role of the 
state). This led to a ‘New Economic Model’ across Latin America in the mid-1980s, 
whereby ISI was replaced by export-led growth and an emphasis on market forces 
instead of state intervention. This vision became known as the Washington 
Consensus, based on free markets, liberalisation of trade and the privatisation of 
public enterprises.86
85 Collier D. (1980), Ffrench-Davies R. and Mufioz O., ‘The Latin American Economic Development and the 
International Environment’ in Meller P., The Latin American Development Debate Oxford, Westview Press
(1991), Manzetti (1999).
86 Ffrench-Davies R., Mufioz O. and Palma J. G., ‘The Latin American Economies, 1950-1990’ in Bethell L., The 
Cambridge History o f  Latin America volume VI, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1994), Thorp (1998),
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The handling of the individual crises would determine the positioning of the country 
going into the 1990s, and therefore condition the success of privatisation reforms 
such as those experienced in the telecom industry. Historically, orthodox policies 
proved largely ineffectual in Argentina and so when Alfonsin took the transitional 
presidency he favoured the deployment of more heterodox policies from the outset. 
Initially Alfonsin’s Austral Plan (to counter inflation) was well received, but without 
any reduction in the deficits of SOEs (sustained under military rule), long-term 
success was not achievable. Argentina was languishing: public-sector spending was 
being financed by printing money, real wages were at worryingly low levels, there 
was hyperinflation and negotiations concerning foreign debt had stalled, forcing the
on
country to re-adopt more orthodox reforms. The evolution of Argentinian society 
also reduced the power of the previously colliding forces like the labour unions.88 
Alfonsin tried to bring democracy and foster economic progress without making 
structural changes to the social and institutional forces that were built over the last 50 
years.89 The economic situation faced by Alfonsin was far beyond his control and 
after several failed attempts to reform, a period of hyperinflation in 1989 signalled 
the end of his tenure.90 By the end of the decade, Peronists reassumed power. The 
Radicals may not have been successful in restructuring politics or militant mutinies 
during this period, but thankfully for Argentina, democracy never really seemed to 
be under threat.91 Although there was no real growth in average GDP per capita in 
Latin America as a whole during the 1980s, Argentina would fare much worse than 
Mexico (see appendix A, table A.2). After this, following years of repression and 
corruption, both civil society and democracy had to be entirely rebuilt before a 
broken economy could be reinvigorated.
Bulmer-Thomas V., The New Economic Model in Latin America and Its Impact on Income Distribution and 
Poverty Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan (1996).
87 Lewis C. M. and Torrents N., Argentina in the Crisis Years (1983-1990): from  Alfonsin to Menem London, 
Institute of Latin American Studies (1993), Nader N., Economic Policy and Stabilization in Latin America New 
York, M. E. Sharpe (1996).
88 Further, the labour unions had not done themselves any favours by refusing all efforts to make the SOEs more 
efficient. See Halperin Donghi (1993).
89 Further, Alfonsin’s opposition to the military, labour unions and Peronists meant he was continually entangled 
in chronic disputes. For example in the mid 1980s, his attempt to appease labour unions through wage hikes led 
to dangerous levels of inflation, causing him more problems.
90 Cortes Conde (2009).
91 In the political literature, it is pertinent to note that the Argentine Radical party has received the most attention 
from economic historians and two such important works are: Del Mazo G., El Radicalism): Ensayo sobre su 
Historia y  Doctrina Buenos Aires, Ediciones Gure (1957) and Rock D., Politics in Argentina, 1890-1930: The 
Rise and Fall o f  Radicalism Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1975).
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By comparison, the Mexican economy was stabilised and generally transformed 
between 1982 and 1987. The economic emergency that had materialised for Mexico 
was no easy task to correct, since the collapse of the exchange rate meant that the 
private banks (the entities through which the country’s debt had been channelled) 
could not meet their international financial obligations. However, they did correct it, 
as President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) executed structural reforms that 
controlled inflation and deficits, reforms later continued by Carlos Salinas de Gotari 
(1988-1994) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). Mexico’s policies proved relatively 
more successful than Argentina’s in stabilising the economy, reducing its foreign 
debt by 35% and attracting new foreign investment again. 92 The expanding 
maquiladora industry that multinationals had built along the U.S. border was one 
particularly important aspect in Mexico’s recovery. Policy making was heading 
positively towards economic liberalisation, as Mexico joined the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the mid 1980s and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.94 NAFTA represented a commitment to regional 
economic integration for Mexico, with its developed, and wealthy northern 
neighbours. NAFTA was not just about free trade, it was largely about investment. It 
was believed that Mexico’s preferential ties with the U.S. would then enable it to 
gain access to the plentiful investment flows of Europe and Japan.95 In short, 
NAFTA sought to embed institutional change. By securing membership of such 
organisations, Mexico was mitigating any perceived shortcomings in its legal 
framework and signalling to the foreign investor community that it was once more, a 
reliable economic trade partner.
The early 1990s saw the beginning of recovery in most of Latin America, due to the 
combined effect of market liberalisation and fiscal reforms (e.g. privatisation), the 
enforcement of tax compliance and the reduction of government subsidies. The states 
now focussed on macroeconomic policy, infrastructure build-up and social
92 See Kaufman and Stallings (1989), Thorp (1998), Nader (1996) and Dombusch and Edwards (1995).
93 Maquiladora or ‘in-bond’ industries were assembly plants, which operated under a programme that allowed the 
entry of supplies into Mexico duty-free.
94 For an invaluable source on GATT, see Koch K., International Trade Policy and the GATT, 1947-1967 
Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell (1969). NAFTA was a mutually benefiting agreement, however, and thus 
Mexico had to ensure the U.S. had access to its oil reserves. NAFTA (the free trade zone spanning Canada down 
to Mexico) was the largest agreement in the world, with a combined GDP of $6.2tn in 1990 and $720bn 
combined exports.
95 See Saborio S., The Premise and the Promise: Free Trade in the Americas Oxford, Transaction Publishers
(1992).
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programmes, while moving away from state-led ISI, economic protectionism, and 
strong private enterprise regulation, since these could no longer foster sustainable 
growth, but rather promoted inefficiency.96 In Argentina, Carlos Menem (1989-1999) 
made his country the most neo-liberal economy in Latin America as he decided to 
achieve political stability and economic recovery through privatisation (including 
that of ENTel, the national telephone provider), and deregulation: reducing inflation 
to single digits by 1993, as well as stabilising the currency by pegging it to the U.S. 
dollar. The economy grew particularly strong again, at an annual average rate of 
almost 4% in GDP per capita terms, between 1990 and 1997 (see appendix A, table 
A.2). Despite this, Argentina’s economy, at an aggregated level, was still smaller 
than it had been at the start of the 1980s. In comparison to the rest of the world, 
Argentina’s GDP per capita was now just 30% of the level in the U.S., and its 
average growth rates for the second half of the twentieth century were less than 75% 
of the global average.97
In Mexico, the post-debt crisis presidents collectively sold off over 900 state 
enterprises, including the privatisation of Telmex (the national telephone provider), 
whilst opening the economy to foreign competition. Salinas de Gotari’s strategy in 
the 1990s was to transform the country from an inward-looking, state-dominated 
protected economy, to an outward-looking, privatised, open economy. Mexico’s 
economic performance became closely tied to that of the U.S. and its living standards 
began to converge with Argentina’s (see appendix A, table A.7). Growth returned in 
1990-1997 for both countries (see appendix A, table A.2) and economic stability led
AO
them to become important recipients of foreign capital. The privatisation of the 
telephone providers in Argentina and Mexico during this period was a reform which 
had a large impact on the diffusion patterns of this technology. Indeed, Argentina’s 
and Mexico’s restructuring of their telecom sector marked them out from the rest of 
the developing world due to the rapid speed, vigour and relative success of their 
turnaround. Privatisation was to theoretically increase efficiency and hence allow for
96 Ffrech-Davies et al. (1994), Manzetti (1999), Tomell A., ‘Economic Crises and Reform in Mexico’ in Haber S., 
Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America: Theory and Evidence Stanford C.A., Hoover 
Institution Press (2002).
97 Lewis C. M. (2002).
98 Manzetti (1999).
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more successful diffusion (see chapter 3, section The Period o f Privatisation, for 
further analysis).
The progression of the political economies in Latin America in general, in terms of 
policy choice, went from the export-led growth period characterised by free-trading, 
capital-importing hegemonic power, multilateralism in trade and payments under the 
Gold Standard, towards populism characterised by ISI led growth and an emergence 
of a more interventionist government. In Argentina and Mexico (as well as in many 
other countries), this led to the nationalisation of foreign owned enterprises, only to 
later return to market orientated reforms after the 1980s debt crisis, characterised by 
liberalism of trade and privatisation of state owned enterprises. One observes a yo-yo 
effect in the political economy over time (which had a large impact on ICT diffusion), 
as Argentina and Mexico strove with varying levels of success to achieve sustainable 
economic growth."
1.1.2 Industrial Growth in Argentina and Mexico
The telegraph and the telephone technologies were very important components of the 
success of industrial growth. The construction of the railways was also vital to the 
industrialisation process, in ensuring the efficiency o f mass production. The 
relationship between the railways and the telegraph was mutually dependent and 
complementary (explored in more detail later in the chapter, see section 1.3 The Joint 
Supply of the Railways and the Telegraph). However, the telegraph and the 
telephone simply were not identified characteristics of an industrialising economy; as 
innovative communicative tools, they were directly supportive of the industrial 
process.100 The birth and nature of industrialisation in Latin America has been the 
source of much academic debate for a long time. Wythe and Lewis present some 
strong analysis of overall industrialisation process in Latin America, while ECLA 
published very useful country specific pieces.101 A fair amount has been written on
99 For good overviews of the economic problems and subsequent economic policies over the second half of the 
twentieth century refer to Di Telia G. and Dombusch (1989) for Argentina. Also see Ferrer, Di Telia G. and 
Zymelman. Ferrer A., La Economia Argentina: Las Etapas de su Desarrollo y  Problemas Actuates Buenos Aires, 
Editorial Fondo de Cultura Economica (1967b), Di Telia G. and Zymelman (1967). For Mexico, see Cardenas, 
Lustig and Reynolds: Cardenas E., Historia Economica de Mexico 4 volumes, Mexico D.F., Editorial Fondo de 
Cultura Economica (1990), Lustig N., Distribucion del Ingreso y  Crecimiento en Mexico. Un Analisis de las 
Ideas Estructuralistas Mexico D.F., El Colegio de Mexico (1981), Reynolds (1970).
100 In Latin America, these ICTs fostered state formation and the consolidation of power.
101 Wythe G., Industry in Latin America, New York, Columbia University Press (1945), Lewis C. M. and Suzigan 
W., ‘Industry and Industrialisation in Latin America: In Pursuit of Development’ Cuademos de Historia
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industrial growth specifically in Argentina, including the work of Villanueva and 
Dorfinan (covering from 1930 to 1980), while for the period in Mexico, Haber offers 
a good overall review.102
There is no acceptable consensus in regard to the origins of industrialisation in Latin 
America since views depend largely on the definition of industrialisation, of which 
there are many. There are broadly three main areas of interest that materialised 
regarding the views of early industry in Latin America: coming from the dependency 
thinkers, the structuralists and the developmentalists. Desarrollistas and dependistas 
associate industrialisation with a growing shift of manufacturing in the composition 
of aggregated output. It therefore has been a long held belief of early dependency 
traditions and cepalista academics that industrialisation occurred in Latin American 
only after the global financial crisis of the 1930s. Celso Furtado offers a particularly 
succinct overview of the cepalista hypothesis and makes attempts to incorporate 
some of the revisionist challenges into his work.103 In this view, it was thought that 
the export-led growth period in Latin America was unfavourable to industrial 
development and that a simple increase in manufacturing did not pertain to outright 
industrialisation. They argue that the feasibility o f industrialisation was only possible 
post 1929, when traditional import-export dynamics broke down, the ‘anti-industry’ 
bias was removed and the industrial bourgeoisie were able to challenge the political 
oligarchy in matters of commerce and industry.104 Despite maintaining an expanded 
definition of industrialisation, structuralists would agree that industrialisation was not 
attained pre-1929. They observed no coordinated state action/policy that they 
consider sought to promote manufacturing: such as targeting infrastructure 
inadequacies or market integration, which were essential components in achieving
Latinoamericana 8 (2000): 227-316. ECLA (1959), Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), The 
Process o f  Industrialisation in Latin America New York, United Nations (1966).
102 Villanueva J., ‘En Origen de la Industrializacion Argentina’ Desarrollo Economico 12.47 (1972): 451-476, 
Dorfinan A., Cincuenta Ahos de Industrializacion Argentina, 1930-1980 Buenos Aires, Ediciones Solar (1983). 
See also Altimir, Santamaria and Sourrouille, who address the policies o f industrialisation: Altimir O., 
Santamaria H. and Sourrouille J. V., ‘Los Instrumentos de la Promocidn Industrial en la Post-guerra’ Desarrollo 
Economico 6.24 (1967): 709-734. Haber uses the specific case study of the Monterrey region (a major centre for 
industry in Mexico) to draw more generalised conclusions: Haber (2000). Also see Rosenzweig Hernandez F., El 
Desarrollo Economico de Mexico Mexico D.F., Colegio Mexiquense, ITAM (1989).
103 For the original statement of the cepalista hypothesis see Furtado (1977). For subsequent, neo-cepalista 
assessments of development, refer to Ffrench-Davies, Munoz and Palma (1994). Also see Sunkel O., 
‘Introduction’ in Sunkel O., Development from  Within: toward a Neostructuralist Approach fo r  Latin America 
Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers (1993).
104 Ferrer gives a strong account of this view from Argentina’s perspective. Ferrer A., The Argentine Economy 
Berkeley, University of California Press (1967c).
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their definition of industrialisation. Institutionalists, meanwhile, do not typically 
differentiate between industrial growth (increasing manufacturing output) and 
industrialisation, and would therefore advocate the earliest advent of industrialisation 
among these academic views.105
The social ramifications of industrialisation and the role that the telegraph and the 
telephone technologies played in this were vast. For Argentina and Mexico, the 
inclusion of various parts of society in the process was troublesome to the 
maintenance of the ruling elites’ hegemony and, although the state wanted to 
promote industrialisation, its continual growth empowered the working classes 
further. The role of states was particularly important in promoting ISI induced 
growth, as they established industrial companies that would be government run and 
invested in privately run ones too. Some states continually implemented protectionist 
policies like tariff barriers and huge import taxes in order to promote domestic 
industrial growth. The section below is divided into the tariff protected period of the 
early twentieth century, the response o f industry to the Depression, and the 
development of structuralist policies from the 1950s.
Industrialisation During the Early Twentieth Century: Tariff-protected Growth 
The argument for pre-1930s industrialisation is often related to Gershenkronian type 
concepts of late development, such as the institutional substitutability in the 
relatively ‘backward’ Latin American economies vis-a-vis their developed 
counterparts. The literature directly dealing with this is limited but there are many 
reliable texts (with a reasonable Mexican bias) that look for signs of early industrial 
advancement.106 Cardoso and Faletto also present a particularly influential statement 
(dependista in nature) of pre-193Os industrialisation and go on to cite various 
specific contexts where there was clear manufacturing development.107 One should 
note that there is a great deal of writing on diffusionist concepts, especially in
105 Lewis and Suzigan (2000).
106 For example, Haber is one of the few who directly draws on Gerschenkron’s view is a particularly good 
account, while Reynolds, Solis, Vemon and Glade and Anderson are also excellent (the last three writing from a 
revisionist perspective) and all address Mexico. Haber (2000), Reynolds (1970), Solis (1970), Vemon R., The 
Dilemma o f  Mexico’s Development: The Roles o f  the Private and Public Sector Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press (1963), Glade W. P. and Anderson C.W., The Political Economy o f  Mexico Madison, University of 
Wisconsin Press (1963). Meanwhile Diaz Alejandro provides an excellent examination of Argentinian case, Diaz 
Alejandro (1970).
107 Cardoso and Faletto (1971).
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Argentina, which redefine industrialisation in a manner that firmly dates its arrival to 
before the Depression.108
In nineteenth century Latin America The promotion of manufacturing activities was 
seen as a way to become a modem society. There were two main routes to take in 
stimulating industrial expansion. The state could directly aid the manufacturing 
sector, or take a less direct approach by encouraging individual endeavours in 
promoting growth. Latin American politicians initially rejected introducing 
protective tariffs in the latter part of the nineteenth century, due to their lack of 
suitability. However, in the early part of the twentieth century, tariff-protection 
policies became a strong driver of growth in infant industries. Despite the fact that 
industrialisation was not necessarily regarded as occurring at this point by all 
academic groups, more recent research points out that there was already a reasonable 
depth to the organisational setting of the manufacturing industry. Some claim that 
business associations/industrial clubs may have had a greater influence than first 
thought. 109 The Union Industrial Argentina is one example. 110 Moreover, 
entrepreneurs introduced vertical integration to the process stages of manufacturing, 
thereby deepening the industrial process.111 Neo-structuralists warn, however, that 
such market deepening throughout the period of export-led growth was not 
accompanied by much institution building.112 The lack of institutional structure 
during export-led growth was also a feature of the very early period of telephone 
diffusion, since the real formation of the regulatory framework did not come until the 
1930s (with the creation of the supervisory board, SECOM, in Argentina in 1936 and 
the introduction of the Law of General Means of Communications in Mexico in
i n
1938). Nevertheless, export-led growth at the very least, laid the foundations for
108 For instance see Diaz Alejandro (1970), Cortes Conde (1979), Cortes Conde R. and Gallo E , La Formacion 
de la Argentina Moderna Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidos (1967) and Di Telia G. and Zymelman (1967).
109 Acufla C. H., ‘Business Interests, Dictatorship and Democracy in Argentina’ in Payne L. A., Business and 
Democracy in Latin America Pittsburgh, University o f Pittsburgh Press (1995), Ridings E., Business Interest 
Groups in Nineteenth-century Brazil Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1994), Schvarzer J., Empresarios 
del Pasado: la Union Industrial Argentina Buenos Aires, CISEA/lmago Mundi (1991), Lewis P. H. (1990), 
Quiroz A. W., ‘Financial Leadership and the Formation of Peruvian Elite Groups, 1884-1930’ Journal o f  Latin 
American Studies 20.1 (1988): 49-81.
110 This was a recognised channel in Argentina through which one could voice opinion regarding industry, and by 
the 1920s it launched a sophisticated campaign that focussed on job creation and tariff reform.
111 Lewis and Suzigan (2000).
112 Thorp (1998).
113 Mexico, C&mara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Union, Ley de Vlas Generates de Comunicacion, 1938 
(General Means o f  Communication Law) Mexico D.F., Diario Oficial de la Federation (December 30,1939).
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industrialisation by increasing the availability of important elements such as capital 
and labour.
In the early nineteenth century, given the large scale of its factory production 
capabilities pre-independence, Mexico’s dynamic and integrated economy seemeed 
to be well placed for self sustained growth and in turn a strong prospect of advancing 
its modem industry.114 Industry, however, did not experience sustained growth until 
the end of the century. By the 1890s, the barriers to entry were large, as Mexican 
textile companies for instance were forced to purchase all o f the necessary equipment 
in one go. This structural issue, coupled with the burdensome regulatory environment 
for finance meant that unlike their U.S. counterparts, Mexican firms were not able to 
finance expansion or modernise the industry through re-investment of profits.115 
Textiles were also quite a sizeable industry early on in Argentina with domestic 
consumption at 50% .116 But aside from textiles, even by 1882 Argentina had 
employed very few workers in industry (as recorded in the Buenos Aires Yearbook)
117and by 1914, the overall scale of industry was limited. In Mexico, despite the 
positive manufacturing traits of ‘limited liability’ and capacity to implement new 
technologies, sector rates of industrial growth peaked in 1907 and declined thereafter. 
As a result it has been claimed, at least in the case of Mexico, that export-led growth 
(although necessary) was not always an adequate condition for industrialisation.118 
Many would argue, however, that manufacturing was well established in Argentina 
and Mexico by 1911 already and the composition of their export markets was fairly 
diverse. This was supported by infrastructural modernisation in the form of railway 
construction, which was relatively widespread and an industry that would be 
inextricably linked to the development of the telegraph build-out.
114 Its textile mills, which carried some of the most up-to-date mechanised equipment for production, were 
especially well positioned as these were established from as early as the 1830s. See Suzigan W., Industria 
Brasileira: Origems e Desenvolvimento Sao Paulo, Editora Brasiliense (1986), Weid E. and Rodrigues Bastos A. 
M., O filo  da Meada: Estrategia de Expansao de uma Industria Textil: Companhia America Fabril Rio de 
Janeiro, Fundagao Casa de Rui Barbosa, Confederafao Nacional da Industria (1986), Keremitsis D., La Industria 
Textil en el Siglo X IX Mexico D.F., Sep-Sententas (1973), Haber (2000).
115 Haber S., ‘Regulatory Regimes, Capital Markets and Industrial Development: A comparative study of Brazil, 
Mexico and the United States, 1840-1930’ in Harris J., Hunter J. and Lewis C. M., The New Institutional 
Economics and Third World Development New York, Francis Routledge (1995).
116 Thorp R. and Bertram G., Peru, 1890-1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy London, Macmillan 
Press (1978).
117 Province de Buenos Ayres, Ministere de Gouvemement, Bureau de Statistique Generale, Annuaire Statistique 
de la province de Buenos Ayres, 1882 Buenos Aires (1883). Republica Argentina, Comision Nacional del Censo, 
Tercer Censo Nacional, 1914 Buenos Aires, Talleres Graficos de L. J. Rosso y Cia. (1916-1917).
118 Lewis and Suzigan (2000).
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Overall, some maintain that due to the amassed scale of export-driven, tariff induced 
growth in manufacturing during the early part of the twentieth century, there was 
now a lack of dependence on the export sector and a shift toward ‘natural’ 
industrialisation. Di Telia G. and Zymelman argue that this industrial expansion, 
although fairly constant (amid cyclicality) was not worthy of being called 
‘industrialisation’ still. They labelled the years between 1914 and 1933 as a period of 
missed opportunities in Argentina, for instance, as the potential prospect of ‘natural’ 
industrialisation did exist but was not achieved.119 Between 1900 and the start of the 
global financial crisis, there were phenomenal shifts in industrial activity in
i ^/\
Mexico. Although official tariffs over this period protected against dramatic falls 
in the price of imported manufactured goods and a rise in production costs, 
industrialists were well aware that exchange rate fluctuations influenced both. 
Nevertheless, this drive toward autonomous industrialisation saw manufacturing 
assume sector leadership in Argentina’s and Mexico’s economies, and its growth 
contributed not only to economic development but also to structural change, which 
clearly favoured traditional ICT advancement.
The Response o f  Industry to the Depression
Neo-structuralists claim that the pre-conditions for industrialisation existed as early 
as the First World War in Latin America but that self-sustained development was
only possible after the global crisis, as implied in the first two words of Korol and
1^1Sabato’s title, ‘incomplete industrialisation’. There have been more recent 
attempts to integrate structuralist and dependency views with a revisionist account
t
and arguably Weaver and Lewis are among the most successful. There are many 
themes that come about as a result of the growth of the revisionist field of study, but 
the consequences of the First World War are a particularly dominant theme, with
119 Di Telia G. and Zymelman (1967).
120 Average annual growth of manufacturing output was +3.1% between 1901 to 1910, but this turned negative 
(-0.9%) between 1911-1921, before growing rapidly at +3.8% again between 1922-1935. See Lewis and Suzigan 
(2000).
121 Korol J. C. and Sabato H., ‘Incomplete Industrialisation: An Argentine Obsession’ Latin American Research 
Review 25.1 (1990): 7-30. Also see Di Telia G. and Zymelman (1967), and Lewis P.H. (1990) who provides a 
particularly detailed and direct overview of these discussions.
22 Weaver F. S., Class, State and Industrial Structure: The Historical Process o f  South American Industrial 
Growth Westport, Greenwood Press (1980), Lewis C. M., ‘Industry in Latin America’ in Bemecker W. L. and 
Tobler H. W., Development and Underdevelopment in America New York, Walter de Gruyter (1993).
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some of the best commentary on this topic in Miller and Albert. For an analysis of 
policy and the growth of manufacturing in this era, Ranis and Thorp provide 
particularly useful generic accounts of Latin America.124
Irrespective of the definition of industrialisation, it is now generally accepted by all 
schools that by the 1930s, Latin America had achieved some sense of 
industrialisation, or at least had the opportunity to do so. It is therefore no wonder 
that much research has focussed on this period. This subject was first written about 
during the 1950s (consolidated in the 1960s) and was advanced by ECLA.125 Despite 
the more recent school of thought claiming that industrialisation pre-dates the 
Depression (as explored above), it is a commonly held view that Latin America’s 
eventual economic/political response to the Depression brought about industrial 
advancement and unequivocal ‘industrialisation’ by even the strictest of definitions. 
Responses to the Depression are described as having unfolded via three specific 
phases. First, there is minimal policy reaction, which would turn into uneven event- 
driven and orthodox state action (c. 1929-1931/1932). Secondly, one observes 
coherent and pragmatic economic policy that assumed external order would return 
(c. 1932-1934/1936). Finally, proto-Keynesian industrially favourable projects were 
implemented (in the late 1930s).
At the beginning, most Latin American countries responded with limited active 
policies to tackle crises caused by external events and domestic forces.126 Mexico 
was one of the few nations able to internalise this conflict and over time transform 
reactive measures into pro-active, pro-industrial ones. Despite originally taking a 
supremely minimalist approach, Argentina was quickly among even fewer 
economies able to accommodate domestic policy making within their incumbent
123 Miller R., ‘Latin American Manufacturing and the First World War: An Exploratory Essay’ World 
Development 9.8 (1981): 717-34, Albert B., South America and the First World War: The Impact o f  the First 
World War on Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Chile Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1988).
124 Ranis G., Government and Economic Development New Haven, Yale University Press (1971), Thorp (1984). 
For Argentina see Guy D. J., ‘Carlos Pellegrini and the Politics of Early Industrialization, 1873-1906’ Journal o f  
Latina American Studies 11.1 (1979): 123-144, Lewis C. M., ‘Immigrant Entrepreneurs, Manufacturing and 
Industrial Policy in the Argentine, 1922-28’ Journal o f  Imperial and Commonwealth History 16.1 (1987): 77-108. 
For Mexico see Arias P., Industriay Estado en la Vida de Mexico Zamora, El Colegio de Michoacan (1990).
125 This is particularly well documented in (ECLA) (1966). Also refer to the country monographs produced 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, as an example see ECLA (1959).
126 The impact of the crisis was a fall in export and state revenues which induced the pursuit of pro-cyclical 
policies. Policies such as tax cuts (import duties) and curbs in expenditure were targeted generically across Latin 
America, while domestic interest rates rose aggressively and loans were recalled.
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internationalist economic strategies due to the strength of their relatively well 
established institutionalised structures. ECLA’s classic piece argues that the external 
shock that hit Latin America at the start of the 1930s was the primary reason for the 
import substitution that led to rapid industrialisation in the larger countries.127 Indeed, 
during this final stage of the Latin American response, macroeconomic policy 
became more overtly pro-manufacturing as the assumption that global economic 
‘normality’ would resume was abandoned.
The increasing alignment of Mexico with the U.S. is a relationship that deserves 
greater attention in the examination of deepening industrialisation in Mexico. Mexico 
was doubly hit during the global financial crisis as its northern neighbour, the U.S., 
experienced GDP contraction of almost 40%, and rising job losses brought about a 
mass return of Mexican migrant workers. However, during the 1930s, market forces, 
particularly real exchange rate depreciation, drove industrialisation further, as its role 
within the economy expanded. During the Second World War industrialisation had 
become almost synonymous with economic prosperity and politically, it became 
easier for regimes to redirect efforts to finance and promote industry. Despite the 
decline of international trade and the prominence of import substitution for many 
countries during the war, Mexico’s industrialisation process continued to be export- 
led. The U.S., which had been the cause of initial economic pain in the 1930s 
(although this was positive for industry), in the 1940s was driving demand in growth 
for Mexico’s commodities due to the absence of trade restrictions between the two 
countries during wartime.129 Politically, it was claimed that the Aleman Valdes 
administration identified most closely with the drive toward industrialisation.130 Also 
his administration was connected to the beginning of the drive toward nationalisation 
of the telephone company in Mexico, as increasing influence was directed toward 
Telmex from 1947.
127 ECLA (1966). As part of its early work, ECLA produced a number of monographs by country, which remain 
very useful on the role of industrialisation in the 1930s, see for example ECLA (1959). Some other very good 
work in Argentina during this period is done by Diaz Alejandro (1970), and Lewis P. H. (1990).
128 Lewis and Suzigan (2000).
129 Cardenas (2000).
130 Ibid. This was due to the continuation of protectionist policies aimed at promoting domestic industry -  
industrialisation became the strategy of economic development.
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Overall, the institutional setting and the nature of state action (increasingly pro-active 
in economic matters) in this period changed for Latin America, and this evolution 
was generally favourable to the manufacturing as well as the ICT sector. The onset of 
the Second World War confirmed the structural shift that had taken place in the 
global economy, in exposing the problems faced by primary producers. Such 
problems induced the growing diffusion of ECLA developmentalism and 
interventionist approaches in policy making. Any negative assessment of the external 
environment therefore was taken positively with regard to the domestic situation and, 
given the perception of state competence from certain actions, conditions for 
manufacturing growth and institution-building became very favourable.
The Development o f Structuralist Policies from the 1950s
It was during this period and especially the 1960s and 1970s that the dependency 
debate came about, seemingly because of the perceived flaws in the ECLA 
structuralist arguments. Levin and Frank’s early research on this area (although 
focussing mainly on Chile and Brazil) are particularly noteworthy.131 From 1945 
until the early 1960s ISI developed and industrialisation expanded as protection from 
foreign competition increased. For Argentina, coordinated sectoral plans to improve 
the continuity of industrialisation were established through the creation of the 
National Development Council (CONADE).132 In Mexico, the process o f ‘stabilising 
development’ was already underway by the early 1950s, which meant that state 
planning was not only more flexible, but more sophisticated at the sector and macro 
levels.133 Policy design promoted the advancement of modem manufacturing, with 
workers now enjoying greater job security and higher wages than they were able to 
attain in traditional industry or agricultural labour.134
Through the 1950s and 1960s, orthodox stabilisation packages (encouraged by the 
IMF) were common in Latin America. Soon their perceived failings were followed
131 Levin J. V., The Export Economies: Their Pattern o f  Development in Historical Perspectives Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press (1960). Frank A. G., Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical 
Studies o f  Chile and Brazil New York, Monthly Review Press (1969). Note that Frank has made since slight 
modifications to his initial view.
132 Lewis P. H. (1990), Diaz Alejandro (1970).
133 Cardenas E., La Hacienda Publicay la Politico Economica, 1929-1958 Mexico D.F., El Colegio de Mexico 
(1994), Hamilton N., ‘Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico’ in Hamilton N. and Harding T. F., 
Modern Mexico: State, Economy and Social Conflict Princeton, Princeton University Press (1982).
134 Thorp (1998).
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by neo-liberal type policies through the 1970s. In the 1970s, in various parts of the 
continent governments aimed to reduce the size of the state, cut subsidies, liberalised 
financial markets and opened economies. The resulting recessions had an adverse 
impact and sometimes induced further policy changes.135 The debt crisis and failed 
structural adjustment gave way to heterodox programmes in several countries in the 
1980s. Advocates of heterodoxy considered that stabilisation with growth and a 
reinvigorated industrial drive was the best policy.
As history tells us, initial rapid growth in the 1970s quickly turned to debt crises and 
bankruptcies in the early 1980s, changing the ownership and scale of industrial 
activity as attempts were made to restabilise manufacturing. When countries like 
Argentina abruptly opened their economies in the early 1990s there were sharp 
contractions not only in manufacturing but in exports too.136 Industry efficiency 
gains were minimal and resource reallocation (not generation) ensued, as SOEs like 
Argentina’s and Mexico’s telephone industries were privatised. This however, did 
not necessarily amount to full-blown de-nationalisation, as many of those who 
gained from privatisation were previously partners of the state (as purchasers or 
suppliers) in countries like Argentina and Mexico. Although the contribution of 
manufacturing to GDP dropped significantly between 1970 and 1990, the proportion 
of intermediate products in total industrial output grew substantially in countries like 
Argentina.137
History indicates that industrial expansion (at varying levels) was most rapid at the
n o
beginning of the nineteenth century and at the end of the twentieth century. These 
periods also reflect particularly strong levels of diffusion speed in relation to the two 
ICT technologies which are the subject matter of this thesis. Indeed, the beginning of
135 Frenkel R. and O’Donnell G., ‘The "Stabilization Programs" of the International Monetary Fund and their 
Internal Impacts’ in Drake P. W., Money Doctors, Foreign Debts and Economic Reforms in Latin America from  
the 1890s to the Present Wilmington, Scholarly Resources (1994). Machinea J. L., ‘Stabilisation under Alfonsin’ 
in Lewis and Torrents (1993). Kosacoff B., ‘La Industria Argentina: un Proceso de Reestructuracion 
Desarticulada’ in Kosacoff B., El Desafio de la Competitividad: la Industria Argentina en Transformacion 
Buenos Aires, Alianza Editorial (1993).
136 Manufacturing had reached over 30% of economic activity by the mid 1970s and the service sector had been 
growing very quickly since the 1930s in Argentina.
r37 Kosacoff (1993).
138 Note that overall, despite the frenetic pace of industrial expansion in various periods over the twentieth 
century, evidence indicates that Argentina and Mexico did not close the industrial productivity ‘gap’ with leading 
innovative nations such as the U.S. See for instance Hofinan A. and Mulder N., ‘The Comparative Productivity 
Performance of Brazil and Mexico, 1950-1994’ in Coatsworth J. H. and Taylor A. M., Latin America and the 
World Economy since 1800 Cambridge, Harvard University Press (1998).
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the twentieth century coincides with the steepest part of the s-curve shaped patterns 
of telegraph diffusion in the two countries (see chapter 2, figure 2.10 Approximate 
Section of the S-curve Measured by this Analysis), while the 1990s alone saw 
Argentina’s telephone diffusion levels double (see appendix B, table B.3). During the 
inter-war periods, even where development was limited, clearly industrialisation or 
further industrial expansion was forced upon most Latin American states. By the end 
of the whole period, Latin America was unquestionably a largely industrialised 
continent, with Argentina and Mexico experiencing a level of industrialised 
deepening greater than most. 139 The origins and the precise date of when 
‘industrialisation’ was attained, however, remain subjective and open to debate. But 
in acknowledging the industrialisation argument in light of tariff-protected growth, 
the response of industry to the Depression and the structuralist policies from the 
1950s, the industrial backdrop during the processes of telegraph and telephone 
diffusion -  two ‘modem’ bases of industry -  can be contextualised more 
appropriately.
1.1.3 The Politics of the Political Economy
Political characteristics such as the degrees of autonomy and of power concentration 
(within the executive branch) are considered to have a great impact on a 
government’s ability to implement reforms.140 Social scientists would argue that a 
high level of cohesion among policymaking circles (bureaucrats and government) is 
fundamental for effective state intervention.141 State autonomy and state capacity in 
particular are important variables in understanding telegraph and telephone policy 
change. Autonomy and capacity are not the same thing, but are closely related. State 
autonomy largely refers to the independence of the state from other groups within 
society, that is, the degree of freedom enjoyed by the state. Meanwhile state capacity 
refers to the actual ability of the state to implement objectives, objectives which may 
be opposed by certain groups within society. Recent neo-Marxist approaches, 
however* tend to argue for a more direct relationship. They would contend that the
139 Lewis and Suzigan (2000).
140 Petrazzini B. A., The Political Economy o f  Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries: 
Privatisation and Liberalisation in Comparative Perspectives London, Praeger Publishers (1995).
141 Haggard S. Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics o f  Growth in the Newly Industrialising Countries 
Ithaca, Cornell University Press (1990).
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very measurement of state autonomy is defined by the ‘state’s capacity’ to function 
and implement goals at odds with the will of dominant interest groups.142
In the context of this thesis, these characteristics can aid the implementation of key 
policies that fostered faster ICT diffusion. For instance, Mexico’s relative degree of 
greater state autonomy during the first few decades of PRI political dominance from 
the late 1920s, and the insularity gained by the Argentinian administration of Menem 
in the 1990s, arguably had a significant impact in allowing for the successful 
implementation of key reforms (as discussed throughout chapters 3 and 4). However, 
a high degree of state autonomy does not necessarily guarantee a high degree of state 
capacity, or governing effectiveness.143 One could argue that during particularly 
critical periods in regard to telegraph and telephone diffusion, the effectiveness of the 
Mexican state was aided by a relatively stronger centralisation of power around the 
president, and arguably more powerful unity among the various governing elites.144 
In Argentina, by contrast, the distribution of power in the state was affected by the 
process of opening up politics at the societal level.145 This resulted in a succession of 
presidents who faced relatively more difficulties in implementing unpopular reforms 
as a result o f the on-going conflict between the governing elite and interest groups.146 
This was especially highlighted during the transition from nationalisation to 
privatisation. In terms of the overall regime, it is not clear in the literature which type 
is necessarily more conducive to faster ICT diffusion. O’Donnell and Huntington 
argue that a relatively more authoritarian state is necessary for industrialisation once 
a state reaches a certain level o f development and modernisation. 147 Meanwhile, 
Huntington and Nelson argue that at a certain point, economic growth and
142 Hamilton (1982)., Evans P. B., Rueschemeyer D. and Skocpol T., Bringing the State Back in New York, 
Cambridge University Press (1985).
143 Petrazzini (1995).
144 Smith P. H., Labyrinths o f  Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico Princeton, Princeton 
University Press (1979). Ronfeldt D., ‘Prospects for Elite Cohesion’ in Cornelius W. A., Gentleman J. and Smith 
P. H., Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures La Jolla, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies (1989).
145 Waisman C. H., Reversal o f  Development in Argentina: Post-war Counterrevolutionary Policies and their 
Structural Consequences Princeton, Princeton University Press (1987).
146 For instance see Oszlak O., La Reforma del Estado en la Argentina Buenos Aires, volume 6, Documentos 
CEDES (1990).
147 O’Donnell G. A., Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics 
Berkeley, University of California Press (1973), Huntington S. P., Political Order in Changing Societies New 
York, Yale University Press (1968). Also see Apter D., The Politics o f  Modernisation Chicago, University o f 
Chicago Press (1965), O’Donnell G. A., Schmitter P. C. and Whitehead L., Transitions from  Authoritarian Rule 
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press (1986).
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democracy become incompatible. Others, such as Haggard and Kaufman, 
alternatively suggest that the type of regime is largely irrelevant to the effectiveness 
of the state in policy implementation.149
The next section is divided into four sub-sections. Focus first turns to a. the structure 
of the Argentinian and Mexican political systems and a logical analysis of the inter­
relationships of the various political actors, in addition to some coverage of 
authoritarianism and the military. This is followed by a three-sectioned chronological 
analysis of politics over the whole period, namely, b. the years of the early 
Argentinian and Mexican oligarchic rule, c. the years leading up to and immediately 
after the Depression, and the section concludes with d. the years corresponding to the 
second half of the twentieth century.
a. The Structure of Argentina’s and Mexico’s Political System
In institutional terms, Argentina and Mexico were characterised by a similar political 
system. Argentina had a federalist state system of governance and although 
provinces had their own autonomous systems, they typically replicated the national 
system. Argentina’s system featured a president, a national congress, and a judiciary. 
Despite this, from the 1930s, this arrangement was honoured more in theory than in 
practice, as military coup after coup ensured a total of 25 different presidents served 
in Argentina from then until 1989.150 Political instability was a relative mainstay for 
Argentina for much of the twentieth century and it is argued that this was partly a 
result of the absence of any formation of a dominant coalition in politics that could 
provide stability of leadership.151 Argentina was unable to consolidate permanent
148 Huntington S. P. and Nelson J., No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press (1976). Also see Hewlett S. A., ‘Human Right and Economic Realities, Tradeoffs 
in Historical Perspective’ Political Science Quarterly 94 (1979): 453-473. For an analysis of democracy in 
respect to the degree of inclusiveness of the population and civilian control o f the military refer to Dahl R, A., 
Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition New Haven, Yale University Press (1971).
149 Haggard S. and Kaufman R., ‘Democratic Transitions and Economic Reform’ Paper presented at the Southern 
California Workshop on Economic and Political Liberalisation, University of Southern California, Los Angeles
(1993).
150 Petrazzini (1995).
151 As Di Telia says, ‘each group has just enough power to veto the projects originated by the others, but none can 
muster the strength to run the country as it would like’: Di Telia T., ‘An Introduction to the Argentine System’ in 
Fagen R. R. and Cornelius W. A., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice Hall (1970), p. 108. Smith, however, argues that political divisions and conflict are a reflection of the 
interpersonal conflicts among the elite rather than at the base of society. See Smith P. H., Argentina and the 
Failure o f  Democracy: Conflict among Political Elites, 1904-1955 Madison, University of Wisconsin Press 
(1974).
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competitive pluralism, where ‘...policy making is the outcome o f mutual
1 S9accommodation and concessions’. In Argentina there was no real bargaining 
process between interest groups and the state.
Argentina’s society was characterised by conflict since there was extensive distrust 
among all parties involved and any state decision that was in opposition to one’s 
interests was simply not accepted. Since this was known, in order to retain power, the 
state attempted to avoid widespread inclusion in policy making, which only led to 
further distrust, and constant questioning of its authority from antagonistic unions, 
uncooperative entrepreneurs, powerful governors, and an adversarial congress.153 It 
has been argued, however, that despite the seeming relative degree of instability in 
Argentina’s political system (for good portions of the overall period in question); 
below the surface there was a consistent dynamic that reflected quite a stable system 
of power.154 In this view the presidency rotated between two groups, the first 
consisting of agrarian exporters, large industrialists and large financiers, and the 
second represented by the domestic industrial bourgeoisie, SMEs, and the labour 
movement. However, this view would not seem to hold given the lack of internal 
cohesion or discipline, and more importantly the lack of consensus on the policies 
being implemented. Structural shifts in the local and global economy during the mid- 
1970s however would ultimately weaken the underlying power structure and by the 
early 1980s, new (and old) political forces had (re)emerged.155
In Mexico, the federalist political system was quite similar in design to that in 
Argentina, with semi-autonomous local governments. It was also a presidential one, 
featuring equally independent legislative and judicial branches of powers. But just 
like Argentina, practice materially detracted from theory as Mexico’s relatively 
higher concentration of power around the executive branch, coupled with a close 
cooperation among the controlling elites, were dominating characteristics of its 
political institutions for much of the period in question.156 These intricately knit
152 Wynia G. W., Argentina in the Postwar Era: Politics and Economic Policy Making in a Divided Society 
Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press (1978), p.246.
153 Petrazzini (1995).
154 Waisman C. H., ‘Argentina’s Revolution from Above’ in Epstein E. C., The New Democracy in Argentina 
New York, Praeger Publishers (1992).
155 Petrazzini (1995).
156 Ibid.
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informal networks (with implicit hierarchies) of loyalties between the presidential 
office and congress could be traced back as far as the 1930s and facilitated lengthy 
tenures for important political figures.157 These relationships offered immediate 
confirmatory powers for the whole of the executive branch and in turn served as a 
reflection of the highly concentrated power circle, with the elected president at the 
epicentre. Moreover, the main political party (the PRI) maintained relatively tight
control over most of society and although the official historiography o f the PRI
1 ^ 8would stress dominance from the beginning, this varied with time.
Inter-relations o f the State, Business Elites, Trade Unions and Workers 
One of the most critical debates surrounding economic policy in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century revolves around the fact that landed and commercial elites 
virtually controlled the entirety of economic and political decision making in 
society.159 In order to understand the relations between these economic actors, it is 
pertinent to first address the meaning of the state. There is a plethora of literature 
regarding the state in Latin America, as it became one of the most crucial institutions 
after independence.160 The state often claimed a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force, and controlled large scale resources. Two key groups within the state are the 
military and party politicians, while the technocrats and the church constitute other 
important groups.161 The specific nature of the state in Argentina and in Mexico 
differed and nor was this constant through time, as will be apparent from the 
discussion that follows.162
157 Ronfeldt (1989). Additionally, Mexico’s federalism meant that historically the state effectively controlled 85% 
of public revenues.
158 Note the neglect to account for the turmoil of the Cristero revolts in the west for example, see Cornelius W. A. 
and Craig A. L., The Mexican Political System in Transition California, University of California Press (1991).
159 The elites were less than 5% of the Latin American population.
160 The most widely referenced book regarding the state in Latin American is by De Soto H., The Other Path: The 
Invisible Revolution in the Third World London, Harper Collins (1989). For a useful account of state formation at 
the regional level, see Mallon F. E., Peasant and Nation: The Making o f  Postcolonial Mexico and Peru Berkeley, 
University of California Press (1995). For a generic comparative analysis of the state, Topik provides a useful 
assessment of state building in Mexico and Brazil, Topik S., ‘The Economic Role of the State in Liberal Regimes 
- Brazil and Mexico Compared, 1880-1910’ in Love J. L. and Jacobsen N., Guiding the Invisible Hand: 
Economic Liberalism and the State in Latin American History New York, Praeger Publishers (1988). Also useful 
are: Gilbert F., The Historical Essays o f  Otto Hintze New York, Oxford University Press (1975), Hall J. A., States 
in History Oxford, University of North Carolina Press (1988), North D. C., Structure and Change in Economic 
History New York, Norton Press (1981).
161 Skidmore T. E. and Smith P. H., Modern Latin America New York, Oxford University Press (2005).
162 See Oszlak for a useful account for Argentina, in the earlier part of the period under consideration. For the 
whole period Diaz Alejandro’s work is useful. For the case of Mexico, Haber, Camp and Knight, among others, 
are useful. Oszlak (1981), Diaz Alejandro C. F., ‘The Argentine State and Economic Growth: A Historical 
Review’ in Ranis G., Government and Economic Development New Haven, Yale University Press (1971). Haber 
(2000), Camp R. A., Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth Century Mexico New York, Oxford University 
Press (1989), Hamilton (1982), Collier R. B., The Contradictory Alliance: State-Labour Relations and Regime
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Generally, until around 1920, the state apparatus was largely controlled by agrarian 
and commercial oligarchies (and possibly to an extent, allies). Specifically in the 
earlier period (pre-1930s), export-led growth led to modernisation and a change in 
the behaviour of the elite, as a new entrepreneurial vigour swept across Latin 
America. This in turn induced political change as the empowered landowners 
pursued political power. During this period, one can differentiate between two forms 
in the quest for political power: firstly, where the political elite (many assumed such 
status as large landowners) directly took control of government through ‘oligarchic 
democracies’ and strong alliances, as in Argentina. And secondly, where dictatorial 
factions (often in the form of the military) took power by whatever means necessary, 
with indirect involvement of the elite, as in Mexico. Although the approaches clearly 
varied, their goals were consistent, as they both attempted to establish stability, retain 
a tight power circle and claim social control. An example of this was the fact that 
they both directed significant effort toward developing the telegraph early on, as a 
means to achieve this (see chapter 4, section The Government's Attitude towards the 
Telegraph). After the 1930s, various urban groups gained political space and 
influence within the state, including industrialists, the military and technocrats. 
Finally from the 1950s and 1960s, other social actors, including organised labour and 
other popular sectors sought to shape economic and political decision making.163
In Argentina in the aftermath of the First World War the military became a more 
important player in politics. Meanwhile the labour movement had been building its 
opposition to the ruling elite and growing in influence for some time in the early part 
of the twentieth century, but by the 1930s its role had become rather tame. Notably, 
the main political party of the state, the Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN), 
brought together regional oligarchies, consisting o f powerful members who 
collectively held positions in the highest branches of politics, the economy, the
Change in Mexico Berkeley, University of California at Berkeley (1992), Knight A., ‘State Power and Political 
Stability in Mexico’ in Harvey N., Mexico Dilemmas o f Transition London, British Academic Press (1993).
163 Collier R. B. and Collier D., Shaping the Political Arena Princeton, Princeton University Press (1991). Walker, 
Herzog and Cockcroft provide some of the best specific insight into the relationships of the working classes and 
the intellectuals for Mexico at the turn of the century: Walker D., ‘Porfirian Labour Politics: Working Class 
Organizations in Mexico D.F. and Porfirio Diaz, 1876-1902’ The Americas 37.3 (1981): 257-287, Herzog J. S., El 
Agrarismo Mexicano y  la Reforma Agraria Mexico D.F., Fondo de Cultura Economica (1964), Cockcroft J., 
Intellectual Precursors o f  the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 Austin, University of Texas Press (1968). For an 
analysis of the relations between industry and the agrarian sector in Argentina, refer to Gallo E., ‘Agrarian 
expansion and industrial development in Argentina, 1880-1930’ in Carr R., Latin American Affairs (St. Antony’s 
Papers No.22) Oxford, Oxford University Press (1970).
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military and religion. As a result, this make-up had a profound effect upon the 
relations of the state and the workers (and their respective unions). Much of the 
assessment of unionism and its relations with the state in the literature regarding 
Argentina is linked to analysis of Peronism. Baily’s view o f Peronism stresses the 
significance of urban migration and ‘massification’ of the working classes, 
generating much revisionist material challenging this (see Murmis and Portantiero, 
who see support for Peronism as equally shared by the incumbent working classes 
and the recent urban immigrants).164 Perhaps the most influential work on the 
Peronist period of ‘resistance’ (between his overthrow in 1955 and his return in 1973) 
is by James, who creates an identity for the Peronist working class.165
In relation to this thesis, Latin America’s worker unions played quite an important 
role in sector reforms, particularly during the privatisation o f the telephone 
companies (see chapter 3, section The Period o f Privatisation). In sharp contrast to 
Argentina, by the 1960s, unionism had not diffused across Mexico and its peasant 
masses typically were unprotected and unrepresented politically. In Argentina, 
Peronist trade unions became a genuine base of political opposition from as early as 
the 1950s. The relationship differed in Mexico and was largely top down, as the state 
did not need the labour and hence the labour movement was more independent. 
However, the dynamics of the worker-ruling political party relationship were not 
very favourable for workers in Mexico, as the PRI would grant effective wage 
increases, for instance, when unemployment was relatively high (for a more detailed 
assessment of the state relations and the outward influence of the PRI over time see 
the section The Evolution o f  PRI control o f Mexico [until andfrom I960], later in the 
chapter). There is a great deal of work on the labour movement (and their 
relationships) in Mexico, much of it is multi-volume. One particularly succinct 
overview is presented by Bizberg.166
164 Baily S. L., Labor, Nationalism, and Politics in Argentina New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press (1967), 
Murmis M. and Portantiero J .C., Estudios sobre los Origenes del Peronismo Buenos Aires, Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores (1971). For an analysis of important labour movements in specific periods, see Torre (during Perdn’s 
second tenure) and Gallitelli Thompson (for the subsequent militant dictatorship). Torre J. C., Los Sindicatos en 
el Gobiemo, 1973-76 Buenos Aires, Centro Editor de America Latina (CEAL) (1983), Gallitelli B. and 
Thompson A., Sindicalismo y  Regimenes Militares en Argentina y  Chile Amsterdam CEDLA Publications (1982).
165 James D., Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976 Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press (1969).
166 Bizberg I., Estadoy Sindicalismo en Mexico Mexico D.F., El Colegio de Mdxico (1990). Over the course of 
Mexico’s labour history, the Cardenas presidency (1934-1940) possibly received the most academic attention, 
which Ashby (a leftist critique), Meyer and Ch&vez Hernandez have written some interesting commentary: Ashby 
J. C., Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Cardenas Chapel Hill, University o f North Carolina
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Authoritarianism and the Military in Politics
History reveals that Latin America has been relatively more authoritarian in nature 
than the developed world. It should be noted, however, that although related to 
dictatorship and totalitarianism, authoritarianism can take on quite different forms.167 
Across Latin America in the nineteenth century typically authoritarian regimes were 
characterised by caudillo style leadership. Later in the twentieth century, 
authoritarian regimes often took the form of military led governments and although 
they sometimes allowed for political pluralism, this varied dramatically across 
countries, most especially between Argentina and Mexico. Due to the enhanced role 
of the military in the political domain in Latin America, much has been written on 
them: for example Johnson’s classical piece analyses all of Latin America, with
• 1 #58O’Donnell providing a more modem view.
It is clear that authoritarian regimes in Argentina and Mexico were markedly 
different. Moreover, a common question is why Argentina, with such relatively 
strong overall economic development, was subjected to the pain of so many 
authoritarian regimes in the second half of the twentieth century.169 While Potash’s 
assessment on this matter is that of a historian, Rouquie’s analysis is particularly 
useful as it not only extends the analysis to the return of Peron in 1973 but is also 
written from the perspective of a political scientist. 170 Juan Ongania’s 1966- 
inaugurated-regime, can be thought of as the beginning of a shift within 
authoritarianism as he sought to suppress the labour movement and attack the
Press (1967), Anguiano A., El Estadoy la Politico Obrera del Cardenismo Mexico D.F., Ediciones Era (1975). 
Meyer L., El Conflicto Social y  los Gobiemos del Maximato volume 13, Mexico D.F., El Colegio de Mexico 
(1978), and Chavez Hem&ndez A. V., ‘La Mec&nica Cardenista’ volume 16, in Cosio Villegas D., Historia de la 
Revolucion Mexicana 23 volumes, Mexico D.F., El Colegio de Mexico (1979).
167 See Veliz C., Obstacles to Change in Latin America New York, Oxford University Press (1965), Collier R.B. 
and Collier D. (1991) and Skidmore and Smith (2005).
168 Johnson J. J., The Military and Society in Latin America Stanford, Stanford University Press (1964), 
O’Donnell (1973). An interesting relationship that has been analysed with regard to military regimes, or more 
specifically departing military regimes, is the relations they share with the incoming democratic regimes in post­
authoritarian political situations, see for example Goodman L. W., Mendelson J. S. R. and Rial J., The Military 
and Democracy: The Future o f  Civil-Military Relations in Latin America Lexington, Lexington Books (1990).
169 There is particularly extensive literature on the military in Argentina, and a good overview for some of the 
most critical years (1928-1962) is provided by Potash in two volumes: Potash R. A., The Army and Politics in 
Argentina: Yrigoyen to Peron Stanford, Stanford University Press (1969) and Potash R. A., The Army and 
Politics in Argentina: Peron to Frondizi Stanford, Stanford University Press (1980). For an overview of 
authoritarian groups see Gerassi and for a modem analysis see Rock: Gerassi M. N., Los Nacionalistas Buenos 
Aires, Editorial Jorge Alvarez (1969), Rock D., Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, its History 
and its Impact Berkeley, University of California Press (1993).
170 Rouquie A., Poder Militar y  Sociedad Politico en la Argentina 2 volumes, Buenos Aires, Emece Editores 
(1981/1982). A more modem period of analysis comes from Munck: Munck R., ‘The “modem” Military 
Dictatorship in Latin America: The Case of Argentina (1976-1982)’ Latin American Perspectives 12.4 (1985): 
41-47.
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manifestations of Argentina’s economic and social issues, rather than attempt to 
locate the root causes.171
Argentina’s military government of 1976 also continued this ‘tradition’, and 
generally these regimes were referred to across Latin America, as a ‘bureaucratic 
authoritarian’ state.172 In Mexico, it is unfortunate that although military regimes 
were involved closely in politics (especially since the 1930s), the subject is relatively 
understudied from a contemporary perspective, exactly because of this fact. Liewen 
provides some analysis of the post-Revolution military, while Ronfeldt and Camp 
add a modem assessment. In the 1960s, Mexico, unlike Argentina (where there 
was a ‘fuller’ bureaucratic authoritarian state) was able to move away from populist 
authoritarianism to modified bureaucratic authoritarianism as the state gained control 
of the popular sectors of the economy before the economic downturn. Despite the 
growing civic participation in politics from the 1980s across Latin America, most of 
the respective military powers still retained sufficient influence to discretely veto 
unwanted policies, demonstrating the continuity of the power dynamic (even if 
informal) between the military and society over time.
b. Argentina’s and Mexico’s Oligarchic Rule 
The PAN’s Political Machine and its Growing Opposition
In Argentina, following independence, the nature of the state and the manner in 
which it would be financed continued to be the most important political questions. 
The political process during this period around the nineteenth century in Argentina is 
particularly well documented by the Academia Nacional de la Historia and in Ferrari 
and Gallo.174 Other issues such as the state’s capacity to internalise conflict (a feature
171 Taylor gives an exceptional analysis of repression under military rule: Taylor D., Disappearing Acts: 
Spectacles o f  Gender and Nationalism in Argentina’s 'Dirty War’ Durham, Duke University Press (1997).
2 The main characteristics of a ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ state are: 1) new joiners have highly bureaucratic 
career already, such as the military, 2) political and social exclusion of the working class, 3) heavily reduced 
political activity and 4) dependency on the international economy in promoting domestic economic growth. For 
some further thoughts, refer to Refer to O’Donnell G., ‘Reflections on the pattern of Change in the Bureaucratic- 
Authoritarian State’ Latin American Research Review 13 (1978): 3-38.
173 Liewen E., Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall o f  the Revolution Army, 1910-40 Westport, 
Greenwood Press (1968), Ronfeldt D., The Modem Mexican Military: A Reassessment La Jolla, Center for U.S.- 
Mexican Studies, Cambridge University Press (1984), and Camp R. A. Generals in the Palacio: The Military in 
Modern Mexico New York, Oxford University Press (1992).
174 Academia Nacional de la Historia, Historia Argentina Contemporanea 1862-1930 volumes 1 & 2 Buenos 
Aires, El Ateno (1964, 1966). Ferrari G. and Gallo E., La Argentina del Ochenta al Centenario Buenos Aires, 
Editorial Sudamericana (1980).
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of state formation) began to gain importance as conflicts across classes ensued at the 
turn of the twentieth century. During this main period of telegraph diffusion, 
Argentina was run by an oligarchic system (1880-1916), known as the ‘Generation of 
1880’, who ultimately enjoyed several decades of prosperity.175 The PAN developed 
in the 1880s, at the same time as the porteno party politics declined. The PAN soon 
monopolised ‘national’ politics and the only meaningful rivalries that remained were 
intra-party. There was no real difference in ideology within the PAN, which typically 
caused internal conflict as presidential candidates often tried to ‘buy’ support from 
different provincial factions of the elite. It was also no surprise that the PAN 
remained in power for so long since they ran elections fraudulently if required. The 
oligarchy’s notion of ‘Progress’ was built upon limited political participation and 
economic expansion that benefited the elite and the privileged few (landowners and 
powerful farmers), whilst excluding most sections of the population.176
The PAN, which emerged from the interior oligarchies of the opposition to Buenos 
Aires, survived unchallenged for so long because of the growth in resources as well 
as, the supply and distribution of public goods. The state was financed through the 
taxation, borrowing and inflation, which all had distributional effects. Although 
perhaps inflation was not a worry for the commercial elite, it very much affected 
workers and immigrants, and the success o f the modernisation project rested on 
these.177 The PAN pragmatically tried to target strategic industries by investing 
heavily in state railways, for instance. Delivering economic progress whilst retaining 
order, proved to be a necessary justification of the PAN’s oligarchic politics, and this 
‘alliance of elites’ controlled all aspects of politics, almost without interruption, for 
forty years.178 However, the political economy was shifting even as early as 1890, in 
the wake of the Baring Crisis, as society acknowledged that authority had become 
too centralised, and a class of professional politicians who wanted to be recognised
175 Corradi J. E., The Fitful Republic: Economy, Society and Politics in Argentina Boulder, Westview Press 
(1985).
176 For distinct approaches to the nature and formation of party politics, the politics o f ‘representation’ and the 
correspondence of economic and political interest during the pre-1930s period see Rock (1975). Also see Walter 
R. J., The Socialist Party o f  Argentina, 1890-1930 Institute of Latin American Studies, monograph no. 42, Austin, 
University of Texas Press (1977), Alonso P., Between Revolution and the Ballot Box: The Origins o f the 
Argentine Radical Party in the 1980s Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2000), Horn R., Landowners o f  
the Argentine Pampas: A Social and Political History, 1860-1945 New York, Oxford University Press (2001), 
Sabato H. and Lettieri A., La Vida Politico en la Argentina del Siglo XIX: Armas, Votosy Voces Buenos Aires, 
Fondo de Cultura Econdmica (2003).
177 Alonso (2000).
178 Alonso (2000) and Hora (2001).
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emerged. There was, as Lewis describes it ‘a quest for legitimacy’.179 The intrinsic 
corruption of the ruling Miguel Juarez Celman regime (1886-1890) became apparent 
and oligarchic politics were reconstructed in light of the growing distribution of 
power to the littoral.180
In 1906, the death of the incumbent leader, Manuel Quintana (1904-1906), marked a 
turning point in Argentinian politics, as Jose Alcorta (1906-1910) and Roque Saenz 
Pena (1910-1914) sought to destroy the political machine engineered by Roca. To 
verify the legitimacy and political institutionalism of the state, the Saenz Pena 
administration introduced electoral reforms in 1912 (e.g. an official ballot), which 
effectively marked the beginning of the end for the PAN.181 The ‘modem’ opposition 
to the PAN’s authority emerged in the form of the Union Provincial (landowners and 
business groups) and the socialist party (the porteno working class) but it was the 
Union Civica Radical (UCR) that campaigned most successfully against the
1 89oligarchic political control and corruption. Their initial efforts at revolt failed, but 
they stirred widespread social unrest and it was this group that would ultimately 
assume power from the PAN in 1916.183
The Porfiriato: the Range in Authority Exercised
Mexico lost half of its territory to the U.S. in 1848, and the country’s initial anger 
quickly energised the political system. While the liberals wanted to modernise, 
secularise and democratise the country, the conservatives did not want to increase 
participation in government and feared such a liberal course of action would be 
disastrous for Mexico. Instead they preferred to allow the two institutional power 
bases of the church and the military (as historically was the case) to remain in control. 
Unfortunately this debate could not be reconciled and Mexico found itself flung into 
civil war.184
179 Lewis C.M. (2002), p. 194.
180 Alonso (2000) and Hora (2001).
181 Note that by 1914, about one third of Argentina’s total population was foreign bom, hence even with the 
secret ballot, political voting still excluded a large portion of the adult male population.
182 Walter (1977), Alonso (2000) and Hora (2001).
183 Lewis P. H., Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America: Dictators, Despots, and Tyrants Lanham, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers (2006).
184 Vanderwood P., ‘Betterment for Whom? The Reform Period: 1855-1875’ in Meyer M. C. and Beezley W. H., 
The Oxford History o f  Mexico New York, Oxford University Press (2000).
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In theory Porfirio Diaz emerged as heir to the Liberal reformists when he took the 
presidency in 1876. He focused on putting an end to decades of political instability 
and economic depression. It is important to point out that the first four year term of 
Porfirio Diaz was significantly different from the second stint. During his first four 
years in power he faced some struggles with his cabinet, but when he took the 
presidency again in 1884 the government’s power had been consolidated further, as 
the administration had learnt how to protect itself better from enemies and the 
country was at relative peace. The cientiflcos argued that political stability was the 
first step toward social evolution and economic development, and only once Mexico 
was ready could democratic politics (the essence of political legitimacy) be
1 O /J
achieved. Whatever the view of Porfirio Diaz and his actions economically or 
towards the telegraph sector, none can challenge his apparent political mastery. He 
came to power with military backing, and once in power immediately sought to 
extend his working coalition. With regard to the other institutional power base, the 
church, unlike his liberal predecessors, Porfirio Diaz remained neutral. He 
strategically played potential opponents against one another, such as with the 
regional caudillos, and built the rural police in order to maintain control in the 
countryside where most Mexicans lived. The most important writings on this aspect 
of Mexican history date from the 1950s and Villegas provides a particularly detailed
187account.
Between 1877 and 1910, foreign trade across Latin America increased by nine times, 
and was marked in Mexico most of all, where its partnership with the U.S. was 
growing and inducing modest industrial growth. 188 The Porfirian model of 
industrialisation was a key factor behind this Mexican progress. Industrialisation was 
based on oligopoly and monopoly manufacturing, characterised by large, vertically 
integrated firms, protected by tariffs (see section 1.1.2 Industrial Growth in 
Argentina and Mexico), which would employ the most up to date technology at the 
expense of the craftsmen. Although the Porfiriato was the result of a cultural 
revolution, the practices of corruption of the local jefes politicos and the like were
185 Newspaper: El Monitor Republicano, (11 October 1855).
186 Buffington and French in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
187 Cosio Villegas D., ‘El Porfiriato: Su Historiografia o Arte Historico’ Extremos de America Mexico D.F., 
Fondo de Cultura Economica (1949), pp.l 13-182.
188 Skidmore and Smith (2005).
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hardly revolutionary, but were direct breaches of national trust and moral economics. 
The political stability that Porfirio Diaz created to foster economic development was 
characterised, as much by clientage networks and skilful political deal-making, as by 
anything else .189 The Porfirian state depended upon the bureaucrats and the 
technocrats to create a modem nation. But with their support, Porfirio Diaz was able 
to invoke a social dictatorship that controlled congress, the federal judiciary and the 
national bureaucracy.
The Porfirio Diaz administration’s control over politics was not built on 
constitutional reform but on an intricate network of national and regional power 
cliques (notably including the cientificos and the reyistas). He was able to defeat 
attempts by both the cientificos and the reyistas in making a viable challenge to his 
presidency since neither group was willing to disturb the order established. Only the 
caciques posed any real material resistance to the Porfirian state in the earliest years, 
but they were replaced quickly by loyalists when they grew too strong.190 The 
removal o f independent thinkers from the political scene consolidated the political 
machine built by Porfirio Diaz. The Porfiriato effectively induced even more 
definition of social structures, as the regional discrepancies in economic performance 
grew substantially. The differing primary economic activities of the northern (mining 
and ranching), central (wheat and grain) and southern (sugar and sisal) districts were 
the reasons behind the growing inequality of income. By creating an economic 
structure based on domestic concessions and favours, aided by foreign capital, 
Porfirio Diaz had effectively suppressed the formation of a viable entrepreneurial 
class. These classes provided greater political challenges in other Latin American 
economies.
Despite the complex arrangements of the Porfiriato, Buffington and French argue 
that the Porfiriato was ‘hardly a dictatorship’.191 In reality Porfirio Diaz held direct 
centralised power in Mexico City only and required the aid of a 300 strong force of 
local jefes politicos (which he controlled indirectly) to maintain any sort of power in
189 Buffington and French in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid., p.415. Having said that, despite sticking to his original policy of no re-election in 1880, the authoritarian 
tendencies were not far away as he reclaimed power from his handpicked successor four years later, and then held 
on to the presidency until 1911.
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the other regions.192 These jefes politicos had replicated the states power networks 
for themselves at a localised level, enabling them to frequently undermine municipal 
governments and serve the state’s interests throughout Mexico. This relationship, 
however, would become increasingly problematic to maintain towards the end o f the
1 Q ' XPorfiriato, as central government simply demanded too much of the jefes. It is 
interesting to examine Mexico’s local government of this period in different parts of 
the country, thereby assessing the centralised power of the state.194 Perhaps this 
accounts for the regime’s anxiety to promote the expansion of the telegraph’s 
relevance.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, for many, the Porfiriato became 
almost synonymous with the idea of Latin America’s progressive dictatorship. On 
the one hand, Porfirio oversaw the creation and build-out of the country’s railroad 
network, and modem cities, encouraged immigration and foreign investment and 
oversaw the start of industry.195 Despite being originally aligned to the liberalists, 
Porfirio Diaz even gained the support of the conservative hegemony and eventually 
sought closer ties to the Catholic Church.196 Yet on the other hand, the rich got richer, 
while the poor got poorer. Exports boomed but food production slowed and there 
was increasing concentration of landownership. 197 Hence, although industry 
produced new products, many could not afford them as wages were low (and falling) 
while food prices were high. Toward the end of his regime, the situation worsened 
considerably and two of the largest industries, agriculture and textiles suffered 
disastrous setbacks after 1907. Rural workers were largely landless, and urban
192 For an example of local regional power, see the bourgeoisie’s successful resistance to Cardenismo in the state 
of Monterrey: Saragoza A. M., The Monterrey Elite and the Mexican State, 1880-1940 Austin, University of 
Texas Press (1988), chapter 8.
193 See Buffington and French in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
194 Friedrich, Benjamin, Joseph and Gonzalez Gonzalez give excellent accounts of regional history and the 
influence of local institutions. Benjamin A., A Rich Land o f  Poor People: Politics and Society in Modern Chiapas 
Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press (1989), Joseph G. M., Revolution from  Without: Yucatan, Mexico 
and the United States, 1880-1924 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1982), Friedrich P., Agrarian Revolt 
in a Mexican Village Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall (1970). Gonzalez Gonzalez L., Pueblo en vilo: 
Microhistoria de San Jose de Gracia Mexico D.F., El Colegio de Mexico (1972).
195 The telegraph network expansion that took place under Porfirio Diaz from 1877 would not stop until 1910, at 
which point the national network had grown from 8,000 km to 40,000 km and the railways had expanded from 
678km to 19,300 km. See Mexico, Memoria de la Secretaria de Fomento de 1865 a 1891 Archivo General de la 
Nacion Galera 5 (various years) and Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e kiformatica (INEGI), Anuario 
Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Mexico D.F. (various years).
196 Halperin Donghi (1993).
197 For an exploration of the nineteenth century export boom see Topik S. C. and Well A., The Second Conquest 
o f  Latin America: Coffee, Henequen, and Oil during the Export Boom, 1850-1930 Austin, University of Texas 
Press (1998).
64
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The ‘Double Paradox’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
workers (and small businesses) were heavily losing out; Porfirio Diaz did not come 
to the aid of either.198 ‘The dictatorial state that had earned plaudits during the 
prosperous years from 1876 until 1899 became, after 1900, the object of a crescendo 
of criticism. The economically vulnerable regional elites were becoming fed up with 
Porfirio Diaz and were chafing at their lack of political influence’.199 Porfirio Diaz’s 
methods in dealing with resistance may not have been in the national interest, but 
they were certainly effective and maintained his strong reputation abroad, as he 
frequently paid off potential adversaries rather generously.200 Such practices would 
ultimately delegitimize his regime and the hypocrisies of Porfirio Diaz’s ‘social 
democracy’ by 1910 could no longer be tolerated and the legitimacy crisis that
^A1
ensued brought about his demise.
A realistic challenge to Porfirio Diaz’s monopoly of power was only going to be 
credible with backing from the powerful northern territories (closely linked to the 
U.S. economy) and sure enough it came. To the increasing distaste of the localised 
ruling class, northern Mexico had a minimal role in national politics, but a sizeable 
role in social and economic importance. In the preceding decades, the region had 
advanced decidedly faster than the rest of Mexico, and as it began to feel the pain of 
a U.S. economic downturn, so too did Porfirio Diaz, as his regime crumbled around 
him, forcing the former dictator to flee into exile. A new constitution was drawn up 
in 1917, which was more nationalistic and socially progressive in an attempt to 
institutionalise the revolution.202 There is an interesting academic debate surrounding 
this period, which questions exactly why Mexico was so economically 
underdeveloped. Cardoso and Coatsworth attempt to answer this in quite contrasting 
ways, addressing issues such as whether it was fair to lay a lot of the blame at the 
feet of Porfirio Diaz’s regime, or whether it was more to do with the lengthy civil 
wars that pre-dated him.203 For contemporary (or near-contemporary) research on a 
broader analysis of the Porfiriato, there are four main works to review. These are 
particularly insightful and provided contrasting commentaries, with two written by
198 Hart in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
199 Ibid., p.437. For an account o f political elites see Smith (1979).
200 Halperin Donghi (1993).
201 Buffington and French in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
202 Halperin Donghi (1993).
203 Cardoso C., Mexico en el Siglo XIX: Historia Economica y  de la Estructura Social Mexico D.F., Nueva 
Imagen (1980), Coatsworth D., Growth Against Development: The Economic Impact o f  Railroads in Porfirian 
Mexico Dekalb, Northern Illinois Press (1981).
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Mexicans, Sierra and Bulnes (two of Porfirio Diaz’s greatest intellectual supporters) 
and two by Americans, Turner and Beals (less supportive of the Porfirio Diaz regime 
and from a foreign perspective).204
During the 1890s, first Mexico, then Argentina, experienced anti-oligarchical 
movements. In Mexico dissonance came from the middle classes and in Argentina, in 
the form of a new political order: the Argentine Radical party. In Mexico, the mass 
political mobilisation of the urban workforce continued right through the Revolution 
and for much of the first quarter of the twentieth century. There was great unity in 
this plight as radical socialists and conservative Catholics sometimes rallied side by 
side in the same group (although with little social or economic conviction). In 
Argentina, it was unfortunate that the newly formed party seemed overly concerned 
in antagonising the oligarchic authority rather than proposing positive social or 
economic reform. Subsequently the economic and societal structures of Argentina 
and Mexico were much unchanged throughout the period of export-led growth, as 
these movements failed to instigate any real reforms until later.205 Arguably the first 
signs of genuine instability and need for wider popular support in these oligarchic 
hegemonies came during the 1920s, as the power circles built in the aftermath of war 
were socially, narrowly based. Argentina attempted to improve the situation with 
democratisation within a more liberal constitutional framework, while Mexico tried 
to broaden the social base by means of a social revolution. Neither turned out to be 
particularly successful, as Latin American economies across the board slowed and 
social progress waned. Following so many years of relatively strong overall
economic expansion, the crisis that would ultimately ensue would be a harsh reality
*)(\(\for Latin America to face up to.
c. The Politics Leading up to and after the Depression
The relentless attempts to bring about change in Argentina were finally successful in 
1916 when Hipolito Yrigoyen (1916-1922 and 1928-1930) became the first 
‘democratically’ elected president of Argentina. He formed an unusual coalition that
204 Sierra J., Mexico y  su Evolucion Social Mexico D.F., J. Ballesca y Compaflia (1901), Bulnes F., El verdadero 
D iazy la Revolucion Mexico D.F., Ediciones Coma (1920), Turner J. K., Barbarous Mexico Austin, University 
of Texas Press (1910), Beals (1932).
205 Halperin Donghi (1993).
206 Ibid.
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included the support of the middle classes of the riverine provinces, the popular 
urban vote, and the backing of the disgruntled elite. Yrigoyen formed new 
governmental allegiances with the labour unions of large cities, offered decisive 
support and passed beneficial reforms to the rural classes, effectively turning his 
party into an unassailable electoral machine in alignment with the existing social
7fi7order. The dwindling power of the previous oligarchs in politics fell further during
the course of Yrigoyen’s tenure and beyond, as the political voice of the rising urban 
middle classes grew.
Yrigoyen’s UCR party also sought support from the working classes later on, but the 
opposing Socialist Party was very much its own movement and in the 1920s the 
party was restructured into the Partido Socialista Independiente, which gained 
ground during the 1930s as the period of ‘patriotic fraud’ damaged the UCR. By this 
stage trade unions were largely accepted and hence the Partido Socialista 
Independiente included the defence of consumer interests within its social reforms, 
with its core base remaining the skilled workers of the railway, utility and capital 
intensive manufacturing companies. The Radical government could not sustain its 
position, however, as it was not able to adapt fiscal policy to the economy’s changing 
needs.208 Further, exports plummeted in 1930, hindering the state’s capacity to 
redistribute income or democratise the political system.209 Critics argue that the fall 
of democracy in Argentina, was primarily down to Yrigoyen's abuse of power, 
political favouritism and unwillingness to strengthen democratic institutions. After 
1930, nationalism and socialism, not democracy, became ‘the principal ideological 
forces’.210
From the end of the nineteenth century to the start of the Second World War, a 
number of events, including the collapse of the PAN and the democratic electoral 
reforms of 1912, seemingly indicated that the political sphere in Argentina was 
becoming relatively more class conscious and institutionalised. However, despite the 
various reforms that took place in Argentina, there was no integration of class-based
208 For instance, it never altered the country’s tax structure (which was dependent on imports), and as the crisis hit 
imports and therefore government revenues, the currency soon lost its backing in gold.
209 Halperin Donghi (1993).
210 Lewis C. M. (2002), p.217.
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party politics. Whether this was to be blamed on military intervention or the 
‘explosion’ of Peronism was irrelevant; the point was the ‘Progress’ that was 
promised by the democratic rule was to a large extent not achieved. In 1946, the 
trade unions and a section of the military formed the Partido Justicialista (PJ). PJ 
was many things, but first and foremost it was the party of labour and nationalists, 
which ‘continued to be dominant strands in Peronist rhetoric and strategy’.211
The Beginning o f Peronism in Argentina
Populism across Latin America was bome typically out of the emergence of an 
industrial elite and a re-energised labour movement, who struck a powerful 
alliance.212 In Argentina, populism came under Peron’s first tenure in 1946.213 
Peron’s populist coalition was one of the most powerful in Latin American history.214 
Under Peron’s first term, the salaries of the urban workforce in Argentina were 
comparable levels to those of Europe. In order to consolidate his political supremacy, 
Peron made the urban workers the most important ally of the state, and also retained 
close ties to industrialists and the armed forces. He nationalised the Central Bank, 
and re-staffed the university and the judiciary, retaining almost full exclusivity of the 
national press and radio. With his re-election in 1951, he consolidated his power 
even further and the organised labour movement arguably lost all of its autonomy. 
Political success came as a result of his unification o f previously un-politicised 
groups, in whom he was able to instil a great sense of loyalty. Possibly two of the 
best analyses of Peron’s rise to power are documented in Potash and Baily.215
211 Ibid., p.203.
212 Populist regimes typically share two features, that is: they are primarily authoritarian and they represent the 
interests of the classes. However, it must be considered that populism in politics takes on different meanings in 
different countries and different settings. See Di Telia T. and Dix for some of the best overall analysis: Di Telia 
T., ‘Populism and reform in Latin America’ in Veliz (1965). Dix R. H., ‘Populism: Authoritarian and Democratic’ 
Latin American Research Review 20.2 (1985): 29-52.
213 Acuna M., De Frondizi a Alfonsin: La Tradicidn del Radicalismo 2 volumes, Buenos Aires, Centro Editor de 
America Latina (1984), Schoultz L., The Populist Challenge: Argentine Electoral Behaviour in the Post War Era 
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press (1983), James D., ‘The Peronist Left’ Journal o f  Latin American 
Studies 8.2 (1976): 273-396.
214 Note that by 1945 Peron already was simultaneously vice president, minister of war and secretary of labour. 
For an excellent coda on Peronism, see McGuire J. M., Peronism Without Peron: Unions, Parties, and 
Democracy in Argentina Stanford, Stanford University Press (1997).
215 Potash (1969, 1980), and Baily (1967). Also see Most B. A., ‘Authoritarianism and the Growth of the State in 
Latin America: An assessment of their impact on Argentine public policy 1930-1970’ Comparative Political 
Studies 13.2 (1980): 173-203. For a specifically confrontational presentation of Peronist statism, refer to 
Waisman (1987).
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In the beginning of Peron’s tenure, he achieved economic success and reduced 
foreign influence in the Argentinian economy, notably nationalising the British- 
controlled railways and the U.S.-controlled telephone industry in 1948.216 However, 
the scale of his base of working class support (with labour unions doubling in size) 
grew problematic in the late 1940s. Peron’s unsustainable trade-off was now to 
penalise rural producers for the benefit of urban consumers. During his second term 
through to the mid-1950s, he opted to change tack and shifted away from the populist 
and nationalist policies that had characterised his rule in the 1940s. For instance, 
workers were hit with two year wage freezes to fund investment for long-term 
growth as he felt further economic growth could only be achieved through a reversal 
of his previous policies. His meticulously assembled populist coalition was 
threatened for the first time by class conflict. A battle against the church by Peronist 
radicals also weakened his grip on power, as his party began to spiral out of control. 
The opposition opportunistically pounced on Peron’s questionable actions in the first 
half of the 1950s and this perceived weakness ultimately allowed them to overthrow 
him in 1955.217 For commentary on Peron’s first stint in power, see Luna, and for his 
second, see Di Telia.218
The Evolution o f PRI Control o f Mexico (until 1960)
In Mexico, over this period, the PRI continued to dominate the political sphere. One 
can distinguish three main periods in its evolution. First the PRI grew into power 
from the 1930s and 1940s. Second, from the 1940s to the 1970s, the ‘all powerful’ 
PRI dominated politics and third, during the 1980s it is clear that the PRI began to 
lose control. Interestingly, the erosion of the authority o f the PRI was felt in some 
areas of the country well before others, before it was displaced. It is important to 
appreciate, however, that the state never lost control of Mexico. For a detailed 
analysis of the dominant PRI party, see the exceptional pieces by Garrido and 
Nava.219
216 Economic growth was very robust and Peron achieved particularly strong GDP growth in his first three years, 
see Skidmore and Smith (2005).
217 One example of such actions was the relaxing of state restrictions on the exploitation of Argentinian oil fields. 
See Halperin Donghi (1993).
218 Luna F., Peron y  su Tiempo, 3 volumes, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana (1984-1986) and Di Telia G. 
(1983).
219 Garrido L. J., El Partido de la Revolucion Institucionalizada: La Formacion del Nuevo Estado en Mexico 
(1928-1945) Mexico D.F., Siglo Ventiuno Editores (1986). Nava C., Ideologia del Partido de la Revolucion 
Mexicana Mexico D.F., Centros de Estudios de la Revolucion Mexicana “L&zaro Cardenas” A.C. (1984).
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In 1920s and 1930s Mexican politics, there was certainly a consolidation of regimes. 
The PRI in its original form was created and Mexico developed what is referred to as 
a ‘soft’ authoritarian stance.220 The PRI (in its various forms) dominated politics and 
although regular elections took place, only one political party was actually in the race 
from around the 1930s, with outgoing presidents recommending a successor. 
Democracy did not really exist (in the conventional form) since the PRI refused to 
acknowledge electoral defeat, when there was a meaningful challenge to the
991presidency, meaning they ‘won’ every election until the 1990s. The typical 
structures of a Western political society, such as labour unions and opposition parties
9 9 9served quite different purposes in Mexico. Nothing was particularly standard at the 
PRI, as the main functions of the administrations were to maintain relations with the 
clientelistic network, and at the societal level to arbitrate between civil society and 
the central administration. Further, they were to skilfully organise social demands, 
while the federal bureaucracy implemented their policy directives. There was no 
broad participation in politics, and even the ‘licensed’ mechanisms for all sectors of 
society to have a political voice were more of a theoretical feature than a practical 
one.223 In post-revolutionary Mexico, previous proponents of social change such as 
the landowners or historical sources of resistance like the military, no longer retained 
a political say. This afforded the PRI a great deal of autonomy in designing and 
implementing economic policies.224
Over time, the nature of the PRI changed. During the Depression in Mexico, peasants 
and workers became more aggressive as the agrarian reform slowed down and
9 9 c
economic crisis continued to grow. This group, with regional revolutionary parties, 
began to form the basis of the then named PNR party. However, when the populist, 
Cardenas came to power in 1934, he was supported mainly by industrial labour and
220 Skidmore and Smith (2005).
221 Meyer L., ‘Democratisation of the PRI: Mission Impossible?’ in Cornelius W. A., Gentleman J. and Smith P. 
H., Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures La Jolla, for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California Press 
(1989).
222 Cornelius W. A., Gentleman J. and Smith P. H., Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures La Jolla, for U.S.- 
Mexican Studies, University of California Press (1989).
223 Petrazzini (1995).
224 Halperin Donghi (1993).
225 For an overview of the agrarian analysis over most of the twentieth century, refer to Bartra A., Los 
Movimientos campesinos posrevolucionarios en Mexico, 1920-80 Mexico D.F., Ediciones Era (1985). For a more 
direct assessment of agrarismo in light of politics, refer to Brown L. C., ‘Cardenas: Creating a campesino power 
base for presidential policy’ in Wolfskill G. and Richmond D. W., Essays on the Mexican Revolution: Revisionist 
Views o f  the Leaders Austin, University of Texas Press (1979).
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segments of the peasantry, but also the military. Cardenas attempted to strengthen the 
political core by re-aligning the government with regional caudillos, who felt they 
had been let down by previous presidencies. He even sought to rebuild relations with 
the church, as well as the left wing of the party. This enabled the creation of large 
and more empowered worker unions that maintained close links to the state. 
Cardenas’s reorganisation of the PNR in 1938 led to the birth of the PRM. When 
Avila Camacho took power in 1940, he removed the military sector from the PRM in 
1941 and strengthened the popular sector in 1943. In the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the belief that gained ground was that domestic industrialisation would 
be the best chance yet to boost wealth across the country and combat poverty. A new 
generation of governing elite came to rule who played no part in the revolutionary 
conflict. Aleman Valdes was the president to lead the way (unlike his predecessors, 
he did not have a military background). One of his first actions was to rename 
(almost rebrand) the party, to mark the potential turning point in Mexico’s economic 
history. The PRM became the PRI, as the word ‘institutional’ was added to their 
political title, as if to instil greater credibility or at least signal a drive to pragmatism. 
Aleman Valdes’ objective was quite clearly economic development, and the poor 
quality of the basic infrastructure seemed like a good starting point from which to 
introduce a huge scale programme of public works. The Mexican economy thrived in 
the short term due to protectionist import policies but unfortunately Aleman Valdes’ 
government would become shrouded in corruption allegations.227
d. The Politics in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century
Given the economic backdrop described earlier in the chapter to the most recent 
period under study in this thesis and the fact that this period also coincides with huge 
structural developments in the telephone industry, an analysis of the political context 
takes on an elevated role. While a succession of contradictory policy-making evolved 
in Argentina during the second half of the twentieth century; despite mitigating a 
surge in population growth and various difficulties in exploiting its inherent natural 
resources, Mexico’s policy-making (at least during the first half of this period) 
brought even greater relative economic success.
226 Halperin Donghi (1993).
227 Vemon (1963) provides some of the most detailed coverage of the overall political economy in Mexico in the 
first half of twentieth century.
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Peronism and Post-Peronism in Argentina
In Argentina, a problematic cycle ensued, whereby nationalist policy-making 
regimes (typically Peronist and hostile to the market and foreign trade) were replaced 
by liberal policy-making regimes (strong anti-Peronist) every few years. One of the 
most effective aspects of Peronist Party politics in the second half o f the twentieth 
century was the labour movement. Peron had continually sought to represent 
unorganised workers and with the aid of government intervention, wages and 
working conditions improved materially. Even so, the labour movement was never 
able to consistently influence the post-1955 regimes and their power diminished 
further by inter-union feuds. In acceptance of their reduced status, some factions of 
organised labour thought it would be best to try and work with, rather than against, 
the incumbent civilian or military regime. Organised labour was now divided into the 
anti-Peronist (supporters of Pedro Aramburu [1955-1958] and socialist/classist 
views), and pro-Peronist, which were further split between purists (remaining 
entirely loyal to the exiled Peron) and neo-Peronists (who favoured cooperation with 
the government).
The administrations of Eduardo Lonardi (September -  November 1955) and 
Aramburu found it very difficult to overcome and re-establish the macroeconomic 
stability necessary for sustained growth. However state intervention was required 
especially since foreign investment was lacking.228 During the tenure of Arturo 
Frondizi (1958-1962), the labour unions that had lost strength after Peron began to 
revive and they worked on rationalising and restructuring state entities, which 
induced a military response against the strikers. Frondizi faced a difficult situation as 
he was caught between the Peronists on the one hand, and the military on the other. 
The military was beginning to claim a greater degree of autonomy compared to the 
constitutional government. Stronger economic growth during this period would have 
eased these political pressures, but despite Frondizi making some of the severest 
adjustment plans in Argentina, fundamental economic change was not attainable in 
this context of chronic instability. For his radicalism, he faced some 32 attempted 
military coups, before he was overthrown. Jose Maria Guido took the transitional
228 Gerschunoff and Llach (2003), Lewis P. H. (1990), Rapoport (2000).
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presidency (1962-1963), for a period which revealed internal military conflicts and 
further economic deterioration.229
President Illia, from the Radical party, followed and was determined to bring back 
electoral freedom and end military repression toward the government. Argentina 
experienced strong economic expansion for the following couple of years before the 
recovery began to weaken by mid-1965. By this point, the Peronists had rebuilt a 
great deal of their political base and their power was based firmly on the labour 
unions, but now, ‘...the labour leader had begun to imagine a Peronism without 
Peron’.231 The Peronist movement tried to remerge in the political sphere, but at the 
threat of this, the military overthrew Illia and swore in the new military president, 
Juan Ongania (1966-1970)232 The overthrow of Illia’s constitutional government had 
media backing, as journalists (loyal to the military) took it upon themselves to inform 
the masses that the armed forces and labour unions were the real factors of power in 
politics. Ongania began his tenure by attacking the threatening cultural revolution 
that had started over a decade earlier. The targets included universities, and the 
cosmopolites of Buenos Aires; it was a project of ‘cultural and ideological 
purification’. The labour unions long opposed Ongania’s economic policies also.
Halperin Donghi argues that ‘Argentina’s path through dictatorship and re- 
democratisation was more turbulent than any other’ country.234 The military already 
was giving up the idea o f control of the national government in 1970, and by 1972 
Alejandro Lanusse’s (1971-1973) efforts to stop Peron from returning from exile 
would prove to be in vain. Meanwhile Peronism had returned to Argentina in early 
1973, as Hector Campora (May -  July 1973) ascended to the presidency. Despite 
merely asserting that he was holding the fort as it were, until Peron returned, he 
attempted (in a notably short space of time) to implement wide reaching reforms that 
would ingeniously try and unite the entire nation. It was a big task and an even 
bigger one in the face of escalating violence, and although it brought a significant 
economic boom in the early part of Raul Lastiri’s tenure (July -  October 1973), its
229 Halperin Donghi (1993).
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid., p.316.
232 Collier D. (1980).
233 Halperin Donghi (1993), p.318.
234 Ibid., p.354.
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effect quickly faded. In 1973 the long awaited return of Peron happened. Although 
divisions had grown among his supporters, increased political violence paved a path 
for his return. Peron retained his established truce with the Radical party and put 
together a ruling Justicialista coalition, incorporating a wider range o f political 
groups. The fact that the Peronist Youth had received almost an equal amount of 
legislative slots as the Peronist labour unions induced some inter-coalition conflict. 
This meant that Peron had to politically isolate the Peronist left, and get rid of the 
Justicialista coalition’s left wing elements.235 During the May Day celebrations of 
1974, it was clear how divided Peronism had become. Moreover, organised labour 
seemingly posed a greater threat now than the insurgent left.
Peronism saw a number of structural changes over time but they were even more 
pronounced after 1983, when the PJ became relatively more open, allowing its 
supporters to have greater input in the presidential selection processes. However, the 
democratic start weakened under Menem from 1989, who ascended to power on 
vague promises, slogans rather than defined policies and an anti-UCR vote more than 
anything else.238 Although the PJ was theoretically ‘in power’; in a very short space 
of time, Menem departed from the party’s traditional nationalistic policies favoured 
by Peron, and instead ruled by continual issuance of decrees of urgency and 
necessity (thereby reducing the credibility of the political system). A lack of party 
democracy and discipline ensured that Menem retained the presidency through
235 For a general Latin American insight into the political left, see Castafieda J. G., Utopia Unarmed: The Latin 
American Left after the Cold War New York, Alfred A. Knopf (1993). For studies on the Argentine political left 
(especially in the inter-war period), see Tamarin D. The Argentine Labor Movement, 1930-1945: A Study in the 
Origins o f  Peronism Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press (1985), Munck R., Argentina from  
Anarchism to Peronism London, Zed Books (1987), and James (1969). For analysis of the Mexican left, Carr is 
one of the most prominent academic figures. A useful account of the whole twentieth century can be found in 
Carr B., Marxism and Communism in Twentieth-Century Mexico Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press (1992), 
but for a more detailed view of the specific periods, see Carr B., El Movimiento Obrero y  la Politico en Mexico, 
191CL1929 Mexico D.F., Ediciones Era (1981). For the earlier period refer to Fuentes M. M. and Araujo O. R., El 
Partido de la Intemacional Comunista, 1919-1943 Mexico D.F., Ediciones ‘El caballito’ (1973), between 1919- 
1943 see Le6n S. and Marvan I., La Close Obrera en la Historia de Mexico: En el Cardenismo 1934-1940 
Mexico D.F., Siglo Veintiuno Editores (1985). For the Cardenas years and for the latter part of the twentieth 
century see Carr B. and Montoya A., The Mexican Left, the popular Movements, and the Politics o f  Austerity San 
Diego, Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California (1986), and Carr B., ‘The Creation of the 
Mexican Socialist Party’ Journal o f  Communist Studies 4.3 (1988): 339-341.
236 One symbolic indication was the way in which the exit of the Peronist Youth (plus sympathisers) from the 
celebrations was greeted by a wave of noisy insults.
237 Halperin Donghi (1993).
238 When Menem came to power in 1989, this was the first time in 70 years that an opposition party had won the 
elections.
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targeted corrupt alliances. His tenure was testament to the instability of Peronism in
' J ' l Q
power and specifically marked a return to populism and authoritarianism.
Throughout the period, it is apparent that Argentina’s interventionist policies not 
only failed to achieve the desired economic and social objectives, but also 
encouraged greater inefficiency in the administrative and production processes. Rent- 
seeking was rife, inequality of income increased and a series of economic failings 
generated substantial social unrest. Neither the neo-structuralist accumulationist 
strategy nor the neo-authoritarian internationalist strategy that followed solved 
Argentina’s economic woes. In Argentina, the UCR and the PJ in practice held a 
duopoly over politics from the 1940s to the 1990s. The exclusion of other political 
parties was most clearly underpinned by the loose structure of the parties. Although 
Argentinian politics had somewhat ‘opened up’ in this period, this process did not 
come without problems. It could be claimed that the political history o f Argentina 
over this period was essentially a story of unresolved conflict. Regional conflict at 
the end of the nineteenth century, changed into social and political conflict at the turn 
of the twentieth century, which quickly assumed a class dimension and became intra­
sectoral conflict in the second half of the twentieth century. The conflicts may have 
changed in nature (and visibility) but they remained constant and unresolved, which 
ultimately contributed to the lack of consensus surrounding the role of the state in the 
economy as well as society. Politics of all the political parties had brought the role 
that the state played with the dominant interest groups into question, as the political 
class was somehow continually able to distribute and safeguard limited strategic 
resources to itself during the bad times and foster a facade of equality and democracy 
during the good times.240 With regard to the telephone sector over this period, it is 
likely that this story of Argentinian conflict (especially in the third quarter of the 
twentieth century) was potentially a constraining factor to rapid telephone diffusion 
(see chapter 3, section The Period o f Nationalisation).
239 Walter (1977), Alonso (2000), Hora (2001).
240 Halperin Donghi provides an invaluable analysis of Argentina’s political development over this period: 
Halperin Donghi T. H., Argentina, la Democracia de Masas Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidos (1983).
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The Evolution o f PRI Control o f Mexico (from I960)
In Mexico, the evolving nature of the PRI continued throughout the period of the 
‘Mexican economic miracle’ years as Aleman Valdes was succeeded by Ruiz 
Cortines and then by Lopez Mateos, who would together attempt to modernise 
Mexico while the economic backdrop remained favourable. In the second half of the 
century, most Mexicans accepted that the ruling developmentalists were not going to 
come good on their promise of social justice, but effectively they had achieved some 
sense of political stability (and therefore more time in power) as a result of their 
overall relative economic successes. Mexico’s overall achievements were unmatched 
largely across all of Latin America. These advances, however, also drove income 
inequality even higher to a level that could not be matched across Latin America.241 
These were the first signs that the PRI’s long lasting stability would not endure, and 
despite attempts to appease opposing political interests by offering some seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies, it was clear the PRI had no desire to surrender any o f their 
political power.242
The growing concentration and frustration of the middle classes in Mexico City 
ultimately escalated into serious violence in 1968. For the first time in some time, 
other large groups such as student bodies, rallied and although the bloody massacre 
of protestors that followed temporarily silenced political discord, these actions 
alienated the young political class of Mexico.244 Protests against the relative 
authoritarian style regime continued to demand change in the form of new faces, a 
more modem style of governing, and an open discussion on societal issues. Between 
1962 and 1971, not only did the protectionist policies of the state expand, it 
implicitly indicated that their path of development would ultimately cmmble. 245 
‘Stabilising growth’ was effectively over, and it was Echeverria who took on the task 
of steering Mexico out of the economic mess. Echeverria failed in his attempt to 
restore the stability witnessed during the Aleman Valdes era. He combined 
egalitarian and popular mobilisation with political liberalism to appease the
241 Halperin Donghi (1993).
242 For instance when Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-1970) became president in 1964, the PRI leaders rebutted any 
attempt at internal democratisation. Moreover, when the Partido de Accion Nacional managed to win some 
municipal elections in northern Mexico, the victories were quickly annulled.
243 C&rdenas (2000).
244 For interesting analysis of the student movement, see Ramirez R., El movimiento estudiantil de Mexico: Julio- 
diciembre de 1968 2 vols, Mexico D.F., Ediciones Era (1969).
245 Cardenas (2000).
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protesters’ demands (yet simultaneously ending the privileged positions o f the 
governing elite). Despite facing a natural slowdown in the economy and a loss of 
perceived invulnerability in his party, initially he was able to engage both the young 
protesting elite and the frustrated masses successfully as he took over the presidency 
in 1970. However during the 1970s, the PRI undertook an extensive review of its 
economic options, as other Latin American economies had, in light of greater public 
unrest.246 Echeverria had become the most prominent critic of the governmental 
institutions he oversaw. He attempted to mend the government’s relations with the 
masses by implementing the Cardenista heritage that had been popular in the 1930s, 
but given the marked discrepancies between the Mexico of 40 years ago and the 
Mexico of the 1970s he was destined to fail.
During the early 1970s, there was still much unrest from the middle classes of 
Mexico City, who were aligning themselves increasingly with the resurgent Partido 
de Action National (PAN party) (parts of industrial labour were also becoming 
estranged from the political establishment).247 Echeverria did not help matters when 
he authorised the landless to invade irrigated properties in the north, and rumours of 
a military coup quickly surfaced. Individuals grew unhappy with the PRI 
governments, which were seen more and more as authoritarian and undemocratic. 
Echeverria’s perception was that if the inherent economic problems were solved, 
people would be happy to continue with the PRI in power. Echeverria had failed to 
solve these problems, and in 1976 Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) relieved him of his 
duties.
Lopez Portillo oversaw an institutional revolution that moved toward discipline and 
austerity. The rules governing the ejido were reformed (unsuccessfully) although 
newly found oil reserves picked up some slack from a poorly productive agricultural 
sector. Under Lopez Portillo’s administration, the state sector expanded so rapidly 
that by the end of his tenure, the state indirectly controlled some 80% of the total 
economy. 248 During the 1980s, economic woes (a fall in oil revenue and debt 
accumulation etc.) turned into political tumult and the PAN party (with allegiances to
246 Halperin Donghi (1993).
247 Benjamin in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
248 Camp in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
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the church and conservative business) gained influence. In 1982, de la Madrid was 
elected into office, with particular backing from the northern part of the country, 
‘...where economic growth had always been less dependent on state patronage and 
the local elite were therefore less beholden to the government’.249 De la Madrid 
inherited a country that faced the worst recession since the Depression. 250 
Improvements finally came in 1987, revealing once again the resilience of Mexican 
political institutions. Politically, he had opened up the system to strong competition 
from opposing parties. He improved relations with the private sector and began to 
privatise many of the SOEs. As Halperin Donghi argues, the 1980s for Mexico, in 
many respects closely resembled the end of the Porfirio Diaz’s dictatorship, as the 
central government once again saw its power eroded along the northern border. This 
was because the improvements that had come to Mexico were primarily a result of 
the ever expanding maquiladora industry. Moreover, those in power (both de la 
Madrid and his successor Salinas de Gotari) were technocrats, equivalent to the
i
cientificos of the Porfirian times.
The changing outward nature of the PRI continued at rapid speed in this period and 
in the late 1980s despite a lack of credibility, the PRI sought for the first time to 
make their election of a presidential candidate more transparent. Salinas de Gortari 
was the chosen one, and despite winning by the smallest of margins, there were 
widespread accusations of electoral fraud. However, Salinas de Gotari managed to 
strengthen his hold on the presidency as time passed and eventually secured a larger 
portion of popular support. In surrendering some political dominance to the PAN,
he negotiated unrealistic dominance where he needed it most, such as in areas close 
to Mexico City. Salinas de Gotari continued the liberalisation programmes that de la 
Madrid had started and his defining moment in power was seemingly in signing the 
NAFTA deal (detailed earlier). This afforded him the opportunity to institutionalise 
his own economic reforms, as it was possible for him to inscribe them into this new 
internationally binding treaty. However, like many Mexican leaders, Salinas de
249 Halperin Donghi (1993), p.371.
250 To solve this, he faced the difficult task of lowering inflation and attracting foreign investment. Fiscal 
discipline and austerity remained the policies of choice and as the government reduced its subsidies on basic 
commodities, real wages and employment both moved swiftly to begin with.
251 Halperin Donghi (1993).
252 Sherman J. W., ‘The Mexican Miracle and its Collapse’ in Meyer M. C. and Beezley W. H., The Oxford 
History o f  Mexico New York, Oxford University Press (2000).
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Gotari was subjected to widespread accusations of corruption and more unfortunately 
in regard to the assassination of a senior PRI leader in 1994. Despite this, the PRI 
managed to retain the presidency until the polls, where finally they would surrender 
political control.
The PRI’s demise was a long time in coming but when it finally did come it was 
dramatic. The loss of the presidency caused the party to make some harsh revisions 
to its practices, one of which was the decision that the next presidential candidate 
was required to hold elected office. Halperin Donghi directs our attention to the 
continual staying power of the PRI, who effectively had lost their political 
stranglehold on Mexico in 1968.254 Despite the erosion of their authority they still 
retained economic influence and the presidency for many years before they were 
voted out of office. Moreover, the fact that the PRI was a strong political force 
almost as far back as the Mexican Revolution was a dominant factor in Mexico’s 
stabilising success and so too, was the 1917 Constitution, as it placed few constraints 
on presidents.255 This was potentially an important factor in determining the success 
of ICT diffusion in Mexico.
Latin American economic history during much of the twentieth century was 
governed by three main types of states: the economically/socially active state, 
involved in interventionism and welfarism (1930s-60s); the populist state, involved 
in ISI/stabilising growth (middle of the twentieth century) and the market-friendly, 
neo-populist state involved in securing international acceptance again (from the 
1970s). Argentina and Mexico adopted these strategies with varying degrees of 
success and the role of the state is thought to have been the differentiating factor. 
Although the degree of power of the PRI in Mexico varied with time, it nonetheless 
was a more politically stable system than that experienced in Argentina for much of 
the period. One of the few limitations to their executive powers was the sexenio, 
although there was such centralisation of policy making that presidencialismo’s 
inter-temporal agreements were reached between incumbent and successive
253 A rule that disqualified all the PRI presidential candidates since the 1970s.
254 In October 1968, the Mexican army violently suppressed student demonstrations in Mexico D.F.. This made 
the urban elite, intellectuals and some government officials aware of the dubious moral stance of an authoritarian 
state that required violence against students to maintain its position. See Halperin Donghi (1993).
255 Haber etal. (2003).
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administrations, meaning that policies were not only stable but coordinated. 256 
Although it may seem that Argentina had a stronger economic platform to leverage 
from over the better part of telegraph and telephone diffusion, it could be argued that 
perhaps the nature of the Mexican political domain afforded Mexico greater 
opportunity to implement ICT diffusion-enhancing policies.
1.2 The State and the Role of ICT in Latin America
The notion that the state matters particularly resonated in the two case studies under 
consideration. Ordinarily state action is expected to take on an enhanced role in 
developing economies. It is important to understand the roots of the relationship 
between the state and the given technology, against the historical and economic 
backdrop. This section examines the link between state formation and the role of 
technology across countries in general, and then focuses specifically on this 
relationship in Argentina and Mexico.
In most countries, the provision of telecommunication services comes under the 
aegis of the state. The telegraph and the telephone are considered to be types of 
consumer goods with characteristics of public goods. As they provide positive 
externalities these should be more easily available. Theoretically, the profit-seeking 
private sector will not necessarily provide these goods most efficiently, given the 
generic problems of ‘competitive inefficiency’ in developing economies. The high 
costs of infrastructure, and necessary homogeneity of the network to ensure 
interconnection of the national network, as well as the need to provide universal 
service, are key reasons why the telecommunication sector is considered a natural 
monopoly. Given its strategic importance, the solution is therefore often found in 
government supply, and consequently these goods tend to be monopolies of the state. 
If there is lack of competition in the market due to private monopolies, theoretically, 
a nationalised monopoly is a better choice as it can ensure more efficient service. 
Alternatively, a government may subsidise their production in the private sector. 
Evans rationalises that as long as the market is not characterised by the text-book 
model of competition, the role of the state will be important. Moreover, Evans
256 The sexenio is the six year term limit of the Mexican Presidency. Presidencialismo is the system whereby all 
the political and executive power lies with the president.
257 Evans et al. (1985).
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argues that relaxing the assumption of competitive markets eliminates the market’s 
ability to stimulate or discipline entrepreneurial behaviour. Although the importance 
of the role of the state in allowing for successful diffusion is not necessarily a 
revolutionary idea, one of the aims of the thesis is to demonstrate in later chapters the 
extent of the dominant effect it can have on the diffusion process.
The state can act as a substitute to typical diffusion drivers since ‘with public 
enterprises the state becomes an active participant in production and market 
exchange and partially supersedes the way in which the market meshes knowledge, 
incentives, and economic power’. In Gerschenkron’s theory of delayed 
industrialisation, Germany and Russia followed a similar path, as the state acted as 
an institutional substitute for the capitalist class, in their effort to catch up with 
England. 259 Similarly Amsden argues that Korea’s industrialisation was closely 
linked to the pervasive government intervention which allowed the country to 
overcome the institutional and skill disadvantages associated with being a late 
industrialiser, once again placing the government in the role of substitute.260 
Durkheim sustains that the market needs a set of normative underpinnings to 
function orderly.261 While North adds, that resources will not be allocated efficiently, 
unless these normative underpinnings receive institutional guarantees.262 In the two 
case studies of this thesis it could be argued that the normative underpinnings were 
substituted to a certain extent due to the engaged role of the state.
State Formation and the Telegraph and the Telephone in Argentina and Mexico 
In Latin America, the provision of the railways, and then the telegraph (and to some 
extent the telephone) were key facilitators for the formation of the state, as these 
technologies allowed for national integration and the consolidation of power, as well 
as aiding economic development. Given the political implications, it is evident why 
the governments across Latin America (and in Argentina and Mexico specifically)
258 Ibid., p.57.
259 Gerschenkron (1962).
260 Amsden A., A sia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation New York, Oxford University Press 
(1989).
261 Durkheim E., On the Division o f Labour in Society (Translated by George Simpson) New York, The Free 
Press (1981).
262 North D. C., ‘A Framework for Analysing the State in Economic History’ Explorations in Economic History 
Elsevier 16.3 (1979): 249-259.
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were keen to finance and drive their expansion.263 When the telegraph first emerged 
in the 1850s, Latin America was plagued by a significant degree of political 
instability. Argentina and Mexico were characterised specifically by a great deal of 
‘disorder’. Having recently gained independence, Mexico became obsessed with 
protecting its borders, while Argentina faced a continual power-struggle between 
Buenos Aires and the provinces at least until 1880. The continuous internal struggle 
and civil wars in Argentina in the post independence period meant that for four 
decades, it constrained the formation of a national state. Consequently, the political 
and social environment in which the telegraph diffused in these ‘new’ regions was 
characterised by the need for national unification and state consolidation. There was 
a common need across the two countries for the state to centralise power and 
establish ‘order’. As a result, efforts were geared towards state building in the two 
countries, as they adopted institutional tools which would allow for the consolidation 
and legitimisation of their power, one of which was the improvement of 
communications. Oszlak points out that in order to achieve progress, order had to be 
established. The telegraph was thus a means to achieve state building, and state 
actions were critical in order to achieve these infrastructural changes. The period that 
ensued would be referred to as the era of ‘Order and Progress’.264
It is interesting to note that despite Argentina’s and Mexico’s economic disparities 
during the period of telegraph diffusion, the administrations in the two countries 
placed a similar emphasis on the telegraph, as they were well aware of its importance 
in aiding state formation. For a large country like Argentina, the telegraph facilitated 
wide-reaching control and generally became an invaluable resource. The oligarchic 
states in the two countries were keen to assert control over the sector early on, and its 
expansion was largely driven by domestic political considerations. Provision was not 
exclusively handled by the state. Instead concessions were handed out to private, 
provincial, and railway companies, in order to mitigate the states’ lack of funding 
and desire to build a network rapidly. The state remained a large consumer of 
telegraph services, and although they offered state subsidies, this was in part 
effectively paying for their heavy official use (which was free). The government also 
had priority use, while the private providers extracted extremely high rents from the
263 De la Pefia J., Historia de las Telecomunicaciones Barcelona, Editorial Ariel (2003).
264 Oszlak (1982).
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general public and provided a relatively poor service.265 It is important to emphasise 
that the telegraph, although widely publicly available, was first and foremost 
perceived as a tool for national security and for consolidating the power of the state. 
Its role as a means of public communication was secondary. Therefore it was not so 
much that the governments’ policies had failed in developing a universal national 
network at the beginning, but rather that this was not the initial goal.
With regard to the provision of the telephone, when the technology was first 
introduced, Argentina’s and Mexico’s governments had heavily invested in the 
telegraph. Hence the telephone was commonly perceived as a potential threat to the 
already widespread telegraph system, which to all intents and purposes was a 
‘successful’ means of communication that facilitated their rule. Consequently the 
administrations in Argentina and Mexico regarded the telephone as a secondary 
means of electrical communication. It certainly was not viewed as imperative to 
national security as the telegraph. The lack o f initial governmental interest was 
apparent as no steps were taken to make the telephone a state monopoly initially, nor 
did they engage in offering state subsidies (as with the telegraph). The telephone’s 
successful expansion was a less pressing matter on the governmental agenda; 
accordingly, governments assumed minimal responsibility for the regulation of the 
telephone companies and were happy merely to grant licenses.267 As a result, despite 
relatively healthy economic growth and significant foreign investment in the two 
countries at the start of telephone diffusion, this had a negligible impact on the early 
years of the process. Only once perceptions began to change towards the telephone, 
with the Argentinian and Mexican governments taking a more prominent role in its 
diffusion (through nationalisation, then privatisation), did a significant spurt in its 
diffusion occur.
265 Noyola L., La Raza de la Hebra: Historia del Telegrafo Morse en Mexico Puebla, Universidad Autonoma de 
Puebla (2004), De la Pena (2003), Bieber L., Las Relaciones Economicas de Bolivia con Alemania 1880-1920 
Berlin, Colloquium (1982), Telecom, Historia de las Telecomunicaciones en Colombia Bogota, Telecom (1970).
266 Oszlak (1981), Baur C., ‘The Foundations of Telegraphy and Telephony in Latin America’ Journal o f  
Communication 44.4 (1994): 9-25.
267 Berthold V. M., History o f  the Telephone and Telegraph in the Argentine Republic, 1857-1921 New York, 
AT&T (1921a), Berthold V. M., History o f  the Telephone and Telegraph in Colombia, 1865-1921 New York, 
AT&T (1921b), Berthold V. M., History o f  the Telephone and Telegraph in Uruguay, 1886-1925 New York, 
AT&T (1925), Tesler M., La Telefonia Argentina, Su Otra Historia Buenos Aires, Editorial Rescate (1990), 
P6rez R. M., Los Telefonistas Frente a la Crisis y  la Reconversion Mexico D.F., Editorial Nuestro Tiempo (1989), 
Brock G. W., The Telecommunications Industry, the Dynamics o f  Market Structure Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press (1981).
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Theoretically private providers will not supply service to less profitable (rural) areas, 
and given the fact that the market was ‘imperfect’, the case for state intervention, as 
argued by Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, was even more significant to ensure 
distributional goals.268 Whether this happened is not important, but rather the concept 
is a theoretical one: arguing that due to the nature of the technologies under study 
and given the environment of the two countries in which diffusion took place, the 
enhanced role of the state was logical. Having said this, it is essential not to ‘...fall 
into the functionalist trap of assuming that because the state is “necessary” it will 
therefore have the inclination and capacity to fill the required role’.269 This argument 
is explored in chapter 5 (see sections 5.1.1 The Telegraph and 5.1.2 The Telephone). 
Furthermore, Evans et al. assert that ‘even if state managers hit on an essentially 
correct policy, they will not be able to implement it unless they have at their disposal, 
previously constructed bureaucratic machinery with appropriate capacities for 
action’.270 Hence state action can potentially positively and negatively impact the 
ICT diffusion process. Given its central role in this thesis’ hypothesis, the state’s 
ability to drive diffusion is examined throughout.
1.3 The Joint Supply of the Railways and the Telegraph
An important connection exists between the railways and the telegraph that is both 
mutually beneficial and present throughout the entire diffusion process. The 
telegraph was essential for the efficient operation of the railways (not just in Latin 
America) by allowing railway dispatchers to control the movement of trains, 
guaranteeing both the safety of the system and observation of the timetable. Likewise, 
the railways promoted the diffusion of the telegraph; as telegraph stations were set up 
along railway routes and as the right-of-way had been cleared it was easier to set up 
additional poles to carry the telegraph wires. The continuously reinforcing 
relationship cemented the railway’s importance to the telegraph’s future diffusion 
particularly in large ‘new’ countries (such as Argentina and Mexico), irrespective of 
whether or not the railways were built by the state. Hence with the expansion of the 
railways came the expansion o f the telegraph network. Much research has been done 
on the railways, given their importance and the large amounts of foreign capital they
268 Evans et al. (1985).
269 Ibid., p.46.
270 Ibid., p.61.
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attracted, with Lewis and Coatsworth providing particularly useful accounts for the
971two countries under consideration.
Internationally, Britain is perhaps one of the best examples where the development of 
the telegraph was almost immediately accompanied by the global expansion of the 
railway network: as early as 1839, railway construction became closely associated 
with telegraph expansion. Promoters of the telegraph concentrated significant 
amounts of effort upon gaining the interests of railway companies, for both financing 
and demand for the technology. Many developed countries (European, then later the 
U.S.) followed the British example by running railway and telegraph systems parallel 
to each other.272 Meanwhile in Latin America the telegraph’s primary use was not 
public communication (but rather state communication). In Europe once it was 
introduced, its provision became much more responsive to the needs of the public. 
For much of the world, in fact, the primary rationale for state control of the telegraph 
was due to the shared characteristics of a public good; the government could 
theoretically protect general public interests. However, sole construction of the 
network was not a financially viable option for the governments in Argentina or in 
Mexico.
In Argentina and Mexico, as in the rest of Latin America, the close relationship 
between the telegraph and the railways prevailed, mutually developing their financial
97^and commercial markets through integration. The economic and social utility of an 
efficient communications network is important for any country, although this was 
magnified in Latin America due to the vastness of its terrain and its sparse population. 
The telegraph and the railway were thus quickly identified as fundamental 
instruments to civilise the nation, unite the different regions and eventually play a 
key role in industrialisation and the export-led growth economy. The first telegraph 
was introduced in Argentina as a necessary tool for the first railway in 1857 (it
271 Lewis C. M., British Railways in Argentina, 1857-1914 London, The Athlone Press (1983), Coatsworth 
(1981). Also see Goodwin P. B., ‘The Central Argentine Railway and the Economic Development of Argentina, 
1854-1881 ’ Hispanic American Historical Review 51A  (1977): 613-632.
272 The railways exclusively used the telegraph system to begin with, as Britain’s first commercial public 
telegraph did not open until 1845.
273 Reggini H. C., Los Caminos de la Palabra: Las Telecomunicaciones de Morse al Internet Buenos Aires, 
Ediciones Galapago (1996).
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belonged to the Western Railway of Buenos Aires).274 It was not until 1860 that the 
railway line was extended and the first public telegraph line was opened 
simultaneously, parallel to the railway, following the British example. 275 The 
Mexican experience, by contrast, seems closer to the U.S. The first Mexican 
telegraph was built by Juan de la Granja with private foreign capital, and the 
telegraph was only years later, in 1875, linked to the railway companies. However, 
because the telegraph network in Mexico took longer to develop in tandem with the 
railways, it does not necessarily follow that once it did, it was not even more 
successful than in Argentina. Indeed, in Mexico, the government actually managed to 
take greater advantage of this relationship earlier on (see chapter 3, section The Role 
o f the State: the Impact o f New Laws).
Argentina’s popularity, especially among British investors, grew during 1907-1913, 
and from 1907 to 1916 the railway network expanded by more than 50%. Telegraph 
diffusion grew in line with this, as the majority of British-owned lines (between 69% 
and 80% of the national total from 1900-1914) initiated large-scale building 
programmes throughout Argentina. 276 Initially disorganised telegraph networks 
developed in both Argentina and Mexico, as they were constructed simultaneously 
by the federal and provincial government, private enterprises and the railway 
companies. It was hardly reminiscent of the typical European model, where the 
government alone coordinated all efforts, or indeed of the U.S. model, where service 
was privatised entirely, with little government involvement. Unsurprisingly, the 
administrations’ decisions in Argentina and Mexico to employ a strategy mix
7 7 7resulted in partial regulation, shared financing and a slow and intermittent service.
The focus of the chapter now shifts, and concentrates on addressing technology 
diffusion more directly. The roots of technology diffusion are explored first,
274 Bahia M. B., Los Telegrafos de la Republica Argentina Estudio Tecnico presentado al Director General, 
Buenos Aires, Imprenta La Universidad de J. N. Klingelfuss y Cia (1891). Reggini H. C., Sarmiento y  las 
Telecomunicaciones: La Obsesion del Hilo Buenos Aires, Ediciones Galapago (1997). Berthold (1921a).
275 Zalduendo, Wright, and Lewis C.M. provide particularly comprehensive accounts of the railway expansion in 
Argentina: Zalduendo E. A., Libras y  Rieles Buenos Aires, Editorial El Coloquio (1975), Wright W. R., British- 
owned Railways in Argentina: Their Effect on Economic Nationalism 1854-1948 Austin, University of Texas 
Press (1972), Lewis C. M., ‘Problems of Railway Development in Argentina, 1857-1890’ Inter-American 
Economic Affairs 22.2 (1968): 55-75, and Lewis C. M. (1983).
276 Argentina accounted for more of British overseas investment than any other country in 1910, the majority of 
which went toward British owned Argentinian railroad development. See Lewis C. M. (1983), Lewis C. M. 
(2002).
277 Bahia M. B. (1891).
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followed by a review of the relevant approaches that explain the differences in ICT 
diffusion rates across countries.
1.4 The History of Technology Diffusion
Diffusion is defined in this thesis as the process by which an innovation is adopted 
by the members of a social system. Research on technology diffusion started as a 
series of independent intellectual enclaves. Diffusion research was divided by 
discipline and it was not until the 1960s that the similarities of diffusion across 
disciplines became widely recognised. Today boundaries between such traditions 
have been broken down, and there has been a complete convergence. There is a 
significant degree of commonality regarding the diffusion of most innovations, 
because the pattern of diffusion almost always follows an s-shaped distribution 
curve.279 In the beginning of the twentieth century, Gabriel Tarde became the pioneer 
of the study of diffusion of innovations, dubbed ‘...the main European forefather of 
the diffusion field’.280 It was another 20 years, however, before further studies on 
diffusion followed. These were few and predominantly carried out in the field of 
anthropology. It was not until the 1940s that a real interest in the diffusion of 
innovations developed, particularly after Ryan and Gross’ study, which established 
the original formulation of the diffusion paradigm, in considering not only why, but 
how, an innovation actually diffused.281 During the 1950s studies proliferated across 
the U.S. and in the 1960s interest began to arise in developing countries in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. Research increased significantly from the mid-1960s, 
testament to the fact that innovation diffusion started to be viewed as ‘...an integral
787aspect of efforts to promote economic development’. Indeed, research began to 
reveal the specific importance of telecommunications, as infrastructure for economic
78^and social development.
278 Different diffusion research traditions include: anthropology, agricultural economics, communications, 
education, early sociology, geography, general economics, general sociology, industrial engineering, marketing & 
management, public health and medical sociology, psychology, public administration and political science, rural 
sociology and statistics.
279 In 1903, Gabriel Tarde was the first to observe that innovations diffused following an s-shaped curve 
distribution. Tarde G., The Laws o f  Imitation New York, University of Chicago Press (1969).
280 Rogers E. M., Diffusion o f  Innovations 4th edition, New York, The Free Press (1995), p.40.
281 Ryan B. and Gross N. C., ‘The Diffusion of Hybrid Seed Com in Iowa Communities’ Rural Sociology 8 
(1943): 15-24.
282 Brown L. A., Innovation Diffusion, A New Perspective London, Methuen & Co. (1981) p. 197.
283 Wellenius B. and Stem P. A., Implementing Reforms in the Telecommunications Sector: Lessons from  
Experience Washington D.C., The World Bank (1994).
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Initially, as Rogers and Shoemaker astutely observe, diffusion studies in developing 
countries were carried out by North American or European researchers, or 
researchers from developing countries who had studied in the U.S. or Europe.284 
Consequently, these studies were characterised by, as these authors described it, a 
‘made in America’ stamp. In other words, these studies generally portrayed the 
diffusion process in developing nations as similar to their counterpart in the 
industrialised nations. Even by the early 1970s, almost nothing of a critical nature 
had been written with regard to this field of research, and ‘such absence of critical 
viewpoints may have indeed been the greatest weakness of diffusion research’.285 
The late 1970s marked the beginnings of genuine criticisms on diffusion research; 
questions arose about the importance of culture and different socio-cultural 
conditions in developing countries compared to the U.S. or Europe. This in turn 
sparked the debate as to whether these two types of countries could be treated in the 
same manner, since innovations may diffuse differently in developing countries 
compared to the developed world.
ICT diffusion in particular, which is the component within the general field of 
technology diffusion research that this thesis is concerned with, surfaced during the 
193Os/1940s. However, it did not become important until the 1960s. In fact, in 1962 
only around 1% of total diffusion research studies were on technological innovations, 
and by 1995 this had grown to 12%, or the equivalent of 484 publications.286 This is 
shown in figure 1.1, which displays the number of published studies on diffusion 
research since 1940.
284 Rogers E. M. and Shoemaker F. F., Communication o f  Innovations: A Cross Cultural Approach New York, 
Free Press (1971).
285 Rogers (1995), p.99.
286 Ibid.
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R esearch Studies on Diffusion R esearch  Studies on T echnology Diffusion
4,000
g 3,000
2,500
« 2,000
ft 1,000 
I  500
1940 1950 1960 1970 19901980
Year
Source: Rogers (1995).
From figure 1.1, it is evident that historically research on technology diffusion has 
been relatively light and this gives further justification for the subject matter o f this 
thesis, since there is obviously scope to add to the existing knowledge. During the 
1970s communication scholars began to investigate the diffusion o f  technological 
innovations throughout the U.S., applying various methods; sometimes using the 
communities themselves as the adopting units. By the 1980s these scholars began to 
research the diffusion o f  the new communication technologies such as cable 
television and e-mail systems. This thesis is categorised as communications research 
and within that broader field, it is part o f the diffusion o f innovations research that 
concerns itself with the rate o f  adoption o f innovations in different social systems: 
specifically in Argentina and Mexico.
1.5 Review of the Approaches to Different Rates of ICT Diffusion
This section provides the context from which to understand the potential explanatory 
factors behind the diffusion o f  the telegraph and the telephone in Argentina and 
Mexico. A survey o f the literature in regard to the approaches that can explain 
different ICT diffusion rates across countries is detailed below. It is important to note 
that much o f the literature review is modem-centric simply because much o f the 
relevant and insightful literature is recent. For simplicity, the principal explanatory 
factors are divided into four main approaches; the economic approach (which 
dominates the literature), the social approach, the natural endowments approach and 
the institutional approach. First, each approach is defined, followed by an exploration
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of their merits and the presentation of their main empirical findings. The factors 
within each approach were then subdivided into two groups, supply and demand. The 
supply side factors are those influencing the direct infrastructure build-out (network 
expansion). These affect diffusion since the larger the telegraph network, the greater 
its availability and therefore its capacity for usage in society. The other set of factors, 
drive telegraph diffusion by directly affecting consumer demand.
1.5.1 The Economic Approach
The economic approach encompasses those scholars who affirm that economic 
factors are the fundamental considerations in understanding the different rates of ICT 
diffusion across countries. In their work, factors such as GDP per capita, urbanisation, 
and human capital are seen as key explanatory variables. The supporters of this 
approach include the pre-eminent scholar, Everett Rogers, who formalised the 
renowned ‘Diffusion of Innovations’ in 1962.287 The economic approach is perhaps 
the most commonly explored technique, and there is extensive evidence supporting 
the central role of economic factors in determining the rate of diffusion o f a new 
technology. In general, a crucial deficiency of many of these studies is that they tend 
to focus solely on developed countries and therefore generalisations with regard to 
global diffusion are restricted to the developed world. Meanwhile, studies that do 
explore the effect of economic factors on developing countries tend to focus on 
modem ICTs.288 This again means that one must be careful when making
287 Rogers (1995). Other advocates include Hargattai and Norris who claim that economic activity is the key 
behind cross-country differences in the rate of diffusion of the internet: Hargattai E., ‘Weaving the Western Web: 
Explaining Differences in Internet Connectivity among the OECD Countries’ Telecommunications Policy 23.10- 
11 (1999):701-718, Norris P., Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet 
Worldwide Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2001). Other well known advocates of the economic 
approach are Griliches and Mansfield, although not in the context of ICT diffusion, they are still important as the 
pioneers in the diffusion field. Griliches used a logistical growth model on a cross-regional study in the U.S. on 
hybrid com (1932-56) and shows that different diffusion rates can be explained by economic variables, and that 
the impact of social factors will cancel each other out. See Griliches Z., ‘Hybrid Com: An Exploration in the 
Economics of Technological Change’ Econometrica 25.4 (1957): 501-522, Mansfield E., ‘Technical Change and 
the Rate of Imitation’ Econometrica 29.4 (1961): 741-66, Mansfield E., ‘The Speed of Response of Firms to New 
Techniques’ Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 77.2 (1963a): 290-311 and Mansfield E., ‘Intra-firm Rates of 
Diffusion of an Innovation’ The Review o f  Economics and Statistics 45.4 (1963b): 348-359.
288 Scholars that explored ICT diffusion in developing countries include Rouvinen, and Kiiski and Pohjola. 
Rouvinen studied mobile telephones and divided his sample, into one with only developed countries, and one 
with both developed and developing countries. Rouvinen P., ‘Diffusion of Digital Mobile Telephony: Are 
Developing Countries Different?’ Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006): 46-63. Kiiski and Pohjola examined the 
diffusion of the internet across both developed and developing countries. Kiiski S. and Pohjola M., ‘Cross­
country diffusion of the Internet’ Information Economics and Policy 14 (2000): 297-310. Antonelli’s work is also 
interesting, he examined the diffusion of advanced ICTs, such as the capacity of electronic switching, across 44 
developing countries in 1977-87: Antonelli C., The Diffusion o f  Advanced Telecommunications in Developing 
Countries Paris, OECD (1991), and Antonelli C., ‘Investment and Adoption in Advanced Telecommunications’ 
Journal o f  Economic Behaviour and Organisation 20 (1993): 227-45. Caselli and Coleman looked at the cross 
country diffusion of personal computers across 155 developed and developing countries from 1970-90. Caselli F.
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generalisations about traditional ICTs, such as the telegraph or the telephone. Studies 
with large representative samples are preferred, although problems can arise 
precisely because of this. Accounting for differences in diffusion rates across as 
many as 184 countries for instance (as done by Dekimpe, Parker and Sarvary) , 
means one can end up with a more limited set of testable explanatory variables due 
to the difficulties in sourcing a complete data set for such a large number of
290countries.
Economic Factors that Influence Consumption Growth
Within the economic approach, the key factors that tend to influence consumption 
are GDP per capita, network externalities and education as explored below.
Gross Domestic Product per capita
The extent of economic development/wealth is the best documented and most 
empirically tested economic variable responsible for the varying rates of ICT 
diffusion.291 Often GDP or GNP per capita are used as proxies to represent this factor 
and they will be part of most empirical analysis on ICT diffusion. However, the fact 
that ‘national income is the single most obvious influence’ does not mean it is de 
facto the most important.292 In analysing a range of disciplines, it was Rogers who 
originally asserted that countries with higher income levels will tend to experience a 
more rapid diffusion rate of new technologies.293 Although Rogers’ work is not 
focussed purely on ICT, it is essential reading for any researcher looking at the 
diffusion of an innovation, as he is one of the most prominent scholars o f the wider 
field within which this study sits.
and Coleman W. J., ‘Cross-country Technology Diffusion: The Case of Computers’ American Economic Review
91.2 (2001): 328-335.
289 Dekimpe, Parker and Sarvary examined the diffusion of the mobile telephone across both developed and 
developing countries (184 countries). See Dekimpe M.G., Parker P. M. and Sarvary M., ‘Staged Estimation of 
International Diffusion Models: An Application to Global Cellular Telephone Adoption’ Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 57 (1998): 105-132.
290 As commented upon in Singh J., ‘Measurement Issues in Cross-national Research’ Journal o f  International 
Business Studies 26 (1995): 597-618.
291 Wealth is treated here purely in terms of economic wealth.
292 Foreman-Peck J., ‘Competition and Performance in the UK Telecommunications Industry’ 
Telecommunication Policy 9.3 (1985): 215-228, p.219.
293 Rogers (1995).
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The importance of income is extensively researched, and possibly some o f the most 
useful studies are those of Dekimpe, Parker and Sarvary.294 In their 1998 study, 
which looked at mobile telephone penetration between 1972 and 1992, they found 
that wealth and ethnic homogeneity promoted telephone diffusion across their 
sample. They later discovered in their study in 2000 that network externalities were 
also key. Their study is useful since it engages in both insightful qualitative and 
rigorous quantitative analysis, providing consistent and substantial empirical 
evidence throughout, whilst affirming Rogers’ earlier findings, in the context of ICT 
diffusion.295 Dekimpe et al.’s is also one of the few studies that look separately at 
both the determinants of adoption and the subsequent rate of diffusion, as opposed to 
treating them as one.296 Further, for comparative purposes, their extensive country 
sample size and unique application of sample matching, allow for powerful
*707conclusions. Studies applying global databases, such as Dekimpe et al.’s, provide a 
higher quality of result as they ensure the largest possible variation in both the 
dependent and independent variables. Gatignon and Robertson, and Mahajan and 
Muller, test similar variables to Dekimpe et al. and arrive at the same conclusions 
with regard to ICT, although they use smaller samples, and Mahajan and Muller
7QRfocus on developed countries only.
Another influential study is that of Littlechild, whose informed opinion -  as the first 
official regulator of the U.K. telephone system -  clearly commands a great deal of 
respect.299 Littlechild used data across 99 countries in his 1975 study and although 
narrowly focused on regression analysis, it adds further support to this argument.
294 Dekimpe et al. (1998), Dekimpe M. G., Parker P. M., and Sarvary M., ‘Global Diffusion of Technological 
Innovations: A Coupled-Hazard Approach’ Journal o f  Marketing Research 37 (2000a): 47-59. Dekimpe M. G., 
Parker P. M., and Sarvary M., ‘Globalisation: Modelling Technology Adoption Timing across Countries’ 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 63 (2000b): 25-42.
295 Antonelli is another researcher that used GNP as a proxy for the country’s wealth and also found significant 
evidence to support the claims that higher degrees of economic growth within a country lead to a faster rate of 
modem ICT diffusion, as faster growing economies are more likely to witness a higher degree of direct 
investment in technological innovations. Antonelli (1993).
296 Some studies which focus on the adoption side only include Graham S., ‘Class and Conservatism in the 
Adoption of Innovations’ Human Relations 9.1 (1956): 91-100, Milner H. V., The Global Spread o f  the Internet: 
the Role o f  International Diffusion Pressures in Technology Adoption New York, Columbia University (2003), 
Glazer A., ‘The Advantages of Being First’ The American Economic Review 75.3 (1985): 473-80.
297 Sample matching improves comparable observations across countries, i.e. it forces researchers to make 
comparisons within comparable social networks to make valid statements across countries.
298 Gatignon H. and Robertson T. S. ‘A Prepositional Inventory for New Diffusion Research’ Journal o f  
Consumer Research 11 (1985): 849-867. Mahajan V. and Muller E., ‘Innovation Diffusion in a Borderless Global 
Market: Will the 1992 Unification of the European Community Accelerate Diffusion of New Ideas, Products and 
Technologies?’ Technological Forecasting and Social C hanged  (1994): 221-237.
299 Littlechild S. C., ‘The Effect of Ownership on Telephone Penetration’ Telecommunications Policy 7.3 (1983): 
246-247.
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Similarly, the International Telecommunication Union’s study provides some of the 
most definitive empirical evidence, showing that GDP per capita explained as much 
as 84% of the variance of telephone penetration in their 1965 study of 30 countries 
(an extension of their previous ICT studies in 1955-1960).300 The problems with 
these studies are twofold; firstly, they focus mostly on developed countries, and 
secondly and perhaps more disconcertingly, they assess the effect of GDP per capita 
on the rate of telephone diffusion in an isolated year. Diffusion is not a snapshot 
event; consequently, testing the effects of a given factor over a single year can never 
provide reliable generalisations for that factor’s role in the rate of diffusion as a 
whole. The work of this thesis will thus observe the entire diffusion period in order 
to provide more significant findings. Despite these shortcomings, a relationship 
between the degree of economic development and the rate of ICT diffusion exists to 
a certain extent. Theoretically and even intuitively, one would expect that the 
wealthier a country is, the faster will be its adoption and rate of ICT diffusion, as 
individuals can more easily afford the ‘economic sacrifice’.301 Although higher GDP 
per capita should equate to more demand, the problem may not be with respect to 
demand, but rather supply (and poor infrastructure).302 The Argentinian telephone 
diffusion case study neatly illustrates this point; where waiting lists for fixed 
telephone line installations were as long as 12 years in the 1960s (during 
nationalisation).303 There was no lack of demand, individuals had sufficient income 
and desire for telephones, but they had no access as a supply problem persisted, 
which is directly linked to the institutions providing the telephones.
Caselli and Coleman’s study is interesting because alternatively they find that the 
level of income had at best a weak impact on the rate of diffusion of computers 
across 155 countries for the period 1970-1990.304 Meanwhile Rouvinen finds that 
while the rate of mobile telephone diffusion was partly explained by the income 
effect in developed countries, it did not have a significant effect in developing 
countries, across his sample of 165 countries between 1990 and 2000.305 One may
300 Consultative Committee for International Telephony and Telegraphy (CCITT), Economic Studies at the 
National Level in the Field o f  Telecommunications (1964-68) Geneva, United Nations (1968).
301 Lee C., ‘Determinants of National Innovativeness and International Market Segmentation’ International 
Marketing Review 1 (1990): 39-49.
302 Kiiski and Pohjola (2000).
303 Noam E. M., Telecommunications in Latin America New York, Oxford University Press (1998).
304 Caselli and Coleman (2001).
305 Rouvinen (2006).
93
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The ‘Double Paradox’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
argue that in developing countries, due to their inherent economic ‘backwardness’, 
economic wealth plays a less prominent role, whereby all that is needed is a certain 
economic threshold, and beyond the threshold, other factors, such as the institutional 
environment, may be the driving force that dictates the rate of ICT diffusion 
(alluding to Gerschenkron’s ideas in regard to industrialisation).
Further, it is not just the absolute level of wealth, but the distribution of wealth 
within a country that is important. A high degree of income inequality can lead to a 
similarly unequal distribution of ICT, as it distorts diffusion patterns by becoming an 
elitist activity. Felix and Franco imply that this rationale was potentially an important
• 0^7factor in explaining the pattern of ICT diffusion in Latin America. As Felix points 
out, the deep divisions witnessed in Latin America’s socio-economic structures 
represent a fundamental challenge facing policy makers. Latin America, more than 
any other capitalist region, is characterised by concentrated pockets of wealth and, 
despite output growth, there have been limited positive spill-over effects for the 
masses. Accordingly the wealthy can adopt these ICTs quickly, as they can afford 
them, whereas the less wealthy cannot.
Network Externalities
Network externalities arise when technologies produce increasing returns to scale 
and scope. If more individuals make use of the new technology its marginal value per 
user increases, and there is more to be gained by new and existing users from having 
it. Hence, theoretically, the greater the number of users, the faster the diffusion rate 
should be. Unfortunately this is an issue which has not been tackled to the same 
degree within the literature as many of the other variables, with the notable 
exceptions of Milner (on internet diffusion), Katz and Shapiro (on telephone
1AO
networks and facsimiles) and Rouvinen (on mobile telephones). Katz and Shapiro, 
in particular, developed a simple model to capture the importance of these 
externalities, and demonstrated their significance in the context of their chosen ICTs.
306 Gerschenkron (1962).
307 Felix D., ‘Income Distribution and the Quality of Life in Latin America: Patterns, Trends, and Policy 
Implications’ Latin American Research Review 18.2 (1983): 3-33. Franko P. M., The Puzzle o f  Latin American 
Economic Development New York, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. (1999).
308 Milner (2003). Katz M. and Shapiro C., ‘Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility’ American 
Economic Review 75.3 (1985): 424-440. Katz M. and Shapiro C., ‘Technology Adoption in the Presence o f 
Network Externalities’ Journal o f  Political Economy 94.4 (1986): 822-841. Rouvinen (2006).
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Network externalities are particularly relevant for the case of telegraph and telephone 
diffusion, since in the extreme case that you are the only person to own a telephone, 
it is rendered useless. As Antonelli points out, however, these types of 
telecommunication technologies, which experience such (positive) network 
externalities, are also likely to experience negative externalities as the number of 
subscribers increases.309 Congestion effects will negatively impact the quality of 
communication and the failure rate of calls. Moreover, as Rouvinen’s study shows, 
these issues are likely to be more important in developing countries, where 
infrastructure is, in relative terms, more expensive to build and maintain and the 
possibility o f increasing returns to scale is further incentive. Dekimpe et al. provide
OIA
strong corroborating evidence in the case of mobile telephones. Indeed, although 
primarily a consumption driver, a ‘...widely recognised imperfection in infrastructure 
services is economies of scale due to network externalities’.311
Education
Although more emphasis is often placed on the degree of economic wealth, 
economic factors such as human capital are also given a high level of priority in 
explaining a country’s rate of ICT diffusion. Mokyr, in his largely historical narrative, 
declares that ‘in the lingo of economics, human capital and technology are 
complements’.312 The argument that enhanced education will result in individuals 
becoming aware of the new technology sooner and increase their ability to utilise it, 
was originally proposed by Nelson and Phelps in their analysis of capital structure 
and technological progress. Notionally, literacy levels may not be directly 
correlated with the diffusion of the telegraph and the telephone since users do not 
need to know how to read or write. However, Caselli and Coleman argue that an 
educated population will feel more empowered to use such technologies. Although 
these authors make no reference to the existing literature, they provide strong
309 Antonelli (1986).
310 Dekimpe et al. (2000b).
311 Esfahani H. S. and Ramirez M. T., ‘Institutions, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth’ Journal o f  
Development Economics 70.2 (2003): 443-477, p.447.
312 Mokyr, J., ‘Thinking About Technology and Institutions’ presented at Macalester International College 
Roundtable Prometheus’s Bequest, Technology and Change (2002): 1-31, p. 1.
313 Nelson R. and Phelps E., ‘Investment in Humans, Technological Diffusion, and Economic Growth’ American 
Economic Review 56 (1966): 69-75.
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empirical evidence (for the diffusion of computers) and it is one of few studies that 
examines diffusion as a process (rather than a snapshot).314
Perhaps one of the most powerful research pieces is the work of Kiiski and Pohjola, 
who add critical depth to the education argument, examining the rate of diffusion of 
the internet and the associated role of education.315 In the sample of developed 
countries, education had no significant impact on the rate of internet diffusion, 
whereas for the whole sample (developed and developing countries), education 
became a key explanatory variable. Rosenberg also argues that it is not just the 
existence of education/technical skills that is of relevance, but more importantly how
'X1 (\these skills are acquired. Although Rosenberg’s study is of a much more general 
nature (in focussing on a range of technologies), his work is important because he is 
a prominent figure in the literature and many of his arguments were key in originally 
driving this research field. He argues that the extent to which skills can be transferred 
from the old to the new technology will also play an important role in determining 
the speed of diffusion rates. Wozniak interestingly argues that since education 
reduces information costs and uncertainties of adoption, the effect of education
1^7diminishes after a certain threshold is achieved. Therefore education is likely to 
have a positive impact on the diffusion rates of traditional ICT only up to a certain 
level, in the same way that after a certain level of income, further income will not 
necessarily translate into faster rates of diffusion. This is logical since, as the 
population reaches a given degree of literacy, diffusion rates for these types of 
technologies (which require no prior knowledge to use) are not affected by a 
marginal increase in the rate of education.
314 Caselli and Coleman (2001). Also see Milner for corroborating findings for internet diffusion: Milner H. V., 
‘The Digital Divide: The Role of Political Institutions in Technology Diffusion’ Comparative Political Studies 
39.2(2006): 176-199.
315 They used average schooling years as their educational proxy, which some may argue is not the best 
assessment of educational attainment, although their findings are innovative and rigorous, Kiiski and Pohjola 
(2000).
316 Rosenberg (1972).
317 Wozniak G., ‘Human Capital, Information and the Early Adoption of New Technology’ Journal o f  Human 
Resources 22 (1987): 101-112. Also see Romer P. M., ‘Endogenous Technological Change’ Journal o f  Political 
Economy 98.5 (1990): 71-102.
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Economic Factors that Influence the Expansion o f Infrastructure and Access 
Within the economic approach the key factors that tend to influence infrastructure 
expansion are urbanisation and population growth, FDI and the latecomer advantage, 
as explored below.
Urbanisation and Population Growth
Two closely linked variables which many advocate as going a long way towards 
explaining ICT diffusion rates are urbanisation and population growth (and 
population density). This is pertinent in the context of Latin America, as the region 
underwent significant growth of both especially during the earlier years of the period 
under examination, which in the case of Argentina and Mexico led to the
110
development of primate cities. There is a strong relationship between the level of 
urbanisation (or population density in general) and the availability of infrastructure. 
Infrastructure typically clusters in urban hubs since these areas tend to be more 
profitable. Therefore, increased urbanisation rates potentially translate into faster 
diffusion.
Best and Mac lay observe modem ICTs in developing countries and maintain that a 
high degree of urbanisation will provide the ‘best’ environment for rapid diffusion, 
as large telecommunications companies will give priority to urban markets and will 
be more reluctant to enter smaller (and less profitable) rural ones.319 Although their 
logic seemingly holds, their findings are not supported empirically or by means of a 
theoretical model. Fischer and Carroll’s claims are stronger as they examined U.S. 
telephone diffusion between 1902 and 1937, and provide evidence that 
commercialisation in urban centres created an economic environment which 
generated faster telephone diffusion.320 However, Fischer and Carroll’s theoretical 
model o f diffusion is rather limited and perhaps overly simplistic.
Proenza, Bastidas-Buch and Montero explain that in urban areas the necessary 
infrastructure for ICT diffusion is established already and argue further that in rural
318 Davis K. and Golden H. H., ‘Urbanization and the Development o f Pre-Industrial Areas’ Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 3 (1954): 6-26.
319 Best M. L. and Maclay C. M., ‘Community Internet Access in Rural Area: Solving the Economic 
Sustainability Puzzle’ The Global Information Technology Report 2001-2002: Readiness fo r  the Networked 
World Oxford, Oxford University Press (2002).
320Fischer S. C. and Carroll G. R., ‘Telephone and Automobile Diffusion in the United States, 1902-1937’ The 
American Journal o f  Sociology 93.5 (1988): 1153-1178.
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areas the costs of building infrastructure and the costs associated with 
maintenance/operations are higher. In an extreme example in Peru, for instance, by 
2003, Lima had 45% of its urban households fitted with a fixed telephone line, 
compared to only 0.5% of the rural areas.322 As Morse explains, there is a ‘contrast 
between high-primacy urban-systems (Argentina, [...] Mexico) and low-primacy 
ones (Brazil, Chile...)’. 323 Consequently one may infer that the high rates of 
urbanisation in Argentina and Mexico, their elements of ‘urban primacy’ (by being 
dominated by primate cities), may be part of the explanation for their similar 
diffusion rates.324 Mehta, on the importance of urbanisation, argues that these 
‘metropolis dwellers are faced with the requirements of urban living...’ which forces 
the adoption and diffusion of ‘...innovations, which those in the countryside, if left 
to themselves, would never make’. Milner’s work also finds a positive correlation 
for this school of thought, claiming that ‘more dense populations support more 
interaction’.326
In Gruber’s study of Europe, he finds a strong positive correlation between 
urbanisation and mobile phone diffusion rates: a result supported by the more 
international study of Liikanen, Stoneman and Toivanen, who also examined mobile 
diffusion rates, but across a larger sample of 80 countries between 1992 and 1998.327 
Although both of these studies look at a very short number of years, they provide 
strong support for the relationship. Rouvinen’s study is particularly powerful to this 
argument as he finds that urbanisation plays a significant role in both developed and
321 Proenza F. J., Bastidas-Buch R. and Montero G., Tele-centres fo r  Socioeconomic and Rural Development in 
Latin America and the Caribbean Washington D.C., Inter-American Development Bank (2001).
322 Femandez-Maldonedo A. M., ‘Telecommunications in Lima: Networks for the Networks?’ Paper fo r  the 
Conference Cities in the Global Information Society, Newcastle-upon-Tyne (1999).
323 Morse R. M., ‘Trends and Patterns of Latin American Urbanisation 1750-1920’ Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 16.4 (1974): 416-447, p.427.
324 Wilkie J. W., Latin American Population and Urbanisation Analysis: Maps and Statistics, 1950-82 California, 
Latin American Centre Publications (1984).
325Mehta S. K., ‘Some Demographic and Economic Correlates of Primate Cities: A Case for Revaluation’ 
Demography 1.1 (1964): 136-147, p.139.
326 Milner H.V., ‘The Global Spread of the Internet: the Role of International Diffusion Pressures in Technology 
Adoption’ Paper presented at the second conference on ‘Interdependence, Diffusion and Sovereignty,’ held at 
UCLA, March (2003): 1-44, p.10. For other good studies on the diffusion of modem ICTs see Kiiski and Pohjola, 
Goolsbee and Klenow, who produce similar findings. Kiiski and Pohjola (2000), Goolsbee A. and Klenow P., 
‘Evidence of Learning and Networking Externalities in the Diffusion of Home Computers’ National Bureau o f  
Economic Research, Working Paper 7329 (1999): 176-199.
327 Gruber H., ‘Competition and Innovation: The Diffusion of Mobile Telecommunications in Central and Eastern 
Europe’ Information Economics and Policy 13.1 (2001): 19-34, Liikanen J., Stoneman P. and Toivanen O., 
‘Intergenerational Effects in the Diffusion of New Technology: The Case of Mobile Phones’ Swedish School o f 
Economics and Business Administration Working Paper 3 (2001).
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developing countries.328 Alternatively, Canning ascertains that urbanisation is more 
strongly positively correlated with telephone diffusion rates in developing countries 
than in developed countries. In fact, the only reviewed study which found a 
negative correlation between telephone diffusion rates and the degree of urbanisation 
was that of Wallsten, where the results were not statistically significant. However, 
Wallsten was exploring Latin America and Africa primarily during the period after 
privatisation, which was characterised by already high levels of urbanisation. Once 
the infrastructure is available, the impact of urbanisation diminishes, perhaps 
explaining Wallsten’s insignificant result.
Foreign Direct Investment
Realised and implied economic growth rates alone cannot determine the speed of 
technology diffusion; as Antonelli argues, the degree of investment is just as 
important.331 The leading role of FDI is further supported by UNCTAD, Dicken, 
Soete, and Findlay who emphasise the particular importance in developing 
countries.332 Investments by transnational corporations in the form of FDI played a 
significant role in the rate of diffusion of ICT in developing countries, as 
infrastructure often was funded by it. Despite much work on the role of international 
trade in the rate of diffusion, there is much less empirical work that concentrates on 
the role o f FDI.333 Some would argue that the only available systematic evidence is 
indirect and comes in the form of analyses of the relationship between FDI and 
economic productivity, where results are mixed.334
328 Rouvinen (2006).
329 Canning D., ‘A Database of World Stocks of Infrastructure, 1950-95’ The World Bank Economic Review 12.3 
(1998): 529-547.
330 Wallsten S., ‘An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, Privatisation and Regulation in 
Telecommunication Markets in Africa and Latin America’ Journal o f  Industrial Economics 49.1 (2001a): 1-19.
331 Antonelli (1993).
332 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 1999: Foreign 
Direct Investment and the Challenge o f  Development Geneva: United Nations (1999), Dicken P., Global Shift: 
Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st century London, Sage Publications (2003), Soete L., 
‘International Diffusion of Technology: Industrial Development and Technological Leapfrogging’ World 
Development (1985): 409-422, Findlay R., ‘Relative Backwardness, Direct Foreign Investment, and the Transfer 
of Technology: A Simple Dynamic Model’ American Economic Review 92.1 (1978a): 1-16.
333 Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie B. and Lichtenberg F., ‘Does Foreign Direct Investment Transfer Technology 
Across Borders?’ The Review o f  Economics and Statistics 83.3 (2001): 490-497.
334 Blomstrom found a positive relationship, while Aitken and Harrison, and Mencinger found a negligible or a 
negative one. Blomstrom M., ‘Foreign Investment and Productive Efficiency: The Case of Mexico’ Journal o f  
Industrial Economics 35 (1986): 97-110, Aitken B. J. and Harrison A. E., ‘Do Domestic Firms Benefit from 
Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence from Venezuela’ American Economic Review 89 (1999): 605-618, 
Mencinger J., ‘Does Foreign Direct Investment Always Enhance Economic Growth?’ Kyklos 56 (2003): 491-508.
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Perkins and Neumayer examine diffusion across three technologies, including digital 
telephones, covering between 75 and 147 countries. Theoretically they support the 
above argument and link it to the degree of openness of international trade.335 
However, their empirical evidence failed to provide statistical support for the idea 
that FDI accelerates diffusion speed. This is surprising, but may be explained partly 
by the fact that their FDI measure may be poorly suited to identifying sector-specific 
effects, since it is not technology-specific, but rather at an aggregated level. A strong 
positive relationship between international trade and FDI with the rate of technology 
diffusion is, however, corroborated by Wheeler and Martin, Grynspan, and Caselli 
and Coleman. They explain the relationship through market liberalisation, which 
allows for better technology diffusion.
The work of Ochoa-Morales is significant for the contemporary understanding of the 
role of FDI, as he finds that privatisation of the telecommunication sector must be 
carried out by foreign investment, asserting that FDI is the only way they can bridge 
the ‘digital gap’.337 Nevertheless, this strong view loses some of its persuasive power 
as it is purely qualitative. His views, are strongly in line with the work of Schuler and 
Brown who argue that developing countries must ensure that institutions are set up to 
support FDI so as to encourage foreign investors to initiate and develop 
technology.338 Schuler and Brown spell out however, that although FDI is key to fast 
diffusion rates, it is the associated institutions that provide the appropriate 
environment for successful FDI and, consequently, it is the institutions which are 
directly responsible for the rate of diffusion. Ochoa-Morales agrees, arguing that the 
state must provide a viable atmosphere for firms and entities controlling ICT in order 
to invite foreign investment. This foreign investor engagement is facilitated via 
membership of international organisations to support any shortcomings of the 
existing legal framework such as the WTO or GATT (as per Mexico’s experience).
335 Perkins R. and Neumayer E., ‘The International Diffusion of New Technologies: A Multi-technology Analysis 
of Latecomer Advantage and Global Economic Integration’ Annals o f  the Association o f  American Geographers 
95.4 (2005): 789-808.
336 Wheeler D. and Martin P., ‘Prices, Policies and the International Diffusion of Clean Technology: The Case of 
Wood Pulp Production’ in Low P., International Trade and the Environment Discussion paper 159, Washington 
D.C., The World Bank (1992), Grynspan D., ‘Technology Transfer Patterns and Industrialisation in LDCs: A 
Study of Licensing in Costa Rica’ International Organisation 36.4 (1982): 795-806, Caselli and Coleman (2001).
337 Ochoa-Morales H. J., ‘The Dynamic Changes in the Telecommunication Sector in Latin America and its 
Effects on the Knowledgeable Society’ Communications o f  the IIMA 2.1 (2002): 84-93.
338 Schuler D. A. and Brown D. S., ‘Democracy, Regional Integration and Foreign Direct Investment’ Business 
and Society 38.4 (1999): 450-473.
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Paus asserts that Latin America’s governments must specifically ‘identify and 
support those types of foreign investment that are most beneficial to their countries’ 
development’ and resist the temptation of reverting to rigid and misguided
' I ' i Q
nationalistic tendencies that view foreign investment negatively. Although her 
study does not focus on the diffusion of ICT, it is useful as it provides an accurate 
account of FDI in Latin America and particularly resonates with the shifting 
ideologies of the states in Argentina and Mexico across the period under review.340 
She additionally argues that a prerequisite for increased FDI in Latin America is the 
achievement of successful technology diffusion, thus indicating the importance of 
institutions in sustaining FDI in the long-run by successfully using the funds. Hence, 
even though the degree of FDI can be key for fast ICT diffusion, the ‘right’ 
institutions are required to foster this type of behaviour and, consequently, will 
dictate the rate of technology diffusion.
The Latecomer Advantage
Another factor often argued to drive the speed of diffusion of a given technology is 
the latecomer advantage. This fundamentally argues that if an innovation is adopted 
by a country later, there is a greater chance that it will diffuse at a faster rate, as 
‘latecomer’ benefits will arise. These benefits include learning investments and a 
lack of previous capital stock, which result in substantial costless benefits.341 
Supporters of this argument are Gerschenkron, Rogers, Perkins and Neumayer, Ames 
and Rosenberg, and Todaro and Abramovitz.342 The views regarding the lack of 
previous investment versus the accumulated learning advantage are generally 
mixed.343 Either way, the very best studies (including those above) tend to account 
for both.
339 Paus E., ‘Direct Foreign Investment and Economic Development in Latin America: Perspectives for the Future’ 
Journal o f  Latin American Studies 21.2 (1989): 221-239, p.239.
340 Albeit her work is largely confined to the period of the 1980s onwards.
341 Ray G. F., ‘The Diffusion of New Technology: A Study of Ten Processes in Nine Industries’ National 
Institute Economic Review 48 (1969): 40-83.
342 Gerschenkron (1962), Rogers (1995), Ames E. and Rosenberg N., ‘Changing Technological Leadership and 
Industrial Growth’ Economic Journal 73.289 (1963): 13-31, Perkins and Neumayer (2005), Todaro M. P., 
Economic Development Reading, MA, Addison Wesley Longman (2000), Abramovitz M., ‘Catching-up, Forging 
Ahead and Falling Behind’ Journal o f  Economic History 46.2 (1986): 385-406.
343 For an argument on the advantages of previous investment see Clark G. L. and Wrigley N., ‘The Spatial 
Configuration of the Firm and the Management of Sunk Costs’ Economic Geography 13 (1997): 285-304, 
Dekimpe et al. (2000a). For an argument on the accumulated learning advantage see Grubler A., ‘Time for a 
Change: On the Pattern of Diffusion of Innovation’ in Ausubel J. H. and Lagford D. H., Technological 
Trajectories and the Human Environment Washington D.C., National Academy Press (1997), Ravn H.F., and 
Valqui Vidal R. V., ‘Operational Research for Developing Countries-A Case of Transfer of Technology’ The 
Journal o f  the Operational Research Society 37.2 (1986): 205-210.
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Ray empirically demonstrated that pioneers are characterised by an array of ‘teething 
troubles’, while Ames and Rosenberg actually quantified the ‘penalty for taking the 
lead’. 344 They argue, however, that despite the penalties, latecomers are not 
necessarily better off than innovators. These studies, although limited in scope, 
create the basic tools for much future research. Indeed, there are subsequently 
numerous studies providing corroborating evidence o f the positive effects of 
latecomer advantages, such as those on technology transfer and leapfrogging by 
Sharif, Ravn and Valqui Vidal, and on mobile telephones by Rouvinen.345
The theoretical modelling work of Eaton and Lipsey, Schmalensee and Spence 
contends that early adopters actually encounter substantial benefits as a result of 
economies of scale, learning by doing and strategic opportunities.346 While all of this 
is true, there are defined benefits for latecomers too. The accumulated learning 
aspect centres on the establishment of ‘best practice’, since once any element of the 
diffusion process is ‘...demarcated, other and easier routes to obtain that objective 
may become obvious’.347 Thus a latecomer country can benefit by avoiding the costs 
of initial learning and experimentation (paid for by the pioneers), allowing them, as 
Rosenberg argues, to see technology diffuse at a faster rate.348 Additionally, their 
lack of previous investment provides a larger spare capacity for the new technology 
to be absorbed.349
Antonelli, Perkins and Neumayer merit particular attention as they took this strand of 
research to the next level. Antonelli, on his research on advanced 
telecommunications within developing countries, found that the latecomer position 
was only advantageous for technologies which are not highly complementary. 
Meanwhile, Perkins and Neumayer revealed that the degree of the latecomer
344 Note that Ray (1969) used a small sample of Western European countries. Ames and Rosenberg (1963).
345 Sharif M. N., ‘Technological Leapfrogging: Implications for Developing Countries’ Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 36 (1998): 201-208, Ravn and Valqui Vidal (1986), Rouvinen (2006).
346 Eaton B. C. and Lipsey R. G., ‘The Theory of Market Pre-emption: The Persistence of Excess Capacity and 
Monopoly in Growing Spatial Markets’ Economica 46 (1979): 149-58. Schmalensee R., ‘Product Differentiation 
Advantages of Pioneering Brands’ American Economic Review 72 (1982): 349-365. Spence A. M., ‘The Learning 
Curve and Competition’ Bell Journal o f  Economics 12 (1981): 49-70.
347 Rosenberg N., ‘Economic Development and the Transfer of Technology: Some Historical Perspectives’ 
Technology and Culture 11.4 (1970): 550-576, p.551.
348 Rosenberg (1970).
349 Clark and Wrigley (1997).
350 Antonelli C., ‘The international diffusion of new information technologies’ Research Policy 15 (1986): 139-47, 
Ravn and Valqui Vidal (1986), Perkins and Neumayer (2005).
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advantage varies across technologies. Moreover, their work is of particular value 
since, with the exception of Dekimpe et al. no other study has empirically examined 
the impact of a lack of existing capital stock by a latecomer on the rate of their 
technology diffusion. Dekimpe et al. revealed that the costs associated with the 
replacement of an old technology can hinder full adoption of a new technology, 
thereby reducing diffusion speed for countries with a larger installed base of an old 
technology (a factor that was present during early telephone diffusion in Argentina 
and Mexico, given the size of the telegraph network).
Overall, the economic approach revealed the importance of a plethora of factors as 
potential drivers of ICT diffusion, including GPD per capita, urbanisation, inequality, 
human capital, network externalities, and the latecomer advantage. Succar shows that 
developing countries in particular require an economic environment resembling that 
of developed countries in order to see technology successfully diffuse quickly.352 
However, since the economic circumstances of most developing countries do not 
resemble those of developed countries, one could argue that there is more reason to 
emphasise the role of institutions and specifically the government, to provide the 
tools or act as substitutes for the limited economic environment. It is not suggested 
that economic factors are not important explanatory variables, but rather that they are 
not necessarily the most important factors driving the process.
1.5.2 The Social Approach
The social approach argues that the rates of ICT diffusion across different countries 
can be explained by a country’s specific social and cultural characteristics. These 
refer, more specifically to those intrinsic characteristics, history, values, beliefs and 
behaviours shared by members within a given society. The importance of the social 
approach stems from the fact that, in the words of Gurevitch and Loevy: ‘...the 
cultural conditions determine if, when, how, and in what form the new [technology] 
item will be accepted’. Advocates of this approach maintain that factors such as 
the degree of homogeneity among the population, the social perceptions about the
351 Dekimpe et al. (2000a).
352 Succar P., ‘International Technology Transfer: A Model of Endogenous Technological Assimilation’ Journal 
o f  Development Economics 26 (1987): 375-395.
3 3 Gurevitch M. and Loevy Z., ‘The Diffusion of Television as an Innovation: The Case of the Kibbutz’ Human 
Relations 25.3 (1972): 181-197, p.181.
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attributes of the innovation and whether these are compatible with the beliefs o f that 
society, as well as, the degree of cosmopolitanism among the population, are some of 
the most popular social factors in understanding the rates of ICT diffusion. Given the 
nature of the approach, these factors, as explored below, tend to primarily affect 
consumer behaviour, rather than influence the expansion of infrastructure.
Rogers is again important to this school of thought.354 He claims that technology 
diffusion can partly be explained by looking at the characteristics of the adopting 
individuals, and that diffusion rates will depend upon the innovations compatibility 
with the values and norms in the social system.355 The main issue with Rogers, 
however, is that he assumes that this takes place within a fixed size social system. 
This is an unrealistic assumption, as it is impossible to identify the size of the social 
system when looking at the process of diffusion, as the size is likely to vary with 
time.356
Although social factors are difficult to quantify, there are some studies which have 
done this exceptionally well. In regard to generic international technology transfer, 
Davidson and McFetridge agree on the vital role that culture plays in developing 
countries when determining the rate of technology diffusion.357 Meanwhile Keida 
and Bhagat’s conceptual model accounts for the differences within cultures, as 
‘cultural variations across nations and organisational culture-based differences are
ICO
considered two major factors’. They draw attention to the importance of language, 
common ancestry and shared history, in order to explain the rate of diffusion, 
accepting that ‘...economic development is a major factor, [but] cultural
 ^CO
predispositions play an important role’.
354 Rogers (1995). Other important advocates of the social approach include Dekimpe et al. (1998, 2000a, 2000b) 
Gatignon and Robertson (1985), Gurevitch and Loevy (1972), Takada H. and Jain D., ‘Cross-national Analysis of 
Diffusion of Consumer Durable Goods in Pacific Rim Countries’ Journal o f Marketing 55.2 (1991): 48-54, 
Gatignon H., Eliashberg J. and Robertson S., ‘Modelling Multinational Diffusion Patterns: An Efficient 
Methodology’ Marketing Science 8.3 (1989): 231-47, and Bowden S. and Offer A., ‘Household Appliances and 
the Use of Time: the United States and Britain since the 1920s’ Economic History Review 47 (1994): 725-748.
355 Factors such as personality, social background and network location can predict the adoption rate of a new 
technology in his view.
356 Note that the size of the social system that will adopt the new technology will not be the same as the whole
W. H. and McFetridge D. G., ‘Key Characteristics in Choice of International Technology Transfer 
Mode’ Journal o f  International Business Studies 6.2 (1985): 5-21.
358 Keida B. L. and Bhagat R. S., ‘Cultural Constraints on Transfer of Technology Across Nations: Implications 
for Research in International and Comparative Management’ Academy o f  Management Review 13.4 (1988): 559- 
571, p.559.
359 Ibid., p.562.
population.
Davidson
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Homogeneity
Rogers claims that a high degree of homogeneity (i.e. similar religion, ethnicity, 
language, etc.) among the population will result in greater communication and 
increased social emulation, thereby aiding the rate of technology diffusion.360 In a 
more homogeneous society, individuals with shared traits and backgrounds are able 
to relate and interact more effectively and thus encourage a higher degree of 
information exchange and communication. Gatignon and Robertson follow on 
from Rogers’ work, emphasising the importance of accounting for the social 
framework in which diffusion takes place, because ‘diffusion occurs within a social 
system that possesses a set of values and norms’ and these are likely to have a strong 
impact on the diffusion rate of new communication technologies. Gatignon and 
Robertson’s study, although purely theoretical, is very helpful as it separates the 
adoption process from the diffusion process. The main shortcoming is the fact that 
little of their theory is actually put into context and no empirical work was carried 
out. Nevertheless their work is fundamental to this research area and many 
researchers have subsequently adopted their ideas, namely that high heterogeneity 
will negatively impact the rate of technology diffusion, due to reduced interaction 
among members of the social system. Although these two studies do not provide 
empirical evidence to support this view, they supply the building blocks from which 
other studies have verified the relationship, these include Dekimpe et al.’s, Putsis, 
Balasubramanian, Kapkan and Sen, Gatignon, Eliashberg and Robertson’s, whom 
together cover a range of ICTs. Of these empirical studies, once again Dekimpe et 
al. must be recognised for providing robust and highly practical work. They measure 
homogeneity by accounting for the number of ethnic groups within each country, and 
find a positive correlation with the rate of mobile telephone diffusion. Takada and 
Jain, also provide evidence for this effect for the diffusion of radios (among other 
consumer technologies) across four countries in the Pacific Rim, although they do 
not look at the whole process of diffusion.
360 Rogers (1995).
361 Dekimpe et al. (1998).
362 Gatignon and Robertson (1985), p.857.
363 Dekimpe et al. (1998), Putsis W. P., Balasubramanian S., Kapkan E. H. and Sen S. K., ‘Mixing Behaviour in 
Cross-Country Diffusion’ Marketing Science 16 (1997): 354-69, Gatignon et al. (1989).
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Putsis et al. enhance the argument for modem ICT by providing evidence suggesting 
that diffusion rates will be faster, when the degree of homogeneity is greater, not 
only among the country’s population, but also between the adopting country and the 
country it is adopting from, as this will facilitate external contact as well.364 Thus the 
rates of diffusion will be faster for countries with similar cultures. Gatignon et al. 
actually developed a specific methodology which accounts for heterogeneity across 
social systems for six consumer durables (including ICTs such as radios) in 14 
European countries. 365 By accounting for the countries social boundaries, they 
concentrate on the patterns of social communication across a country and the impact 
this has on the rate of diffusion. They found evidence that the level of 
cosmopolitanism and mobility were particularly important in explaining ICT 
diffusion.
Perceptions
Individual perception is another tested social variable often held accountable for the 
rate of ICT diffusion. The collective perceptions individuals have about the 
innovation, perceptions which are shaped by culture, are deemed important. Takada 
and Jain’s later work, for example, finds strong supporting evidence of this effect. 
Unlike the more theoretical study of Gatignon and Robertson, they provide rigorous 
mathematical support.366 Their work is also an improvement on Rogers’ propositions 
(since these were just proposals with no mathematical testing). Consequently, 
Takada and Jain make a significant contribution to the literature on this issue. As 
Casson stresses, part of the reason for the relatively fast telephone diffusion 
collectively in Latin America was that by the time diffusion began, individuals were 
far more aware of the telephone’s potential advantages and no longer viewed it
'ic.n
merely as a ‘scientific toy’ as Europe had.
364 Putsis et al. (1997).
365 Gatignon et al. (1989).
366 Takada and Jain (1991), Gatignon and Robertson (1985).
367 Casson N. H., The History o f  the Telephone Chicago, A.C. McClurg & Co. (1910). Wallsten S., ‘Returning to 
Victorian Competition, Ownership, and Regulation: An Empirical Study of European Telecommunications at the 
Turn of the Twentieth Century’ Journal o f Economic History 65.3 (2005): 693-722.
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Hollenstein argues that the benefits associated with a technology will ultimately 
dictate its rate of diffusion. Clearly the perception regarding the attributes of an 
innovation must affect the subsequent rate of diffusion, as evidenced in the lack of 
enthusiasm toward telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico when the 
technology first arrived. Bowden and Offer categorised new consumer technologies 
into ‘time saving’ or ‘time using’ technologies and claimed that some technologies 
diffuse faster than others (e.g. the refrigerator versus the radio) due to the differences
- l / J Q
intrinsic in their nature. Meanwhile Gurevitch and Loevy find strong support for 
the relationship of ‘cultural compatibility’ between society and the new technology 
after examining television diffusion rates within the kibbutz society in Israel (note 
that kibbutz societal values wholly rejected television). This extreme example 
demonstrates the huge impact that social values can have on ICT diffusion.370
Cosmopolitanism
Generally, diffusion research relating to the degree of cosmopolitanism in a given 
social system has found generally that it has a positive impact on the rate of diffusion. 
Proof of this is given in the rural sociology tradition by Rogers.371 Indeed, 
cosmopolitans are individuals oriented beyond their immediate social system, 
whereas locals are oriented towards their immediate social system. Cosmopolitans 
are therefore seen as important communicators of innovations across boundaries; 
hence the more cosmopolitan the members of a population are, the faster the 
diffusion rate, as information spreads faster. Theoretically this could impact ICT 
diffusion rate differentials across Argentina and Mexico since high migration of 
Europeans took place in Argentina early in the period under consideration.
This positive relationship was formalised by Rogers, Gatignon, Eliashberg and
' j ' l i
Robertson, and Gatignon and Robertson. The last is perhaps the most useful study
368 Hollenstein H., ‘The Decision to Adopt Information and Communication Technologies (ICT): Firm-Level 
Evidence for Switzerland’ The Economic Impact o f  ICT, Measurement, Evidence and Implications Paris, OECD 
Publications (2004).
369 They argue that individuals’ preferences dictate the differing diffusion speeds. In the U.S. and the U.K., for 
instance, individuals placed more emphasis on the quality of their free time as opposed to the quantity of it, thus 
one observed a faster rate of diffusion for time-using goods. See Bowden and Offer (1994).
370 Gurevitch and Loevy (1972).
371 Rogers (1995). The cosmopolitanism variable has its roots in the ‘cosmopolitan-local’ dichotomy initially 
proposed by Gouldner. See Gouldner A. W., ‘Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social 
Roles’ Administrative Science Quarterly 2 (1957): 281-306.
372 Gatignon et al. (1989).
373 Rogers (1995), Gatignon et al. (1989), Gatignon and Robertson (1985).
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of the group as it tests an extensive number of social factors over communication 
technologies across European countries, before finding that the degree of 
cosmopolitanism is one of the most important in shaping the rate of diffusion. 
Easingwood examined the diffusion of colour televisions in ten Western European 
countries in the 1970s and Gatignon and Robertson is an improvement on this, 
because they provide an analogical approach to diffusion patterns, as well as a useful 
diagnostic tool for comparing the determinants of diffusion across countries.374 
Further, Gatignon and Robertson develop their own economic model to account for 
the diffusion rates of innovations, predominantly analysing the impact of social 
factors, building upon their previous theoretical work with added empirical rigour.
Overall the social approach emphasises the importance of social and cultural factors. 
Specifically, it highlights the role played by the degree of homogeneity and 
cosmopolitanism within society, as well as individual perceptions of the new 
technology, as important factors in explaining ICT diffusion. Social factors therefore, 
should have some role in the rate of diffusion, and hence (despite the difficulty in 
quantifying many of these factors) some attempts were made to include these types 
of variables in the regression analysis in chapter 4.
1.5.3 The Natural Endowments Approach
The natural endowments approach explains differences in ICT diffusion rates by 
examining the inherent characteristics of a region, which cannot be changed, or can 
only be changed in the very long run. Advocates of this approach include 
Hagerstrand, Takada and Jain, Fischer and Carroll, Milner, Felix and Canning. 
These all commonly demonstrate the importance of the natural environment of the 
recipient society for the rate of diffusion of ICT. They maintain that certain 
characteristics inherent in a country’s natural environment, for instance, the impact 
of geographical location, or the country size, will play a decisive role in speeding up 
(or slowing down) the rate of technology diffusion. In contrast to the social approach, 
these variables tend to directly influence the capacity for the expansion of 
infrastructure, as opposed to consumer demand itself.
374 Easingwood C. J., ‘An Analogical Approach to the Long-term Forecasting of Major New Product Sales’ 
International Journal o f Forecasting 5 (1989): 69-82. Gatignon and Robertson (1985).
375 Hagerstrand T., ‘A Monte Carlo Approach to Diffusion’ Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 6.1 (1965): 43- 
67, Takada and Jain (1991), Fischer and Carroll (1988), Milner (2003), Felix (1983) and Canning (1998).
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Geographical Positioning
The impact of spatial diffusion on rates of diffusion has been ignored by many 
economists. This concept refers to all processes that contribute to moves, to 
migration within geographical space, and to backlash effects generated in the space 
by those moves. Spatial diffusion was introduced to the field of geography by 
Hagerstrand who, on the basis of several case studies, emphasised the existence of 
temporal and spatial regularities in the processes of spatial diffusion of 
innovations.376 Spatial diffusion works to a large extent through contagion effects, i.e. 
the probability of contact between adopters and non-adopters of a new technology 
rapidly decreases as a function of distance.
Work on the role of geography rests on the initial pillars built by Hagerstrand and 
although his classical piece examined agricultural innovations, his work is 
noteworthy as he is one of the pioneers on spatial diffusion.377 In a more directly 
related study for the purposes of this thesis, Hagerstrand investigated migration and 
telephone calls, calculating the probability of face-to-face contact with a given 
person living X  distance away, to in turn attempt to explain technology diffusion 
speed. In theory, the shorter the geographical distance between adopters and non­
adopters, the faster the rate of diffusion, sometimes referred to as the contagion effect, 
or the ‘neighbourhood effect’.378 The main limitation of Hagerstrand’s work was that 
he placed almost too much emphasis upon spatial variables, excluding more 
sociological and economic variables. Hagerstrand’s work has been corroborated by 
Brown, Takada and Jain, Gatignon and Robertson, and Audretsch and Feldman, who 
collectively argue that geographical location is a primary driver of ICT diffusion 
rates.379
Country Size
The size of the country is important in determining the rate of ICT diffusion, as this 
will be closely related to the economic issues of infrastructure, economies of scale
376 Hagerstrand T., Innovation o f  Spatial Process Chicago, University of Chicago Press (1953).
377 Ibid.
378 Hagerstrand (1965).
379 Ibid., Brown (1981), Takada and Jain (1991), Gatignon and Robertson (1985) and Audretsch D. B. and 
Feldman M. P., ‘R&D Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation and Production’ American Economic Review 
86 (1996): 630-640. This is also supported by the later work of Milner (2003), Bonaccorsi A., Piscitello L. and 
Rossi C., ‘The ICT Diffusion: A Spatial Econometric Approach’ Social Science Research Network 120 (2005): 1- 
18, and Dekimpe et al. (2000a), who provide evidence within ICT diffusion at a globalised level.
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and in turn population density or population growth. Clearly the larger the area of a 
country, the more infrastructure that is necessary, and Antonelli finds evidence 
supporting that ICT diffusion rates were relatively faster in smaller countries
OOA
(particularly those countries with also a higher level of income). The justification 
may be that infrastructure is relatively easier to build for smaller countries. Canning 
verifies this inversely correlated relationship in the case of telephone diffusion and 
finds that the provision of infrastructure is significantly correlated with a country’s
101
geographical endowment. Fischer and Carroll also demonstrate the importance of 
the availability of infrastructure for faster ICT diffusion rates: a country’s structural 
features ‘can accelerate or retard the internal dynamic of diffusion’ especially in the 
long-term.382
Overall, the natural endowments of a country must inevitably, to some extent, affect 
its rate of ICT diffusion, by largely affecting the establishment and availability of the 
necessary infrastructure. The natural endowments approach argues that factors such 
as the country size and geographical location have a direct impact on ICT diffusion 
rates. These factors, however, are unchangeable (at least in the short-medium run), 
consequently underlining the importance of the state in mitigating or taking 
advantage of a country’s intrinsic makeup.
1.5.4 The Institutional Approach: The Role of the State
The chapter now focuses on the institutional approach, and more specifically the role 
of the state. The fundamental argument of this thesis is that no other variable can 
explain the observed rates of ICT diffusion in Argentina and Mexico more 
comprehensively. The institutional approach argues that the differences in ICT 
diffusion rates can be explained by a country’s institutions and more specifically its 
political institutions. These factors primarily affect the expansion of ICT 
infrastructure but can also affect consumption in various ways. One must consider 
the fact that even if the government sees the potential benefits of a given technology 
it is still up to the individual consumer to decide whether to adopt it. Nevertheless, 
the role of the government will be important due to their role in the provision of the 
necessary infrastructure. Whether it be the direct impact of the role of the state, the
380 Antonelli (1986).
381 Canning (1998).
382 Fischer and Carroll (1988), p. 1173.
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degree of stability within the government, or the indirect need for institutions to 
coordinate the supply of the innovation, arguably institutions are found at the end of 
every explanatory road.
Institutions are defined by North as the ‘rules of the game’ whereby humanly devised 
constraints shape human interaction. These comprise formal constraints (explored 
below) such as laws or regulations, and informal constraints (addressed in the social 
approach above) such as social norms or customs, which are all affected by the state. 
Formal constraints within the telecommunications industry incorporate government 
policy, regulatory bodies, the legal framework, the market structure and the degree of 
government intervention, as well as their evolution over time. There is a substantial 
literature indicating the importance of institutions, but fewer detailed practical 
applications. The literature regarding this approach includes the work of Rosenberg 
and Mokyr, who generically look at new technologies while Wallsten, Henisz and 
Zelner, Schuler and Brown focus specifically on ICT.384
Rosenberg is at the forefront of this research field and his narrative served as the 
reference base for much of the subsequent literature. Although not solely concerned 
with ICT, his paper is central to the understanding of this thesis.385 He stresses the 
importance of institutions, since they have the power to shape and protect the 
economic and social environment in which technology diffusion takes place. He 
marked a turning point in the literature, since earlier ‘...our ignorance of the rate at 
which new techniques were adopted, and the factors accounting for these rates... 
[was]... no cause for professional self-congratulation’.386 Indeed, the inspirational 
work of Rosenberg motivated the primary question of this research, the fact that 
similar diffusion rates in Argentina and Mexico could not be explained by their 
economic environment, and thus could be better understood by examination of their 
respective institutional settings.
383 North D. C , Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press (1990), pp.3-4.
384 Rosenberg (1970, 1972), Mokyr (2002), Wallsten (2001a, 2005), Henisz and Zelner (2001), Schuler and 
Brown (1999).
385 Rosenberg (1970).
386 Ibid., p.3.
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Brown’s study provides an overview of technology diffusion, and in it he finds that 
‘institutional factors...influence the diffusion process by affecting the context within 
which the technological factors operate’.387 He argues that historically diffusion 
research has underemphasised the significance of the role of the government. It 
typically gives a disproportionate power to the individual choice of adoption of a
new technology, which although important, is set within the constraints established
<100
and controlled by the government and private institutions. Until the 1980s in Latin 
America, the telecom industry was provided largely monopolistically, either via a 
state-owned or a heavily regulated private entity, hence the importance of the role of 
the state.
Mokyr’s paper, like Rosenberg’s, is on the wider field of technology, and it is of 
central importance since he addresses the historical links of technology with 
institutions and income levels (the two most important explanatory factors of this 
thesis).389 Indeed, Mokyr attests that ‘not all roads to economic prosperity have 
followed the same institutional pattern’.390 Rosenberg similarly cautions against 
generalisations, since ‘...a wide diversity o f institutional forms have proved to be 
successful under differing conditions’ and vice versa.391 His work is very much 
aligned with Gerschenkron’s on the industrialisation of late developers. 
Gerschenkron claims that countries like Italy and Russia were able to industrialise 
faster than Britain (the early industrialiser) by making more extensive use of their 
institutional setting (i.e. the state), in order to compensate (acting as a substitute) for 
their inherently larger degree o f ‘backwardness’.392
The institutional factor was a principal explanatory variable in various cases, namely 
in Henisz and Zelner, and Levy and Spiller who argue that the development of basic 
infrastructure for telecommunications is directly dependent upon the quality of a 
country’s institutions.393 Henisz and Zelner find a strong and significant link between
387 Brown (1981), p.188.
388 Ibid.
389 Mokyr (2002).
390 Ibid., p.9.
391 Ibid., p.573.
392 Gerschenkron (1962).
393 Henisz W. and Zelner B., ‘The Institutional Environment for Telecommunications Investment’ Journal o f  
Economics and Management Strategy 10.1 (2001): 123-147, Levy B. and Spiller P., Regulations, Institutions and 
Commitment Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1996).
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the commitment of political institutions and telecom infrastructure. Meanwhile Levy 
and Spiller argue that the goals of regulatory reform in telecommunications 
(improved service and fair prices) may not be achieved consistently in developing 
countries, due to the interaction between political institutions and economic 
conditions. Petrazzini studies the role of government intervention in the provision o f 
telecom services in developing economies throughout the 1970s-1990s.394 He argues 
that political factors such as state autonomy and concentration of power had a key 
role in the successful privatisation of state owned telecommunication enterprises.
The institutional approach is prominent within the diffusion of ICT in the context o f 
Latin America since local governments were the ones that decided how these ICTs 
would be introduced. Thus from the very outset, the diffusion of these technologies 
was dictated by state actions. Having appraised the macro-institutional literature, the 
market structure, the role of the government and government types, and political 
incentives are reviewed below.
Market Structure, Competition and State Intervention
Mansfield was one of the first to explore the impact that an industry’s market 
structure had on the rate of innovation diffusion and although it was at the firm level 
and not specifically on ICT, it is very important since many researchers in the 
diffusion literature built on these ideas.395 Following this study, a substantial amount 
of work has been carried out by the likes of Wallsten, Ochoa-Morales, Hollenstein, 
Littlechild and Foreman-Peck on the impact of market structure and state 
intervention upon ICT diffusion rates (although mostly post-privatisation).396
Various studies by Wallsten and by Hollenstein provide substantial evidence that 
market structure is correlated closely to the rate of telephone diffusion. Wallsten in 
particular demonstrates that a faster rate of telephone diffusion is encountered in a 
competitive environment and typically a slower rate is found under a monopolistic 
system. Bennett goes so far as to say that to make the telephone system more
394 Petrazzini (1995).
395 Mansfield E., ‘Size of Firm, Market Structure, and Innovation’ Journal o f  Political Economy 71.6 (1963c): 
556-576.
396 See Wallsten (2001a, 2005), Hollenstein (2004), Littlechild (1983), Foreman-Peck (1985) and Ochoa-Morales 
H. J., ‘The Effect of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) on the Globalization Paradigm’ Issues in 
Information Systems 5.2 (2004): 647-653.
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efficient all monopolies must be eliminated. North and Williamson maintain that 
because infrastructural investments suffer from a number of market imperfections, 
such as economies of scale resulting from network externalities, the role of the
1QO
government increases. Indeed, it is Holcombe’s belief that a government operated 
telephone system is preferred, but Casson would argue that the lack of a higher level 
of telephone diffusion was actually due to too much government involvement.399 
There is no definitive answer and thus no all-encompassing generalisations can be 
made, although the views of key authors coincide in claiming that privatisation (with 
competition and limited political favouritism) allows for faster telephone 
diffusion.400 Further, Littlechild finds that telephone diffusion rates were in fact more 
responsive to economic variables such as GDP per capita, under private systems than 
under government-owned systems.
James points out that privatisation, like competition, generally had a positive impact 
on the rate of telephone diffusion, as it encouraged service providers to supply more 
telecom technology. 401 The lower cost associated with a greater degree of 
competition means that an increased diffusion rate should be found; consequently 
policies which encourage this must be supported. In Wallsten’s analysis of telephone 
diffusion in 33 countries (most in Europe), he found that different types of 
telecommunication ownership impacted the rate of diffusion.402 Wallsten’s study (of 
the period 1892-1914) is refreshing in that it is one of very few which did not 
concentrate solely on the period of privatisation. However, he looks at 4-year periods 
(not constant across his countries), which is problematic because diffusion rates are 
best measured over time, nevertheless, his findings are very significant. Although 
less rigorous, it is also worth mentioning Wallsten’s earlier work on Africa and Latin
397 Bennett A. R., The Telephone Systems o f  the Continent o f  Europe London, Longmans, Green and Co. (1985).
398 North (1990), Williamson O., ‘The Logic of Economic Organisation’ Journal o f  Law, Economics and 
Organisation 4 (1988): 65-93.
399 Holcombe A. N., Public Ownership o f  Telephones on the Continent o f  Europe Boston, The Riverside Press 
(1911), Casson (1910).
400 Wallsten (2001a, 2005), Littlechild (1983).
401 James J., ‘Pro-Poor Modes of Technical Integration into the Global Economy’ Development and Change 31 
(2000): 765-783.
^W allsten  (2005), Wallsten S., ‘Ringing the Twentieth Century: The Effects of State Monopolies, Private 
Ownership, and Operating Licenses on Telecommunications in Europe, 1892-1914’ Regulation and Competition 
Policy, Development Research Group Washington D.C., The World Bank (2001b): 1-38.
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America.403 This was one of the first studies to test the effect of competition 
econometrically in developing countries in the telecom industry.
Wallsten’s work is supported by Littlechild and Hollenstein, the latter providing 
substantial evidence that policies which strengthen competition in ICT markets 
contribute significantly to its more rapid diffusion rate.404 Conversely, Foreman-Peck 
found evidence that competition and privatisation in the ICT sector actually became 
significant factors in explaining telephone diffusion rates only after the 1980s. He 
claims that the effects of state-owned government monopolies posed significant 
disadvantages only once a certain level of economic development was reached. He is 
not claiming that a certain degree of competition was not beneficial, but rather that it 
was not a primary driver. A key limitation of Foreman-Peck’s work is that his 
conclusions are derived from assessment of just one year (1913).405 Overall both 
Wallsten’s and Foreman-Peck’s studies are immensely useful due to their focus on 
the earlier period; but Wallsten’s is perhaps more useful here, due to the larger data 
set and support from other well-respected researchers.406 The role of competition in 
determining the rate of ICT diffusion is not clear, however. On the one hand, studies 
such as Gatignon and Robertson’s suggest that ‘the greater the level of competitive 
activity, the faster the rate of diffusion’ of ICT, whereas Dekimpe et al. find only a 
marginal effect on the diffusion rate of mobile telephones.407 Further, many argue 
that competition should be limited to allow for economies of scale, but limited 
competition can lead to abuses of monopoly power, which generates demand for a 
regulatory regime to protect customers/suppliers 408 A widely accepted view is that 
ICTs like the telegraph and the telephone, as natural monopolies, are best supplied by 
the government (see section 1.2 The State and the Role of ICT in Latin America 
from earlier in the chapter).
403 Wallsten (2001). This study is less rigorous since Wallsten only examines the post privatisation period (1980s 
onwards), and he fails to define what he actually means by the degree of government ownership or what 
constitutes private service under ‘harsh conditions’ etc., and does not acknowledge the fact that different 
countries obviously experienced differing degrees of these variables, but it is still an interesting read.
404 Littlechild (1983), Hollenstein (2004).
405 Foreman-Peck (1985). Note that the other variables Foreman-Peck accounts for (besides government 
ownership) are GNP per capita and population.
406 E.g. Littlechild (1983).
407 Gatignon and Robertson (1985) p.861, Dekimpe et al. (1998).
408 Hill A. and Abdala M. A., ‘Regulation, Institutions, and Commitment: Privatisation and Regulation in the 
Argentine Telecommunications Sector’ Policy Research Working Paper 1216, Washington D.C., The World 
Bank (1993): 1-41.
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Initially Latin America’s telecommunication services, like those in most developing 
countries, were run by foreign private companies and government agencies. In 
developing countries, state monopolies ordinarily operate quite differently to those in 
developed countries. They tend to cause shortages of supply, and this was apparent 
during telephone diffusion. Moreover, reliability and quality of service were 
inconsistent and generally substandard: for instance, Wellenius and Stem report that 
cities would be left without telephone service when it rained and the lines would take 
weeks or months to repair when they broke down. Latin America’s limited 
telecommunication infrastructure meant it was heavily congested, making telephone 
connections very difficult during peak business hours. The efficiency of the 
provision of ICT diffusion where government monopolies existed was quite varied. 
This led many users often to pay in excess of official tariffs to get a telephone 
connection in ‘secondary’ (some illegal) markets or by renting properties with 
telephones already installed.409
Resistance
Mokyr claims that successful technology diffusion depends to a very large degree on 
a conducive environment, since ‘resistance to innovation is identified as a central 
element governing the success of new inventions’.410 Resistance comes from those 
whose assets are threatened; this may be an individual, at the political level, or an 
influential institution. Udell and O’Neill agree that the process will be most 
successful in a conflict-free environment.411 Mokyr concludes that governments need 
to implement policies to protect and encourage technology diffusion, especially 
where resistance is apparent. Incidentally, Argentina’s experience regarding the first 
two failed attempts to privatise ENTel neatly demonstrate this point (see chapter 3, 
section The Period o f Privatisation).
Government Policies
According to Hanna, Guy and Arnold market forces in developing countries are 
insufficient to induce investment in new ICTs.412 As a result, institutions in these
409 Wellenius and Stem (1994).
410 Mokyr J., ‘Technological Inertia in Economic History’ The Journal o f  Economic History 52.2 (1992): 325-38, 
p.325.
11 Udell G. G. and O’Neill M. F., ‘Technology Transfer: Encouraging the Non-corporate Inventor’ Business 
Horizons 20.4 (1977): 40-45.
4,2 Hanna et al. (1985).
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countries should implement strategies which promote an integrated approach to 
incentives and capabilities. Henisz and Zelner found a strong statistically significant 
correlation between political institutions and the diffusion rate of 
telecommunications. Indeed, if there are credible commitments by political actors 
that the state will not expropriate assets, diffusion should be faster. 413
ICT is also typically characterised by large sunk costs, economies of scale and large 
consumption, thus creating a situation of political interest in telecoms pricing. The 
dual influence of economic opportunity and political motivation brings about an 
intrinsic contracting problem as demonstrated by Levy and Spiller, or by the more 
formal analysis of Sidak and Spulber.414 Since technologies like the telegraph and 
telephone rely on large sunk investments and huge output demand by the general 
public, Bergara, Henisz and Spiller argue that the contracting process is highly 
politicised, hence the dependence on the country’s political institutions.415 This 
dependence is even greater for traditional ICTs. Henisz and Zelner also imply that, in 
countries with more manipulative political systems, diffusion will not be successful 
where substantial financial resources are diverted from economic activity to political 
rent seeking.416 James’ study on information technologies emphasises the role of the 
government, particularly in affecting the rate of technology diffusion in developing 
countries.417 Meanwhile Cameron and Baker conclude that institutions, in fact, often 
serve as a barrier to faster technology diffusion.418 Bath and James specifically argue 
that in the case of Latin America, the rate of technology diffusion was restrained by 
external forces, and there was a need for a shift in policies to enhance economic 
incentives, which in turn would increase their access to technical knowledge, which 
could potentially generate improved prospects for technology diffusion. They argue
413 Henisz and Zelner (2001).
414 Levy and Spiller (1996), Sidak J. G. and Spulber D.F., Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract: 
The Competitive Transformation o f  Network Industries in the United States New York, Cambridge University 
Press (1997).
415 Although this study is not directly on the diffusion of ICT (they examined hydroelectric power in electricity 
production), their study is interesting because they show that the role of the government was key given the large 
sunk investment costs in the provision of utilities, just as there are in ICT. Bergara M., Henisz W. and Spiller P., 
‘Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment: A Cross-Nation Analysis’ California Management Review 
40.2(1998): 18-35.
416 Note that in ICT diffusion, it is not just the policies of the recipient government that matter, restrictive 
licensing in the innovating country will also be a crucial determinant of the new technology’s diffusion rate, see 
MacLeod C., ‘Strategies for Innovation: The Diffusion of New Technology in Nineteenth-Century British 
Industry’ Economic History Review 45.2 (1992): 285-307.
417 James J. (2000).
418 Cameron (1975), Baker E., ‘Institutional Barriers to Technology Diffusion in Rural Africa’ American 
Agricultural Economics Association (2005): 1-30.
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that incumbent policies maintain Latin America’s status quo, and policy changes that 
could be beneficial to the society at large are sometimes vetoed, as those in power 
are easily influenced by foreign interests. These illustrations all serve to demonstrate 
how influential the government can be in shaping the rate of ICT diffusion.
Ochoa-Morales links this component of the literature back to the economic approach 
as he argues that government policies in the adopting countries are essential for 
successful ICT diffusion and must be geared towards the provision of an 
environment which enhances FDI.419 Schuler and Brown agree that the emphasis 
must be on setting up the ‘right’ type o f institutions in developing countries, while 
Dahlam argues that only government policies can rectify market failures.420 Henisz 
and Zelner acknowledge the magnitude of political institutions and comment that 
institutions which allow for appropriate infrastructure development are vital in 
shaping the diffusion of new technologies, as supported by Brown.421
Government Type, Legal Framework and Political Incentives 
It is not sufficient to survey the policy choices faced by governments; it is important 
that these choices are contextualised, i.e. under what systems were these decisions 
formed. Petrazzini and Duch see domestic political and institutional arrangements 
within the given country as a key explanatory factor in determining the degree of 
success of telecom reforms (and in turn diffusion rates). Petrazzini found support (in 
developing countries) for closed policy processes and a high concentration of power 
in the state, and Duch argued the case for open decentralised political systems (but in 
developed economies).422 Duch looks at the telecom privatisation and liberalisation 
reforms in Britain and Germany and argues that privatisation and liberalisation are 
more likely to be implemented in pluralist countries, such as Britain, which managed 
to put forward larger telecom reforms than countries with statist styles, where a 
dominant group or coalition can more easily block reforms. Critically these findings 
both hold, since initiatives to reform the telecoms sector are largely endogenous in
419 Ochoa-Morales (2004). Also see McCullock who emphasises the need for favourable international policy: 
McCulloch R., ‘Technology Transfer to Developing Countries: Implications of International Regulation’ Annals 
o f  the American Academy o f  Political and Social Science 458 (1981): 110-122.
420 Schuler and Brown (1999), Dahlman C. J. And Westphal L. E., ‘The Transfer of Technology: Issues in the 
Acquisition of Technological Capability by Developing Countries’ Finance and Development 20.4 (1983): 6-9.
421 Henisz and Zelner (2001), Brown (1981).
422 Petrazzini (1995), Duch R. M., Privatising the Economy: Telecommunications Policy in Comparative 
Perspective Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press (1991).
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developed economies (as in Duch’s study), whilst they are typically exogenous in 
developing ones (as in Petrazzini’s) requiring the state to assume responsibility in the 
promotion of diffusion-conducive reforms.
Milner focuses on 190 countries during the 1990s and finds that speedy internet 
diffusion was not driven mainly by economic factors but by political institutions, 
concluding that democratic governments play a key role.423 Further, Milner argues 
that technology diffusion rates are dependent upon domestic policy, which in turn is 
dependent upon the choices that political leaders make about the rules governing the 
new technology. Similarly, Wilson states that ‘when countries have environments 
that promote stability and respect for law and democratic rights... rapid ICT 
diffusion is more likely’.424 Ultimately, as Kalathil and Boas colloquially argue, in 
regard to ICT the ‘states still call the shots’.425
A discussion of the choices and types of government rule would similarly be 
incomplete without any mention of regulations, which ultimately determine the 
structure of the financial markets and the quality of institutions that govern the 
market. Well developed and regulated financial markets will provide adequate 
potential returns on investments and attract capital that is important for faster rates of 
ICT diffusion. In turn, the structure of political incentives and political institutions in 
each country can shape its system of property rights and the regulation of the 
communications system. According to Wellenius and Stem, the form of the electoral 
and party systems, the way power is divided in the national government, as well as 
the degree of federalism, will strongly influence the choice of telecommunication 
policies.426 They also maintain that the political structures of Argentina and Mexico 
made for important policy differences at the time of privatisation. For instance, both 
countries chose to privatise and allow foreign ownership of the telecommunications
423 Milner (2006).
424 Wilson E., The Information Revolution and Developing Countries Cambridge, MA, MIT Press (2004), p.327. 
Kedzie also finds that democratisation has a positive impact on ICT diffusion rates as political regimes that 
suppress freedom of speech may want to control the diffusion of ICT (since these are primarily communication 
media). Kedzie C., Communication and Democracy: Coincident Revolutions and the Emergent Dictator's 
Dilemma Santa Monica, Research And Development (RAND) (1997).
425 Kalathil and Boas examine eight authoritarian governments and analyse the way the internet is used by 
societal, economic and political actors. See Kalathil S. and Boas T. C., Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The 
Impact o f  the Internet on Authoritarian Rule Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
(2003), p. 137.
Wellenius and Stem (1994).
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provider, but Mexico opted for a single national company whereas Argentina opted 
for two separate regional monopolies.
From Andonova and Diaz-Serrano’s perspective the development of the necessary 
telecom infrastructure will inevitably depend on the quality and nature of the 
country’s political institutions (a view endorsed by Esfahani and Ramirez, Henisz 
and Zelner, Levy and Spiller).427 In an earlier study, Andonova found that the 
difference in ICT diffusion rates (specifically in mobile telephones and the internet) 
between developed and developing countries was largely due to the difference in the 
quality of their institutions; particularly with an institutional environment associated
49  ftwith lower investment risks and better property rights protection. Despite a 
potential limitation of the study in regard to their accounting of institutional 
heterogeneity, it is undeniably a key study addressing the ‘quality’ factor 429
Overall, the institutional approach shows that there are a plethora of factors that can 
explain the different rates of ICT diffusion across countries. It seems that a 
potentially important factor, especially in developing economies, is the role of the 
state. The intrinsic traits, views and actions of the state can markedly affect the 
experience of diffusion from the very point of adoption to ultimate saturation, as it 
can control or oversee many aspects of any given technology. Identifying this factor 
as key is just the starting point, since Rosenberg famously conjectured ‘...there has 
been no single institutional formula for success’ 430 If the state operates successfully 
in diffusing a single technology, it does not necessarily follow that similar actions in 
another country, or for a different technology, will yield the same positive outcomes. 
It is important, therefore, to note that this thesis examines more than one technology 
across two countries.
427 Andonova and Diaz-Serrano specifically analyse the diffusion rate of three ICTs (fixed-line telephones, 
cellular telephones and the internet), across 183 countries for the period between 1990-2004. They find that the 
diffusion of these were closely dependent on political institutions. Andonova V. and Diaz-Serrano L., ‘Political 
Institutions and the Development of Telecommunications’ Institute for the Study of Labour, Discussion Paper 
2569 (2007): 1-28. Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), Henisz and Zelner (2001), Levy and Spiller (1996).
428 Andonova V., ‘Mobile Phones, the Internet and the Institutional Environment’ Telecommunications Policy 30 
(2006): 29-45.
429 Andonova used internationally comparable indices regarding institutional quality, which were drawn up at a 
national level. However some political scientists recognise institutional heterogeneity within a country.
430 Rosenberg (1970), p.575.
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1.5.5 Summary o f  the Literature
One of the findings of the thesis is that the telegraph and telephone diffusion rates in 
Argentina and Mexico were similar. Given the differences in their economic settings, 
economic factors are seemingly unable to account for such an occurrence. The 
review above examined an extensive range of factors within the existing literature 
that could account for differences in the rates of ICT diffusion across the two 
countries. The economic, institutional (and to some extent social) approaches are 
clearly the most relevant to this specific thesis, although some attempts will be made 
to account for the natural endowment approach (e.g. country size via the population 
density variable). In developing economies, the role of the government ultimately 
requires greater emphasis due to its ability to shape and determine the economic and 
social environment in which ICT diffusion takes place, especially in regard to the 
provision of the necessary infrastructure. Without government support in the process 
of ICT diffusion, all other important factors, will become largely inconsequential, 
hence its paramount importance.
1.6 Gap in the Literature
Technology diffusion is well documented in the academic literature, however, there 
has been no technology diffusion research that comparatively analyses these 
traditional ICTs in Argentina and Mexico over the whole period of their diffusion, 
from adoption to saturation, whilst accounting for a wide range of variables. 
Numerous studies have looked at the diffusion o f the two technologies from static 
perspectives. However, this is problematic since diffusion is a process and as such 
one cannot hope to view a snapshot and draw meaningful conclusions or provide 
much insight in regard to the primary drivers of a given diffusion rate for the whole 
period of diffusion.431 As indicated, much of the ICT literature primarily focuses on 
the most recent period and although there is some work on telephone diffusion in 
Argentina, there is a significant lack of work on the diffusion of the telegraph in 
Argentina or Mexico.
A considerable amount of research has focused on investigating innovations as 
standalone episodes, as if they were entirely independent of all other innovations.
431 Rogers (1995).
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This is a dubious assumption, especially in the case of technologies that are so 
closely interrelated, where the experience of one innovation is likely to influence the 
diffusion of the next. As Rogers acknowledges, ‘it is much simpler for diffusion 
scholars to investigate the spread of each innovation as an independent event, but this
A fi'y
is a distortion of reality’. For instance, few studies examining internet diffusion 
pay attention to previous fixed-line telephone diffusion. This study somewhat 
mitigates these issues in terms of making generalisations across ICTs by analysing 
the telephone and its predecessor, the telegraph. In terms of the technique of analysis, 
it is true that the application of an institutional emphasis (particularly focussing on 
the role of the state) is not unique in the technology diffusion literature but what this 
thesis contributes is corroborating evidence to support these claims. Through careful 
consideration of Argentina’s and Mexico’s particular political economies and various 
other potential explanatory factors, this comparative study is able to evaluate their 
respective dynamics regarding ICT diffusion.
1.7 Methodology
The thesis applies a modelling framework that includes the Flexible Logistic Growth 
model as well as linearisation techniques. As a consequence of the s-curve shape of 
the diffusion process, linearisation techniques were necessary to quantify the rate of 
diffusion across the two technologies. This process demonstrated that diffusion in 
Argentina and in Mexico took place at similar speeds, providing part of the 
foundations upon which the thesis is based. Once the Paradox was quantified, 
regression analysis coupled with very necessary qualitative analysis followed, in 
order to assess the extent to which the main factors surveyed in the literature review 
explained the diffusion rates in Argentina and Mexico most effectively. The 
quantitative analysis, however, must be considered in light of the inherent limitations 
regarding the reliability and consistency of all the official data (see the introduction 
to the appendices and appendix B). This is a long experienced problem faced by 
academics and one must take great care when interpreting the findings. The 
qualitative section is naturally more focused upon the institutional factors, given their 
intrinsic inability to be quantified with a great degree of accuracy, whilst the 
quantitative approach deals with the socio-economic factors in greater detail. The
432 Ibid., p. 15.
122
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The ‘Double Paradox’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
methodology of the thesis is based on four databases: Argentina’s telegraph diffusion, 
Mexico’s telegraph diffusion, Argentina’s telephone diffusion, and Mexico’s 
telephone diffusion. This thesis defines telegraph diffusion as the number of 
telegrams sent per 100 inhabitants. The telegrams sent are those sent by the public 
and exclude telegrams sent through the radiotelegraph. Telephone diffusion is 
defined here as the number of telephone handsets per 100 households. Information 
for the four main databases was predominantly collected from the census and 
yearbooks of national statistics. These were constructed from extensive field research 
and archive work (see appendix B for all the relevant sources). A range of socio­
economic data were also collected in relation to the quantitative analysis (see 
appendix C).
The perception that economic indicators need to be treated with care was 
contemplated by some international organisations in the 1950s/1960s. It was noted in 
various ECLA publications that certain statistics in particular Latin American 
economies faced a rather serious issue of reliability. The problems are twofold: first, 
there was a methodological issue, and secondly, the politically sensitive nature of 
this kind of data.433 As indicated, one must remain sceptical regarding the precision 
of the collected data, specifically around the turn of the twentieth century, since 
official data compilation in this period unfortunately may not be as reliable as one 
would wish. Collecting data such as population growth or urbanisation during the 
earlier period under consideration naturally presented a great logistical challenge for 
countries like Argentina and Mexico. Moreover, there are obvious political 
sensitivities surrounding the nature of socio-economic variables such as GDP per 
capita, or income inequality, and it is therefore prudent to acknowledge the potential 
for bias. Inconsistencies also exist, for example, with regard to the telegraph and 
telephone data presented in Mitchell, compared to that of INEGI (see appendix B for 
details and further discussion).434 The accuracy and reliability of the data, however, 
generally has improved over time. This was reinforced during the 1960s, as foreign 
agencies started to compile the data simultaneously due to the insistence of the U.N.,
433 For instance, see ECLA especially publications in the Serie Distribucion del Ingreso, for example, No. 3, 
‘Antecedentes Estadisticos de la Distribucion del Ingreso en Chile, 1940— 82’ (Santiago, Chile, 1987).
434 An explanation for this particular issue is that Mitchell and INEGI account for the variables in slightly 
different ways, even if  the general trends of the data are very similar. Despite this, some inconsistencies among 
different sources of data are apparent, which provide insight into their reliability. See the introduction to 
appendices and appendices A and B.
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that countries must adopt a standard definition for categorisations like 
urbanisation.435 Comparisons between any two countries (like Argentina and Mexico) 
have to be made with care, since it must be borne in mind that criteria definitions 
differ over time and across countries. Urbanisation data is one such area where 
accuracy varied materially over time as a lack of continuity at the census offices 
induced continual criteria change.436
Despite this shortcomings, some fairly reliable earlier data does exist, for instance for 
the decades around the Second World War (specifically 1930-1946). ECLA perhaps 
provides the most rigorous statistical data compilation for Argentina and Mexico 437 
The yearly Economic Surveys and Statistical Yearbooks of ECLA are two very good 
source of data across Latin America. Meanwhile, Argentina’s national census of 
1914 provides particularly useful for data before the First World War.439 Further 
analysis of Latin American economic development over this period can be found in 
Maddison and Bairoch.440 For socio-economic factors such as GDP per capita and 
population, I primarily used Maddison’s data because this spans the longest period 
(hence allows for consistency) and is particularly reliable as he draws much of his 
data for Latin America from ECLA.441 In addition to ECLA, the Argentina data is 
supplemented by CONADE, and the data for Mexico by INEGI and the World Bank.
435 For a detailed overview of the classification changes see Goyer D. S. and Domschke E., The Handbook o f  
National Population Censuses. Latin America and the Caribbean, North America and Oceania Connecticut, 
Greenwood Press (1983).
436 Urban population growth trends and differences in definitions in how to measure urban populations are treated 
in the United Nations, Growth o f  the World's Urban and Rural Population 1920-2000 New York, United Nations
(1966). Also see United Nations Patterns o f Rural and Urban Population Growth New York, United Nations 
(1980).
437 ECLA (1959).
438 For example see Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook 
for Latin America and the Caribbean Santiago, United Nations (1996). Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 1998-1999 Santiago, United 
Nations (1999). Note that ECLA is now called ECLAC. Another important ECLA publication is ECLA 
Direccion y  Estructura del Comercio Latinoamericano Santiago, United Nations (1984). It must be noted, 
however, that there are some discrepancies between the work of ECLA and that of the U.N., which are discussed 
in Wells J., Latin America at the Cross-Roads Santiago, CEPAL (1988).
439 Republica Argentina, Comision Nacional del Censo, Tercer Censo Nacional, 1914, Talleres Grdficos de L. J. 
Rosso, Buenos Aires (1915-1917). For other economic data for this period, also see Tomquist E. and Cia. 
Limitada, The Economic Development o f  the Argentine Republic in the Last Fifty Years Buenos Aires, United 
Nations (1919).
440 Maddison A., Growth and Slowdown in Advanced Capitalist Economies: Techniques of Quantitative 
Assessment’ Journal o f  Economic Literature 25.2 (1987): 649-698. Maddison A., Phases o f  Capitalist 
Development Oxford, Oxford University Press (1982). Bairoch P., The Economic Development o f  the Third 
World since 1900 London, Methuen & Co. (1977).
441 Indeed, the work of ECLA represents the most thorough attempt by an international organisation to ensure 
data consistency across Latin America.
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As stipulated, for the purposes of this study a full data set is necessary, to be able to 
build the diffusion s-curves for the telegraph and telephone. As a result, I decided to 
use data collected from Maddison, instead of using Mitchell’s data for instance (as I 
had done initially).442 Mitchell’s historical data on Latin America is used widely and 
is an excellent source (especially for large comparative studies), due to its 
consistency, wide range of factors, and the large number of countries under coverage. 
Yet for the purposes of this thesis, since the focus here is only on two countries, there 
are other preferred sources which included more specific and detailed Argentinian 
and Mexican data. For instance, in Mitchell there are no telegraph or telephone data 
for the intra-war years for Argentina, while for Mexico, much of the data for the 
early years of diffusion is missing. Further, Mitchell’s data do not differentiate 
between the telegrams sent by the government and those sent by the public. As a 
result of the field trip to Latin America, I obtained a fuller data set and hence was 
able to attempt to fill some of the gaps in Mitchell’s work.
Other data, used in the regression analysis of chapter 4, was collected from various 
sources, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Interuniversity 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) to name a few (see appendix 
C for full details). For the period 1950-1990 the yearly publications and databases of 
the OECD and the World Bank, as well as the IMF’s, are also especially useful. 443 
As a result of the variable degree of quality and date intervals of official data in Latin 
America, many demographers typically draw on the standardised data compilations 
of the Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia (CELADE) 444 CELADE is a good 
source for more recent data, but urban population data in Latin America, for instance, 
was collected only from 1950 onwards, while this thesis analyses data from as far 
back as the nineteenth century.445 This is a typical problem posed by many statistical 
publications, since most historical data often includes only the second half o f the
442 Mitchell B. R., International Historical Statistics: Australasia and Americas London, Palgrave Macmillan 
(1983).
443 Organisation for Co-operation and Development (OECD), Historical Statistics and National Accounts (various 
years) (http://www.oecd.org). The World Bank, World Bank Tables Washington D.C. (various years), The World 
Bank, World Development Report 1994 Washington D.C. (various years), IMF:
(http ://ww. i mf. or g/extem al/pubind. htm).
Centro Latinoamericano y Caribefio de Demografia (CELADE), Boletin Demografico (various years) provides 
periodic summaries of the most important demographic indicators.
5 CELADE is the population division of ECLA and its data are available online: (http://www.cepal.org).
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twentieth century. Again, the demands of this thesis, in requiring data sets that pre­
date the twentieth century, mean that many statistical publications do not readily 
provide sufficient data.446 For further commentary on the data used and its specific 
sources, refer to the introduction to the appendices and appendices A, B and C. 
Appendix A details the relevant socio-economic data over the period, citing and 
discussing the sources used, as well as acknowledging the inherent limitations of the 
data. Appendix B and C follow the same process, with appendix B presenting a full 
list of the telegraph and telephone data, while appendix C reveals the other relevant 
quantitative data used in this thesis. In summary, although it is prudent to have an 
appreciation of the validity issues of a given data set, it is also important to 
acknowledge that no single option is perfect.
446 For instance, the IMF are only available from 1950 onwards, for the World Bank and ITU from 1960, while 
UCTAD only goes back as far as 1970.
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Chapter 2 
The Flexible Logistic Growth Model
This chapter provides the theoretical modelling framework which allowed for the 
quantitative exploration of the traditional ICT diffusion process in Argentina and 
Mexico. The chapter demonstrates that the diffusion paths in Argentina and Mexico 
abided by s-curve theory, and then applies a critical analysis of the potential 
applicable diffusion models. The origins of the accepted theory on generic diffusion 
of innovations are traced from their theoretical beginnings with Rogers to the latest 
type of innovative flexible modelling.1 The remaining focus of the chapter is on the 
Flexible Logistic Growth Model (FLOG), which is chosen as the most appropriate 
model to statistically examine diffusion in Argentina and Mexico. The chapter 
provides a justification for the choice of methodology, and then applies the model 
(and linearisation techniques), in order to measure the diffusion speeds. This chapter 
provides some sense of mathematical basis for the arguments of the comparative case 
studies by demonstrating that the two technologies diffused at a similar rate in 
Argentina and Mexico, thereby revealing the Paradox.
2.1 The Process of ICT Diffusion
The process of technology diffusion is a complex one, and should not be taken 
simplistically, as differing technologies will diffuse in entirely dissimilar fashions. 
Different countries will adopt and diffuse a given technology at different points of 
inception and at different rates because they may for instance have different 
economic or environmental settings, which impact the facilitation o f technology 
transfer. The process of ICT diffusion refers to the practice by which new ICTs 
spread across their potential markets over time. Diffusion does not happen 
instantaneously; instead it is a long, drawn-out process which commonly tends to 
take many years until the saturation of the new technology is finally attained.2 The 
Theory of Diffusion of Innovations, formalised by Everett Rogers in 1962, predicted 
that an innovation will diffuse following an s-shaped distribution curve (or Pearl
1 Rogers (1995).
2 Stoneman P., The Economics o f  Technological Diffusion Oxford, Blackwell (2002).
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curve) as in figure 2.1. This theory established the basis for all studies related to the 
diffusion o f  a new technology.3
F igure 2.1 The S -shaped Diffusion C urve
100
Poin t of 
In lec tio n
Cum ulative Y ears o f Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration.
The logic behind the s-shape diffusion curve in figure 2.1 is that the rate at which a 
new technology diffuses begins at a low level and increases gradually, until it 
reaches a point o f inflection (i.e. where the maximum rate o f diffusion is reached). 
After this point, the level o f  diffusion increases but at a decreasing rate, as progress is 
harder to achieve the closer one gets to the upper limit (the saturation point).4 
Theoretically the telegraph and the telephone, are expected to follow this s-shaped 
path. The s-shaped curve is derived, fundamentally, from a symmetric Bell curve 
mathematical division, which maps the rate o f adoption over a given period to form a 
normal distribution.5 The resulting s-curve shown in figure 2.2 is a cumulative 
graphing o f the Bell-curve distribution.
3 Rogers (1995), Griliches (1957), Linstone H. A., and Sahal D., Technological Substitution New York, American 
Elsevier (1976).
4 Mahajan V., Muller E. and Bass F. M., ‘New Product Diffusion Models in Marketing: A Review and Directions
for Research’ Journal o f Marketing 54.1 (1990): 1-26. Griliches (1957).
5 Adoption is typically characterised by the following: innovators (2.5%), early adopters (13.5%), early majority
(34%), late majority (34%) and laggards (16%). Rogers (1995).
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Figure 2.2 The B ell-shaped and  C um ulative S -curve C h a rts
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Source: Adapted from Mahajan Muller and Bass (1990).
Figure 2.2 shows that, as the Bell-curve distribution and the cumulative distribution 
curves tend away from one another, the maturity stage in the rate o f adoption and 
ultimately the saturation levels are attained (i.e. when the curves flatten). Saturation 
often coincides with the growth stage o f a competing technology; examples o f which 
can be found in various studies.6 Unsurprisingly, the saturation stage o f the diffusion 
o f the electric telegraph coincided with the growth stage o f the telephone and the 
spread o f  radiotelegraphy.
2.2 The Diffusion S-curves in Argentina and Mexico
Argentina’s and M exico’s pattern o f ICT diffusion closely followed that o f the 
developed world (by adhering to an s-shaped curve). In practice, in the developing 
world few technologies achieve complete diffusion through the population. Instead, 
what tends to happen is that a new substitutive technology will take the place o f the 
earlier one (an example being the mobile telephone). In some cases, in developing 
countries where people may not have adopted the earlier technology (such as a fixed 
line telephones for instance), they may simply leapfrog onto the next technology 
before anything resembling saturation materialises.7 The actual diffusion paths o f the 
telegraph and the telephone in Argentina and Mexico are shown below (figures 2.3 -
6 For instance, see Fisher J. C. and Pry R. H., ‘A Simple Substitution Model o f  Technological Change’ 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 3 (1971): 75-88. Fisher and Pry demonstrated this via the 
substitution o f synthetic/natural fibres and synthetic/natural rubbers.
7 M enezes C., ‘Development o f  the Information Society in Latin America and the Caribbean’ UNESCO Report 
(2000): 1-7.
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o
2.6) and generic s-curves were added for illustrative purposes. The diffusion o f the 
telegraph is represented by the cumulative number o f  telegrams sent by the public 
(excluding official telegrams) per 100 inhabitants and for telephone diffusion the 
data is graphed as the number o f telephone handsets per 100 households, against time.
F igure 2.3 A rg en tin a’s T elegraph  Diffusion S-curve
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Source: Own elaboration. For detailed sources on the data collection see appendix B.
This study is concerned with the relative speed with which a country diffuses a 
technology. Despite this, it must be noted that the absolute level o f telegraph 
diffusion in Argentina was much greater than in Mexico. This is discussed further in
'These were drawn with the help o f Loglet Lab2.
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chapter 3, section 3.1.3 The Years o f Telegraph Saturation. However, perhaps what 
is more remarkable is just how close the absolute levels o f  diffusion were for the 
telephone technology (see figures 2.5 -  2.6). There are obviously many factors that 
distort a country’s final level o f diffusion, such as the period in time in which 
diffusion takes place and their access to newer substitutive technologies, but this 
study remains primarily concerned with the speed at which a given country diffuses 
to their respective saturation level and since the study accounts for more than just 
one technology, any cause for concern is reduced further. It is pertinent to note that 
100% o f diffusion here and throughout the thesis is observed endogenously as the 
actual level o f  saturation reached, as opposed to the market potential.
Figure 2.5 A rg en tin a’s Telephone Diffusion S-curve
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F igure 2.6 M exico’s Telephone Diffusion S-curve
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Figures 2.3 to 2.6 show that the diffusion of the two technologies in Argentina and 
Mexico followed the expected s-shaped curve, as predicted by the literature. 
However, simply stating that the diffusion pattern will follow an s-shaped curve is 
not enough, since part of the complexity within the process of technology diffusion 
rests on the fact that different technologies will diffuse in different fashions and at 
different speeds. Mansfield, Stoneman and Toivanen revealed this across different 
industries, Lehr and Lichtenberg proved it across different firms, and Stoneman and 
Battisti showed that the diffusion path of the same technology can differ across 
regions, an argument supported by Alderman and Davies, and Nabseth and Ray.9 
Although it is a common finding that the diffusion of a new technology, when plotted 
against time, will ordinarily produce an s-shaped curve10 (as confirmed by studies as 
early as Griliches and Mansfield’s), the exact shape can take various forms (as 
considered in table 2.1 later in the chapter).11 In closer examination of Argentina’s 
and Mexico’s respective diffusion s-curves (figures 2.3 -  2.6), the most appropriate 
type of s-curve model must be chosen for the statistical mapping of the telegraph and 
telephone diffusion paths.
2.3 Conditions for the Theoretical Modelling Framework
One aim of the thesis is to gain greater understanding of the logic behind the 
observed diffusion rates for the telegraph and the telephone in Argentina and Mexico 
in order to explain why these technologies were diffused at remarkably similar rates 
in both countries, despite experiencing significantly different economic environments. 
The hypothesis is that it was due to the role played by the state, but before any 
explanations can be tested, one must be in position to demonstrate statistically that 
the two technologies did indeed diffuse at a similar rate. In order to test this, it is 
critical to use a formal model.
9 Mansfield E., ‘Industrial Robots in Japan and the USA’ Research Policy 18 (1989): 183-192, Stoneman P. and 
Toivanen O., ‘The Diffusion of Multiple Technologies: An Empirical Study’ Economics o f  Innovation and New 
Technology 5 (1997): 1-17, Lehr W. and Lichtenberg F., ‘Computer Use and Productivity Growth in US Federal 
Government Agencies, 1987-1992’ Journal o f Industrial Economics 21.1 (1990): 27-44. Stoneman P. and Battisti 
G., ‘Intra Firm Diffusion of New Technologies: The Neglected Part of Technology Transfer’ International 
Journal o f  Industrial Engineering 4.4 (1997): 270-282. Alderman N. and Davies S., ‘Modelling Regional Patterns 
of Innovation in the UK Metal-working Industries’ Regional Studies 24.6 (1990): 1451-1461, Nabseth L. and Ray 
G. F., The Diffusion o f  New Industrial Processes: An International Study Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
(1974).
10 See Sharif M. N. and Islam M. N., ‘The Weibull Distribution as a General Model for Forecasting Technological 
Change’ Technological Forecasting and Social Change 18 (1980): 247-256.
11 Griliches (1957), Mansfield (1961). Mansfield looked at the diffusion of 12 different new technologies, across 
different sectors, which confirmed the aforementioned s-shaped diffusion pattern.
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The choice of a diffusion model is no simplistic task, given the wide range available. 
The appropriate model for this thesis must accurately be able to measure the rate at 
which the telegraph and the telephone diffused in Argentina and Mexico. The 
telegraph and the telephone are technologies specifically characterised by positive 
network externalities, i.e. their associated value grows as the number of customers 
using it increases. Consequently, the model must account for network externalities, 
as this factor to some extent explains an individual’s rationale in adopting such a 
technology. Most importantly the model must fit the data presented in figures 2.3 -  
2.6, that is to say, it must be flexible enough to allow for the given s-curve 
characteristics of asymmetry and varied inflection points. Finally, the thesis requires 
a model which addresses the diffusion of a technology in terms of the market in 
aggregate (i.e. not at the individual level) as the thesis measures diffusion within a 
country (as opposed to just within a household or firm). It is also important to note 
that the chosen technologies are characterised by a lack of significant improvements 
or changes since their initial diffusion.12 Consequently, the chosen model does not 
need to be the most complicated, especially since there is no need for predictive 
powers, as the data set is historical. The available theoretical models are examined 
below, and ultimately the FLOG is chosen as the most suitable.
2.4 Theoretical Models to Measure the Rate of Technology Diffusion
Although the physical shape of the empirical s-curves and the requirements listed 
above enabled us to discount many of the models initially surveyed below, this 
section has remained generic to demonstrate more transparently the top down 
approach that was adopted in choosing a model. In general, a diffusion model will 
attempt to measure ‘the spread of an innovation among a given population... in terms 
of a simple mathematical function of the time that has elapsed from the introduction 
of the innovation’.13 There are four main model types which explain the s-shaped 
diffusion curves, namely, the Epidemic models, the Rank (or Probit) models, the 
Order models and the Stock Adjustment models. Table 2.1 summarises the model 
branches that were considered.
12 One may argue that the services of the telephone and telegraph improved, but ultimately these technologies 
remained largely unchanged, in comparison with more complex technologies such as computers.
13 Mahajan V. and Peterson R. A., Models fo r  Innovation Diffusion California, Sage Publications (1985), p.10.
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T able  2.1 D ifferen t C ategory  Types o f Diffusion M odels
EPIDEMIC MODELS
FLEXIBLE DIFFUSION MODELS
GOMPERTX MODEL + 
EXTENSIONS
BASS MODEL -t- 
EXTENSIONS
LOGISTIC MODEL + 
EXTENSIONS
RANI iDELS JDRDgRJUePEtS^ JjTOQltMe&EtS^
DIFFERENT TYPES OF DIFFUSION MODELS
Source: Own elaboration from information mainly in Karshenas and Stoneman. (1993).
As indicated by table 2.1, Epidemic models are the relevant branch required for this 
thesis and these models are accordingly divided into further sub-categories 
(disregarded models are indicated with a red strike through their name). The key 
rationale for choosing the Epidemic models are because they are the only ones which, 
in addition to accounting for the s-shaped diffusion curves, also account for network 
externalities. This factor often proves most problematic when choosing a model to 
measure technology diffusion.14 Consequently, the Rank, Probit (e.g. David 1969, 
Davies 1979), Order (e.g. Ireland and Stoneman 1985, Fudenberg and Tirole 1985) 
or Stock Adjustment models (e.g. Reinganum 1981, Quirmbach 1986, Schumpeter 
1984) are unsuitable.15 Moreover, the Rank, Stock and Order models tend to focus on 
the diffusion o f a new technology at the micro level (e.g. the firm) rather than the 
macro level, as required here.16
The Epidemic models are the earliest and most common type o f models aimed at 
explaining the s-shape curve within the diffusion literature. They are based on the
14 Rogers (1995).
15 For more information see Karshenas M., and Stoneman P. L., ‘Rank, Stock, Order, and Epidemic Effects in the 
Diffusion o f  N ew Process Technologies: An Empirical M odel’ Research And Development (RAND) Journal o f  
Economics 24.4 (1993): 503-528, For Probit models see David P., A Contribution to the Theory of Diffusion 
Sanford, Centre for Research in Economic Growth Research Memorandum 71, Stanford University (1969), 
Davies S., The Diffusion of Process Innovations Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1979). For order 
models see Ireland N. and Stoneman P. L., ‘Order Effects, Perfect Foresight and Inter-temporal Price 
Discrimination’ Recherches Economiques de Louvain 51 (1985): 7-20, Fudenberg D. and Tirole J., ‘Pre-emption 
and Rent Equalization in the Adoption o f  New Technology’ Review of Economic Studies 52 (1985): 383-401. For 
stock adjustment models see Reinganum J., ‘Market Structure and the Diffusion o f  New Technology’ The Bell 
Journal o f Economics 12 (1981): 618-624, Quirmbach H., ‘The Diffusion o f  N ew  Technology and the Market for 
an Innovation’ Research And Development (RAND) Journal o f Economics 17 (1986): 618-624, Schumpeter J., 
The Theory of Economic Development Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1984).
16 Kemp R., Environmental Policy and Technical Change: A Comparison of the Technological Impact of Policy 
Instruments U.K., Edward Elgar (1997), Barreto L., ‘Gaps and Needs in Technology Diffusion Models: The 
Perspective o f an Energy-systems M odeler’ Paper presented to the Workshop on Clean Technologies Diffusion 
Modelling (2003): 1-11.
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principle that dissemination of information and/or contagion is key in driving 
technology diffusion. As Griliches and Geroski identified, the rate of diffusion is 
predetermined by the degree of information available regarding the new technology,
leading different countries to adopt and diffuse new technologies at different times
11and speeds. These types of models are highly appropriate for measuring the 
different rates of diffusion of the telegraph and the telephone because the underlying 
assumption regarding the rate, at which non-adopters adopt, is determined by the
1 ftvolume of existing and future potential users. Indeed, existing users are essential in 
increasing cumulative diffusion because they act as test-cases/sources of information 
for prospective users, and the more their numbers grow, the greater the probability 
that a prospective adopter will adopt.19
Epidemic models assume that there is a potential population of adopters, that the 
innovation cannot be lost once it is adopted and that it is diffused when contact 
between two individuals occurs, with the frequency of contact remaining constant. 
Thus the start of the diffusion of a new technology will see a given number of 
subscribers, followed by users and non-users mixing within society making contact 
over time. The key assumption is that by making contact with a user of the new 
technology, it is more likely that the non-user will become a user. Consequently, 
over time the number of non-users will decrease and the number who can convert 
will fall. Due to the increased probability of contact, the growth in the number of 
users (as a proportion of the total number of potential users) results in an s-shaped 
distribution curve. The main criticism of these models rests on the fact that many 
new technologies take many years to saturate, and it seems unrealistic to think that 
the only reason why late adopters have not acquired the technology is because they 
do not know of its existence. For the telegraph or the telephone, a response to this 
criticism would be that, in fact, all potential adopters know o f the existence of the 
new technology but it is rather the knowledge of its performance and utility that is 
transferred through contact. Thus the mere contact between a user and non-user does 
not necessarily result in the non-user converting. The non-user may need to meet
17 Geroski P. A., ‘Models of Technology Diffusion’ Research Policy 29 (2000): 603-625.
18 Swann G. M. P., ‘Sales Practice and Market Evolution: the Case of Virtual Reality’ International Journal o f  
Industrial Organization 19 (2001): 1119-1139.
19 Yeon S., Park T. S. and Kim S., ‘A Dynamic Diffusion Model for Managing Customer’s Expectation and 
Satisfaction’ Technological Forecasting and Social Change 73 (2006): 648-665.
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many users before deciding to become a user him/herself. Epidemic models are also 
advantageous because they assume that the quality of the technology being diffused 
remains constant. Moreover, Epidemic models are most successful when populations 
are dense and ‘...where the new technology is clearly superior to the old one and no 
major switching costs arise,’20 which is the case in this thesis.
An examination of the different sub-divisions within the epidemic models follows 
below.
2.4.1 Diffusion Models within Epidemic Models
Having established that Epidemic models are the most appropriate type of models for 
the purposes of this thesis, one must ascertain which specific type best serves the
study’s needs. Figure 2.7 illustrates the main types of Epidemic s-shaped diffusion
01curves and their points of inflection.
20 Geroski (2000), p.607.
21 The point of inflection relates to the point on a curve where the curvature (second derivative) changes signs and 
shape, from concaving upwards (positive curvature) to downwards (negative curvature). It is a very important 
variable to consider in determining a suitable diffusion model.
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F igure 2.7 D ifferen t T ypes of Epidem ic S-curves
T in a { T )
Log Logistic (2 Parameters)
Tin* (t)Tina (t)
Tina (t) Tina (t)
Source: Adapted from Meade and Islam (1998).
As depicted in figure 2.7, the effective structure o f the basic diffusion s-curve is 
explained mathematically by two properties: the point o f inflection (indicated by the 
dashed lines) and the degree o f  curve-symmetry. For instance, if the diffusion pattern 
has a point o f inflection at the 50% level and the s-curve is symmetrical at the mid­
point, the s-curve is said to be Logistic (as per the first graph in figure 2.7). Indeed, 
the Logistic curve is the best known and most common type o f diffusion s-curve. It is 
worth noting that there are many models with a point o f  inflection below 50% but 
few above 50%. The table depicts six o f  the main Epidemic model shapes and shows 
clearly that a fixed inflection point, whether at 50% (e.g. Logistic) or 37% (e.g. 
Gompertz), is very much the norm.
There are numerous examples within the generic Epidemic models, and it seems 
most appropriate to divide them as Geroski labels them, between ‘true’ Epidemic 
models (i.e. with no extensions), and ‘flexible’ Epidemic models (i.e. with
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extensions). The most common, true Epidemic models are the traditional Logistic 
models (e.g. Griliches’ model and Mansfield’s model with its numerous extensions, 
such as the Fisher-Pry and the Blackman models).22 However, given that the 
empirical s-curves for the telegraph and telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico 
(as per figures 2.3 -  2.6), are not all symmetrical around the mid-point and, that the 
given points of inflection are not seemingly consistent, it means an extended or 
flexible Logistic model (as in the last graph within figure 2.7) is required. These 
findings eliminate the use of rigid models such as the Logistic, often termed crudely
'J'Xmechanical in nature. Even the alternative Gompertz models with an inflection 
point at 37%, or similar models such as the Floyd (inflection point at 33%) are still 
too rigid, since the point of inflection continues to be predetermined at a fixed 
level.24
The real shortcoming of these fixed inflection point models is that there is no data 
determination. Both in practice and in theory, the point of inflection of the diffusion 
of a technology should be free to occur at any given point of the diffusion process 
and this is where the flexible diffusion models come in.25 Ultimately, although 
individual graphs may display logistic characteristics, not all do. Thus one can 
confidently conclude that the diffusion of the telegraph and telephone in Argentina 
and Mexico must be modelled by a broader, more flexible group of models than can 
for instance account for both a Logistic and Weibull curve if necessary.
2.4.2 Epidemic Flexible Diffusion Models
The model of choice should be capable of illustrating several patterns of diffusion 
by, ideally, allowing entire data-determination of both the point of inflection and 
degree of curve-symmetry.26 Table 2.2 presents the main flexible diffusion models, 
with their main characteristics and previous practical applications.
22 Griliches (1957), Mansfield (1961), Fisher and Pry (1971), Blackman A. W., ‘The Market Dynamics of 
Technological Substitutions’ Technological Forecasting and Social Change 6 (1974): 41-63.
23 Silverberg G., Dosi G. and Luigi O., ‘Innovation, Diversity and Diffusion: A Self-Organisation Model’ The 
Economic Journal 98 (1988): 1032-1154.
24 Chow G. C., ‘Technological Change and the Demand for Computers’ The American Economic Review 57
(1967): 1117-1130. Floyd A., ‘A Methodology for Trend Forecasting of Figures of Merit’ in Bright J., 
Technological Forecasting fo r  Industry and Government: Methods and Applications NJ, Englewood Cliffs, 
Prentice Hall (1968).
25 Mahajan et al. (1990).
26 Bewley R. and Fiebig D. G., ‘A Flexible Logistic Growth Model with Applications in Telecommunications’ 
International Journal o f  Forecasting 4 (1988): 177-192.
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T able 2.2 Flexible Diffusion M odels
Model Inflection Points 
(%)
Symmetry Applications
Bass (1969) 0-50 NS
Consumer goods, retail, education, 
industrial innovations
Jeuland (1981) 0-50 S o r N S
Consumer durable goods 
innovations
Stanford Research Institute (1986) 0-50 NS Energy innovations
Sharif and Kabir (1976) 33-50 S o r N S Industrial innovations
Non-Uniform Influence: NUI 
(1983)
0-100 S o r N S
Consumer goods, retail, education 
innovations
Non-Symmetric Responding 
Logistic: NSRL (1981)
0-100 S o r N S Medical innovations
Von Bertanlanffy (1957) 0-100 S o r N S Agricultural innovations
Flexible Logistic Growth: FLOG 
(1988)
0-100 S o r N S Telecommunications innovations
Source: Adapted from Mahajan et al. (1990) Note: The symmetry of the curve is S (symmetric) or NS (non- 
symmetric).
For the reasons already stated, some o f  the models in the table were discounted 
immediately but they were all included at this point for completeness. Looking at the 
curves in figures 2.3 -  2.6, it is possible that M exico’s telegraph diffusion is close to 
symmetric (tested formally later in the chapter) and thus it would be wrong to apply a 
model that did not account for this. One can directly discount the Bass and the 
Stanford Research Institute models since these do not account for a symmetric s- 
curve.27 Given the cap on the inflection points set by Jeuland, and Sharif and Kabir,
0 o
these were eliminated too. Only four o f the models in table 2.2 offer complete 
flexibility in capturing the diffusion pattern, in other words, the point o f inflection 
can be anywhere between 0-100% diffusion and the s-curve can be either symmetric 
or non-symmetric. These are the Von Bertalanffy model, the NUI model and the 
NSRL models (both by Easingwood, Mahajan and Muller), and the Flexible Logistic 
Growth model (FLOG) by Bewley and Fiebig.29
27 The Stanford Research Institute model is recorded in Teotia A. P. S. and Raju P. S., ‘Forecasting the Market 
Penetration o f  N ew  Technologies Using a Combination o f Economic Cost and Diffusion M odels’ The Journal o f 
Product Innovation Management 3.4 (1986): 225-237. Bass M. F., ‘A New Product Growth Model for Consumer 
Durables’ Management Science 15 (1969): 215-227.
28 Jeuland A. P., ‘Parsimonious Models o f Diffusion o f  Innovation Parts A and B: Derivations and Comparisons’ 
Working Paper 8 (1981), Sharif M. N. and Kabir C. A., ‘A Generalised Model for Forecasting Technological 
Substitution’ Technology Forecasting and Social Change 8 (1976): 353-364.
29 Von Bertalanffy L., ‘Quantitative Laws in Metabolism and Growth’ Quarterly Review of Biology 32 (1957): 
217-231, Easingwood C. J., Mahajan V. and Muller E., ‘A Nonsymmetric Responding Logistic Model for 
Technological Substitution’ Technological Forecasting and Social Change 20 (1981): 199-213. Easingwood C. J., 
Mahajan V. and Muller E., ‘A Non-uniform Influence Innovation Diffusion Model o f  New, Product Acceptance’ 
Marketing Science 2 (1983): 273-296, Bewley and Fiebig (1988).
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The Von Bertalanffy model is at a disadvantage compared to FLOG and Easingwood 
et al.’s models because it only allows for the coefficient of internal influence (or 
imitation) to be decreasing to a constant zero. Note that the coefficient of internal 
influence is the accepted behavioural theory of the population, used in almost all the 
mathematical models that map the process of technology diffusion.30 In other words, 
it assumes that the network effect (or the coefficient of internal influence) decreases 
over time. Meanwhile the FLOG and Easingwood et al. models allow for this 
coefficient to increase, decrease or remain constant over time, thus imposing fewer 
restrictions and therefore providing a better fit for this study.31 Intuitively it makes 
sense to allow for the coefficient of internal influence to vary with time given that, as 
Bundgaard-Nielsen argues, late adopters may actually adopt an innovation faster than 
early adopters, provided that information regarding the technology is freely 
available, since late adopters are positioned better to evaluate the new innovation.32 
On the other hand, Kotler contends that in some instances the coefficient of internal 
influence will decline over time, since ‘the remaining potential adopters are less 
responsive to the product and associated communications’.33 What is clear is that the 
norm of most models, that is to hold the coefficient of internal influence constant 
over the diffusion process, is a potential misrepresentation and lacks some theoretical 
rationale.34
Indeed, while the FLOG offers a closed-form solution like the Von Bertalanffy 
model, it also allows for a varied coefficient of internal influence in the same way as 
the Easingwood et al. model. After much deliberation, the FLOG was selected as the 
best model to use in review of the demands of this particular thesis and the fact that it 
has been applied successfully in the field of telecommunication innovations.
30 Mansfield E., ‘Technological Change and the Rate of Imitation’ Econometrica 29 (1981): 741-765.
31 Mahajan et al. (1990).
32 Bundgaard-Nielsen M., ‘The International Diffusion of New Technology’ Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change 9 (1976): 365-370.
33 Kotler P., Marketing Decision Making: A Model Building Approach New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston 
(1971), p.53.
34 Hemes G., ‘Diffusion and Growth: The Non-Homogeneous Case’ Scandinavian Journal o f  Economics 78 
(1976): 427-436, Mahajan et al. (1990).
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2.5 The Theoretical Framework of the FLOG Model
The FLOG model proved to be very useful as it could be applied to all four diffusion 
processes and, in terms of standardisation, it could be readily applied to other 
countries or regions, if future research demanded.
In comparison with the simpler Epidemic diffusion models, flexible models like the 
FLOG, although they provide a better fit to the data, often it is argued that this 
feature is a result of the incorporation of additional parameters, which always create 
a better ‘within-sample’ fit.35 The FLOG model’s wider applicability also comes 
under scrutiny for two main reasons. Finding four parameters (as required to 
mathematically define a FLOG curve) is clearly more difficult than finding two and 
this presents a greater challenge in the absence of time series data for the given 
process. However, this is not a big issue here because of the availability of a full 
time series. Indeed, the FLOG’s flexibility in modelling both symmetrical and 
asymmetrical properties, whilst allowing the point of inflection to be completely data 
determined is what differentiates it from its peers. The FLOG is also the preferred 
model as it allows for possible extensions to the study, since its ability to forecast 
internal saturation levels means that the case studies examined here can be directly 
compared to modem ICT studies subjected to similar analysis.37 Furthermore, as the 
analysis will reveal, there is no single distribution that ranks first on the ‘goodness of 
fit’ tests for all four modelled data sets, which vindicates the choosing of the FLOG .
Here, a brief explanation of the mathematical concepts behind the diffusion curves is 
provided (see appendix E for details). Following on from the s-curve theory, the 
FLOG can be examined in more depth. Then the linearisation methods are explained 
and applied to the empirical data collected in order to determine relative ‘speeds’ of 
diffusion in the two countries.
35 Flexible diffusion models have fitted the data better in Easingwood C. J., ‘Early Product Life Cycle Forms for 
Infrequently Purchased Major Products’ International Journal o f  Research in Marketing 4 (1987): 3-9.
36 Mahajan et al. (1990).
37 Meade N. and Islam T., ‘Forecasting with Growth Curves: An Empirical Comparison’ International Journal o f  
Forecasting 11 (1995): 199-215.
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The Diffusion Curves
Technology diffusion was originally modelled by Roger’s theoretical two-step 
process, which is defined by the initial point o f adoption (data determined) and the 
rate or speed o f diffusion (calculated from the plotted graph). The growth rate o f 
adoption, i.e. the number of adopters over the time, N (t)  is proportional to the total 
number o f adopters. Ultimately, a point o f saturation, M, is reached. This relationship 
can be represented fundamentally by the exponential growth model (in differential 
form) as follows, where a  represents the growth rate constant:
^  =  a  m
Another mathematical property o f  the s-curve is based on the fact that the Logistic
10
curve initially maps that o f the exponential curve, as illustrated in figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8 The Path of the Logistic Curve
100
Exponential
Logistic
s
o
.5roa
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0
Cumulative Years of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration.
Figure 2.8 indicates why the mathematics describing the exponential and the Logistic 
curves have commonality. The coefficient o f internal influence, p is then taken into 
account in addition to some other small modifications, at which point one is able to 
define an s-curve mathematically.
The FLOG Model
Here the main mathematical concepts on which the FLOG model is based upon are 
considered. Easingwood et al. argue that the diffusion process can be described by
The Logistic curve is the most common type o f  s-curve.
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the following differential process (the solution of which depicts the raw substitutive 
process of diffusion):
This equation is the fundamental premise of analysis for the Blackman, Mansfield, 
Fisher-Pry, Floyd and Sharif-Kabir models and for several others.40 The FLOG 
model builds upon this generalised fundamental 2 parameter model (a and P) and 
adds a further two parameters ( k  and p). Parameter k  controls the horizontal scale of 
the s-curve, while p affects the curvature of the s-curve in a way that enables it to 
predict an internal saturation level that is neither necessarily pre-determined nor 
struck at a level of unity.41 The full derivation of the FLOG model is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, what is important is to appreciate that the main benefit of the 
FLOG is derived from the fact that it has many useful models nested within it.42 The 
precise model formulation and specifications of the FLOG are summarised in table 
2.3.43
Table 2.3 FLOG Formulae Specification
Differential Form ^  =  p [ ( l  +  k t)l]&‘ k>N(M - N)
Equation Solution N =  {1 +  e [ - a  -  p t(ji ,  k)]}-1
Internal Saturation Level w = { i + e [ - « - g f
Point of Inflection ( l - 2 N ) l n { [ m ~ 1 - l ] / m - 1 - 1 ] }  == cK - i i ) / i i
Where t(p,k) =  {[(1 +  /ct)(V*)f -  l}y p *  0, k * 0
=  (1 /k ) ln(l +  kt) p =  0, k * 0
=  ( e ^ - l ) / p P *  o, k = 0
=  t fi =  0, k = 0
Source: Bewley and Fiebig (1988).
39 Easingwood et al. (1981).
40 Fisher and Pry (1971), Floyd (1968), Sharif and Kabir (1976).
41 Although advantageous, this is not an essential feature for this study (but perhaps for future ones), since there is 
no forecasting element.
42 Including the Log-logistic and Box-Cox Transformation for instance.
43 For the full derivation, refer to Bewley and Fiebig (1988).
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Table 2.3 shows why the FLOG is such a useful base from which to model diffusion 
curves since at the extreme, when p and k  = 0, the FLOG can be mathematically 
reduced to the Logistic form (the basic two-parameter model). As mentioned, four 
parameters fully specify the FLOG model formulae: a, p, p and k . Depending on the 
curve being modelled to the FLOG, the parameters a, p are always estimated but p 
and k  do not need to be estimated in some special cases:
Table 2.4 Special Variant Cases of the FLOG
Model P K t(H ,K) Location of Inflection Point
Normal 1 1 T M /2
Log-logistic 0 1 Ln (t) M /2 x  [1 -  1/p]
Source: Adaptation from  Bewley and Fiebig (1988).
The specific point of inflection (N = 0 - 100%) is determined by the values obtained 
for the four parameters and since the FLOG encompasses both the standard Normal 
( k  = 1, p = 1) and Log-logistic ( k  = 1, p = 0) models (see table 2.4), it accounts for 
symmetric and asymmetric responses. The standardised parameters were estimated 
using statistical software due to the many curves that can be proposed as possible 
best-fits.44 There are many possible methodologies when estimating distribution 
parameters based on available data sets, and this particular modelling does not limit 
itself to just one. The parameter estimation methods used here were: i). the method of 
moments (MOM), ii) the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE), iii) the least squares 
estimates (LSE), or iv) the method of L-moments.45 In observing the plotted 
empirical s-curves in Argentina and Mexico, and given the simplicity of the data set, 
it was decided to estimate the FLOG model using the following potential s-curve 
types: Normal, Logistic, Log-logistic (2 and 3 parameter) and Weibull (3 parameter). 
Upon several ‘goodness of fit’ tests (outlined below), the model which presented the 
highest overall ranking was used to parametise the FLOG formulae.
44 All the calculations are based on modelling executed in EasyFit 4.1 Professional Edition (Mathwave 
Technologies) and Microsoft Excel.
45 Where possible, EasyFit uses the least computationally intensive method.
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Tests fo r  Distributional Adequacy and Supremacy
There are a number of useful tests to accurately curve-fit data sets. The Kolmogorov- 
Smimov (K-S) test was used for testing the ‘goodness of fit’ here.46 The test proves 
whether a sample data set comes from a given distribution. It tests the maximum 
distance between curves (one empirical, the other standardised) and the lower the test 
statistic, the better the fit. One particular advantage of applying this method is the 
fact that the K-S test statistic itself is not dependent upon the underlying distribution 
that is being tested. Indeed, the K-S test is a very useful and general nonparametric 
method for curve comparison, since it has sensitivity to differences in shape and 
location of the curves. It is appropriate in this instance because it can be applied to 
many distributions and the highest ranked distribution can safely be used as the best- 
fitting s-curve in estimating the FLOG. On the other hand, the K-S test can 
sometimes be overly sensitive around the middle of a distribution vis-a-vis the tails. 
Hence statisticians often find it prudent to apply the Anderson-Darling (A-D) 
‘goodness of fit’ test as well.47 The A-D test is a modification of the K-S test, and it 
simply gives more weight to the tails of the data in order to validate the ranking of 
the given curves. For this study the ranking awarded to a given curve estimation will 
be primarily determined by the order of its K-S test statistic since this is where most 
of the emphasis is placed, but if it is accompanied by a particularly poor A-D ranking 
this will obviously be taken into consideration (for more information on the tests, see 
appendix G). Upon completion of table 2.3, the modelled FLOG curve can be 
applied to the data set and further investigation can begin.
S-curve Transforms
In order to transform a s-curve, the tested data set must be approximately close to the 
normal distribution (i.e. at the 1% level under the K-S and A-D testing methods). 
Upon verification of this, it is possible (using the relevant statistical software) to 
linearise an s-curve (once the data are transformed) and render it a straight line when 
plotted on a semi-log plot (log-lin) scaled axis, historically referred to as a normal 
probability plot.48 This is done by taking the point of saturation as unity (1 or 100%),
46 Chakravarti I. M., Laha R. G. and Roy J., Handbook o f Methods o f  Applied Statistics Volume I, New York, 
John Wiley and Sons (1967).
47 Anderson T. W. and Darling D. A., ‘Asymptotic Theory of Certain "Goodness-of-fit" Criteria Based on 
Stochastic Processes’ Annals o f  Mathematical Statistics 23 (1952): 193-212.
48 All linearisations were done using Loglet Lab 2 Statistical software.
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plotting the subsequent calculations o f the 1st, 10th and xth percentiles o f saturation 
onto the transform graph, and then drawing a best-fitted line through them. Therefore, 
as the data grows (or declines) in Logistic/flexible-logistic fashion in the s-curve, it 
will grow (or decline) linearly when transformed as seen in figure 2.9 below:
Figure 2.9 Linearisation of the S-shape Curve
99%
CRD
9 0 % ----------
£  10%
1%
Cumulative Y ears of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration using Loglet Lab2 Statistical software.
Figure 2.9 shows the result o f  the linearisation technique. The rationale for doing this 
is that it enables one to compute a value o f relative speed, in order to compare 
diffusion-experiences across countries. This value will be called the characteristic 
rate o f diffusion (CRD) and it is calculated by measuring the time it takes for the 
transformed curve to travel between 10% and 90% o f total diffusion.49 It is standard 
practice to use the period o f 10% to 90% as this measures the ‘real’ diffusion speed 
i.e. the steep part o f  the s-curve as illustrated in figure 2.10.
49 Very close in nature to what Fisher-Pry refer to as the characteristic duration. See Fisher and Pry (1971).
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F igure 2.10 A pproxim ate Section of the S-curve M easu red  by th is A nalysis
100
90%
Real Diffusion 
Speed
10%
Cumulative Years of Division
Source: Own elaboration.
Figure 2.10 approximates the relevant portion o f the s-curve under scrutiny (that is 
the 10-90% diffusion portion) when measuring the CRD, with the percentage o f 
cumulative diffusion on the y-axis and cumulative time taken on the x-axis. Using a 
period o f  1-99% for instance, would be too broad, as this would include too much o f 
the start-up period in a technology’s adoption, which can vary materially across 
countries, depending on their given intrinsic characteristics. Moreover using a tighter 
section o f say 25-75% would likely be too narrow and much too short o f a period 
(for a technology like the telegraph), in attempting to examine diffusion in any 
meaningful depth.
2.6 Applying the FLOG Model
To map the diffusion process statistically, before quantifying the rate at which the 
telegraph and telephone diffused in Argentina and Mexico, the application o f the 
FLOG follows. The respective FLOG formulae and the accompanying s-curve 
estimations are presented below. It is pertinent to point out that, the finalised s-curves 
(with representative mathematical formulae) in the upcoming figures 2.11 - 2.14 
correspond directly to the illustrative s-curves depicted back in figures 2.3 - 2.6.
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2.6.1 Estimated FLOG Curves 
Telegraph Diffusion in Argentina
Estimated formula o f Argentina’s telegraph s-curve:
N  = { 1 + e[2 4 .2 8 6  -  6 .8 In t]} "1 since, t ( u ,  k )  = \ n t  
F igure  2.11 A rgentina T elegraph: E stim ated F L O G  C urve
Estimated FLOG (Log-logistic 3P)
70
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Cumulative Years of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration.
Telegraph diffusion in Argentina is most accurately mapped by a Log-logistic (3 
parameters) diffusion curve. The point o f inflection in figure 2.11 is 35.61 telegrams 
sent per 100 inhabitants (i.e. [Saturation/2] x 1 — 1/ p %).
Telegraph Diffusion in Mexico
Estimated formula o f M exico’s telegraph s-curve:
N  = { 1 + e[5 .354  -  0 .2127 t]}"1 since, t(u, k) = t 
F igure 2.12 M exico T elegraph: E stim ated  FLO G  C urve
Estimated FLOG (Normal)
CL
40
Cumulative Years of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration.
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Telegraph diffusion in Mexico is most accurately mapped by a Normal diffusion 
curve. The point o f inflection in figure 2.12 is 15.40 telegrams sent per 100 
inhabitants (i.e. Saturation/2 = 50%).
Telephone Diffusion in Argentina
Estimated formula o f Argentina’s telephone s-curve:
N  = { 1 +  e[11.6  -  2.87 In t]}"1 since, t(u ,  k )  = \ n t
F igure 2 .13A rgentina T elephone: E stim ated  FLO G  C urve
 Estimated FLOG (Log-logistic 3P)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Cumulative Years of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration.
Telephone diffusion in Argentina is most accurately mapped by a Log-logistic (3 
parameters) diffusion curve. The point o f inflection in figure 2.13 is 28.08 telephones 
sent per 100 households (i.e. [Saturation/2] x 1 — 1/p %).
Telephone Diffusion in Mexico
Estimated formula o f M exico’s telephone s-curve:
N  = {1 + e[34 .255  -  7.8 In t]}-1 since, t(u , k )  = In t
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F igure 2.14 M exico T elephone: E stim ated  FLO G  C urve
 Estimated FLOG (Log-iogistic 3P)
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Cumulative Years of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration.
Telephone diffusion in Mexico is most accurately mapped by a Log-logistic (3 
parameters) diffusion curve. The point o f inflection in figure 2.14 is 37.62 telephones 
sent per 100 households (i.e. [Saturation/2] x 1 — 1/ P  % )•
For a complete account o f the s-curve formulae determination, see appendix F.
2.6.2 Linearisation o f the S-curves
To measure the speed o f diffusion, the s-curves must be linearised. Before the data 
can be linearised, it must be verified that all four diffusion curves are approximately 
close to a normal distribution (see table 2.5).
T able 2.5 A cceptance to the N orm al D istribution
Data set 1% Critical Value 
o f  a (K-S)
K-S
Statistic
1% Critical Value 
ofct(A -D )
A-D
Statistic
Accept Normal 
Distribution
Argentina Telegraph 0.36117 0.2171 3.9074 1.0792 Y, Y
M exico Telegraph 0.37062 0.1413 3.9074 0.7076 Y, Y
Argentina Telephone 0.28987 0.1508 3.9074 1.2213 Y, Y
M exico Telephone 0.29971 0.2540 3.9074 2.5694 Y, Y
Argentina Telegraph 0.36117 0.2171 3.9074 1.0792 Y, Y
Source: Own calculations using EasyFit 4.1 Professional Edition (Mathwave Technologies). Note Y = Yes.
Table 2.5 shows that all o f Argentina’s and M exico’s s-curves were accepted as 
approximations to a normal distribution curve (at the 1% level) under the K-S and A- 
D testing methods. The curves were then linearised by transforming the data points
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onto a normal probability plot scaled graph, with a best-fitted line drawn through 
them (see figures 2.15 -  2.18).
F igure 2.15 L inearisa tion  of the T eleg raph  S-curve for A rgentina
CRD = 25 y e ars
90%
1%
20 30 40
Cumulative Years of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration. Drawn with Loglet Lab 2.
F igure 2.16 L inearisa tion  of the  T eleg raph  S-curve for Mexico
99%
CRD = 26 y e a rs
o> 90%
10% -----------
Cumulative Years of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration. Drawn with Loglet Lab 2.
The linearised telegraph diffusion s-curves in Argentina and Mexico (figures 2.15- 
2.16) show diffusion speeds measured in CRDs o f 25 and 26 years respectively, 
which is remarkably similar. The same logic was used for the telephone.
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F igure 2.17 L inearisation  of the Telephone S-curve for A rgen tina
99%
CRD = 54 y e a rs
Cumulative Years of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration. Drawn with Loglet Lab 2.
F igu re  2.18 L inearisation  of the T elephone S -curve fo r M exico
CRD = 52 y e a rs
90% ___
50%
10%
1% „
' 4 0  50 60 70
Cumulative Years of Diffusion
Source: Own elaboration. Drawn with Loglet Lab 2.
The linearised telephone diffusion s-curves in Argentina and Mexico (figures 2 .1 7 -  
2.18) show diffusion speeds measured in CRDs o f  54 and 52 years respectively. As 
with the diffusion o f the telegraph, these are very similar. It is important to note that 
the years corresponding to the 10% and 90% levels o f  diffusion (as per the 
linearisation analysis above) will be the reference periods that are analysed in detail 
in the chapters that follow. The relevant period for the telegraph corresponds to the 
years 1891-1916 in Argentina and 1881-1907 in Mexico, and for the telephone, these 
are 1943-1997 in Argentina, and 1945-1997 in Mexico.
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2.7 Conclusion
The process of telegraph and telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico followed 
an s-shape diffusion curve as predicted by Rogers.50 The application of the FLOG 
and linearisation techniques allowed the diffusion process of the two ICTs in 
Argentina and Mexico to be quantified. It is clear that the diffusion rates were similar 
in the two countries; for the telegraph CRDs were 25 and 26 years respectively, and 
for the telephone CRDs were 54 and 52 years respectively. This took place despite 
the countries’ different economic settings. Table 2.6 provides an overview of the key 
findings.
Table 2.6 Summary of Results from the Analysis
Data set Best Fitting Model Estimator FLOG Formula
Saturation
Point
Inflection
Point CRD
Argentina Telegraph Log-logistic(3P) N = { 1 + e [24.286 -  6.8 lnt]}"1 83.5 35.6 25
Mexico Telegraph Normal N = { 1 + e [5.354 -  0 .21271]}"1 30.8 15.4 26
Argentina Telephone Log-logistic(3P) N = { 1 +  e[11.6 -  2.87 In t]}"1 86.2 28.1 54
Mexico Telephone Log-logistic(3P) N = { 1 + e[34.255 -  7.8 lnt]}-1 86.3 37.6 52
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 2.6 shows that three of the four curves had a best-fit most closely
approximated to the three-parameter Log-logistic distributions, while the pattern of 
telegraph diffusion in Mexico was the exception as it was best fitted to the Normal 
distribution curve. The four diffusion curves have points of inflection which range 
from 32-50%, which vindicates the need for using the FLOG model, since no single 
distribution ranked first for all data sets, nor was there any consistency in the points 
of inflection. This chapter quantified the finding of the ‘Double Paradox’, which was 
facilitated by using a carefully constructed theoretical framework. The next chapter 
will document the development of the Paradox, by taking a closer look at the 
expansion of the telegraph and the telephone sectors in Argentina and Mexico. 
Following this necessary grounding, more meaningful analytical work and discussion 
can be contemplated in the subsequent chapters.
50 Rogers (1995).
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Chapter 3
The Development of Telegraph and Telephone Diffusion
It is imperative to place Argentina and Mexico in their historical, political and 
economic contexts, in order to provide the reader with a greater understanding of the 
broader environment as well as the various nuances of each country (see chapter 1 
section 1.1 The Historiography of Argentina’s and Mexico’s Political Economy). 
This chapter comparatively examines the evolution of the diffusion of the telegraph 
and the telephone technologies within this framework. The historical backdrop was 
necessary since it is only in appreciation of this that the comparative analysis 
regarding the major determinants of the diffusion process can be assessed, first in 
chapter 4 and then consolidated in chapter 5. This chapter explores in greater depth 
the elements of the political economy that are believed to have materially impacted 
telegraph and telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico, giving particular 
attention to the role of the state. The thesis divides the diffusion periods into the 
critical segments represented on the s-shaped diffusion curve used in the linearisation 
analysis: broadly the 0-10%, 10-90% and 90-100% diffusion levels.1 Measuring the 
success of a country’s diffusion path is no simple task, and for the purposes of this 
study, although diffusion advancement is the primary measure in assessing the 
relative ‘progress’, obviously the quality of service and the financial performance of 
the relevant companies are considered also.
3.1 The History and Development of the Electric Telegraph: The Argentinian 
and Mexican Experiences
The diffusion of the telegraph mainly took place in Argentina and Mexico during the 
period of export-led growth (see chapter 1, section 1.1.1 The Economics of the 
Political Economy). This context had a marked impact on the diffusion of the 
telegraph, as the railways (and implicitly the telegraph) expanded to allow for more 
effective trade (see chapter 1, section 1.3 The Joint Supply of the Railways and the 
Telegraph), and both countries sought to consolidate the power of the state and unite 
their respective nations. The evolution of the railway and of the telegraph were
1 The levels were determined by the linearisation analysis in chapter 2, section 2.6 Applying the Flog Model. 
Also recall that the 100% diffusion level is defined as 100% of the maximum diffusion rate observed.
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heavily dependent on one another and it was this mutually benefiting relationship 
that drove the diffusion of both. Meanwhile, the role of the state, as will be revealed 
throughout this chapter (and an argument that will gain focus in chapters 4 and 5), 
was continuously a primary promoter (or inhibitor) of fast diffusion.2 Given the bouts 
of political instability in Argentina and Mexico in the earlier part of the nineteenth 
century, governments believed that in achieving consolidation and some sort of 
centralist success they would continue to attract foreign investment and help their 
economies grow. These regions were also expanding, and with increasing foreign 
investment flooding into Latin America, governments felt the need to control 
industries that would cement their authority across the country. The telegraph 
became an extremely useful political tool in this process.
To address the discussion of the diffusion of the telegraph more effectively, the 
period of telegraph diffusion is divided into three sub-sections: the adoption and 
early years of diffusion (0-10%), the years of expansion (10-90% diffusion), which 
are the primary focus of the thesis, and the years o f saturation (90-100% diffusion).4 
This section examines and compares these periods across Argentina and Mexico, in 
order to place diffusion within its historical context.
3.1.1 The Adoption and Early Years of Telegraph Diffusion 
This section is concerned with the years from the start of the use of the telegraph 
usage until its diffusion reached the 10% level; equivalent to the years of 1857-1891 
in Argentina, and 1851-1881 in Mexico. It is interesting to note that the electric 
telegraph was available to the public in Mexico six years earlier than in Argentina, 
despite Argentina’s relative economic advantage over Mexico, which is what the 
Paradox is built upon. An observation common to both countries on the diffusion of 
the telegraph was the close relationship it bore not only to the country’s economic
2 See chapter 1, section State Formation and the Telegraph and the Telephone in Argentina and Mexico, which 
provides an overview for the rationale behind this.
These were obviously not easy objectives to achieve, but centralism had some early success in Argentina with 
the selection of Buenos Aires as a federal district in 1880, and in Mexico, Porfirio Diaz was able to enhance 
national power through the deployment of policies that weakened regional powers.
4 The 10-90% diffusion years are the specific period of focus in the regression analysis in chapter 4, section 4.2 
Analysis of Diffusion -  A Quantitative Approach.
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development but to their respective political developments, in addition to the 
importance of the technology to the military.5
In Argentina, during Domingo Sarmiento’s administration (1868-1974), the 
telegraph took on added importance, demonstrated in his passing of special laws to 
reallocate funds from road/bridge building to allow further telegraph construction. 
Argentina’s administration was financially more able than Mexico’s to construct the 
lines themselves, and in 1869 Sarmiento ensured that the first national government 
telegraph line was built. As the link between the telegraph and national security 
became clearer, the support for retention of state ownership only increased.6
In Mexico, during Maximilian’s empire (1864-1867), the unstable financial position 
made it impossible to build-out a national network, so instead he opted for granting 
private concessions, enlisting the ‘help’ of private providers under a callable option 
condition, ultimately enabling Maximilian to re-purchase the rights at any time.7 
Maximilian made it clear, however, that the telegraph network was state property and 
if the state chose to grant private concessions, this was merely for their convenience.8 
Later on, the Benito Juarez (1867-1872) administration would do something similar 
in 1867, when the telegraph theoretically became the property of the Mexican federal 
government, though in practice they continued to be built by private companies. In 
Argentina, by 1878, 6,000km of telegraph lines had been built out in less than 10 
years; and Sarmiento had managed to connect many distant points within the 
Republic through the diffusion of this new technology. 9 While that may be 
impressive, by the same year in Mexico, 9,000km of lines were built.10 Porfirio Diaz 
put a clear emphasis on promoting infrastructure build-out, which would continue 
throughout his presidency. He began to rebuild lines (most of which ironically he had
5 Alvarez C. L., Historia de las Telecomunicaciones en Mexico Mexico D.F., Revista del Doctorado en Derecho 
(2007).
Benavides Garcia R , Hitos de las Comunicaciones y  los Transportes en la Historia de Mexico Mexico D.F., 
Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes (1987). Argentina, Fundacion Standard Electric Historia de las 
Comunicaciones Argentinas Buenos Aires, Fundacion Standard Electric Argentina (1979). Also see Reggini 
(1996).
It should be noted that this was a standard feature of utility contracts of this era. See Cardenas de la Pefla E., 
Historia de las Telecomunicaciones y  los Transportes en Mexico. El Telegrafo Mexico D.F., Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes (1987a).
8 Noyola (2004).
9 Argentina, Memoria of the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs, submitted to the Minister of Interior for 
1878.
10 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos Mexico D.F., (various years).
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destroyed in his ascent to power) and despite the difficult financial situation of the 
treasury, most of the telegraph lines that were destroyed were soon rebuilt, and new 
lines were constructed everywhere.11
With regard to structural progress, Mexico was arguably ahead of Argentina, 
especially in terms of developing telecom policy and a regulatory framework, which 
began in 1855.12 The telegraph network in Argentina developed from the very 
beginning in tandem with the railway expansion (while in Mexico this only took 
place in 1875), but despite the installation of a relatively sizeable network by 1862, 
Argentina had done very little in regard to the regulatory framework. By 1869, while 
Mexico was cementing the rules for the telegraph offices, Argentina was only finally 
creating a national telegraph of sorts, and in 1875, after lengthy debate, Argentina 
passed the first telegraph law.13 This established the telegraph as a monopoly of the 
state and remained unchanged in statute for many years. Under this new law, no 
telegraph lines (aside from those for internal railway use) were to be constructed 
without the sanction of the Argentinian government, nor were private companies 
allowed to provide telegraph service without prior government consent. In Mexico 
these rules were established as early as 1865. Although the two countries had private, 
provincial government and railway companies building telegraphs in tandem with the 
federal government, in Argentina there was little coordination until 1892 (when 
attempts to integrate all the different lines were encouraged). This became 
problematic as the lines, rather than complement each other, ended up competing 
with one another, leading to competitive inefficiencies.14 The system was therefore 
theoretically more efficient in Mexico given that all the lines were consolidated into 
a national system from 1869.
11 For example see Noam (1998), Berthold (1921a), Noyola (2004), Cardenas de la Pena (1987a) and Hodge J. E , 
‘The Role of the Telegraph in the Consolidation and Expansion of the Argentine Republic’ The Americas 41.1 
(1984): 59-80.
12 Griffith K. A., ‘Mexico’ in Noam E. M., Telecommunications in Latin America New York, Oxford University 
Press (1998).
13 Telegraph Law (Law no. 750) of October 7, 1875, for laws and decrees relating to the telegraph in Argentina 
see Ministerio del Interior, Legislacion Postal y  Telegrafica. Convenciones, Reglamentos, Administracion, 1858- 
1900 Buenos Aires (1901).
14 Berthold (1921a).
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Telegraph diffusion in Mexico reached 10% diffusion faster than in Argentina, 
despite the relatively better economic situation of Argentina.15 Perhaps this was 
because the collective administrations in Mexico often seemed one step ahead of 
Argentina’s in terms of the regulatory framework and general strategic planning. 
Mexico’s network expansion was overseen by the government 10 years earlier than 
in Argentina. Moreover, a key difference was the actual resemblance to a national 
network that was formed; Mexico had made a real attempt by granting various 
concessions early on, as indeed most of the lines were built by private companies, 
meanwhile in Argentina the network was uncoordinated and messy. The willingness 
of Mexico’s administrations to promote fast diffusion could be viewed as somewhat 
forced due to the strategic threats posed at their borders. As mentioned, the U.S. 
seized half of Mexico’s land in 1848 and Mexico suffered long before this too, 
having experienced decades of economic and political instability (although Argentina 
faced political instability too). Any tool, such as the telegraph, that could potentially 
alleviate these problems would clearly get a lot of attention. In Mexico, the 
prominence of first the Maximilian empire and then Juarez’s administration within 
the industry, compounded by the decisiveness of Porfirio’s Diaz’s actions towards 
the sector, meant that in Mexico efforts were coordinated in the beginning relatively 
more effectively than in Argentina. Naturally telegraph expansion in Argentina was 
aided by its leading economic stance, but in Mexico, the administrations made a real 
attempt to make the network as effective as possible through more explicit 
interventionist measures.
3.1.2 The Years of Telegraph Expansion
The years of telegraph expansion (i.e. the period of 10-90% diffusion) are the focus 
of the thesis since these are the years where the fastest (and similar) rate of diffusion 
took place. This period corresponds to the years of 1891-1916 in Argentina, and
1881-1907 in Mexico. Table 3.1 displays the actual levels of diffusion as measured 
by the number of telegrams sent per 100 people over this period.
15 Telegraph diffusion in Mexico reached 10% diffusion 30 years after the official inauguration of the telegraph 
versus 34 years in Argentina.
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Table 3.1 Telegraph Diffusion during the Years of Expansion (telegrams sent per 100 people)
<N ^  0 0  O  CN
0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  ON OS
00 00 00 00 00 00
O n O n 
00 00
N o o o o c s ^ v o o o o r ^ ^ *
Argentina 8.0 9.9 11.6 13.0 14.6 15.6 16.4 17.1 17.6 17.8 17.8 17.9 18.0 48.1 73.8 68.0 64.3 68.8
Mexico 0.7 0.6 1.0 3.1 4.7 5.6 6.5 9.1 10.2 16.7 19.9 22.2 25.7 25.4 27.4 30.8 14.2 15.1
Source: See appendix B.
Table 3.1 shows that diffusion in Mexico was initially slower, for instance, between 
1882 and 1898 there was only an increase o f 9 telegrams in the average number of 
telegrams sent per 100 people, while a further 9 telegrams increase from 1898 took 
just half the time. The rate of diffusion in Mexico significantly lagged Argentina’s 
until 1902. However, by 1902 it actually exceeded Argentina in absolute levels 
(despite Argentina’s wealthier economy) and continued to grow at a considerable 
rate until 1906. After 1906, telegraph usage seemingly stagnated in Mexico (while 
surging in Argentina) and growth ultimately stalled soon after the Mexican 
Revolution, thus reaching its saturation point (albeit lower than in Argentina). One 
should be aware that there are various limitations with the data that underlie the 
analysis presented. For instance, for the early years o f telegraph diffusion in 
Argentina there is very little statistical information available (especially regarding 
the private companies). It was claimed that it was entirely useless to inquire into the 
financial results of the national telegraph at least until 1890, given the lack of 
appropriate account keeping and fraudulent information in some areas.16 In fact, up 
to the First World War, Argentina’s government did not publish any official sectoral 
data either (see introduction to the appendices and appendix B for a detailed account 
of the reliability of the data).17
In order to assess the diffusion speeds further, is useful to get some perspective on 
the growth of the telegraph network and the growth of the traffic on it, so that the 
effects of growing intensity of usage can be differentiated clearly (see tables 3.2 and 
3.3).
16 Argentina, Memoria of the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs, Dr. Estanislao Zeballos, submitted to the 
Minister of Interior in 1891. It was not until 1896 that the first official publication on telephone statistics was 
drawn up, see Province de Buenos Ayres, Ministere de Gouvemement, Bureau de Statistique Generale, Annuaire 
Statistique de la Province de Buenos Ayres, 1896 Buenos Aires (1897).
17 This changed when the first Telephone Census was ordered by Ricardo Pillado (the then incumbent Director 
General of Telegraphs), see Argentina, Telephone Census Boletln Mensual de Correosy Telegrafos Buenos Aires, 
No. 16, Telefonos, (1912).
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Table 3.2 Argentina’s National Telegraph Network Size and Traffic (during 10-90% Diffusion)
1904 1906 1908 1910 1912 1914 1916
Length of the Network 
(km) 23,237 24,757 25,335 26,173 33,477 38,674 40,492
Network Usage (per 
km) 42.07 42.86 120.51 192.76 149.61 131.17 139.73
Source: See appendix B. Note: network usage = total telegrams sent/total km o f  telegraph lines.
Table 3.3 Mexico’s National Telegraph Network Size and Traffic (during 10-90% Diffusion)
1882 1886 1890 1894 1898 1902 1906
Length o f the Network 
(km) 16,252 17,151 24,774 30,202 32,194 33,017 34,914
Network Usage (per 
km) 4.39 6.72 22.47 26.80 41.97 83.73 106.84
Source: See appendix B. Note: network usage = total telegrams sent/total km o f telegraph lines.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that during this critical portion of telegraph diffusion, 
network build-out and network usage occurred at different times. In Argentina, the 
heaviest growth in usage took place between 1906 and 1908, where the rate almost 
trebled, despite the real pickup in network size taking place from 1910 onwards. In 
Mexico, the network build-out was relatively steadier throughout the period and the 
largest shifts in usage took place between 1886-1890 (230% increase), and between 
1898-1902 (100% increase, but from a higher base). The following sections provide 
the historical background for Argentina and Mexico on three important aspects: 
economic growth, the degree of foreign investment and the role of the state during 
the period of 10-90% diffusion. These are important recurring themes, which may 
provide potential explanations for the observed diffusion trends.
In terms of socio-economic development, as examined in chapter 1, the period of
export-led growth was positive overall not only for these two countries but for all of
Latin America. Over the whole period, both countries experienced economic growth
(although not equally distributed among the population) and enjoyed significant
1 8foreign investment inflows, particularly in the first part of the twentieth century. 
Also note that much of the growth came at the beginning of this period (although 
Mexico’s growth was interrupted by the Revolution). Moreover there was 
geographical unevenness in both countries. In Mexico, the northern region was much 
more prosperous than the central parts of the country, while in Argentina economic 
progress was heavily tilted toward the littoral. In terms of the importance of the role
18 See chapter 1, section The Period o f  Export-Led Growth (1870-1930).
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of the state (and specific laws) in affecting telegraph diffusion, this was a clear 
common factor across the two countries. Again, as explored in chapter 1, the role of 
the state was critical because it essentially controlled the build-out of infrastructure, 
by directing the necessary resources.19 The critical difference was perhaps that, 
although both states emphasised the importance of the diffusion of this technology, 
they introduced key reforms at very different times. Toward the end of the nineteenth 
century, both countries experienced anti-oligarchical movements and although they 
largely failed, during the first quarter of the twentieth century there was a growing 
need to cement political stability and widen the base of support for both regimes. 
Ultimately, it is no surprise that the administrations in both countries placed a 
significant emphasis on the diffusion of the telegraph, both perceiving it as a key tool 
for state unification.
Economic Development during Export-led Growth
As argued in chapter 1, Argentina had significantly faster overall economic growth, 
rising real wages and higher levels of social development (in terms of a more 
educated population and higher life expectancy rates) vis-a-vis Mexico, during the 
period of fastest telegraph diffusion (see appendix A, tables A.3 and A.4).20 In 
Mexico, Porfirio Diaz’s dedication to boost the economy provided economic growth 
at a level that Mexico had never seen before, but it was nowhere near Argentina’s 
rate. To offer some perspective, from 1880 to the start of the First World War, 
Argentina’s GDP per capita was the highest in Latin America (growing at a rate 
more than twice that of the world economy), while Mexico was below the Latin
ry 1
American average. Argentina’s growth during this period was also relatively more 
constant, while most of Mexico’s economic growth occurred in the early stages of 
export-led growth. Furthermore, despite Mexico’s strong annual average GDP per 
capita growth during the Porfiriato, it must be noted that scholars’ views on the 
achievements of the Porfiriato are mixed, as explored in chapter 1. This is because 
although the economy as a whole expanded, this went hand-in-hand with very 
skewed patterns of wealth distribution, and falling average living standards.
19 See chapter 1, section 1.2 The State and the Role of ICT in Latin America.
20 Haber (2000). Also see Thorp (1998), Knight (2000) and Lewis C. M., ‘Industry in Latin America before 1930s’ 
in Bethell L., The Cambridge History o f  Latin America Volume IV Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
(1986).
21 See appendix A for the data.
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Although both countries were characterised by high income inequality, this was 
particularly pronounced in the case of Mexico. Theoretically, in economic terms, the 
average Argentinian consumer was in a better position to make use of the telegraph 
services than the average Mexican consumer, and it seems reasonable to assume that 
this more ‘sophisticated’ population would appreciate the benefits and adopt the 
telegraph at a faster rate than in Mexico. The analysis of diffusion speed in chapter 2 
however, showed that this was not the case (see chapter 2, section 2.6 Applying the 
Flog Model).
Foreign Investment: A Common Plight
Given the key role that foreign investment had in financing the expansion of the 
necessary infrastructure, it played an important role in the diffusion of the telegraph, 
if not directly through telegraph network build-out, indirectly through railroad 
construction.22
In the very early part of telegraph diffusion, toward the end the first Barings Crisis 
(1889), foreign investment started to dry up in Argentina as the country faced 
economic crisis. The government had no capital left to apportion to the telegraph's 
advancement and for a short period in the 1890s, it had to interrupt all the works on 
the network due to the heavy foreign debt.24 Meanwhile, Mexico had just returned to 
international capital markets in the 1880s and benefited from a strong positive 
reversal of foreign capital outflow, but also faced an economic downturn during the 
early 1890s (although not as severe as Argentina’s).25 In spite of this, Argentina and 
Mexico quickly recovered and began to profit from extensive foreign investment; 
large amounts of capital inflows came from the U.S. and Europe, and significant 
portions went towards the development of the railways (and thus de facto into the 
expansion of the telegraph network, as explored in chapter 1). One third of capital 
inflows were going toward the construction of the railways in Mexico, while 
Argentina had the highest rates of both foreign investment and railway expansion in 
all of Latin America during this period. Argentina was the recipient of 42% of all
22 Bulmer-Thomas (1994), Noam (1998), D'Estrabau G., Historia de las Comunicaciones y  los Transportes en 
Mexico: El Ferrocarril Mexico D.F., Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes (1988).
23 Lewis C.M. (2002).
24 Hodge (1984).
25 Mexico had remained cut off international capital markets until the 1880s due to its inability to pay for its 
public debt. See Bortz and Haber (2002).
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Latin American FDI in 1914, versus 15% in Mexico.26 As referred to throughout the 
thesis, the expansion of the railways was a key intrinsic factor aiding faster telegraph 
diffusion, with the two technologies growing in tandem and the administrations in 
Argentina and Mexico providing significant subsidies to incentivise this build-out 
(see chapter 1, section 1.3 The Joint Supply o f the Railways and the Telegraph). This 
was compounded in Mexico by the government’s requirement for the railway 
companies to build an extra telegraph line for free for the government from as early 
as 1881 (as explored below). From 1902-1903, half of Mexico’s new telegraph lines 
were installed on new telegraph posts, and the other half were installed on the
9 7existing railway posts. By the same token, by 1919 in Argentina, railway telegraph 
services as a proportion of the total telegraph network had increased to 54%.28 The 
railway network in Argentina was significantly more advanced than in Mexico, and 
in per capita terms they were comparable to those of the developed world. Overall 
from an investment perspective, Argentina was theoretically in a better position to 
diffuse the telegraph.
The Role o f the State: The Impact o f New Laws
Already by the late 1890s, the telegraph was seen as a very efficient and 
indispensable form of communication. The telegraph enabled rapid dissemination of 
information, allowing the state to keep abreast of the happenings in far away regions, 
and facilitated the immediate dispatch of orders from the government across the
90whole country. As argued, the telegraph was a useful tool in consolidating the 
state’s power, and its role as a consumer good came secondary.30 Proof of this is that 
in the 1860s the Mexican government actually ‘prohibited the general public from
using the telegraphs... while demanding expedited services’ for its own
-> 1
communications. The telegraph’s importance to the military was realised quickly 
and lines were built (especially in Mexico) along strategically key routes where there 
were credible fears of local uprisings, civil wars, or even foreign invasions. From
26 Islas Rivera V., Estructura y  Desarrollo del Sector Transporte en Mexico Mexico D.F., El Colegio de Mexico 
(1992), Garcia Merodio G. G., ‘Technological Innovation and the Expansion of Mexico D.F., 1870-1920’ 
Journal o f  Latin American Geography 5.2 (2006): 109-126, Haber (2000).
27 Noyola (2004).
28 Berthold (1921a).
29 Hodge (1984).
30 See chapter 1, section State Formation and the Telegraph and the Telephone in Argentina and Mexico.
31 C&rdenas de la Pefia (1987a), p.38.
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1875 in Argentina, the telegraph became more central to their territorial expansion as 
well.32
The telegraph’s necessity for the advancement and protection of the state meant that 
in Argentina and in Mexico, the government adopted an active role in its promotion, 
although until the turn of the century this translated into numerous concessions given 
to private companies. The Mexican government continued to allow many o f the lines 
to be constructed by private companies, as it had done in the earlier period of 
diffusion, since this remained the most economically viable choice.33 Government 
ownership increased particularly after 1905, when the Mexican railways were 
nationalised. Meanwhile, in Argentina, unlike in Mexico, the railway companies 
constructed most of the telegraph lines and retained ownership, meaning that they 
owned more of the network than any other group.34
An important law linked to the railways in Mexico was introduced in 1881, as the 
Mexican state made it obligatory for the railways to build a telegraph line at the side 
of the track to accompany their service (a reform introduced in Argentina 16 years 
later, in 1897).35 The Mexican law also made it compulsory to build an extra 
telegraph line for the government free of charge to them (this equivalent further step 
would not come into effect in Argentina until the introduction of the Mitre Law on 
the 1st October 1907).36 Despite the earlier establishment of the telegraph and railway 
relationship in Argentina, the country waited 50 years to fully exploit this 
relationship. The administrations in Mexico waited just 6 years.37
The Mitre Law in Argentina also extended the scope of the statute to include 
provision extensions, and this free wire would then become part of the national
32 For a detailed account of the role of the telegraph in the territorial expansion in Argentina see Hodge (1984).
33 Benavides Garcia (1987).
34 Bear in mind however that in Argentina, the government would give 50 year concessions, after which the line 
would become the property of the state.
35 Mexico, ‘Reglamento de Ferrocarriles, Telegrafos y Telefonos’ en Sabas y  Munguia, Recopilacion, 1870-ss, t. 
XXXVIII, (16th December 1881), pp.346-347. This initial law in Argentina actually put in statute that it was 
obligatory for railway companies to construct a telegraph line at one side of the railway (for the service of the 
railway and often for public use).
36 Argentina, Leyes Nacionales 1907-1908 (Law no. 5315) Publication Oficial de la Secretaria del Honorable 
Senado de la Nation, Buenos Aires (1912).
37 In Argentina other positive steps were taken however, for instance in the introduction of the 1905 law, which 
authorised the construction of new lines connecting all important commercial centres with Buenos Aires. 
However by 1911, less than 50% of the proposed lines had been built. Berthold (1921a).
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telegraph network. Data collected showed that diffusion in Argentina for the period 
between 10% and the introduction of the Mitre Law grew at an average annual rate 
of 1.4%, compared with 17.6% in the period between its introduction and 90% 
diffusion. These rate differentials are quite staggering, with the number of telegrams 
sent per capita almost trebling between 1906 and 1908 alone. The Mitre Law may 
not have established any new principles, and as Lewis suggests, it would be an 
oversimplification to claim that its introduction alone was the cause of the rapid 
railway investment during the years immediately before the First World War but the 
effects on telegraph diffusion were quite dramatic (see tables 3.1 and 3.2).40 Note 
that the 1875 Law actually stipulated something similar to the Mitre Law, however, 
most companies failed to comply with regard to the provision of the public telegraph 
lines.41 The Mitre Law, among other things, ensured compliance.42 The Mitre Law 
marked an important moment in the telegraph diffusion process for Argentina: 
previously Argentina’s administrations had been very generous in giving financial 
concessions to both the railway and private telegraph companies, and had received 
little benefit in return. After the Mitre Law, Argentina’s national telegraph system 
expanded significantly, particularly in 1911, when the year on year telegraph 
network grew by 15% (versus 1-2% growth in the previous years). By 1915 (1 year 
before 90% diffusion), the government had received 5,293 km of free wire from the 
railway companies.43 This was almost 40% of the total telegraph network build-out 
since 1907 (see appendix C, table C.l for details). Additionally, the Mitre Law 
attracted significant foreign investment by granting interested investors a range of 
financial privileges.44
It is important to bear in mind that there was significant telegraph diffusion growth 
immediately after the Mitre Law’s introduction, even though the law was only 
introduced in the fourth quarter of 1907. This is because the Mitre Law also critically 
stipulated (in further extension of the original 1875 Law) that the telegraph network
38 Argentina, Fundacion Standard Electric, Historia de las Comunicaciones Argentinas Buenos Aires, Fundacion 
Standard Electric Argentina (1979).
39 See appendix B, table B.l for data and sources.
40 Lewis C. M. (1983).
41 Berthold (1921a).
42 For a full account of the Mitre Law see Argentina, Leyes Nacionales 1907-1908 (Law no. 5315) Publication 
Oficial de la Secretaria del Honorable Senado de la Nation, Buenos Aires (1912).
43 Berthold (1921a).
44 For example the exemption from all import duties on materials used and instead paying a fixed 3% contribution, 
being exonerated from any further taxes.
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owned by the railways, which was not always available for public use (or not 
previously available at the same price until the unified telegram tariff programme 
was introduced in 1907), had to be connected to the existing national telegraph 
network.45 Moreover, even where railroad telegraph lines were publicly available, 
there was a distinct order of priority of usage, which did not encourage public usae.46 
Simply allowing for the connection of adjacent lines was naturally a much quicker 
and simpler process than constructing entire new lines. Hence this had a positive 
effect on diffusion, by suddenly opening up network coverage, connecting more 
useful commercial hubs (in terms of sending telegrams), even though the actual 
network (in km) did not grow substantially until after 1910-1911, due to the lagged 
time effects.47 It is this part of the law that can potentially explain the significant 
immediate growth in the usage of the telegraph network; note that there was over 91% 
year on year growth in traffic of the network in 1907.48 Given the potentially 
important impact of this law, it is assessed in further detail in chapter 4.
The Progress Achieved during 10-90% Diffusion
Any success needs to be examined in light of factors such as the quality of service, 
since a huge national network is irrelevant if it is constantly out of service or the 
quality o f its provision is poor. During this period, as much as promoting demand for 
telegraph usage was important to the industry, a large part of inducing diffusion was 
concerned with the supply side (i.e. the infrastructure build-out). As shown by tables
3.2 and 3.3 (and appendix C), while the build-out of the national network was 
relatively stable in Mexico, growing at an average annual rate of 3.4% between
1882-1907, Argentina’s build-out was much more erratic, with very little growth 
achieved between 1904-1910, and then a surge between 1910-1916 (55%).
The independent construction of the telegraph lines in Argentina and Mexico resulted 
in a largely fragmented network structure, which reflected a series of expansions 
rather than a systematic grid akin to those in Europe. Despite various attempts to
45 Argentina, Leyes Nacionales 1907-1908 (Law no. 5315) Publicacion Oficial de la Secretaria del Honorable 
Senado de la Nacidn, Buenos Aires (1912).
46 Hodge (1984).
47 Argentina, Leyes Nacionales 1907-1908 (Law no. 5315) Publicacion Oficial de la Secretaria del Honorable 
Senado de la Nation, Buenos Aires (1912).
48 Usage of telegraph network = total number of telegrams sent/total length of the national telegraph network. See 
appendix C for sources and further details.
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unify all the lines, an uncoordinated network remained.49 In Argentina the grid 
looked much better on paper than in reality and the reason why much of the network 
was frequently out of order was because of the poor quality of line construction, at 
least in the beginning. Indeed, as much time went into reconstructing lines as it did 
on extending new routes.50 In addition to the lack of systematic development, the 
lines deteriorated quickly because basic repair maintenance was never carried out on 
a timely basis, therefore small problems became large ones.51 The situation was 
similar in Mexico. Despite earlier planned strategies on the building of a national 
system, a lack of finance often forced the state to opt for many private concessions.
Many lines were often out of service (for prolonged periods) and even when they 
were frilly functional, they were not particularly efficient. This critically impacted 
demand; even if individuals wanted to send a telegram, the system was not effective 
or timely. In Argentina messages would have to be re-transmitted at different stations 
in order to reach their final destinations and this structural failing ultimately resulted 
in an inferior quality of service. For instance, it would take as many as eight 
operators and many hours to send a telegram from Buenos Aires to the northernmost
S'?city of Jujuy. The situation in Mexico was perhaps even worse: in an extreme 
example in the very early period, sending a telegram from Mexico City to Chihuahua 
could actually take up to 20 days, in part due to structural factors such as faulty 
networks (over 50,000 posts were regularly down) and also due to intrinsic 
performance factors such as a lack of workers to repair the lines. Moreover, the 
problems were compounded by a lack of public understanding of how the system 
worked. A given customer would typically go to their nearest telegraph office to send 
a message, but if they walked a little farther and sent it from a different telegraph 
office, their telegram might have taken a more direct and therefore quicker route to 
the required destination.54 Although the service in Argentina did slightly improve in 
the 1890s as efforts to integrate the network were put forward, the truth is that poor
49 Moreover, where connections did exist, they were so poorly joined together that the lines were unusable. See 
Hodge (1984).
50 Other specific problems included: Indian raids, high winds, rotting or poorly positioned poles, and inferior 
metal insulators. See Hodge (1984).
51 Argentina, Memoria of the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs, submitted to the Minister of Interior in 
1892.
52 Hodge (1984).
53 This extreme example was recorded in 1885. See Cardenas de la Pefia (1987a).
54 This was especially the case in Buenos Aires, where there were so many different choices of telegraph stations. 
See Hodge (1984).
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service continued, as the network was characterised by no proper ‘accounting of the 
telegraph service...they are fall of mistakes and...[there were] a mass of de­
fraudations’. 55 Moreover because of the system’s physical condition, the whole 
network required reconstruction, with the need for standardised methods of 
transmitting and reporting.56
After a series of reviews by various agencies, little progress had still been made and 
in a 1917 report by the Director of Telegraphs, he sadly commented that the 
condition of the country’s telegraph system was ‘truly deplorable’.57 The situation 
continued to worsen and more information was disclosed in relation to the rationale 
for such a predicament in the 1919 report. He argued that budgets had been too small 
to meet the scale of the tasks required and that despite some successes in regard to 
the telegraph’s provision, the existing problems were made worse by an increase in 
traffic volume. However, the greatest disappointment was the fact that the 
deteriorating quality of the lines amid increased traffic had gone hand in hand with 
increasing tariffs.58 In Mexico, a multitude of complaints were gathered each year 
regarding the poor performance of the service, ranging from incompetent staff to 
long waiting times. Although both countries invested in trying to understand the root 
of the problems, these problems were too difficult to solve in the short term and the 
reality was that by the time some real improvements took place, telegraph diffusion 
had reached its saturation stage and the rising appeal of the telephone was 
dominating the interests of capital markets, as well as the attention of those 
empowered to act.
In absolute levels, by 1907, when Mexico reached 90% telegraph saturation, the 
country had 35,153 km of telegraph lines, compared to Argentina’s 25,098 km.59 
Since Mexico is a smaller country, in terms of line length per square km, telegraph 
network expansion was seemingly more impressive in Mexico. Overall, the role of 
the state was apparent in both experiences but was perhaps more visible in the case
55 According to the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs in Argentina, quoted in Berthold (1921a), p. 12.
56 Argentina, Memoria of the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs, Dr. Estanislao Zeballos, submitted to the 
Minister of Interior in 1891, in the chapter ‘Line Construction’.
57 Translated from Spanish, ‘cuyo estado es realmente deplorable’, Director General of Posts and Telegraphs, 
Berthold (1921a) p. 14.
58 Argentina, Memoria of the Director General of Posts and Telegraphs, submitted to the Minister of Interior in 
1919.
59 See appendix C for data sources.
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of Mexico, due to the need to attempt to substitute for lower economic means. 
Moreover, the joint supply of the railways and associated key laws were important to 
the development of the telegraph in both countries, but especially so in Argentina 
given the seemingly negative impact that the lack of enforceable reforms had upon 
diffusion (until the Mitre Law was passed in 1907).
3.1.3 The Years of Telegraph Saturation
The telegraph saturated in 1913 in Mexico and in 1922 in Argentina.60 The saturation 
of the electric telegraph did not mean that the technology became entirely obsolete, 
but rather there was no longer an incremental growth in its usage (the s-curve flattens 
as per figures 2.1 and 2.2 in chapter 2, section 2.1 The Process of ICT Diffusion). 
Consequently for the purposes of this study, these are regarded as the last years of 
the telegraph diffusion. The demise of a technology often coincides with the growth 
of an improved version or the innovation of a more advanced technology. The 
telegraph was no exception and in fact faced both. This period was also marred by 
the tumult of war, which negatively impacted telegraph diffusion.
When telephone companies began to settle in Latin America as early as the 1880s the 
importance of the telegraph over the telephone to the state was apparent, as they 
viewed the new technology as a threat to the telegraph. However, by the turn of the 
century, the telephone quickly became a major factor in urban telecommunications, 
while further experiments with radiotelegraphy almost completely limited any future 
progress in the electric telegraph (radiotelegraphy did not require physical 
construction of posts, therefore previously inaccessible areas became accessible). In 
the specific case of Mexico, it is interesting to note that it was not only the increased 
availability and popularity of the new telegraph substitutes (radiotelegraphy and 
telephones) that drove its demise, as was largely the case in Argentina, but 
significantly for Mexico, the Mexican Revolution severely destroyed infrastructure 
making it simply easier to leapfrog onto newer technologies than to repair old lines, 
and thus it may have acted as a catalyst for radiotelegraph diffusion. In truth it is easy 
to see why Mexico would place such emphasis on radiotelegraphy, given its history
60 Although not the primary concern of the thesis, it must be noted that at saturation, Argentina’s absolute level o f 
diffusion was greater (81.7 telegrams sent per 100 people versus 29.6 telegrams sent per 100 people in Mexico).
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of building and rebuilding lines up and down the country.61 Moreover, the 
maintenance of the lines often cost more than the initial construction, and thus a 
system that did not require physical lines/posts was readily welcomed.62 One may 
argue that the electric telegraph may not have saturated when it did in Mexico had it 
not been for the Mexican Revolution, since right up until this point, further 
improvements were being addressed. Mexico’s experience could thus be seen as 
premature saturation. Having said this, the collected data shows that the s-curve had 
begun to grow at a slower rate well before 1910, consistent with the saturation phase 
of typical diffusion (see chapter 2, figure 2.4 Mexico’s Telegraph Diffusion S-curve).
During much of the period of telegraph diffusion, the overall economic experiences 
of Argentina and Mexico were quite disparate (see chapter 1, section The Period o f 
Export-led Growth (1870-1930): particularly the final paragraphs). Theoretically, 
given the considerably higher overall levels of socio-economic development in 
Argentina, telegraph diffusion should have been faster there than in Mexico. 
Economic differences between the two countries were obviously not linear and the 
economic backdrop to telegraph diffusion was a volatile path for both, however the 
economic gap between the two countries remained sizeable (see appendix A). 
Despite this, not only were the telegraph lines introduced on Mexican soil first, but 
diffusion of this technology throughout the key 10-90% period took place at a 
relatively similar speed. It is true that Argentina had amassed a sizeable 40,000 km 
of telegraph lines in 1916, but because this was spanning an area covering 
approximately 2,700,000 sq km, it was not so impressive, at least when compared to 
Mexico, where by 1914, there were almost as many lines (approximately 37,000km) 
spread over 1,900,000 sq km.63 This potentially can be seen as a question of political 
economies: at the beginning of the diffusion o f the telegraph, having lost more than 
half its national territory, it was natural for regimes in Mexico to become obsessed 
with state-building and the telegraph provided an opportunity to establish order. In 
Mexico the telegraph became the property of the state well before it did in Argentina,
61 For instance, as mentioned at the beginning of Porfirio Diaz’s tenure when he rebuilt the lines he destroyed 
when he came to power.
62 Noyola (2004), Merchan Escalante C. A., Historia de las Comunicaciones y  los Transportes en Mexico: 
Telecomunicaciones Mexico D.F., Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes (1988), Noam (1998).
63 Castro Esteves R., Historia de Correos y  Telegrafos de la Republica Argentina volume V, Buenos Aires, 
Ediciones de la Direction General de Correos y Telegrafos (1952), Berthold (1921a), Cardenas de la Pena 
(1987a).
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and Mexico’s regimes began overseeing the construction of the network earlier on, as 
well as taking advantage of the railways’ right of way earlier too. In Mexico, the 
diffusion of this technology soon was perceived as necessary for the unification and 
prosperity of the nation, as well as the consolidation of state power, and it was the 
resultant comparable diffusion speed in Mexico combined with Argentina’s 
economic advantage that gave rise to the Paradox.
3.2 The History and Development of the Telephone: The Argentinian and 
Mexican Experiences
The historical account of the adoption and diffusion of the telephone is broadly 
divided into three stages: the initial years of telephone adoption, the early years of 
telephone diffusion, and the years of telephone expansion. These groupings differ 
slightly from those examined in the diffusion of the telegraph due to the larger time­
frame under consideration. The years o f 0-10% diffusion (used for the examination 
of the telegraph) have been split here between the initial years of telephone adoption 
(0-1%) and the years of its early diffusion (1-10%). The years of telephone 
expansion (10-90%) is the period of fastest diffusion, and remain consistent with the 
telegraph analysis, since this is the most important period for the purpose of the 
thesis. The years of telephone saturation (90-100%) are not investigated in the thesis. 
One may argue that for the study of telegraph diffusion, exploring the saturation 
years was relatively more important because this represented the transitional period 
in which the telephone developed and to some extent explains why initial telephone 
diffusion was so slow (see chapter 1, section State Formation and the Telegraph and 
the Telephone in Argentina and Mexico). However, for the purposes of telephone 
diffusion there is more gained by examining the 0-90% period of diffusion in greater 
detail.
3.2.1 The Initial Adoption Years of Telephone Diffusion
The initial adoption of the telephone in both countries was very much characterised 
by local private entrepreneurial initiatives, although soon enough it would become 
dominated by foreign private capital (predominantly U.S. in Mexico and British in 
Argentina).64 This foreign presence in the telephone sector was in line with the
64 Petrazzini (1995).
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attitude of the prevalent administrations towards the telephone at the time. The 
telegraph was the states’ tool of choice for national security and consolidation of 
state power, and the telephone was initially perceived as a threat. Telephone 
providers operated in a largely competitive and unregulated market and the initial 
years of diffusion were admittedly slow (it took over 20 years before reaching 1% 
diffusion). Widespread adoption of the telephone was limited in the beginning as a 
means to communicate over long distance by its initial meagre 20 mile radius and to 
some it was experimental rather than practical. For instance, the first telephone 
network in Mexico was seen as an administrative aid to officials and as a consumer 
good only secondarily.65 Argentina’s network came first in 1881, but Mexico 
followed just one year later, quite impressively given the prominent economic 
position of Argentina.66
In Buenos Aires there were three foreign private companies and one local provider 
competing against each other and by 1886, the foreign providers merged into The 
United River Plate Telephone Company (UT). This merged entity was wholly 
financed by English capital and as the largest telephone provider in Argentina, it 
soon forced the solitary local firm out of business.67 Meanwhile, in Mexico, the U.S. 
firm Greenwood was first to be given a domestic federal licence in 1881 to build a 
national network and connect all the growing local networks. However, due to 
financial and technical constraints Greenwood was forced to sell his concessions to 
U.S.-owned, Continental Telephone Company (CTC), which in 1882 created the
zro
Compania Telefonica Mexicana (Mextelco).
Although there were no more than one or two large, main providers, theoretically 
there was competition in both markets and this was something which the 
governments were keen to promote; especially in Mexico since the constitution
65 Mexico’s first telephone connected six police stations, the Office of General Inspection, the Mayor’s Office 
and the Ministry of Interior.
66 Refer to the economics section in the earlier part of chapter 1, section The Period o f  Export-led Growth (1870- 
1930), for a comparative overview of the respective socio-economic situation.
67 The three foreign companies were Compania de Telefonos Gower-Bell (British), Compania de Telefonos 
Graham-Bell (U.S.) and Compania Pan Telefonos Loch (Belgium) and the local company was Cayol and 
Newman Sociedad de Hecho. Petrazzini (1995).
68 Noam (1998). Note that in 1905 Mextelco changed its name to Compania Telefdnica y Telegrafica Mexicana 
(CTM). Espada V. C., ‘Corporate Policy in Mexico During the Porfirian Age. The Telephone Companies, 1881- 
1905’ Munich Personal RePEc Archive 1740 (2005): 1-29. Kuuse J., Olsson U. and Jacobaus C., L. M. Ericsson: 
100 Years Orebro, Interbook Publishers (1977). Hill and Abdala (1993).
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specifically prohibited monopolies. Competition was theoretically positive for the 
fast growth of the sector since this meant that different providers competed for the 
same subscribers. Unsurprisingly, telephone diffusion followed skewed patterns of 
distribution among the population, and usage was focused in the big cities. In reality, 
the smaller companies operated mostly in the regions, which were not covered by the 
main large providers, precisely because they were less profitable. On reflection, the 
American shareholders of Mextelco (the largest telephone provider) were probably 
more concerned with high short-term profits, than with implementing a quality 
national system. This changed in 1905 with the arrival of competition in the form of 
Ericsson’s Mexeric.69 In Argentina, although there was a monopoly provider for a 
brief period, as early as 1887, Sociedad Cooperativa Telefonica (3CT) was set up to 
compete against UT for fear of a monopoly becoming firmly established. Between 
1882 and 1912, Argentina’s various administrations provided a total of 71 
concessions, and consequently there was a sense of competition.70 However, in 1912, 
with the introduction of the Castillo Law further expansion of existing lines, as well 
as the construction of new ones was negatively impacted.71 Moreover, in practice, 
while Mexico had a duopoly, the three main providers in Argentina also controlled 
most of the market. By the time the telephone reached 1% diffusion in Argentina (in 
1900) and in Mexico (in 1906), both countries had some notion of a ‘competitive’ 
market: however, an efficient service is not the guaranteed product of competition.
3.2.2 The Early Years of Telephone Diffusion
The early years of telephone diffusion refer to the period of 1-10% diffusion: these 
correspond to 1900-1943 in Argentina, and 1906-1945 in Mexico. In terms of growth 
rates, telephone diffusion in Argentina was higher than in Mexico, as would be 
expected given Argentina’s stronger economic position at least until the 1930s. As 
mentioned, Argentina became the tenth largest commercial economy in the world, 
while in comparison, by 1929 Mexico’s GDP per capita was just 40% of Argentina’s
69 Previously, the government struggled to promote effective competition in Mexico and resorted to simply 
making it harder for Mextelco to renew its contract at expiry. Unfortunately for Mextelco, the slow-down in 
demand, along with its costly obligations to retain its licences, meant that the company was also undergoing a 
difficult transition period as it acquired various independent companies.
70 Argentina, Telephone Census: Boletin Mensual de Correos y  Telegrafos No. 16, Telefonos, Buenos Aires 
(1912).
The ‘Castillo’ Law in Argentina decreed that any inter-state telegraph and telephone line constructed 
henceforth would become the property of the state after just 30 years, and the licensee would receive no 
compensation in return. See Berthold (1921a).
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(see chapter 1, specifically the last part of the section The Period o f Export-Led 
Growth (1870-1930)).12 During this period, Argentina experienced relatively faster 
telephone diffusion, with a teledensity of 7.1 telephones per 100 households by 1913, 
compared to just 2.4 in Mexico; moreover, by 1939 Argentina had 18.4 telephones 
per 100 households, while Mexico languished on 4.5 (see table 3.4).
Table 3.4 Telephone Diffusion (Handsets per 100 households)
1900 1905 1910 1913 1920 1925 1930 1935 1939 1946
Argentina 1.7 4.5 6.4 7.1 15.1 16.1 18.1 16.9 18.4 18.2
Mexico 0.7 1.5 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.7 3.4 4.5 5.4
Source: see appendix B.
Table 3.4 displays the levels of telephone diffusion during the early part of the whole 
diffusion period. In these years it is clear that telephone diffusion in Mexico 
significantly lagged the levels in Argentina.
The key shift during the 1-10% period was the change in perceptions regarding the 
telephone, which unsurprisingly coincided with the demise of the electric telegraph. 
An indication of this can be seen in Argentina, in the repeal of the Castillo Law in 
1920, which was a continual hindrance to telephone network expansion. Indeed, in 
Argentina, the notable progress of export activities and the urban economy had 
combined to create ‘...the largest, most articulate middle class in Latin America’, a 
population grouping that would no doubt demand the latest communication devices 
and drive their diffusion.74 The shift in attitude toward the importance of the 
telephone in Argentina was reflected at the highest levels, as the General Director of 
Posts and Telegraphs made his discontent with the government’s attitude towards the 
industry quite clear. In numerous reports he tried to convince the Minister of the 
Interior to change the government policy of granting multiple concessions, claiming 
that although the private companies are ‘...careful in living up to their obligations, 
they always put their own interests first, interests that are generally incompatible
n c
with [the provision of a]...public service’ such as the telephone. A government
72 Maddison (2006).
73 Teledensity here is defined as the number of telephone handsets per 100 households.
74 Lewis C. M., ‘Industry in Latin America before 1930s’ in Bethell L., The Cambridge History o f  Latin America 
volume IV, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1986), p.314.
75 Berthold (1921a), p.23.
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monopolisation of this ICT was, in his words, ‘the future solution of this subject’.76 
Although this would not happen for some years, it demonstrates how perceptions, 
nationalistic feelings, and the view on foreign dependence had begun to reverse 
during the First World War and particularly in its aftermath. Indeed, these feelings 
would continue to grow in Argentina and Mexico throughout the 1920s and 
eventually the 1929 Depression caused such an economic dislocation that it forced 
change upon Latin America.
In regard to structure, the 1-10% diffusion period was one of market consolidation 
across the two countries, whereby the telephone ended up under monopoly provision 
in Argentina, and under a duopoly in Mexico. In 1927 in Argentina, the International 
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) gained full control of SCT and its well 
developed network. For a couple of years UT competed against ITT, until it was also 
acquired in 1929.77 By the mid-1940s ITT dominated the Argentinian telephone 
market (owning approximately 90% of the market, with CAT [Ericsson] operating 6% 
and some 40 small local cooperatives controlling 4% of the market).78 In Mexico the 
market was dominated by a duopoly consisting of ITT also (which had bought 
Mextelco in 1924) and Mexeric (Ericsson). At this point there was limited 
competition and still a strong foreign presence, which meant that telephone diffusion 
was not driven particularly quickly in either country. Ultimately, the change in 
economic mode (and political economy) would see the emergence of the 
interventionist state in the 1930s, which led to a number of nationalisations 
(including the telephone industry) as disputes over foreign ownership o f basic 
economic sectors took on a more prominent role on the government’s agenda (see 
chapter 1, section The Period o f Import Substitution Industrialisation [1930s- 
1980sT).79
This shift in the political economy coincided with the increased importance attached 
by the state to the telephone as a means of communication, allowing economic 
development, further state consolidation and national security, more so than the
76 Ibid., p.23.
77 Petrazzini (1995).
78 CAT was owned by Ericsson and it operated in six provinces, remaining the only private provider until the 
privatisation process in 1990. See Petrazzini (1995).
9 Cardenas et al. (2000), Fitzgerald (1984), Thorp (1998).
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telegraph ever had. Consequently there were growing calls for a more pro-active role 
of the state in the sector. Argentina’s government gradually began to discontinue the 
normal practice of extending private concessions and experienced increased
OA
teledensity, while a similar shift in terms of attitude took place in Mexico. 
Successful diffusion in Mexico took on elevated importance, and from the mid-1930s 
there was greater government intervention in the sector; for instance, in 1938 the 
Cardenas administration set out a regulatory framework that granted the state 
extraordinary interventionist powers over the telecommunications sector. This 
framework ultimately manifested itself in the Law of General Means of 
Communications (1938) and was perhaps the single most important governmental act 
in telephone diffusion of the post-revolution period, since it was still in force in 
1990.81 In Argentina, the federal government also began to assume a more visible 
role in the control of the telephone sector, and although the scale of their actions was 
not as extensive, in 1935 they ensured that companies made arrangements for inter­
provincial connections. A year later, however, the government issued an executive 
decree which stated that telephone services now came under federal jurisdiction and 
that any concession granted to a private firm could be revoked at any time, thus 
demonstrating a real lack of commitment to property rights, which would obviously 
not spur investment. Nevertheless, it was seemingly this shift in state perceptions 
towards the technology that ultimately spurred the need to develop the telephone 
industry.
It was only after the 1930s that industrialisation by all definitions was attained and a 
new economic model that focussed on the domestic (import substitutive) side of 
economic policy making was encouraged (see chapter 1, section 1.1.2 Industrial 
Growth in Argentina and Mexico). The increased role of the state in economic 
activity led to specific reforms that improved the development of telephone 
infrastructure. Politically (and critically for the regulatory landscape of the telecoms 
industry) times were changing as Argentina had seen its first democratically elected 
president sworn in (and out). Meanwhile in Mexico, the PRI political party, which 
would ultimately run the country without interruption until the 1990s, was also
80 Casaus (1994). Also see Petrazzini (1995).
81 Mexico, Camara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Union, Ley de Vlas Generates de Comunicacion, 1938 
(General Means o f  Communication Law) Mexico D.F., Diario Oficial de la Federation (30th December 1939).
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growing in power. At the same time there was an important shift in economic growth: 
although in absolute terms, Argentina’s GDP per capita was still significantly ahead 
(see appendix A, tables A.1 and A.2), the momentum and departure in direction o f 
growth rates was important, as this could have impacted the diffusion of the 
technology even more, since the incremental impact of higher income may have been 
more significant. It is interesting that until the end of the 1940s and in spite of 
Mexico’s economic growth spurt (although not to the extent Mexico would 
experience during the economic miracle years), telephones per household in Mexico 
still significantly lagged those in Argentina (refer back to table 3.4).
3.2.3 The Years of Telephone Expansion
The years o f telephone expansion (10-90% diffusion) saw similar rates of diffusion 
for Argentina and Mexico.82 The years in question correspond to 1943-1997 in 
Argentina, and 1945-1997 in Mexico. The very similar periods show that not only 
was diffusion growing at a similar rate, but actually in tandem. Chapter 4 will assess 
some possible reasons as to why this occurred. This period was largely dominated by 
two key reforms in the telephone sector in Argentina and Mexico: the nationalisation 
reform (1946-1990 in Argentina, and 1947-1990 in Mexico -  note that 1947 marks 
the beginning of the process towards nationalisation in Mexico rather than the actual 
years of majority state ownership, which were 1972-1990) and the privatisation 
reform (1990-1997 for the two countries).83 The period of nationalisation dominated 
the years corresponding to the 10-90% diffusion and it was during this period that 
telephone diffusion in Mexico caught up to the levels in Argentina, both in relative 
and absolute terms. The privatisation years were also very important, because 
although they correspond to a shorter time frame, significant telephone diffusion 
occurred then, especially in Argentina.
The Period o f  Nationalisation
The inter-war years saw the administrations in Argentina and Mexico express 
increasing concern over the function of private capital as nationalistic and
82 During this period of diffusion, CRDs were calculated as 54 and 52 years respectively. See chapter 2, section 
2.6 Applying the FLOG Model.
83 The year 1997 was chosen as the ‘end’ year because this was the year in which both countries were supposed to 
allow for competition in their telephone markets as well as corresponding to the years around 90% diffusion.
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protectionist tendencies became the new policy mantra of Latin America. To this 
end, a new model of ICT development was necessary and a more European style 
model of technology integration was adopted widely. 85 In the aftermath of the 
Second World War, a combination of increased government control and foreign 
corporate withdrawal strengthened the position of the state in relation to the private 
sector. Given the telecom sector’s capacity to promote economic growth in both 
nations, it seemed logical for the government to increase their influence.
In the telecommunications sector at least, ‘populism translated into the
Q /r
nationalisation of the telephone company’. Indeed, populism in its various forms 
was characteristic of much of Latin America during this period. In Argentina a 
government monopoly was seen as the best strategy to ensure fast diffusion, whilst in 
Mexico it was believed that service would be best provided by a private monopoly, 
with full governmental backing: ‘...private enterprise should have complete freedom 
and be able to count on support from the state, so long as it acts on behalf of the 
general interest’.87 Argentina fully nationalised the telephone under Peron much 
earlier than Mexico (1946 versus 1972), but the process of nationalisation began at 
the same time in the two countries. In Argentina, the government purchased a 
controlling share of ITT in 1946 to form Empresa Mixta Telefonica Argentina
• oo ,(renamed Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones [ENTel] in 1956). In a single 
event the Argentinian government acquired majority ownership of the main
on
telephone provider, and complete ownership soon after. In Mexico it was a 
progressive shift in ownership which started in 1947 under Aleman Valdes’s 
administration, with the creation of Telefonos de Mexico (Telmex), which eventually
84 Diaz Alejandro ‘Latin America in the 1930s’ in Velasco A., Trade, Development and the World Economy 
Oxford, Basil Blackwell (1984), Fitzgerald (1984).
85 Under this system, the state would co-run the post, the telegraph, and the telephone (PIT). See Noam E., 
Telecommunications in Europe New York, Oxford University Press (1992).
86 Casaus (1994), p. 179.
87 This was said by Miguel Aleman (Mexico) in Chua (1995), p.233. An interesting issue for consideration here, 
as explored in chapter 1, is the relationship of the state and other interest groups in society, particularly with the 
elites and working classes. See chapter 1, section Relations between the State, Business Elites, Trade unions and 
Workers.
88 Empresa Mixta Telefonica Argentina became Telefonos del Estado just a few months later before it would 
become ENTel 10 years afterward.
89 Herrera A., ‘The Privatisation of Telecommunication Services: The Case of Argentina’ Columbia Journal o f  
World Business 28.1 (1993): 47-61. Cook P., ‘Privatisation and Utility Regulation in Developing Countries: The 
Lessons So Far’ Annals o f  Public and Cooperative Economics 70.4 (1999): 549-587.
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became majority government owned in 1972 under Luiz Echeverria’s administration 
(explained in more detail below).90
The differences in the two strategies can be best understood in light of their political 
economies (as explored in chapter 1). In the run up to the Second World War, 
Argentina’s economic growth altered quite dramatically and between 1930 and 1945 
the overall economy barely expanded, following the impressive levels it had attained 
in the earlier part of the century. It was therefore necessary for the state to take on a 
larger role in industry and perhaps this is why full nationalisation occurred in 
Argentina. In Mexico, the state of the political economy was rather different at the 
beginning of a period that would later be referred to as the ‘Mexican economic 
miracle’ years. Despite the import substitutive mode of industrialisation that had 
been fully embraced in other parts of Latin America (including Argentina), in 
Mexico, the close ties to the U.S. were paying dividends since they allowed some 
sense of export-led growth to continue, via commodity exports. Domestically, the 
government was attempting to transfer resources from agriculture to industry but it 
was not planning for a big shift overnight and therefore their greater desire not to 
overly change the status quo was indicative of its gradual nationalisation strategy. 
This difference in ownership structure was an important feature of the respective 
nationalisation paths, as ENTel was completely government owned, and Telmex’s 
preservation of ‘private flavour’ potentially enabled the Mexican telephone provider 
to diffuse the technology more efficiently (an argument further explored in chapter 5, 
section 5.2.3 The Traits of the Government Administrations in Mexico).91
Aligned with the political economy of the era, nationalisation was a global event and 
occurred in Argentina and Mexico under two very different settings. In Argentina it 
occurred during Peron’s first term; a time when public support for all things Peronist 
was overwhelming and the cries for state intervention could not go unanswered 
(indeed Peron’s ‘Third Position’ unequivocally supported the nationalisation of 
foreign enterprises). This led Peron to argue that state provision of the telephone
90 Telmex was formed in 1947 as a result of a government induced merger of two companies with incompatible 
networks (Mexeric and ITT). See Telefonos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. Datos Intemos Mexico D.F., Telmex 
(1994).
91 If the government had approached the nationalisation of ENTel in a manner similar to the one used in 
nationalising the railways in 1947 creating a mixed private/public company, much like Mexico’s Telmex, the 
outcome would likely have been significantly different.
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services was not only an option to be explored but ‘...essential for the economy and
09defence of the country’. Argentina’s nationalisation of the telephone provider 
theoretically signalled the end of foreign control, ‘incompatible with sentiments of 
national sovereignty and the level of domestic development’.93 The government’s 
involvement in the telephone sector in Argentina was in fact part of a larger project 
of economic nationalism and was pursued very ideologically. 94 Meanwhile in 
Mexico, the state was not trying to gain control but rather to consolidate the 
fragmented network that had materialised, recognising that the ideal of a connected 
national system could not be achieved otherwise. Both states were keen to assert 
control over strategic sectors and so Argentina and Mexico decided independently to 
go it alone.95 In Mexico the influence of the state throughout this period was a 
progressive occurrence, from simple guidance and approving nudges, to induced 
mergers, tariff setting and finance offering: all in an attempt to accelerate integrated 
network development. The nationalisation of the telephone sector, however, was not 
driven by any one political force (although it was one political party) compared to 
the early Peron years in Argentina. Instead, between the 1950s and early 1970s 
Mexico was governed by a series of administrations that slowly exerted an increasing 
influence on Telmex, which culminated in majority government ownership in 1972. 
Although these administrations would collectively be bracketed under the ‘economic 
miracle years’ heading, in terms of economic advancement, it must be noted that 
there were varying degrees of overall success, given the sizeable debts that were 
amassed and the hefty rises with regard to income inequality.
Just as institutions in Mexico had been active early on in the telegraph’s diffusion, in 
1947, Argentina had created the Ministry of Communications and the Secretary of 
State for Telephones. The government thought that this would stamp its authority 
over the telecom sector and make it clear to the market that ENTel’s growth was due 
to the government’s active management. ENTel absorbed a large number of 
cooperatives and by 1955, when Peron was overthrown, CAT was the only private
92 Petrazzini B., ‘Telephone Privatisation in a Hurry: Argentina’ in Ramamurti K , Privatising Monopolies: 
Lessons from  the Telecommunications and Transport Sectors in Latin America Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press (1996), p. 111.
93 Petrazzini (1995), p.56. Donikian L., Raul V. A., Vito D. L. and Roberto V., Telefonos: de la Politico Nacional 
al Saqueo Privatista Buenos Aires, Foetra (1990).
94 Proof o f this was the retention of state telecommunications control despite Peron’s removal from office in 1955.
95 Knight (1985), Thorp (1998), Diaz Alejandro (1983), Lewis C.M. (2002).
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provider remaining.96 ENTel continued to expand, however, and by the 1970s it 
controlled 92% of the market. In the case of Argentina, the strategic importance of 
telecommunications meant that the government would retain absolute control of this 
sector until 1990, when ENTel was privatised. Throughout this period, sector policy 
was the responsibility of the Secretary of Communications and the 1971 National 
Telecommunications Law would explicitly make all telecoms a legal monopoly of
07 nothe state. Unlike ENTel, Telmex was initially mostly foreign owned. Although it 
was acknowledged widely that the infrastructure and services in the telecom sector 
were inadequate, it was not until the presidency of Ruiz Cortines that there was a 
significant increase in investment in communications, something which his 
successors continued as nationalisation neared. The aim was to create an integrated 
national system, and although several small firms continued to exist, Telmex had 
consolidated the market as Mexico’s main provider (controlling 96% of the market 
by 1957).99 In 1958 the Lopez Mateos administration ‘Mexicanised’ Telmex by 
persuading (coercing) heavily invested foreign owners to sell their shares to Mexican 
investors. This period perhaps coincided with some of the PRI’s most authoritatively 
stable years in power, as many largely accepted that the ruling developmentalists 
might not be bringing social justice, but they had achieved overall economic success.
During the 1950s Telmex was to all intents and purposes a private enterprise which 
cooperated closely with the Mexican government, who maintained good relations 
with the private sector in order to meet public needs.100 Mexico’s government 
continued to take on a more prominent role in the development of the telephone 
sector, through official loans and re-investment of revenues into the sector in order to 
aid in its expansion in the 1960s. Indeed, Mexico’s period of stabilising development 
was beginning to receive global recognition. ENTel, by contrast, was solely state 
owned and its interests were fully government-originated consequently, which 
resulted in significant inefficiencies. For instance, the existence of icompre national’ 
meant that only a few local suppliers were used, eroding price competition. Indeed,
96 Scobie J. R., Argentina a City and a Nation New York, Oxford University Press (1964), Hill and Abdala 
(1993), Petrazzini (1995).
97 Hill and Abdala (1993).
98 Temex’s ownership was 51.24% Continental Corporation, 48.75% Ericsson and 0.01% owned by 3 Mexican 
companies.
99 Szekely G. and de Palacio J., Telefonos de Mexico: Una Empresa Privada Mexico D.F., Grupo Editorial 
Planeta Mexicana (1995).
100 Thorp (1998).
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prices paid were often twice or three times higher than those of the international 
market.101 ENTel’s procurement policy was connected closely with the regime. As 
military and civilian regimes followed each other in rapid succession between 1955 
and 1976, procurement policy and ENTel’s development strategy became 
inconsistent and contradictory, with incoming administrations cancelling the pre­
existing contracts with suppliers and negotiating new ones, providing a high 
incentive for corruption.
In Mexico, Telmex was in fact performing relatively well compared to its 
performance in the earlier years of telephone diffusion and although diffusion in 
Mexico had not yet caught up to Argentina’s absolute levels, it was growing 
materially faster (see table 3.5).
Table 3.5 Telephone Diffusion (handsets per 100 households)
1947 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1989
Argentina 18.7 21.4 27.8 29.4 28.1 27.2 29.5 30.4 43.1
Mexico 5.7 5.4 6.3 8.3 11.4 18.3 29.3 41.6 61.4
Source: see appendix B.
Table 3.5 shows that, although Mexico continued to lag Argentina’s telephone 
diffusion levels until the 1970s, the increased role of the government in the sector 
seemed to develop in tandem with diffusion growth. Telephone diffusion in 
Argentina meanwhile remained fairly stable throughout the period as rapid growth 
was frustrated by regime changes and sporadic policy turmoil. In Mexico in the 
1970s, Echeverria’s administration embarked upon an ambitious task of making 
state-owned enterprises more effective in sectors that had been dominated by private 
ownership for a long time, and ‘the role of the state, already significant, expanded 
sharply’. 102 Nationalism began to deepen in Mexico, and the government’s role 
gradually expanded to the point where its ownership of Telmex reached 51% of 
voting shares in 1972. Echeverria argued that the telecommunications sector could 
now, under state ownership, contribute to national development and security. It was 
indeed now that diffusion increased significantly. From 1972, the Mexican 
government took executive decisions regarding Telmex, although it is imperative to
101 Petrazzini (1995).
102 Smith P. H., ‘Mexico Since 1946: Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime’ in Bethell L., Mexico Since 
Independence Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1991), p.371.
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note that, unlike ENTel, Telmex still retained some notion of private-company status. 
This was evident from the fact that the majority of Telmex’s management kept their 
jobs and various private individuals were board members. However, it is interesting 
that while the state strengthened its grip on the telephone sector, the PRI’s grip on 
political power loosened. As shown in figure 3.1 below, telephone diffusion in 
Mexico increased significantly in the early 1970s, and by 1976 it exceeded 
Argentina’s absolute levels, with 41 handsets per 100 households in Mexico in 1980 
compared to 30 in Argentina (see table 3.5 above).
The Progress Achieved during the Nationalised Era
The focus of the thesis is to understand the factors behind the given telephone 
diffusion rates, be they factors that affected the build-out of infrastructure or those 
impacting consumer demand directly. But in order to appreciate fully the extent of 
any relative success during this critical period of nationalisation, the growth in 
diffusion must also be examined with respect to the quality o f the service and the 
providers’ respective financial performances. In the years of nationalisation (and 
those leading to it for Mexico), there was a strong state commitment to network 
expansion in the two countries, and they borrowed heavily during the 1960s and 
1970s from foreign lenders to reinforce this expansion.103 In Argentina economic 
stabilisation efforts repeatedly failed during cycles of inflation and devaluation, 
while in Mexico they were nearing the end of their stabilising development phase. 
Nationalisation brought some progress in the two countries' telephone diffusion rates 
but a key difference was that in Mexico, Telmex continued to operate partly as a 
private company. To this end it is interesting to analyse the whole period of 
nationalisation before and after 1972 for Mexico, in measuring the effect of 
nationalisation with private flavour, as one can observe that household teledensity 
levels tripled during the latter period (see table 3.5 above).104 Yet more impressive is 
that on the eve of privatisation, telephone diffusion in Mexico not only caught up to 
the absolute levels in Argentina, but exceeded it by almost 1.3 times (see figure 3.1).
103 Tuman J. P., ‘Comparing Modes of Privatisation: A Study of the Telecommunications Sectors in Argentina 
and Mexico, 1990-2000’ Industrial Relations Journal 38.2 (2007): 155-177.
104 See appendix B for data and sources.
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Figure 3.1 Telephone Diffusion C ross-over, 1972-1989 (3 y ea r  m oving averages
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Source: see appendix B for data.
Figure 3.1 shows the cross-over o f when telephone diffusion in Mexico caught up 
with the levels in Argentina. The observed trend would prevail for the rest o f the 
period o f nationalisation, whereby after almost 80 years o f telephone diffusion 
leadership in Argentina over Mexico, the relationship reversed. Mexico’s telephone 
diffusion outperformance and the relative underperformance in Argentina during the 
years o f nationalisation are further explored in chapters 4 and 5. It is worth noting, 
however, that the economic disparity between the two countries in absolute GDP per 
capita levels at this point had reduced (see appendix A, table A .l).
State ownership in ENTel resulted in poor service and poor maintenance prevailed 
and although there were periods o f  progress, the predictable economic and socio­
economic problems began to emerge. For instance, underinvestment meant supply- 
demand dynamics were imbalanced, over-employment crept in, political interference 
was abundant, and prices were kept artificially low. For ENTel, Cook, along with 
other observers, believed their ‘highly politicised management and lack o f 
entrepreneurial spirit’ were the main reasons behind the poor quality o f service and 
its poor financial performance.105 As an example, ENTel’s labour policies were 
linked closely to national politics, so the size of the firm’s workforce and hiring 
strategies were not based on efficiency or productivity but rather on larger national 
issues such as the employment rate.106 Also, as ENTel’s senior management were 
appointed at the president’s discretion and as the presidency changed hands
105 Cook (1999), p.558.
106 Petrazzini (1995).
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numerous times in the years during ENTel’s nationalisation, it was similarly no 
surprise that there was significant instability among the senior management at ENTel 
(along with their individual visions), as they frequently came and went. ENTel faced 
significant managerial inconsistencies, and in the 30 years leading up to privatisation, 
the company had 28 different executive directors.107 The changing faces of ENTel’s 
management effectively were a reflection of the changing faces of Argentinian 
politics. Consequently, there was a distinct lack of investment planning, as projects 
were carried out randomly; for instance in 1975, 6,000 lines were delivered, 
compared to 200,000 in 1979.108 This was also in part a result of the often 
contradictory policies issued by different government departments, as ENTel had to 
respond to up to seven different bodies, each pursuing their own agenda. This was 
very different to the situation in Mexico where private and state management shared 
responsibilities. Further, during Telmex’s period of nationalisation, via the PRI, there 
was relatively greater political stability within the Mexican state (although on the 
wane in the 1980s) vis-a-vis Argentina (although this varied), and thus longer term 
goals could be more easily set and achieved.109 Telmex suffered political pressures of 
a different kind in the immediate period before privatisation, however, as it was 
viewed and exploited by the government as a source of revenue.110 As a cash cow, 
Telmex’s eventual privatisation sent a very meaningful signal to world markets, 
indicating that Mexico was well on its way to embracing economic liberalism.
Indeed, in judging the success of these enterprises from the quality of the service 
perspective, despite their rapid expansion, neither excelled, but problems were 
perhaps more pronounced at ENTel. For instance, in 1989 there was an average 
waiting period of 12-14 years to install a new phone, compared to an average of 3 
years at Telmex.111 Waiting time for repairs, on average, were 11-14 days in 
Argentina compared to just 4 days in Mexico.112 Having said that, at any one time, 
roughly 10% of all of Mexico’s telephone lines would be out of service. Nonetheless,
107 Hill and Abdala (1993).
108 Noam (1998).
109 See chapter 1, section The Evolution o f  PRI control o f  Mexico (until 1960 andfrom 1960).
110 For details see Casaus (1994).
111 See Cook (1999).
112 For more details on the quality o f service, see Mairal H. A., ‘The Argentine Telephone Privatisation’ in 
Wellenius and Stem (1994). Also see Cook (1999), Tuman (2007), Ramamurti R., Privatising Monopolies: 
Lessons from  the Telecommunications and Transport Sectors in Latin America Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press (1996).
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the overall situation at ENTel was arguably worse: for example, labour productivity 
lagged Telmex’s considerably, with ENTel producing 75 lines per employee versus 
105 lines at Telmex.113 Furthermore, in terms of first-time connectivity, ENTel had a 
success rate of less than 50% on local calls and 30% on long-distance calls versus 
Telmex levels of roughly 92% of all local calls and 90% of long-distance calls.114 In 
terms of influencing further diffusion growth, long waiting times for installation and 
unsuccessful connections were obviously two potential inhibiters. As the 1980s debt 
crisis progressed, ENTel’s profits continued to suffer and consequently the quality of 
service worsened further, as connection delays exceeded historical averages.115 
Overall, the quality of service was not spectacular in either country, although 
ENTel’s offering was surely worse as, by the 1980s, most Argentinian voters were so 
discontent that they actually began to call for liberalisation of the market (not 
necessarily privatisation), as a means of getting better service.
In terms of financial profitability, a factor often used to evaluate state enterprises, 
Telmex was clearly the relative outperformer. Although Telmex’s profits were not 
always sizeable, their revenues were consistently strong, and although ENTel proved 
profitable during the 1960s/1970s, their revenues were not on the same scale. Despite 
various difficulties, Telmex delivered a reasonable rate of return during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. But it was heading in to privatisation that Telmex became 
particularly profitable, with an average of U.S.$193 million net profit from 1982- 
87.116By the late 1980s, it was growing at double-digit average annual percentage 
growth.117 In contrast, during the 1980s, ENTel saw its financial performance 
worsen, and from memoria to memoria, ENTel revealed losses as year-on-year
1 i  o
installation growth fell equally dramatically. This period proved very difficult 
indeed for the telephone sector as governments reduced their level of investment 
which hindered expansionary plans. Moreover, for ENTel, profitability swung 
violently, depending on the given politically-motivated tariff structure of the time 
and as tariff income was eroded by inflation, so was the financial performance of the
113 Labour productivity is measured as lines per employee.
114 Abdala M A., ‘Institutional Roots of Post-privatisation Regulatory Outcomes’ Telecommunications Policy 
24.8-9 (2000): 645-668.
115 Tuman (2007), Cook (1999), Mairal (1994), Petrazzini (1995), Casaus (1994).
116 Note that this period was dubbed the ‘lost decade’ in Latin America. See Petrazzini (1995).
117 Casaus (1994).
118 Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTel), Memoria Empresaria Buenos Aires (1984).
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company.119 The problem was that the evolution of the tariffs was well below the 
value of inflation registered over the equivalent period.120 Tariffs were not adjusted 
in a timely fashion and due to ENTel’s historical reliance on credit and the finances 
of the state, a vicious cycle was created that saw the company’s financial deficit
191worsen. Moreover exchange rate fluctuations led to an increase in already sizeable 
debts, and problems worsened as interest rates increased from 1979, which would 
ultimately be followed by the debt crisis.122
Telmex’s success over ENTel can be explained in part by the policies implemented 
by de la Madrid, who quickly realised that change was needed in the telecom sector 
and thus implemented various initiatives, which led to the privatisation of Telmex. 
Despite some earlier difficulties as mentioned, especially in the 1970s, Telmex 
headed into privatisation on a strong financial footing. In truth, both state-owned 
telephone monopolies faced difficulties; but Telmex, unlike ENTel, remained 
comparatively more profitable. Thus the impact of the crisis was much more negative 
for ENTel than for Telmex.123 Consequently in financial terms, although both 
providers were profitable going into privatisation, Telmex was again, relatively more 
successful than ENTel.
Overall, in review of the developments during the period of nationalisation, Telmex 
performed relatively better in diffusing the telephone compared to ENTel, as 
indicated by teledensity growth, quality of service and financial performance. A 
critical facet of Telmex’s success was seemingly related to the government’s 
progressive approach to nationalisation and retention of private flavour when finally 
in majority control, versus ENTel’s complete government ownership in a single act. 
This resulted in ENTel potentially facing more inefficiencies. Meanwhile, the very 
fact that nationalisation in Mexico was a relatively shorter period was also seemingly 
positive for diffusion.
119 The tariff structure would involve supporting government’s welfare programmes, or aligning tariffs with anti- 
inflationary plans. See Cook (1999) and Hill and Abdala (1993).
120 Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTel), Memoria Empresaria Buenos Aires (1984).
121 Ibid. Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTel), Memoria Empresaria Buenos Aires (1975).
122 Schaeffer R. K., Understanding Globalization: The Social Consequences o f  Political, Economic and 
Environmental Change Lanham, M.D., Rowman and Littlefield Publishers (1997).
123 Telmex had become the envy of many other Mexican companies due to its performance over this period.
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The Period o f  Privatisation
As the twenty first century approached, private provision came back into vogue. 
There was a renewed emphasis on competition and transparency as the New 
Economic Model emerged, resulting in a favourable political environment to 
implement reforms in the telecommunications sectors and in part motivated 
Argentina’s and Mexico’s administrations to implement the privatisation of their 
telecom providers.124
ENTel’s privatisation was not only a response to international pressures to introduce 
neo-liberalism, but it was also a means to reduce foreign public debt, as ENTel’s 
debt, in the form of state subsidies and privileges since the 1940s, could no longer be 
serviced.125 The significance of the reform was underscored further by the style of 
transaction, as it was at the time, the largest debt-equity swap transaction in Latin 
American history.126 In the case of Mexico, by privatising Telmex (now a large and 
profitable entity), the Salinas de Gotari administration was sending a message to the 
global community that Mexico was now a more liberal and competitive economy. In 
addition to the symbolism that Telmex’s privatisation rendered, it was also the 
strategically rational option since privatisation was expected to increase efficiency 
further. 127 As expected, both countries faced opposition to the reforms and 
overcoming this domestic resistance was key for successful privatisation and 
subsequent diffusion.
Unionism was one important form of resistance and their relationship with the state 
came under scrutiny during this period. The unions were very different in nature in 
the two countries. In Argentina, trade unions, by the time privatisation came about, 
were a well established base of political opposition. In Mexico, the dynamic was 
very different, as independent unionism had not really grown in tandem with industry, 
however, they still had an important role to play during privatisation. Salinas de
124 Manzetti (1999). Moreover, as detailed in chapter 1, the arrival of the debt crisis, which preceded the reform, 
was viewed in international financial-circles as a unique opportunity to force Latin American governments
toward an ideology based on liberalisation and a reduced role of the state.
125 Indeed public sector enterprises were responsible for much of the fiscal deficit (ENTel accounted for 4.86% of 
the total debt in 1989). See Manzetti (1999) and Herrera (1993).
126 Petrazzini (1995), p.22. In fact, a US$214 million cash ceiling was imposed in order to encourage potential
buyers to compete on the debt side of the deal, see Manzetti (1999).
127 Petrazzini (1995).
128 See chapter 1, section Inter-relations between the State, Business elites, Trade unions and Workers.
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Gotari successfully blocked this by incorporating various labour concessions in his 
finalised reform package, which caused the unions to quickly reverse tack and 
publicly support the sale of Telmex. Meanwhile in Argentina, opposition was part of 
the reason why Menem’s privatisation reform was attempt number three. When 
privatisation was attempted first under the military regime during El Proceso, it 
failed due to a lack of cohesion among governing elites. In the second attempt in 
1988, the Alfonsin democratic administration failed to block domestic opposition 
(from unions, equipment suppliers, Peronists, and ENTel’s management) and did not
1 90secure the necessary congressional backing. By the third attempt to privatise in 
1990, although Argentina faced more resistance than Mexico, the Menem 
administration was prepared for it, having learned from the failings of his two 
predecessors. It was in anticipation of this resistance that a swift bidding and reform
1 90process was timetabled. Menem, unlike Salinas de Gotari, was unwilling to 
negotiate with unions and warned that any labour strike would be deemed illegal, and 
ultimately fired many employees in the process (around 400). He also faced strong 
opposition from within his own Peronist party, as their strong statist philosophies 
were in direct opposition to his methods. He thwarted this opposition by replacing 
them with external workers who supported his policies.131
In 1990, Argentina and Mexico successfully privatised because the reform was 
government-led and largely commanded by public opinion.132 Both sales were 
executed by just a few government officials and employed presidential intervention 
wherever necessary. The PRI’s authority may have been on the wane, but despite this, 
they managed to remain a strong enough force in politics during the privatisation 
reform. Their relative (though waning) stability in Mexico versus the very 
fragmented Argentinian political arena in the build-up to privatisation was very 
important and helps to understand why in Mexico, unlike in Argentina, privatisation 
was successfully implemented at its first attempt.
129 See Manzetti (1999).
130Comelius and Craig (1991).
131 See Xelhuantzi-Lopez M., El Sindicato de Telefonistas de la Republica Mexicana: doce ahos (1976-1988) 
Mexico D.F., Sindicato de Telefonistas de la Republica Mexicana (1990). Luxner L., ‘Argentine Telco Sale 
Causes Uproar’ Telephony 218.7 (1990): 9-10, Tuman (2007), Cornelius and Craig (1991), Cook (1999).
132 Wellenius and Stem (1994).
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Although tactically divergent, both Menem and Salinas de Gotari were able to 
overcome opposition, and had they not done this as swiftly as they did, surely 
telephone diffusion would have stalled. Although reforms were supposedly free- 
market reforms, they did not put an end to monopolistic or oligopolistic practices. 
ENTel and Telmex were not necessarily sold to the highest bidders, but rather to 
those that the government saw as most beneficial, demonstrating how difficult it was 
for a nation to shed its legacy ties of favouritism in business. For instance, most of 
Telmex was sold to a Mexican financial and commercial group, Grupo Carso, thus in 
effect converting Telmex from a state monopoly to a private Mexican monopoly. 
Meanwhile in Argentina a duopoly emerged as ENTel became Telefonica de 
Argentina and Telecom, which would be an important structural factor. Although it 
could be argued that ENTel’s sale potentially was mismanaged, the creation of a 
duopoly provided a certain degree of competition, which was important in a non­
liberalised market.133
Following privatisation in the 1990s, telephone diffusion in Argentina managed to 
catch up very quickly with that in Mexico and the two countries ultimately saturated 
at approximately the same time and level (see table 3.6).
Table 3.6 Telephone Diffusion during Privatisation (handsets per 100 households)
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Argentina 41.2 52.0 64.7 75.0 81.1
Mexico 64.5 72.9 86.3 84.5 82.8
Source: see appendix B.
Table 3.6 shows that the recovery in Argentina in terms of telephone diffusion during 
the period of privatisation was spectacular, as telephone handsets per 100 households 
doubled from 1990-1998. This was similar to Mexico’s experience in the 1970s 
when its telephone diffusion speed caught up with Argentina.
In the years prior to privatisation, both countries carried out various important 
reforms in order to make their respective telecom providers more attractive to private 
capital. Indeed, part of Argentina’s and Mexico’s shared success pre-privatisation
133 Manzetti (1999).
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was the fact that in neither country was the responsibility for positive change wholly 
placed on the acquirers. On the financial restructuring side both decreased taxes and 
upgraded tariff policies. Mexico sensibly reduced the debt, and Argentina decided to 
guarantee a debt-free balance sheet of sorts. But while ENTel stopped there, Telmex 
restructured the entire capital of the firm in order to retain Mexican majority voting 
rights yet still attract maximum foreign capital interest.134 As far as institutional 
changes went in preparation for privatisation, these were quite different. Mexico 
entirely restructured its regulatory framework, while Argentina did not formulate a 
regulatory regime until late in the bidding process.135 Although both governments 
took steps to facilitate the sale of their respective telecom providers, it was perhaps 
Mexico’s changes in the law that various analysts agree was the crucial factor in 
determining the success of Telmex’s privatisation process.136 This was important 
since international investors played a key role in the process, and Argentina, due to 
the relatively greater volatility of its economic and political domains leading up to 
privatisation, was regarded as a risky investment, ‘...a  high risk country, and ... not 
worth it to bid for ENTel’.137
Investors’ high degree of uncertainty about the future macroeconomic environment 
in Argentina meant that foreign private buyers had a significant degree of bargaining 
power during the sale process (evidenced in the ultimate degree of liberalisation 
[lack thereof] in the market). In Mexico there was a high level o f centralisation in the 
management, and there was seemingly greater stability in the political environment 
carved out by the transformation of the Mexican economy, especially in the first five 
years after the debt crisis. This meant that the government was able to exert more 
control over international investors during the privatisation process. Given the
134 Telmex provided 3 types of common stock: those sold to the consortium (22.11% of Telmex’s total equity) 
and those already in private hands (3.64%) -  both of which had full voting rights -  whereas the third type of 
shares (74.25%) had limited voting rights. Indeed, maintaining the voting in Mexican hands was a key objective 
of Salinas’ privatisation. See Casaus ‘Privatisation of Telecommunications: The Case of Mexico’ in Wellenius 
and Stem (1994). In Argentina, on the other hand, no special voting structure was implemented, although the end 
result was still significant domestic ownership (43% in Telecom and 47.4% in Telef6nica), however, unlike at 
Telmex, this was not an initial aim. See Hill and Abdala (1993) and Mariscal J. and Rivera E., ‘New Trends in the 
Latin American Telecommunications Market: Telefonica & Telmex’ Paper at the 32nd Annual 
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (TPRC) October (2004): 1-35.
135 For a detailed account on restructuring see Wellenius and Stem (1994). Also see Mariscal J. and Rivera E., 
‘New Trends in the Latin American Telecommunications Market: Telefonica & Telmex’ Telecommunications 
Policy 29.9 (2005): 757-777 and Petrazzini (1995).
136 See Tandon P. and Abdala M., ‘Mexico: Telefonos de Mexico’ in Galal A., Jones L., Tandon P. and 
Vogelsang I., Welfare Consequences o f  Selling Public Enterprises: Case Studies from  Chile, Malaysia, Mexico 
and the UK Washington D.C., The World Bank (1992), also Griffith in Noam (1998).
137 Newspaper: El Pais, (14th June 1990). Comment by one Telefonica manager on behalf of the executive board.
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Argentinian situation, ultimately there was just one interested buyer in each region,
and the government felt forced  to grant monopoly privileges rather than embrace
competition.138 Argentina failed to liberalise, because to attract private capital it had
to make clear the possibility of high revenue growth opportunities. Unlike ENTel, on
the eve of privatisation, Telmex was a very attractive investment: as the second
largest company in Mexico and one of the 30 largest telephone companies worldwide.
Its privatisation was an exciting and lucrative prospect (since it had already grown
into a profitable business) and its geographical location (U.S.-neighbour) translated
1
into an important flow of call demand to be serviced. FDI was increasing and 
general investor sentiment was high (given the dramatic fall in inflation and observed 
GDP growth). However, despite the higher degree of governmental bargaining power, 
Mexico was only able to liberalise its service partially, as a monopoly was granted on 
local and long-distance telephone service, as in Argentina.140 Hence, both countries 
initially failed to liberalise the telephone market, but took significant steps in 
improving the sector.
Another difference between the Argentinian privatisation and the Mexican one was 
the decision to privatise before deregulation of the economy and before the 
achievement of economic stability.141 Argentina drafted new telecom laws, but they 
were flawed severely in terms of clarity and depth. The scheme outlined was 
executed poorly and it took more than a year after privatisation for the regulatory 
body to begin to address matters. Argentina’s regulatory agency did next to nothing 
until 1992. It was dogged by political interference, and its ‘...lack of autonomy... and 
restricted finances placed Argentina’s regulatory agency...at odds with the 
technically and politically difficult task assigned to it’.142 From 1992 the situation 
improved and from 1993 one sees a significant jump in telephone diffusion in 
Argentina. In the case of Telmex, the regulator for the first five years after 
privatisation was successful and thus Mexico was in a better position to experience
138 The monopoly privileges were for 7 years extendable to 10 years. See Cook (1999) and Petrazzini (1995).
139 De la Garza Toledo E., ‘Reconversion Industrial y Cambio en el Patron de Relaciones Laborales en Mexico’ 
in Angiano A., La Modemizacion de Mexico Mexico D.F., Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana (1990).
140 There was a monopoly on long distance telephony until 1997 and on local telephone until 1998. Although 
proposals to enter local services came as early as 1994, concessions were not offered until 1998, thus, in effect 
there was no competition in the fixed local telephone market in Mexico until 1998. See Mariscal and Rivera 
(2004), Walter J. and Gonzalez C. S., La Privatizacion de las Telecomunicaciones en America Latina Argentina, 
Editorial Universidad de Buenos Aires (1998).
141 The deregulation decree in Argentina did not come until October 1991, see Manzetti (1999).
142 Petrazzini (1996), p. 13 8.
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faster diffusion (compared to Argentina before 1992). In the initial period post 
privatisation, Mexico accordingly continued its strong diffusion rate, and by 1994, it 
had a household teledensity of 86.3% compared to Argentina’s 64.7%.143 However, 
from 1996, the new agencies established in Mexico lacked meaningful autonomy to 
act and the teledensity situation quickly reversed, as Argentina’s regulatory 
landscape improved.144
The Progress Achieved during the Privatisation Era
The period under consideration in the following assessment of privatisation is from 
1990, when privatisation was implemented, until 1997, when liberalisation was 
supposed to begin.145 Coincidentally, this period not only marks the advent of 
liberalisation but also represents the 90% telephone diffusion level. In order to assess 
the relative success of telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico during these 
years, the household teledensity growth, the quality of service and the overall 
financial performance are examined.
In terms of teledensity growth over the period of privatisation, diffusion in Argentina 
grew by an average of 7.7% per annum compared to 4.0% in Mexico during 1990- 
1997 (note that this was from a lower base, however).146 In absolute terms, telephone 
diffusion in Argentina clearly performed strongly in the privatisation years. In terms 
of quality of service, Argentina’s telephone providers also managed to make 
significant relative improvements versus Telmex. For the first three years after 
privatisation, Telmex failed to meet its service targets, whereas Argentina’s 
Telefonica and Telecom exceeded theirs (admittedly theirs were less demanding).147 
Targets were set with respect to network expansion and quality of service. For the 
expansion targets these specifically included annual percentage network growth and 
the number of new lines and public phones. For quality, targets were set on call
143 See appendix B for data.
144 Mariscal and Rivera (2004).
145 Ultimately, it was extended until 2000 for Argentina, but for comparability purposes this is the period that will 
be examined.
146 See appendix B for data.
147 For a detailed account on Argentina’s targets see the ‘Pliego de Bases y Condiciones para la Privatizacion del 
Servicio Publico de Telecomunicaciones’ (Document of the Terms and Conditions for the Privatization of 
Telecommunications Services) contained in the Executive Decree 62/1990 of 5 Jan 1990. For Mexico, see 
Telmex, Informe Mexico DF, Telmex (1995), and SET (Consultores en Sociologia y Economia del Trabajo, 
Secretaria de Asuntos Profesionales de FOETRA), Analisis de la productividad en las empresas telefdnicas segun 
balances contable. Matriz basica de datos Buenos Aires, Argentina, FOETRA (1996). Also see Petrazzini (1996) 
and Noam (1998).
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completion rates, time taken to repair faulty lines and the duration of installation 
delays.
In Mexico, service quality continued to draw numerous complaints, particularly in 
Mexico City where at one point they ‘averaged a million customer complaints per 
month’.148 By contrast, Argentina significantly improved its service (from a low base 
again, however), with the number of successful calls at first attempt increasing from 
49% to 85% for local calls and 30% to 80% for long distance.149 During the 1991- 
1995 period, employee productivity improved in relative terms: for Telefonica and 
Telecom it grew by 100% and 121% respectively, compared with 54% at Telmex.150 
The waiting time for a repair also fell sharply in Argentina, from 11 days to 2 (1990- 
1998). This was amid much increased demand also, with the number of new lines to 
be installed in Argentina almost tripling by 1994.151 Although Telmex was 
experiencing further price hikes (from $11 to $21), and in Argentina prices were 
falling slightly, it must be noted that Telefonica’s and Telecom’s tariffs were still 
extremely high ($30 to $28) for 1990-1997.152 Some rationale for is found in the fact 
that there was zero competition in Mexico’s telephone market, whereas in Argentina 
the duopoly meant that when Telecom reduced rates (for whatever reason) this 
placed some pressure on Telefonica to follow suit.153 Therefore, in terms of relative 
improvement, Argentina’s telephone diffusion was more successful, as post­
privatisation it significantly increased investment and Telefonica and Telecom 
improved the quality of service; although one must consider the fact that given the 
state of the telephone sector in Argentina before privatisation, there was considerably 
more scope for improvement than in Mexico.154 The effects of privatisation in terms 
of teledensity therefore were even greater in Argentina as a result of the lack of 
progress made during nationalisation.
148 Cho S., The Dynamics o f  Institutional Reform in Telecommunications: Globalization, Liberalisation, and 
Regulatory Change New York, Garland Publishing Inc. (1998), p.200.
149 Abdala (2000).
150 Petrazzini (1996), p. 138.
151 Walter and Gonzalez (1998).
152 Prices are for total average monthly rates in U.S. dollars (average o f450 minutes). Mariscal and Rivera (2004).
153 Mariscal and Rivera (2004).
154 Abdala (2000).
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On a financial performance level, Telmex was a world-class operator, with 
‘operating margins of over 50 percent’.155 For the period 1991-1993 the telephone 
providers in both Argentina and Mexico experienced positive growth, but Telmex in 
particular managed to increase its revenues by more than 115% during this period.156 
While both boosted their capital spending, Telmex’s efforts were greater. From 
capital expenditure of U.S.$500m in 1989, Telmex spent U.S.$2.75bn in the first 
year after privatisation (1991) and for ‘the six years 1991-96, the total was 
U.S.$12bn’ versus its counterparts in Argentina with an average spend of 
‘U.S.$1.2bn per annum after privatization’.157 In relative terms, Argentina did well, 
with Telefonica and Telecom increasing their net profits by 19% and 16% on average 
(1991-1995). Indeed, Argentina’s two telecoms operators improved the situation so 
much that in terms of net profits and net value added per employee, they actually 
surpassed Telmex’s in 1995. But for the period as a whole, Telmex was more 
successful in financial terms: in 1996 it impressively recorded the second highest 
earnings of any Latin American company. Thus overall, Argentina’s performance 
was not comparable on a ‘bottom-line’ assessment, but to its credit it turned ENTel 
from a loss-making company into a profitable one, generating yearly profits of 
$400million by 1992.159
In terms of household teledensity growth and quality of service during the years of 
privatisation, telephone diffusion in Argentina was relatively more successful than in 
Mexico, although in financial terms, Telmex relatively outperformed. It would have 
been logical to assume that Mexico was in a better position to diffuse the telephone 
faster during these years, given the relatively limited opposition, the greater pre­
privatisation restructuring and the clearer and more efficient regulatory framework, 
after all the priority in Argentina was to sell ENTel as quickly as possible. 
Nonetheless, telephone diffusion in Mexico had experienced a major spurt in growth 
already in the 1970s and thus the continued stable diffusion growth was less a 
reflection of the success of privatisation and more a factor of their achievements to 
date. ENTel’s privatisation reform, in relinquishing government control (and thus the
155 Griffith in Noam (1998), p.180. Note that this was before the 1994-1995 economic crisis.
156 Ibid.
157 For Mexican information see Griffith in Noam (1998), p.180 and for Argentinian see Cook (1999), p.564.
158 Tuman (2007).
159 Newspaper: International Herald Tribune, (7th September 1992).
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associated inefficiencies) and partly in the structural duopoly formation, which 
provided some degree of competition in the market ultimately supported the 
advancement of telephone diffusion. Overall, it is interesting that what was most 
impactful upon the diffusion of the telephone was institutional reform strategy and 
implementation. A good example was the Mexican government’s gradual, rather than 
full blown, nationalisation of Telmex, which was aligned with the political economy 
of the era, as explained earlier.
3.3 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to provide a deeper understanding of the development of 
the telegraph and telephone diffusion, within the political and economic backdrops of 
Argentina and Mexico. In essence, relating the context provided in the first part of 
chapter 1, to the direct events of the diffusion processes. Despite the large relative 
strides taken by the Mexican economy as a whole over this period, as the economic 
disparity narrowed, Argentina from a socio-economic perspective remained at a 
much higher level of development throughout the period. Theory would predict that 
diffusion of the telegraph and the telephone in Argentina should have been relatively 
faster than in Mexico, yet this did not happen. A possible explanation for the Paradox 
may be found in an examination of the state’s role, operating within the bounds of 
the prevailing political economies.
To substantiate the argument, consider that during the early period of telegraph 
diffusion, Mexico had generally experienced a period of serious political flux post- 
Independence (75 presidents in 55 years), hence its regimes became obsessed with 
state building and seized on the opportunities provided by the telegraph to establish 
order. Mexico’s administrations perceptively exploited the railways’ right of way 
earlier on and implemented a regulatory framework ahead of Argentina, thereby 
enhancing the necessary infrastructure build-out, in order to boost consumer demand 
for the telegraph and in turn support its diffusion rate. With regard to telephone 
diffusion, the Mexican governments’ retention of some private-run elements during 
the nationalisation years aided the transition of the telecom company into state hands, 
rather than by a single event (as in Argentina). However, Argentina’s administrations 
rapidly managed to reclaim significant lost ground during the years of privatisation, 
partly through the state’s decision to form a duopoly. Ultimately, as the work of an
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economic historian, it is obviously not the aim of the thesis to dismiss economic 
factors in the rationalising of historical fact, but rather to shed light on the fact that in 
the specific cases of the diffusion o f these two ICTs in Argentina and Mexico, 
alternative mitigating factors (namely the role of the state) seem to provide greater 
understanding to the essential question posed by the thesis: what is the rationale 
behind the Paradox? Aided by a greater understanding o f the political economy 
provided in chapter 1 and in greater appreciation of the actual diffusion processes of 
the two ICTs in each of the two countries presented in this chapter, it is possible in 
the next chapters to attempt to determine the main possible explanatory drivers of 
diffusion.
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Chapter 4
A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of Diffusion
Chapters 1 and 3 placed the diffusion of the telegraph and the telephone in their 
historical, political and economic context. The aim of this chapter is to find the main 
drivers behind the relatively similar diffusion speeds in Argentina and Mexico, as per 
the analysis in chapter 2. The chapter re-visits some of the key potential drivers 
discussed in chapter 1. First a quantitative analysis is applied, using multiple 
regression analysis. It is imperative to note that although the regressions are useful in 
providing some numerical explanations or indications, the findings from the 
quantitative analysis need to be treated with care in light of the issues of data 
reliability (see the introduction to the appendices and appendix B for a detailed 
discussion). Second and most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the second 
section of the chapter applied a more detailed qualitative analysis with particular 
focus on the role played by the state. Given the issues surrounding the data and the 
nature of the most important explanatory variables, there is a closer focus on the 
second half of the chapter. Overall, the chapter provides the basis from which to 
answer (in chapter 5), the three main research questions posed at the start of the 
thesis, namely: what were the main drivers behind the observed diffusion rates in 
Argentina and Mexico? What factors caused the ‘Paradox’? And, to what extent can 
Mexico’s experience with the diffusion of the two technologies be considered a 
‘Success Story’?
4.1 The Factors Behind the Rate of Telegraph and Telephone Diffusion
Chapter 1, section 1.5 Review of the Approaches to Different Rates of ICT Diffusion, 
demonstrated that there were many factors that can account for the relative speed of 
ICT diffusion for a given country over another. These were divided into four 
approaches (the economic, social, natural endowment and institutional approaches), 
and were subdivided further into those factors affecting consumer demand and those 
that affect the construction of the infrastructure. The same groupings are used here. 
There is a slight bias towards the economic factors, since the literature typically
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focuses more heavily upon these.1 However, these factors did not play their 
commonly overriding explanatory role in the two case studies under consideration, as 
will be shown.
The main economic factors that could drive telegraph and telephone diffusion and 
are accordingly included in the regression analysis are: the change in GDP per capita, 
population growth, urbanisation growth, investment and costs. GDP per capita (a 
proxy for income) is the most empirically tested economic variable, and theory 
predicts that a strong positive relationship between GDP per capita and the diffusion 
of the two ICTs should hold. From a technology perspective, the effect of this 
should be stronger in the case of the telephone than the telegraph (given the greater 
individual cost of adoption). Having said this, it is expected that in the context of this 
thesis, the level of GDP per capita will not be the key explanatory variable, given 
that the diffusion of the two ICTs in Argentina and Mexico took place at similar rates 
despite different economic milieus (see chapter 1, section 1.1.1 The Economics of 
the Political Economy). This suggests that there may be other, more pertinent, factors 
that played a more prominent role in driving diffusion. Although one must 
acknowledge that over time it is likely that income plays a large role in 
understanding a given country’s technological-economic history. Urbanisation and 
population growth are theoretically likely to play an important role in explaining ICT 
diffusion also, by affecting the development of the necessary infrastructure. A high 
degree of urbanisation provides the best environment for rapid telegraph/telephone 
diffusion in developing countries, as it is in these areas that infrastructure will 
develop first, as telecommunication companies give priority to the more profitable 
urban markets (vis-a-vis rural ones).3 This is corroborated by Fischer and Carroll, 
who provide evidence that commercialisation in urban centres created an economic
1 See for instance Rogers (1995), Griliches (1957), Mansfield (1961, 1963a, 1963b), Dekimpe et al. (1998), 
Antonelli (1993), Rouvinen (2006), Caselli and Coleman (2001), and Lttcke (1993). Also see chapter 1, section 
1.5.1 The Economic Approach.
2 See Rogers (1995), Ahn H. and Lee M. H., ‘An Econometric Analysis of the Demand for Access to Mobile 
Telephone Networks’ Information Economics and Policy 11.3 (1999): 297-305, Gruber (2001), Gruber H. and 
Verboven F., ‘The Evolution of Markets under Entry and Standards Regulation: The Case of Global Mobile 
Telecommunications’ International Journal o f  Industrial Organisation 19.7 (2001): 1189-1212., - Madden G., 
Coble-Neal G. and Dalzell B., ‘A Dynamic Model of Mobile Telephony Subscription Incorporating a Network 
Effect’ Telecommunications Policy 28.2 (2004): 133-144, Milner (2006), Wallsten (2001a).
3 Best and Maclay (2002). Indeed, this relationship is likely to be even stronger in developing countries and some 
studies acknowledge that there is rarely a negative relationship, thus providing further support for the hypothesis. 
Also see Canning (1998).
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environment which served to incite faster telephone diffusion. 4 Argentina and 
Mexico are dominated by large cities.5 This argument is closely linked to that of 
population growth, whereby more densely populated areas induce greater interaction, 
and again are often areas where infrastructure build-out is preferred. The changes in 
cost and in the level of investment directed towards the sector also are expected to 
explain the diffusion of the two technologies in part and are thus tested. The level of 
investment in particular is important as it dictates to a large extent the infrastructure 
build-out, hence a higher degree of investment should translate into faster diffusion.7 
A range of other economic factors which are deemed important within the literature
Q
were also tested in the regression analysis before ultimately being discounted.
The main social factor tested for in the regression analysis was the historical living 
standard index (HLSI). HLSI is a common measurement of poverty and inequality.9 
Improved living standards should have a positive effect on the rate of diffusion of the 
two technologies. Social factors can play an important role in driving ICT diffusion 
from a consumer demand side perspective, by affecting the individual’s ultimate 
decision on whether or not to adopt the new technology. This is an approach 
supported by many within the literature.10 Although it was initially tested for, HLSI 
was not included in the final set of regressions, since there was apparently no 
correlation whatsoever in the year on year changes with the variation in the diffusion 
of the two technologies.
In terms of natural endowment factors, perhaps the most important for this thesis is 
country size. This is important because it affects the existing and future infrastructure
4 Fischer and Carroll (1988). Also see Proenza et al. (2001), Morse (1974), and Wilkie (1984).
5 However, if  the rate of urbanisation growth is relatively constant the impact of this variable is likely to be less
significant upon the regressions.
7 See UNCTAD (1999), Dicken (2003), Soete (1985), Bell M. and Pavitt K., ‘Technological Accumulation and 
Industrial Growth: Contrasts Between Developed and Developing Countries’ in Archibugi D. and Michie J., 
Technology, Globalisation and Economic Performance Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1997). Findlay 
(1978a), and Mayer J., ‘Technology Diffusion, Human Capital and Economic Growth in Developing Countries’ 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Discussion Paper 154 (2001).
8 This included the number of subscribers (network externality proxy), literacy rates, the length and density o f 
lines and the number of telegraph offices.
9 See Astorga et al (2004). This index accounts for both economic and social indicators by giving weights to GDP 
per capita, life expectancy, and the adult literacy rate, a methodology similar to the UN’s Human Development 
Index, used by Crafts. See Crafts N., ‘The Human Development Index, 1870-1999: Some Revised Estimates’, 
European Review o f  Economic History 6.3 (2002): 395-405.
10 For instance, Dekimpe et al. (1998, 2000a, 2000b), Gatignon and Robertson (1985), Gurevitch and Loevy 
(1972), Takada and Jain (1991), Gatignon et al. (1989), Bowden and Offer (1994), Hofstede G., Culture’s 
Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values Beverly Hills, CA, Sage Publishers (1980), and 
Keida and Baghat (1988).
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build-out. It is closely related to the population density argument. In theory smaller 
countries should experience faster ICT diffusion, as infrastructure build-out is easier 
and it is cheaper to provide service in a smaller, densely populated area, which is 
particularly important in developing countries.11 Ultimately a country’s size will 
affect the availability and accessibility of infrastructure and thus is expected to have 
an important impact. To evaluate country size, the regressions used population 
density, but ultimately this variable was left out of the final set of regressions.
As Milner and Duch’s studies reveal, ICT diffusion was closely dependent upon
1 9political institutions. Institutions are defined here in terms of formal rules, (e.g. 
statute, political system), and these rules in turn provide a governing framework 
within which individuals and organisations act.13 Institutions therefore not only 
frame the incentives that can affect the actors’ conduct, but also supply a relevant 
economic exchange framework.14 Indeed, political players are believed to have an 
important role in explaining diffusion rates in Argentina and Mexico. As Brown 
reveals, it is the institutional factors that will influence the context in which a given 
technology is diffused, a view shared by Rosenberg, Henisz and Zelner, among 
others.15 Arguably, institutions are particularly significant in developing and ‘new’ 
countries, such as the two under examination. Consequently, where possible, some 
measurement for certain institutional factors was included in the regression analysis.
Practically, institutions are ‘the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, [the] 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’. 16 There is much 
agreement on such a definition but no consensus on how to standardise measurement 
of institutional factors empirically.17 Given that multiple regression analysis is able to
11 Antonelli (1990), Canning (1998) and Fischer and Carroll (1988).
12 Milner (2006), Duch (1991). Also see Andonova and Diaz-Serrano (2007), Bergara M., Henisz W. and Spiller 
P., ‘Political Institutions and Electric Utility Investment: A Cross-Nation Analysis’ California Management 
Review 40.2 (1998): 18-35, Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), Henisz and Zelner (2001), and Levy and Spiller (1996).
13 World Bank, Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter Washington D.C., The World Bank Latin 
American and Caribbean Studies (1998).
14 North (1990), Meisel N. and Ould Aoudia J., ‘A New Database for “Measuring” Institutions’ Tresor- 
Economics 24 Paris, Treasury and Economic Policy General Directorate (2007).
15 Brown (1981), Rosenberg (1970, 1972), Henisz and Zelner (2001). Also see Mokyr (2002), Wallsten (2001a, 
2005), Bath C. R. and James D. D., ‘The Extent of Technological Dependence in Latin America’ in Street J. H. 
and James D. D., Technological Progress in Latin America: The Prospects fo r  Overcoming Dependency 
Colorado, Westview Press (1979), Schuler and Brown (1999), and Milner (2006).
16 North (1990), p.3.
17 Woodruff C., ‘Measuring Institutions’ in Rose-Ackerman S., International Handbook on the Economics o f  
Corruption Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing (2006).
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account only for quantitative explanatory variables, measuring qualitative variables, 
such as many institutional factors, is a common problem in the literature. The use of 
dummy variable regressors to measure institutions is a commonly accepted approach 
which allows the inclusion of qualitative explanatory variables in the model, thus 
increasing the range of application of the regression analysis. These proxies are crude 
measures, however, and thus the results must be examined with care. For instance, a 
dummy can account for the effect of privatisation (or nationalisation), by reducing 
the effect to a binary action, but this simply accounts for whether there was 
privatisation or not, and not for the extent or nature of it. This problem might become 
yet more complicated when measuring the degree of political stability, for instance. 
Nonetheless, despite these potential problems, some use of proxy indicators can 
provide the opportunity to examine the importance of some of these institutions 
empirically in the context of telegraph and telephone diffusion in the two countries. 
Although this is only done where it is reasonable to do so (whilst reducing statistical 
errors), greater accountability of the response variable can materially benefit the
1 ftresults of the study. It is of no surprise that the measurement of political institutions 
is a perplexing pursuit for economists and requires the utmost care in assessment 
since they will typically aim to construct quantitative indicators, based on judgment. 
Even then the problem remains: unlike quantifiable measures of macroeconomics 
provided by national accounts, for instance, there is no such framework of 
consistency in examining institutions.19
Given the limitations of measuring institutional factors, only a few key ones were 
included in the regression analysis, where it was reasonably accurate to use dummy 
variables. Another typical danger to be aware of in the measurement of institutional 
factors is the fact that they can often be highly correlated, which thus increases the
ondifficulty of the separating effect. Such causes of concern were considered when 
carrying out the analysis. Government policies can exert a strong influence on 
subsequent technology diffusion. Consequently, key policies such the Mitre Law 
passed during the diffusion of the telegraph in Argentina were tested with the use of
18 The institutional variables that were tested but excluded from the final regressions include the type of regime 
(e.g. democratic/military), the degree of legislative effectiveness and the effect of the line consolidation laws, for 
example.
19 Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2007).
20 Woodruff (2006).
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a dummy variable. The rationale of its potentially significant role in explaining 
telegraph diffusion in Argentina can be found in chapter 3, section Role o f the State: 
The Impact o f New Laws. In developing countries in general, and certainly in the 
cases of Argentina and Mexico, successful diffusion depended on political 
activities.21 These activities were a function o f government perceptions, which is 
another issue that deserves further exploration since studies by Duch and Petrazzini 
show the significant effect they can have upon the diffusion process, as they will
99ultimately shape a country’s system of property rights and regulation. Moreover, 
they can determine to a large extent, both the capacity and ultimate success of a
9-1
given administration’s implemented reform. The ramifications of these factors are 
further explored in the qualitative section of this chapter.
The market structure, the type of ownership and the degree of existing competition 
are amongst the most tested institutional variables since Mansfield’s work.24 As 
North and Williamson argue, investment in this type of infrastructure suffers from a 
number of market imperfections and consequently the government’s role becomes
9 ^even more important. Government induced policies, such as the privatisation and 
nationalisation reforms (the former largely emphasised in the literature), are thought
9 Ato play a leading role in the diffusion of the telephone in the two countries. The 
impact of the privatisation reform was accounted for by a dummy variable, and is 
expected to be particularly important in the case of Argentina, where the rate of 
telephone adoption experienced a significant expansion during the years o f 
privatisation (see chapter 3, section The Period o f  Privatisation). The impact of 
Mexico’s unique telephone nationalisation reform also was tested with the use of a 
dummy variable but due to its gradual nature it is difficult to truly capture its effect 
in this way. The change in the number of telephone lines waiting to be installed was 
included also: one would expect that, as this number fell and telephone installation
21 Henisz and Zelner (2001), Levy and Spiller (1996), Sidak and Spulber (1997), James (2000).
22 Duch (1991), Petrazzini (1995).
23 For instance see Kalathil and Boas (2003), Coe N. M., Helpman E. and Hoffinaister A. W., ‘North-South R&D 
Spillovers’ The Economic Journal 107.440 (1997): 134-149, Kedzie (1997).
2 Mansfield (1961). Also see Wallsten (2001b, 2005), Ochoa-Morales (2004), Hollenstein (2004), Littlechild 
(1983), Foreman-Peck (1985), Milner (2006), Wilson (2004), and Coe et al. (1997).
25 North (1990), Williamson (1988).
26 As per the studies of Wallsten (2001a, 2005), Littlechild (1983), Cecchini S., ‘Poverty, Inequality and New 
Technologies in Latin America’ in Marshall S., Taylor W. and Yu X., Encyclopaedia o f  Developing Regional 
Communities with Information and Communication Technology Pennsylvania, Idea Group Reference (2006), and 
James (2000).
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improved, faster diffusion followed, as individuals would be more prone to adopt the 
new technology if the whole process was easier and quicker, providing for a proxy 
for the quality of service.
After re-examining some of the primary drivers that can account for the rate of 
technology diffusion in a country, the focus now turns to the quantitative analysis.
4.2 Analysis of Diffusion -  A Quantitative Approach
This section attempts to explain the factors behind the rates of telegraph and 
telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico, using multiple regression analysis. The 
factors outlined in the section above were tested to determine whether any of these 
were key drivers of the given diffusion rates in the two countries. It is imperative to 
reiterate that there are a number of limitations in relation to the data and hence the 
findings of the regression analysis must be read in conjunction with the qualitative 
findings that follow. As argued in the methodology in chapter 1 and in the 
introduction to the appendices, the data used is subject to various issues of reliability, 
particularly during the earlier period under coverage.27 The main data sets were 
constructed from extensive field research, including substantial archive work and 
data collection from a number of institutions (e.g. standard sources such as statistical 
yearbooks from INEGI and ENDEC, and national censuses). Nevertheless, this still 
does not guarantee the reliability of the data; with the accuracy of the censuses 
before the 1950s being the most questionable (see appendices B and C for the full 
sources and a critical review of the data). Moreover, the issues surrounding the data 
are also likely to reduce the likely V  squared. Since the dependent variable is not 
biased, however, it is still reasonable to carry out the following analysis to test the 
significance of the right-hand variables and although the qualitative assessment will 
ultimately carry more analytical weight, a regression analysis in this instance is still 
useful in providing initial insights.
The regression analysis uses time series (or longitudinal) data, and relies on yearly 
data. This has clear advantages over cross-sectional data and is preferred for the 
purposes of this thesis since it is the process of diffusion that is measured, and time
27 See chapter 1, section 1.7 Methodology. Also see the introduction in the appendices.
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series data allows for the appropriate capture of this process, whereas cross-sectional 
data are purely one-dimensional (reflecting diffusion as a snapshot). A cross- 
sectional analysis had the potential to add detail to the country level findings (by 
treating each individual region within each country as an observation). However, this 
was not possible with any degree of accuracy, due to a lack of reliable data at the 
provincial level, particularly with respect to the years of the telegraph, making it 
impossible to provide meaningful generalisations. The regression analysis adopted 
the standard econometric technique of analysing the change in the dependent and 
explanatory variables (with the exception of the dummy variables), that is by looking 
at first differences. Additionally, a number of variables were lagged (by 3 years). It 
was necessary to do this to account for the impact of the time lags that some of the 
variables would have on the subsequent diffusion process. For instance, the impact of 
an increase in investment in the telecom sector should induce an increase in 
infrastructure, which should then increase diffusion, as consumers would benefit 
from a wider network. However, the infrastructure takes time to be constructed and 
therefore the positive effect upon diffusion will have an associated time delay. 
Additionally, the same set of regressions were run without the use of lags and the 
results remained unchanged (these are reported in footnotes). Further supplementary 
material to the telegraph regressions was provided by replicating the main set of 
regressions with alternative dependent variables to see if the results changed. Rather 
than the original left hand side variable of telegrams sent per 100 people, the growth 
of the network (in km) and the growth of telegram traffic on the network (calculated 
as telegram network size divided by the number of telegrams sent) were used. In both 
cases, no additional right-hand side variables proved to be statistically significant 
(the results are reported in footnotes). In the presentation of the findings, the figures 
shown below used rolling 3 year moving averages for each of the variables in order 
to smooth out the data and make the trends more easily observable.
The period examined in the regression analysis corresponds to the years of 10-90% 
diffusion (the period over which the characteristic rate of diffusion, CRD, was 
calculated), as determined by the FLOG model and linearisation techniques. The 
diffusion of the telegraph is examined first, followed by the telephone.
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4.2.1 The Telegraph
For the regression analysis that follows, the potentially more important socio­
economic and institutional explanatory factors over the relevant period of telegraph 
diffusion are identified and defined in table 4.1. The change in the numbers of 
telegrams sent per 100 people is the dependent variable used as a proxy for telegraph 
diffusion, and it is explained as a function of changes in income, urbanisation, etc. 
By taking the first differences of each of these socio-economic variables, the 
potential problem of partial correlations among the explanatory variables is avoided, 
hence providing a better regression analysis. For the change in GDP per capita, the 
change in urbanisation, the change in population and the change in budget, a 3 year 
lag was implemented, but this was not applied for the change in the cost of sending a 
telegram or for the dummy variables. All of the factors in table 4.1 were tested in 
the regression analysis (see their descriptive statistics in table 4.2).
Table 4.1 Definitions of the Telegraph Diffusion’s Main Explanatory and Dependent Variables
Type Variable Description Notation Unit
Dependent var. 
(LHS) Telegrams per capita Change in telegrams sent per 100 ATelegram %
Institutional reform Mitre Law Impact of the Mitre Law Mitre_law (0,1)
Political institution Porfiriato Impact of the Porfirio Diaz regime Porfiriato (0,1)
Income wealth Real GDP Change in real GDP per capita AGDP %
Market potential Urbanisation Change in Urbanisation AUrban %
Market potential Population Change in Population APopulation %
Cost Telegram price Change in cost of average telegram ACost %
Investment Budget Change in telegraph & postal budget ABudget %
Source: see appendix C fo r  data sources.
28 An increase in GDP per capita is a proxy for an increase in income, and the impact of this in further telegram 
diffusion is likely to take time since individuals will take time to save and use their disposable income in 
alternative ways such as through telegraph usage. Similarly, the impact of a change in urbanisation or population 
growth is likely to have a lagged effect, because it is in these areas that infrastructure tends to cluster; however, 
an increase in these variables will not see an instant impact on increased infrastructure. Moreover, the impact of a 
change in budget will take time to feed through the system before generating further infrastructure build-out. 
Alternatively, costs were not lagged, because a change in the cost of sending a telegram is likely to have an 
immediate effect upon consumption. Further, the dummy variables, which typically represent a period in time in 
regard to this analysis, were not lagged since they are accounting for a binary outcome.
206
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The 'Double Paradox’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
Table 4.2 Telegraph Descriptive Statistics: Explanatory and Dependent Variables
Date N
Argentina 
Min Max Mean S. Dev Date N
Mexico 
Min Max Mean S. Dev
ATelegram 1891-16 26 -18.9 86.7 7.6 20.1 1881-07 27 -46.3 153.5 20.0 44.1
Porfiriato n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1881-07 27 0 1 n/a n/a
M itrelaw 1891-16 26 0 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
AGDP 1891-16 26 -21.2 15.8 2.4 9.0 1893-07 15 -8.1 10.0 2.7 3.8
AUrban 1891-16 26 -0.8 2.1 1.6 0.4 1881-07 27 -1.3 1.9 0.3 1.0
APopulation 1891-16 26 0.2 4.8 3.4 0.8 1881-07 27 1.1 1.7 1.3 0.2
ACost 1896-16 21 -9.2 20.8 0.8 6.9 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
ABudget 1891-16 26 -51.9 67.6 10.1 19.7 1895-07 13 -12.5 19.1 7.0 8.7
Source: see appendix C fo r  data sources. Note: data are presented as centred three year moving averages.
The descriptive statistics in table 4.2 show that, according to the differences in the 
means, Argentina’s population grew on average at a faster rate than Mexico’s. In 
terms of budget towards the sector, average growth rates over their respective 10-90% 
periods were also much higher in Argentina, but Argentina’s rates also displayed 
greater volatility, indicated by a much higher standard deviation. The regression 
results look first at Argentina and then at Mexico.
Argentina: Telegraph Diffusion Regression Analysis
Argentina’s initial telegraph regression results are presented in table 4.3. The 
explanatory variables in table 4.1 were all included. The final findings however 
showed that the Mitre Law was the only significant variable, and in line with the 
Mexican findings to come, provide little evidence in support of the socio-economic 
variables.
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Table 4.3 Argentina’s Telegraph Regressions with 3 Year Lags
Dependent variable: change in Argentina’s telegrams sent per 100 people
(1)
Mitrelaw 0.9 (8.8)
AGDP 3yLag 0.7 (0.6)
AUrban 3yLag 2.7 (10.6)
APopulation 3y lag 13.0(13.4)
ABudget 3y lag 0.5 (0.5)
ACost 0.6 (0.5)
Constant -54.7(49.1)
N 20
R2 adjust -0.01
D. W. 1.7
Source: see appendix C fo r  data. Note: standard errors in parentheses, *** sig. at 1%,
** sig. at 5% and * sig. at 10% level.
Table 4.3 shows Argentina’s telegraph regression, which tested for the main socio­
economic factors and the most important institutional variable, that of the Mitre Law. 
It must be noted that all of the variables in the regressions that include the Mitre Law, 
have been run without a reading for 1907. Since the Mitre Law was introduced late 
in 1907 (in October), it is not clear whether this dummy variable should begin with 
an effect in 1907 or 1908. Econometrically having 1907 = 0 or 1907 = 1 is 
problematic and therefore the only safe solution is to delete it. The results of this 
initial regression showed all the variables; the change in GDP per capita, the change 
in urbanisation, the change in population, the change in the government’s budget, the 
change in the average cost of sending a telegram, and the Mitre Law were all found 
to be insignificant factors in explaining Argentina’s change in telegrams sent (i.e. 
telegraph diffusion). To some extent these findings are surprising, given the 
emphasis placed within the literature on some of these factors. Theoretically one 
would expect to have found a higher degree of correlation between some of these 
variables: for instance, an increase in urbanisation is likely to have a positive impact 
on diffusion due to a higher degree of infrastructure clustering (hence a more 
accessible network). Although some of these results may be a potential consequence 
of the inherent limitations of the collected data, especially in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century (see the introduction to the appendices and appendix C for an 
evaluation of the data, and details on the specific limitation of each of the sources
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used). Given these findings, it is useful to look at the variables in more detail, factor 
by factor, to assess whether the regression findings hold. Note that the presentation 
o f graphs throughout this section applies a rolling 3 year moving average in order to 
identify the main trends more easily.
F igure 4.1 C hange in A rg en tin a ’s T elegram s Sent (3 Y ear M oving A verages) and the Im p ac t of 
the M itre  Law
C h an ge i n T elegram s sent Mitre LawDummy
V, 40
ra 10
-10
1891 1895 1899 1903 1907 1911 1915Year
Note: as explained, the year 1907 was omitted from the regressions.
Figure 4.1 shows reasonable correlation o f the Mitre Law with the diffusion o f 
telegrams in Argentina. The Mitre Law seems to have materially impacted diffusion, 
as there was no significant increase in the number o f  telegrams sent between 1892 
and 1907, since the market was largely stagnant. After the law’s introduction, the 
number o f telegrams sent increased significantly, specifically by 167% from 1906 to 
1908; although the graph obviously does not show the full extent o f this, given the 
adoption o f rolling 3 year moving averages, the increase in the number o f telegrams 
sent is still appreciable.
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F igu re  4.2 C hange in A rg en tin a ’s T elegram s Sent and  C hange in G D P p e r  cap ita  (3 Y ear 
M oving A verages)
Change in Telegrams sent Change in GDP per capita
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Figure 4.2 shows that the change in GDP per capita was not correlated with the 
change in the telegrams sent. Although there seems to be a modicum o f correlation 
for the most latter period o f diffusion, specifically from around 1909 onwards, this 
does not hold for the majority o f period under examination. For instance, in the years 
between 1894 and 1905 there is almost no change in the number o f telegrams sent 
compared to quite large variations in the rolling 3 year moving average for the 
change in GDP per capita. The rationale for the seeming lack o f explanatory power 
in the change in GDP per capita is an argument that closely follows that o f the cost o f  
sending a telegram. Since it was relatively small, and given the absence o f fixed 
costs for the user in consuming the technology, the impact o f a change in income 
seemingly did not have a large effect upon the increased usage o f the technology.
F igure 4.3 C hange in A rg en tin a’s T elegram s sen t and  C hange in U rban isa tion  (3 Y ear M oving 
A verages)
Change in UrbanisationChange in Telegrams sent
2.5
» -  20
-10 - 0.0 
19151891 1895 1899 1903 1907 1911
Year
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Figure 4.3 shows a clear lack o f correlation between the change in urbanisation and 
the change in telegrams sent. It must be noted, however, that urbanisation is one o f 
the variables that one must take particular care with, in terms o f appreciating its 
reliability seemingly since there is a larger reliance on extrapolation techniques in the 
data collection methods o f this earlier period o f  study (see appendix C, table C .l).
Moving
Figure 4.4 shows something similar to the depiction o f urbanisation, there is clear 
lack o f correlation between the change in population and the change in telegrams 
sent. Although the relationship again seems to hold better towards the latter part o f 
the period, for the majority o f  years under consideration, there is little consistency. 
One should appreciate the fact, however, that the only ‘rigorous’ count o f  the 
population was done on the census years only, hence all estimates in between are 
typically estimates, which is potentially one reason why there is not a great deal o f 
large changes in population data. Having said that, historically year on year 
population changes are rarely particularly volatile series’ (again refer to appendix C 
for full data disclosure).
Figure 4.4 Change in Argentina’s Telegrams Sent and Change in Population (3 Year 
Averages)
 Change in Telegrams sent Change in Population
60 4.5
o) 10
1895 1899 1903
1.5
1907 1911 1915
Year
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Figure 4.5 Change in Argentina’s Telegrams Sent and Change in Budget (3 
Averages)
20
Change in Telegrams sent Change in Budget
Year Moving
Figure 4.5 shows that, although there are some short periods o f relatively strong 
correlation (namely 1904-1906 and 1912-1914), for the whole period there is a 
general lack o f correlation between the changes in the number o f telegrams sent and 
the government budget for the sector. Although one would expect a strong positive 
correlation throughout, there was seemingly no consistency in the trend, as a 
relatively unchanged number o f telegrams sent for the first 12 years or so, sees large 
shifts in the change in budget.
Figure 4.6 Change in Argentina’s Telegrams Sent and Change in the Average Real Cost of a 
Telegram (3 Year Moving Averages) _______________________
•Change in Telegrams sent Change in Cost
1897
Year
Figure 4.6 shows that, although, again there are some periods o f relative correlation, 
this does not hold for the whole period. The seeming lack o f correlation between the
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change in the number of telegrams sent and the change in the cost of sending them 
suggests that individuals were partly price insensitive; high prices apparently did not 
act as a barrier to further diffusion.
Overall, figures 4.3 -  4.6 corroborate to some extent the finding in the regression of 
table 4.3, in that the socio-economic factors tested for, were not particularly closely 
correlated with the number of telegrams sent in Argentina throughout the period. The 
only variable for which the graphs potentially indicate relatively higher correlation is 
in regard to the dummy variable of the Mitre Law. This is therefore tested for in 
isolation in regression 1 of table 4.4. Some of the other socio-economic variables 
were also re-tested for completeness, but I did not expect these to be significant in 
light of the graphs presented above.
Table 4.4 Argentina’s Telegraph Regressions with 3 Year Lags______________
Dependent Variable: Change in Argentina's Telegrams sent per 100 people
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mitre_law 8.5* (4.9) 8.5 (5.3) 9.0 (5.5)
AGDP 3yLag 0.2 (0.3) 0.2 (0.3)
AUrban 3yLag 0.8 (6.3)
APopulation 3y lag -0.6 (3.3)
ABudget 3y lag
ACost
AGDPMitre 3y lag -1.3 (2.5)
Constant 1.4 (2.9) -0.3 (10.2) 2.9(11.2) 7.8* (4.0)
N 25 25 25 26
R2 adjust 0.08 0.08 0.01 -0.03
D. W. 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.4
Source: see appendix C fo r  data. Note: standard errors in parentheses, *** sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 5% 
and * sig. at 10% level.
Regression 1 tested for the effect of the Mitre Law in isolation, and as expected, was 
significant. Regression 2 tested for the Mitre Law, the change in GDP per capita, and 
the change in urbanisation (given their significance within the literature). Regression
2 demonstrated that, none of the variables were significant. Regression 3 ran the 
same variables but substituted change in urbanisation for change in population 
growth, and again nothing was significant. The last regression, regression 4, tested
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for an interaction variable (between the change in GDP per capita and the Mitre 
Law), given that figure 4.2 showed a relatively closer relationship between the 
change in GDP per capita and telegraph diffusion for the specific period after the 
introduction of the Mitre Law. The interaction variable was not significant, 
however.29
Regression 1 was found to be the ‘best’ regression: accounting for 8% of the 
variation in Argentina’s telegraph diffusion during the years 1891-1916.30 This 
regression suggests that Argentina’s telegraph diffusion was statistically best 
explained by the introduction of the Mitre Law. This finding is aligned with my 
initial expectations and the graphical representation of the data given above.
The regression coefficient suggests that, on average, there was an increase of 8.5% in 
telegrams sent, following the implementation of the Mitre Law, compared to the 
previous years. The immediate impact of the Mitre Law can be best understood by 
referring to chapter 3, section The Role o f the State: The Impact o f New Laws within 
the years of telegraph expansion. Since the Mitre Law stipulated that the railways’ 
telegraph lines had to be connected to the national telegraph network, there was an 
immediate improvement in network coverage, as more useful commercial hubs were 
connected despite limited immediate growth in the length of the telegraph network.31 
Meanwhile, the Mitre Law had a larger infrastructural impact over a longer period of 
time, as Argentina’s national telegraph system expanded significantly, in line with 
the ongoing railway boom, especially during the first 4-5 years after the introduction 
of the law. Therefore, the law resulted in the direct physical expansion and 
interconnection of the telegraph network which had the knock-on effect of inducing 
an increase in the number of telegrams being sent; as it became easier and more 
advantageous to send telegrams due to the larger, wider reaching network.
29 Additional regressions were run using no lags and in all cases the results were the same, with all variables 
(excluding the Mitre Law dummy variable) showing no statistical significance. Similarly, two new sets of 
regressions were run: one used capacity utilisation (total number of telegrams sent divided by the national 
telegraph network) as the dependent variable, and the second set used the total length of the national telegraph 
network (lines in km) as the dependent variable. Both of these supplementary sets of regressions were consistent 
with the findings in the main regression, as no other variables were found to be statistically significant.
30 The regression is statistically robust and there is no cause for concern with regard to multicollinearity or 
autocorrelation, since the final regression only accounts for one variable. The normality of the distribution was 
verified visually.
31 This was supported further by the tariff unification program which began in 1907.
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Mexico: The Telegraph Diffusion Regression Analysis
The results of Mexico’s telegraph regression are presented in table 4.5. All the 
explanatory variables of table 4.1 were included at some stage. Overall, the 
regression findings showed that none of the socio-economic factors (or the Porfiriato 
dummy variable) that were modelled in the regressions were significant in explaining 
the rate of telegraph diffusion in Mexico. This is an interesting finding, as it suggests 
that other factors were responsible, factors such as the role of political institutions, 
which is explored in the qualitative approach later in the chapter.
Table 4.5 Mexico’s Telegraph Regressions with 3 Year Lags_______
Dependent variable: Change in Mexico’s telegrams sent per 100 people
(1) (2)
Porfiriato -2.9 (82.9)
AGDP 3yr lag 0.6 (1.6)
AUrban 3yr lag -12.5(11.3) 12.1 (9.7)
APopulation 3yr lag 12.5(61.5) -21.0 (32.0)
ABudget 3yr lag
Constant -2.9 (82.9) 26.8 (40.5)
N 27 15
R2 adjust -0.06 -0.10
D. W. 2.0 2.7
Source: see appendix C fo r  data. Note: standard errors in parentheses, *** sig. at 1%, 
** sig. at 5% and * sig. at 10% level
Table 4.5 shows Mexico’s main telegraph regressions, testing for the primary socio­
economic factors and the most important institutional variable. The variable 
accounting for the change in the government’s budget was not included in these 
initial regressions since this would have reduced the initial sample size even further; 
consequently it was accounted for at a later stage. Regression 1 tested for the impact 
of the Porfiriato, the change in urbanisation and the change in population. A further 
second regression was included to test for the effect of a change in GDP per capita. 
Regression 2 carried over the variables from regression 1 but, due to the lack of a full 
sample for the GDP per capita variable, the Porfiriato dummy variable could not be 
included in this regression (since it would have been constant through the testable 
period). The results of these initial regressions found that all the variables were 
statistically insignificant. This was somewhat surprising because of the findings in
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the wider literature, although part o f this rationale may be due to the limitations o f  
the data, as described above, given that this earlier period was more prone to 
potential data reliability issues (see appendix C). Given these findings, it is useful 
again to look at the variables in more detail, factor by factor, to see whether the 
regression findings held.
Figure 4.7 in Mexico’s Telegrams Sent (3 Year Moving Averages) and the Impact of the 
Porfiriato
Porfirio dummyChange in Telegrams sent
120
~  100
-20
1881 1886 1891 1896 1901 1906Year
Figure 4.7 potentially shows that the Porfiriatio had a positive effect on the diffusion 
o f the telegraph in Mexico, as this was accompanied by an increase in the number o f  
telegrams sent. As will be argued in chapter 5 (see section 5.1 The Rates o f Diffusion 
in Argentina and Mexico), Porfirio Diaz continually sought (once in power) to 
expand the telegraph network (and in turn promote diffusion), hence one would 
expect that his regime had a positive effect on further diffusion.
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F igure 4.8 C hange in M exico’s T elegram s an d  C hange in G D P per cap ita  (3 Y ear M oving 
A verages)
■Change in T elegramssent Change in GDP percapita
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Figure 4.8 shows a lack o f  correlation between the change in GDP per capita and the 
change in telegrams sent, for the overall period under consideration. For a couple o f 
years the change in GDP per capita and the change in the number o f telegrams sent 
were relatively strongly positively correlated (especially immediately before 1901), 
but this was not true for most years under consideration, particularly toward the latter 
part o f the period, where relatively large increases in GDP per capita were 
accompanied by very small changes in telegrams sent. The apparent lack o f  
correlation between the two variables may be explained by the fact that telegraph use 
was relatively cheap, as explained earlier. Therefore, individuals did not have to be 
particularly wealthy to send a telegram once in a while. Similarly, perhaps they 
simply did not even want to send more telegrams, as a lot o f  people lived near their 
acquaintances and had a limited need to communicate frequently via this technology. 
Consequently it is not entirely surprising that an increase in GDP per capita did not 
translate into an increase in the number o f telegrams sent.
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Figure 4.9 C hange in M exico’s Telegram s Sent and  C hange in U rban isa tion  (3 Y ear M oving 
A verages)
Change in Telegrams sent Change in Urbanisation
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Figure 4.9 shows a lack o f correlation between the changes in urbanisation and in 
telegrams sent for most o f the period under consideration, with relatively little 
change in urbanisation occurring in any year. As in the Argentina section above, the 
reliability o f  the urbanisation data during this early period was slightly problematic, 
as even official bodies were forced into quite extensive use o f interpolation in order 
to fill in reasonably substantial gaps in the official data collection (see appendix C). 
Despite this, it is clear that there is no correlation with the telegram data.
Figure 4.10 C hange in M exico’s T elegram s Sent and  C hange in P opulation  (3 Y ear M oving 
A verage)
 Change in Telegrams sent Change in Population
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Figure 4.10 shows a lack o f correlation between the change in population and the 
change in telegrams sent for the whole period. Again as in the case o f Argentina, and
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as with the urbanisation data, one needs to be particularly careful with the population 
data during this period, as there is extensive interpolation (see appendix C), but again 
the lack o f  correlation is apparent.
M oving
Figure 4.11 shows a seeming lack o f  correlation between the change in the 
government’s budget towards the telegraph sector with the change in the telegrams 
sent in Mexico; and there is even a counter-intuitive negative correlation in parts. 
Indeed in some o f  the years in which there was a big increase in the budget, there 
were some o f  the smallest increases in diffusion; for instance in 1901 the budget 
increased by over 14%, while the change in the telegrams sent grew by under 3% on 
a year on year basis.
Figures 4.7 -  4.11 corroborate to some extent the findings in the regressions o f table 
4.5, in that the socio-economic factors tested for, were not particularly closely 
correlated with the number o f telegrams sent in Mexico throughout the period. The 
only variable for which the graphs potentially indicate relatively higher correlation 
with telegraph diffusion is in regard to the dummy variable o f the Porfiriato. This is 
therefore tested for in isolation in regression 1 o f table 4.6. Some o f the other socio­
economic variables were also re-tested for completeness, but again I did not expect 
these to be significant in light o f  the graphs presented above.
F igure  4.11 C hange in M exico’s T elegram s Sent and  C hange in B udget (3 Y ears 
A verage)
■Change in Telegrams sent Change in Budget
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Table 4.6 Mexico’s Telegraph Regressions with 3 Year Lags_______
Dependent variable: Change in Mexico’s telegrams sent per 100 people
(1) (2) (3)
Porfiriato -0.1 (27.5)
AGDP 3yr lag 0.5 (1.5)
AUrban 3yr lag
APopulation 3yr lag
ABudget 3yr lag -1.1 (0.7)
Constant 11.0(7.1) 20.1 (21.0) 20.6** (7.5)
N 15 27 13
R2 adjust -0.07 -0.04 0.12
D. W. 2.6 1.9 2.6
Source: see appendix C fo r  data. Note: standard errors in parentheses, *** sig. at 1%, 
** sig. at 5% and * sig. at 10% level
The results in the regressions in table 4.6 remained consistent with those of the 
earlier regressions in table 4.5, as no variables were found to be significant. 
Regression 1 tested for the impact of the Porfiriato in isolation. It is surprising that 
the Porfiriato dummy variable was insignificant, since Porfirio Diaz placed 
significant emphasis on the development of the new technology. However it is likely 
that this is a result of the difficulty in using a dummy variable over this period to 
capture the real effect. Porfirio Diaz was in power for two terms during telegraph 
diffusion and even when out of office he worked on building out the network.32 
When not president, Porfirio Diaz was the Minister of Public Works, which meant 
that he remained in charge of the telegraphs. Hence when he returned to office in 
1884, his work with the telegraph network already had been under way for eight 
years. Therefore, the lack of statistical significance is partly due to the difficulty in 
accounting for such a variable, it does not mean that his role was not important, but 
rather highlights further the need for a complementary qualitative assessment. 
Regressions 2 and 3 tested for the effect of the change in GDP per capita, and the 
change in budget, respectively, each in isolation, given their perceived importance. 
As expected, these remained insignificant.
32 This was rooted in his pursuit of national unification and state consolidation, as explored in chapter 3, section 
3.1 The History and Development o f the Electric Telegraph: The Argentinian and Mexican Experiences.
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Mexico’s regression analysis showed that none of the factors that were modelled in 
the regression framework were significant.33 The seeming lack of statistical 
significance among these variables can be partly explained by the limitations of the 
data, as indicated earlier. It is necessary to bear in mind that there are some important 
issues regarding the validity and shortcomings of the data for Argentina and Mexico, 
particularly during the late nineteenth century (see the introduction to the appendices 
and appendix C for a detailed description). Despite this, econometrically, the 
regression results for both countries were unexpected, with no socio-economic 
variables proving to be significant, and the graphs supported this. These results serve 
to highlight further the importance of the political economy, which was anticipated to 
be the key driving theme of ICT diffusion, a theme which will take on increasing 
importance and focus of discussion, as the thesis progresses.
4.2.2 The Telephone
In quantitatively assessing the rates of telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico 
for the period of 10-90% diffusion, the potentially more important socio-economic 
and institutional explanatory factors were listed in table 4.7. The change in the 
number of telephones per household is to be explained as a function of changes in 
income, urbanisation, etc. By taking the first differences of each of the variables, the 
potential problem of partial correlations among the explanatory variables is avoided, 
hence allowing for better regressions. Once again, 3 year lags were used for: the 
change in GDP per capita, the change in urbanisation, the change in population 
growth and the change in investment, while the change in lines waiting to be 
installed and the dummy variables were not lagged.34 All of the factors from the table
33 Additional regressions were run using no lags and in all cases the results were the same: with no variables 
showing any statistical significance. Similarly, two new sets of regressions were run: one used capacity utilisation 
(total number of telegrams sent divided by the national telegraph network) as the dependent variable, and the 
second set used the total length of the national telegraph network (lines in km) as the dependent variable. Both of 
these supplementary set of regressions were consistent with the findings in the main regression, as no other 
variables were found to be statistically significant.
34 An increase in GDP per capita is a proxy for an increase in income, and the impact of this in further telephone 
diffusion is likely to take time since individuals will take time to save and use their disposable income in 
alternative ways. Similarly, the impact of a change in urbanisation or population growth is likely to have a lagged 
effect, because it is in these areas that infrastructure tends to cluster; however, an increase in these variables will 
not see an instant impact on increased infrastructure. Moreover, the impact of a change in investment will take 
time to feed through the system before generating further infrastructure build-out. Alternatively, the change in 
lines waiting to be installed was not lagged, because it is likely to have a more immediate effect upon 
consumption. Further, the dummy variables, which typically represent a period in time in regard to this analysis, 
were not since they are accounting for a binary outcome.
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below were subsequently tested in the regression analysis that follows (see their 
respective descriptive statistics in table 4.8).
Although the privatisation reforms were key drivers of telephone diffusion in both 
countries, I believe the impact was more decisive in Argentina. In Mexico, although 
the effect of privatisation was important, the impact of the nationalisation with 
‘private flavour’ was more important. Telmex’s particular form of nationalisation 
offered the telephone company government support but left it privately run in 
essence, thus it was run relatively more efficiently (vis-a-vis the fully nationalised 
ENTel). As a result, although the privatisation dummy was tested in Argentina’s 
regression, the nationalisation reform was the tested dummy of choice in Mexico. 
Privatisation was clearly also important in the case of Mexico’s telephone diffusion, 
but both reforms could not be tested for as dummy variables, as one dummy reflects 
the absence of the other, i.e. the whole period is split entirely between these two 
reforms.
Table 4.7 Definitions of the Telephone’s Diffusion Main Explanatory and Dependent Variables
Type Variable Description Notation Unit
Dependent var. (LHS) Telephone Handsets Change in telephone handsets per 100 households ATelephones %
Institutional reform Privatisation Argentina’s privatisation reform Privatisation (0,1)
Institutional reform Nationalisation Mexico’s nationalisation reform Nationalisation (0,1)
Income wealth Real GDP Change in real GDP per capita AGDP %
Market potential Urbanisation Change in % of urban population AUrban %
Market potential Population Change in population growth APopulation %
Quality service Waiting lines Change in waiting lines for installation AW aitlines %
Investment Investment Change in telecom investment, real terms Alnvestment %
Source: see appendix C fo r  data sources.
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Table 4.8 Telephone Descriptive Statistics: Explanatory and Dependent Variables
Date N
Argentina 
Min Max Mean S. Dev Date N
Mexico 
Min Max Mean S. Dev
ATelephones 1943-97 55 -5.8 12.4 2.7 4.1 1945-97 53 -15.6 13.1 5.5 4.3
Privatisation 1990-97 55 0.0 1.0 n/a n/a 1990-97 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Nationalisation 1947-89 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1947-89 53 0.0 1.0 n/a n/a
AGDP 1943-97 55 -8.0 9.5 1.4 4.8 1945-97 53 -6.5 7.5 2.3 2.9
AUrban 1947-97 55 0.2 1.3 0.7 0.3 1945-97 53 0.7 1.9 1.4 0.4
APopulation 1947-97 55 1.3 2.6 1.7 0.3 1945-97 53 1.8 7.1 2.8 0.8
AW aitlines 1976-97 22 -77.7 57.5 -6.7 31.8 1976-97 22 -64 74.5 4.7 34.3
Alnvestment 1985-97 13 -11.2 235.3 23.9 67.4 1979-97 19 -36.5 76.4 16.6 34.5
Source: see appendix C fo r  data sources. Note: data are presented as centred three year moving averages.
From table 4.8, according to the difference in the means, Mexico clearly had on 
average higher GDP per capita growth for the period under consideration (although 
lower absolute GDP per capita levels). Mexico was also ahead on several other fronts, 
with on average faster urbanisation and population growth. In terms of investment, 
although growth rates were high in both countries, the growth of investment directed 
towards the sector was on average higher in Argentina. The regression results look 
first at Argentina and then at Mexico.
Argentina: Telephone Diffusion Regression Analysis
Argentina’s telephone regression results are presented in table 4.9. The explanatory 
variables from table 4.7 were all included at some stage. Theoretically Argentina’s 
regression would include all of these explanatory variables. The findings highlight 
the specific importance of the privatisation reform, and as in Mexico’s findings to 
come, again the socio-economic variables were insignificant.
A theme that emerged is that during the period o f nationalisation which largely 
dominated the 10-90% diffusion period, ENTel’s telephone provision was so poor 
that the usual socio-economic factors that would be expected to drive diffusion did 
not have a meaningful impact. Only once the privatisation reform was implemented 
does one observe any of the ‘expected’ results with regard to the economic drivers 
positively impacting diffusion, namely the change in GDP per capita. This highlights
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the importance of institutions; since diffusion was seemingly, to a certain extent, 
constrained by the poor quality of service provided under government control.
Table 4.9 Argentina’s Telephone Regressions with 3 Year Lags
Dependent Variable: Change in Argentina’s Telephone Handsets per 100 households
(1) (2)
Privatisation 5.6***(1.6) 7.3***(1.5)
AGDP 3ylag -0.05 (0.1) -0.02 (0.1)
AUrban 3ylag -0.7 (1.7)
APopulation 3ylag 4.7**(2.0)
AWaitlines
Alnvest 3ylag
AGDPPriv 3ylag
2.5*(1.4) -6.1 (3.5)
Constant 55 55
N 0.22 0.29
R2 adjust 1.4 1.7
D. W. (1) (2)
Source: see appendix C fo r  data. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 
5% and * sig. at 10% level.
Table 4.9 displays Argentina’s initial telephone regression (regression 1) which 
tested for the main socio-economic factors and the most important institutional 
variable, that of privatisation. The variables accounting for the change in investment, 
and the change in lines waiting to be installed were left out of this initial set of 
regressions since they reduced the initial sample size significantly (by over half), and 
are considered later (in table 4.10). Regression 2 ran the same variables as regression 
1, but using population growth instead of urbanisation. The change in urbanisation 
and the change in population could not be simultaneously included in the same 
regression because they are too closely inter-correlated (see figure 4.11).
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Figure 4.12 C orre la tion  Between the C hange in U rban isa tion  and  the C hange in Population (3 
Y ear M oving A verages)
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Figure 4.12 shows that there is a very close correlation between the change in 
urbanisation and the change in population (r = 0.6). This means that to avoid 
multicollinearity both variables cannot be included in the same regression.
The results o f  these initial set o f regressions showed that the privatisation reform and 
the change in population were the only significant variables, while all the other 
factors were found to be insignificant. These findings are at some level surprising, 
given the emphasis in the literature on some o f  the other factors. Theoretically one 
would expect to have found an increase in GDP per capita for instance to have a 
positive impact on diffusion, as individuals can more easily afford to adopt the new 
technology. Similarly, an increase in urbanisation would be expected to have a 
positive impact on diffusion due to a higher degree o f infrastructure clustering. The 
lack o f significance among some o f  these variables may be in part a result o f the 
inherent limitations with some o f the data (see introduction to appendices and 
appendix C for a critical evaluation o f the data). Given these findings, it is useful to 
look at the variables in more detail, factor by factor, to see whether the regression 
findings hold.
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Figure 4.13 C hange in A rg en tin a’s Telephones p e r H ousehold (3 Y ear M oving Average) 
Im pact of P riva tisa tion
 Change in Telephones Privatisation dummy
1953 1963 1973 1983 1993
Year
and  the
Figure 4.13 reveals a reasonably strong correlation between privatisation and 
telephone diffusion in Argentina. The figure shows that the largest increases in the 
change in the number o f  telephones per household happened after the 
implementation o f privatisation. The positive impact o f privatisation is largely in line 
with my initial expectations, as well as the research o f W allsten.35 Further, the initial 
findings from the regressions in table 4.9 also support this.
p er
Figure 4.14 shows that although GDP per capita was seemingly closely correlated 
with the change in telephones from the early-1990s, this relationship does not hold 
for the previous decades. In fact, there almost seems to be evidence o f suppressed
35 Wallsten (2001a, 2005). Also see Littlechild (1983), Cecchini (2006).
Figure 4.14 C hange in A rg en tin a’s Telephones p e r H ousehold and  C hange in Real G D P 
cap ita  (3 Y ear M oving A verages)
■ C h an ge i n T elephones ■Change in GDP per capita
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demand during the 1960s and 1970s, so that by the 1980s, despite falls in GDP per 
capita, the number o f telephones continued to increase and only in the 1990s can one 
see a straightforward economic story, by which time an increase (decrease) in GDP 
per capita was accompanied by an increase (decrease) o f  similar proportion in 
telephone diffusion, as the literature suggests. This suppression o f diffusion may be 
explained in part by the fact that ENTel was under complete state control during 
1946-1990, and was characterised by poor quality o f  service, due to the highly 
politicised environment in which it operated (see chapter 3, section The Period of 
Nationalisation).36
(3
Figure 4.15 shows a lack o f  close correlation between the changes in urbanisation 
and telephone diffusion, which is in line with the findings o f the regression in table 
4.9. This may be explained partly by the fact that at the start o f the period under 
consideration, Argentina was already heavily urbanised, with more than three in five 
people living in an urban area. Thus it is hard to imagine that further increases in 
urbanisation would be particularly powerful drivers o f further telephone diffusion.
36 This argument is supported by Cook (1999) and Petrazzini (1995).
Figure 4.15 C hange in A rg en tin a’s Telephones p e r  H ousehold and  C hange in U rban isa tion  
Y ear M oving A verages) _________  __________________________
■Change in Telephones Change in Urbanisation
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F igu re  4.16 C hange in A rg en tin a’s Telephones p e r  H ousehold and  C hange in Population 
Y ear M oving A verage)
■Change in Telephones Change in Population
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Figure 4.16 shows some correlation until the early 1970s, but no correlation 
thereafter. Hence, although regression 2 in table 4.9 showed that the change in 
population was significant, this relationship is likely to be spurious. Despite this, it is 
still tested in the supporting regressions below given its significance in the earlier 
regression. Note that the following two variables were not run in the original 
regressions.
W aiting  to
Change in lines waiting to be installed and the change in telephones in figure 4.17 
potentially looks more correlated than the relationship actually is. This is because o f 
the use o f rolling 3 year moving averages, over the period under consideration that is
F igure 4.17 C hange in A rg en tin a’s Telephones p er H ousehold and  C hange in Lines 
be Installed  (3 Y ear M oving A verage)
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already so short (due to data availability). Nevertheless, despite some potential 
correlation in the last 10 years, in the earliest years there is almost negative 
correlation, with a small negative change in telephones being accompanied by a 9% 
year on year shift in the change in the lines waiting to be installed in the late 1970s.
(3
Again the relationship in figure 4.18 (change in telephones versus the change in 
investment) potentially reveals greater correlation than expected since rolling 3 year 
averages were used over a very short period (just 14 years). However, these charts 
will remain o f  this type, for consistency. Here, while there is relatively stronger 
correlation in the last few years, there is little correlation in the first half o f the period.
Figures 4 .1 2 -4 .1 8  provide some evidence that the socio-economic factors tested for 
do not seem to be closely correlated with the change in telephones per household in 
Argentina. The only variable tested so far that the graphs reveal there may be some 
potential correlation, is for privatisation, as indicated in regression table 4.9. This is 
tested for in isolation in regression 1 o f table 4.10. Some o f the other socio-economic 
variables, such as population growth are also re-tested, for completeness. Further, the 
change in lines waiting to be installed and the change in investment were accounted 
for. I do not expect any o f these variables, with the exception o f the privatisation 
dummy, to be significant.
F igure 4.18 C hange in A rg en tin a’s Telephones p e r  H ousehold and  C hange in Investm ent 
Y ear M oving A verage)
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Table 4.10 Argentina’s Telephone Regressions with 3 Year Lags
Dependent Variable: Change in Argentina’s Telephone Handsets per 100 households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Privatisation 5 9***(1 4) 5.5** (2.1) 1.8 (3.3)
AGDP 3ylag
AUrban 3ylag
APopul 3ylag 0.7 (2.2)
AWaitlines 0.02 (0.0)
Alnvest 3ylag 0.02 (0.0)
AGDPPriv 3ylag 0.7** (0.3)
Constant 1.8*** (0.5) 1.6 (3.7) 2.7**(1.2) 5.0*(2.4) 2.3 (0.6)
N 55 55 22 13 55
R2 adjust 0.24 -0.02 0.19 -0.04 0.09
D. W. 1.4 0.9 2.0 1.8 1.0
Source: see appendix C fo r data. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 5% and  *
sig. at 10% level.
Regression 1 tested for the effect of privatisation in isolation, which as expected, 
remained significant. Regression 2 tested for the effect of population growth in 
isolation, and it was insignificant, providing further support for the fact that the 
significance found in regression 2 in table 4.9 is spurious. Regressions 3 and 4 tested 
for a change in lines waiting to be installed and for the change in investment 
respectively (albeit at the expense of a smaller sample size), whilst also carrying 
forward the privatisation dummy, as the only consistently significant variable. The 
findings revealed that neither the changes in lines waiting to be installed, nor the
*^7changes in investment, were significant, thus confirming my expectations. The 
reality was that, irrespective of the levels o f investment being directed into 
telecommunications before privatisation, investments into ENTel were managed 
badly, as the state-operated company was run very inefficiently. For instance, it 
continually paid prices well above market rates to the same national providers in the 
equipment industry, regardless of how competitive prices were. Moreover, in 
observation of the regressions, it is clear that there is a very low V  squared 
(essentially zero) for regressions without the privatisation dummy in it. Regression 5 
tested for the impact of the privatisation reform while accounting for the change in 
GDP per capita, since figure 4.14 showed a plausible correlation during the latter 
period under consideration. This interaction variable was significant.
37 The regression was also run replacing change in lines waiting to be installed with the actual waiting lines, but 
this was insignificant as well and made no difference to the overall regression results.
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The first regression in table 4.10 provided the ‘best’ fitted regression in explaining 
Argentina’s telephone diffusion and accounts for 24% of the variation during the 
years 1943-97.38 The regression coefficient suggests that on average, there was an 
increase of 5.9% in telephones per household, following the implementation o f the 
privatisation reform, compared to the previous years. Regression 5 shows that 
telephone diffusion was then next best explained by the impact of ENTel’s 
privatisation reform, and once this reform was introduced, by the change in GDP per 
capita (however, this regression accounts for only 9% of the variation). It is 
interesting that the regression analysis showed that the change in GDP per capita did 
not play a key role in driving telephone diffusion in Argentina until privatisation was 
implemented, underlining the importance of the role of the state.
Mexico: Telephone Diffusion Regression Analysis
The results of Mexico’s telephone regression are presented in table 4.11. The 
variables listed in table 4.7, were all included at some stage. Overall the final 
regression findings show that none of the tested socio-economic factors (or 
nationalisation dummy) were individually found to be significant.
Table 4.11 Mexico’s Telephone Regressions with 3 Year Lags
Dependent Variable: Change in Mexico’s Telephone Handsets per 100 households
(1) (2)
Nationalisation 2.8* (1.6) 1.6 (1.7)
AGDP 3yr lag 0.4* (0.2) 0.3 (0.2)
AUrban 3yr lag -2.2 (1.6)
APopulation 3yr lag 0.2 (0.9)
AWaittime
Alnvestment 3yr lag
Constant 5.6*** (2.1) 2.9 (2.3)
N 53 53
R2 adjust 0.06 0.02
D. W. 1.4 1.3
Source: see appendix C fo r  data. Note: standard errors in parentheses, *** sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 
5% and * sig. at 10% level.
38 The regression is robust and, given that it has one single explanatory variable doing all the work, there is no 
danger of multicollinearity or autocorrelation, and the normality of the distribution was verified visually. 
Additional regressions were also run using no lags and in all cases the results were the same, with all variables 
(excluding privatisation) showing no statistical significance. The supplementary set of regressions were 
consistent with the findings in the main regression, as no other variables were found to be statistically significant
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As reported in table 4.11, Mexico’s initial telephone regressions tested for the main 
socio-economic factors and the nationalisation dummy. Note that nationalisation in 
Mexico is taken between 1947 and 1989, which includes the whole period o f gradual 
nationalisation. This reform was chosen as the most important institutional reform in 
Mexico in terms o f telephone diffusion. The variables accounting for the change in 
waiting lines and investment were left out o f this initial set of regressions since they 
reduced the sample size significantly; and they were accounted for at a later stage (in 
table 4.12). It is preferable to examine a fuller sample to begin with. As in the case o f  
Argentina’s telephone regression, the changes in urbanisation and in population were 
not run in the same regression to avoid multicollinearity. The regression results show 
that nationalisation and change in GDP per capita were significant when run 
alongside the change in urbanisation variable; however, when run with the change in 
population, nothing was significant. The seeming lack o f consistent correlation 
between some o f these socio-economic variables, the nationalisation dummy and the 
change in the number o f telephones per Mexican household is somewhat surprising, 
although there is some possibility that these results are partly explained by the 
inherent limitations o f  the collected data (see appendix C). Given these findings, it is 
useful to look at the variables in more detail, factor by factor, to see whether the 
regression findings held.
Figure 4.19 Change in Mexico’s Telephone per Household (3 Year Moving Average) and the 
Impact of the Nationalisation Reform
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Figure 4.19 shows the impact o f the gradual nationalisation reform on the diffusion 
o f  the telephone in Mexico. Although this reform is believed to have played a
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significant role, it is difficult to account for its gradual nature with the use o f a 
dummy variable, hence although I believe this had a strong positive effect on 
telephone diffusion (as argued in chapter 3, section The Period o f Nationalisation) 
this seemingly failed to show itself in the regression analysis.
G D P per cap ita
Figure 4.20 shows that, although there are periods o f  seeming correlation, there is no 
consistently close correlation between the changes in GDP per capita and the 
changes in telephone diffusion over the whole period, with pockets o f inverse 
correlation in parts (e.g. the 1950s especially). This contrasts with the findings o f  the 
first regression in table 4.11, where there was a positive correlation between the 
changes in GDP per capita and telephone diffusion As a result, there is reason to 
believe that this finding may be spurious; hence the change in GDP per capita will be 
re-tested in isolation in table 4.12.
F igure 4.20 C hange in M exico’s Telephone p e r  H ousehold and  C hange in Real 
3 Y ear M oving A verage)
Change in Telephones Change in GDP per capita
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F igure 4.21 C hange in M exico’s Telephone p er H ousehold and  C hange in U rbanisation  
M oving A verage)
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Despite some pockets o f  correlation, figure 4.21 shows that there is not much 
correlation between the changes in urbanisation and the changes in telephones per 
household for the whole period.39 This can be explained in a similar way to the 
Argentinian argument above. By 1970 Mexico was largely urbanised, with 59% of 
the population living in urban areas (see appendix C, table C.4), this meant that 
increases in urbanisation typically grew at a declining rate, while the growth in 
telephones per household (although also declining from the 1970s) was more varied.
Figure 4.22 C hange in M exico’s Telephone p e r  H ousehold and C hange in Population (3 year 
M oving A verage)
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39 Note that the geometrically linearised years from 1952 were excluded from the graph (see appendix C, table
C.4).
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Figure 4.22 shows a seemingly lack o f correlation between the changes in population 
and telephones per household. The lack o f variation in the change o f population 
cannot explain the variation in the change in telephones for most o f the period under 
consideration. Note that the following two variables were not run in the original 
regressions.
F igure 4.23 C hange in M exco’s Telephone per H ousehold and  C hange in the Lines W aiting  to
be Installed  (3 Y ear M oving A verage)
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Figure 4.23 shows some periods o f reasonably strong correlation between a fall in 
the number o f lines waiting to be installed and the changes in telephones per 
household (1990s mainly). However, this relationship does not hold for the whole 
period, a period which again is already shortened (due to lack o f data availability) 
and with data in rolling 3 year moving averages. Theoretically, a fall in the number 
o f lines waiting to be installed should have a positive effect on further diffusion, as 
consumers are more willing to get a telephone line if they have less time to wait; 
however it did not appear to be the case (especially in the 1980s).
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F igure 4.24 C hange in M exico’s Telephone p er H ousehold  and  C hange in Investm ent 
M oving A verage)
Change in Telephones Change in Investment
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Figure 4.24 shows some limited correlation between the changes in investment and 
the changes in telephones per household (especially in the latter period), but for the 
entire first half o f the period, continually large fluctuations in investment are 
accompanied by steadily declining growth in telephone diffusion.
Figures 4.19 -  4.24 provide some evidence that the socio-economic factors tested for, 
do not seem to be closely correlated with the change in telephones per household in 
Mexico. Given the great importance placed upon the unique nationalisation o f 
Telmex, this dummy is run in isolation in table 4.12. However, given the problems o f 
measuring this reform with a dummy variable, the regression may still yield an 
insignificant result. The results in regression table 4.11 show that the change in GDP 
per capita was the only significant variable and hence this variable is also re-tested in 
isolation in table 4.12 for completeness, although I do not expect it to be significant 
given the lack o f  consistent correlation in figure 4.20 above. Further, the change in 
lines waiting to be installed and the change in investment were also accounted for. I 
do not expect any o f these variables to be significant either.
236
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The 'Double Paradox ’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
Table 4.12 Mexico’s Telephone Regressions with 3 Year Lags________________
Dependent Variable: Change in Mexico’s Telephone Handsets per 100 households
(1) (2) (3)
Nationalisation 2.0 (1.5)
AGDP 3yr lag 0.3 (0.2)
AUrban 3yr lag
APopulation 3yr lag
AWaittime 0.01 (0.0)
Alnvestment 3yr lag 0.02 (0.0)
Constant 3.9*** (1.4) 4.7*** (0.8) 4.1*** (0.9)
N 53 53 19
R2 adjust 0.03 0.03 -0.09
D. W. 1.2 1.3 1.0
Source: see appendix C fo r  data. Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** sig. at 1%, ** sig. at 5% and * 
sig. at 10% level.
Regression 1 showed a lack of significance for the nationalisation dummy. To some 
extent this is due to the fact that its effect cannot accurately be captured by the use of 
a dummy variable, since it is actually the impact of the gradual nationalisation, 
rather than a full blown reform as in ENTel, that is trying to be measured. A dummy 
variable is not well suited to this, since it accounts for a binary outcome, whereas the 
effect of gradual nationalisation was not a binary occurrence, but rather a reinforcing 
and increasing effect. It would have been possible to account for the latter period of 
nationalisation (i.e. 1972-1989), when the government owned the majority stake in 
Telmex, but Mexico's success was built on the overall nationalisation strategy, 
including (if not more importantly) the gradual implementation from 1947 (and in 
some respects the shortness of the period of full government ownership).
Regression 2 re-tested for the impact of the change in GDP per capita in isolation, as 
this was the only significant variable from table 4.11. The result showed that GDP 
per capita was not significant, suggesting that the previous statistical significance 
was likely to be spurious. The last regression, regression 3, tested for the impact of 
the two remaining variables, the changes in the number of lines waiting to be 
installed and the changes in investment (albeit at the expense of reducing the sample
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size significantly). The results in regression 3 show that, as expected, neither the 
changes in waiting lines or in investment were significant.40
Mexico’s regression analysis shows that of the factors that were modelled in the 
regression, none were consistently significant.41 As a result, there is no ‘best’ 
regression for the telephone diffusion in Mexico. It is interesting that the regression 
findings revealed that none of the conventional socio-economic drivers were 
significant in explaining Mexico’s telephone diffusion during the 10-90% period, 
contrary to many of the findings within the more general literature on technology 
diffusion.42
4.2.3 Quantitative Analysis Summary
The regression analysis quantified the effect of a number of factors that potentially 
drove the diffusion of the two technologies in Argentina and Mexico. The regression 
findings interestingly showed that, despite the importance placed within the literature 
on these variables, telegraph diffusion was not driven by the conventional socio­
economic factors in either of the two countries and only the introduction of the Mitre 
Law in Argentina was found to be consistently significant. The telephone regression 
analysis showed that in Argentina, the privatisation reform was particularly 
important, and only after its implementation was a change in GDP per capita also 
significant. Meanwhile in Mexico, none of the variables accounted for were found to 
be significant in explaining the country’s rate of telephone diffusion. Once more the 
regression findings serve to bring attention to the integral role played by key state 
reforms. In Mexico, the lack of statistical significance of any variables suggest that 
perhaps its unique style of nationalisation was what distinguished its successful 
diffusion.43 Meanwhile in Argentina it was the privatisation reform which finally 
spurred fast diffusion speed. It must be noted that, although the regressions were not 
biased and hence it was fair to assess the statistical significance of the independent
40 The regression was also run replacing change in lines waiting to be installed with the actual waiting lines, but 
this was insignificant as well, and made no difference to the overall regression results.
41 Additional regressions were run using no lags and in all cases the results were the same, with no variables 
showing any statistical significance. The supplementary set of regressions were consistent with the findings in the 
main regression, as no other variables were found to be statistically significant.
42 For instance see Ahn and Lee (1999), Gruber (2001), Gruber and Verboven (2001), Madden et al. (2004), 
Milner (2006), Best and Maclay (2002), Fischer and Carroll (1988), Proenza et al. (2001), Morse (1974), Wilkie 
(1984), Canning (1998), Rogers (1995).
43 However, Telmex’s nationalisation was not proven to be statistically significant in the quantitative analysis due 
to problems in accounting for the ‘gradual’ nature of the process.
238
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The ‘Double Paradox ’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
variables under consideration, as maintained throughout, the reader must accept these 
findings in light of the inherent limitations of the data, particularly the data collated 
from the earliest censuses. Despite this, the telegraph regressions serve to highlight 
the importance of other factors, such as the political economies of the two countries, 
a central theme of this thesis.
Notably Argentina not only had significantly higher levels of income per capita than 
Mexico during the years of telegraph diffusion and the early years of telephone 
diffusion but in fact was the richest country in Latin America for much of the period. 
According to the literature, diffusion of the new technology in Argentina should have 
been quicker than in Mexico; however, this was not the case. One may contend, 
therefore, that perhaps part of the reason for this result during the period of telegraph 
diffusion was a result of the ‘belated’ introduction of the Mitre Law. Had the Mitre 
Law been implemented earlier in Argentina, the telegraph diffusion rate might have 
been faster. In a similar way Argentina’s telephone services were run relatively 
poorly during the nationalisation years and whether or not income was higher 
(compared to Mexico) seemingly had little relevance in impacting diffusion. It did 
not seem to be a matter of whether consumers could afford the telephone, but rather 
an issue of inefficiency in supply. Thus, one could potentially argue that if a more 
progressive nationalisation reform was introduced for ENTel (as at Telmex), perhaps 
telephone diffusion might have been faster in Argentina also. These arguments are, 
however, merely tentative, and beyond the scope of this thesis.
Focus now turns to the qualitative section of this chapter, which is very necessary in 
order to provide a better understanding of the explanatory variables at work in 
accounting for the observed diffusion rates in Mexico and Argentina.
4.3 Analysis of Diffusion -  A Qualitative Approach
The rates of telegraph and telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico are now 
examined from a qualitative perspective. This is very necessary because of the 
limitations of the quantitative analysis, particularly during the period of telegraph 
diffusion, which was particularly prone to potential unreliability (see introduction to 
appendices and appendix B). Consequently, the qualitative account gains even 
greater weight in the analysis and therefore is given proportionally more attention.
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Further, a qualitative account is the most appropriate way to assess the role of certain 
institutions since in reality many institutional factors cannot be accurately 
quantitatively accounted for. The role played by the government administrations in 
driving diffusion is given special focus because of its perceived importance in the 
context of this thesis.
Given the diverse evolution an institutional framework can take, there can be no 
unique singular formula for success, especially in economically less developed 
countries. Consequently, a given diffusion process may be successful under different 
institutions for different countries, depending upon their institutional heritage.44 The 
process of diffusion is notionally an individual consumer’s decision, but for certain 
technologies, such as the telegraph and the telephone, the adoption decision (and thus 
the subsequent diffusion process) is determined by the government, since it oversees 
the technology’s entrance into the marketplace (see chapter 1, section 1.2 The State 
and the Role of ICT in Latin America) 45 In other words, for technologies such as 
those under consideration, it is not only the factors driving consumer demand that are 
relevant: at least as important are the drivers of the infrastructure expansion, as 
argued in chapter 1 46 In Argentina and Mexico (as in most countries), the build-out 
of the necessary infrastructure, was very much dependent on the disposition of the 
government’s attitude and their coordinating role, as patterns of diffusion were 
strongly driven by the political milieu.47 In regard to the analysis that follows, 
particular focus was placed upon the respective government’s attitude and 
perceptions towards the two technologies, as well as, the actual supply of the service. 
A positive attitude on the part of the state should theoretically (although not always 
practically) translate into state action which positively impacts the build-out of 
infrastructure and availability/accessibility of the technology to the consumer. The 
inherited environment was also important since this partly formed the state’s attitude. 
Finally, the efficiency of the regulatory body and its power of enforcement are 
explored. The rest of the chapter is split up by technology, focussing on the telegraph 
first, and then the telephone.
44 Aoki M., Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis Cambridge, MA, MIT Press (2001), Dekimpe et al. 
(2000b).
45 Mahajan and Muller (1994), Putsis (1997).
46 See chapter 1, section 1.5 Review of the Approaches to Different Rates of ICT Diffusion.
47 Robertson T. S. and Wind Y., ‘Organisational Psychographics and Innovativeness’ Journal o f  Consumer 
Research 7 (1980): 24-31. Dekimpe et al. (2000b).
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4.3.1 The T elegraph
The quantitative analysis showed that the only factor that had any statistical 
significance across the diffusion of the telegraph in Argentina or Mexico was the 
introduction of the Mitre Law in Argentina. This section will shed more light on 
other potentially important variables such as the role of political actors in the 
diffusion process.
The Government's Attitude towards the Telegraph
To contemplate successful diffusion of the telegraph, the ‘right’ attitude and approval 
of the state was not so much an incremental positive as an absolute necessity, for 
they literally controlled the entire spectrum of the process. From the very beginning 
the government was in charge of providing the concessions necessary for the build­
out of infrastructure. However, a positively inclined government attitude toward 
telegraph diffusion was insufficient, and had to be accompanied by state 
characteristics of a certain degree of autonomy and power in order to be able to force 
through diffusion enhancing reforms. As argued in chapter 1, the Argentinian and 
Mexican states quickly recognised how instrumental the telegraph could potentially 
be for their administrations and accordingly asserted control over it, primarily to 
protect their tenure, as well as to unify their countries (see chapter 1, section 1.1.3b. 
Argentina’s and Mexico’s Oligarchic Rule).48 One could argue that out of the two 
countries, Mexico’s administrations backed the development of the telegraph to a 
greater degree. The situation in each country is now examined separately.
Argentina
In Argentina one can observe a shift in the government’s attitude over time as it 
revealed an increasing tendency to regulate and take responsibility for the provision 
of the telegraph. The Sarmiento administration played a particularly key role in the 
future diffusion of the telegraph, since he believed that government action could 
fundamentally affect the development of the telegraph. 49 He believed that the 
expansion of technological advances like the telegraph was o f particular importance 
to Latin American countries characterised by sparse populations, with vast areas of 
land (like Argentina) due to the telegraph’s capacity to unite the region. Sarmiento
48 Oszlak (1981, 1990), Cardenas de la Pena (1987a).
49 Reggini (1997).
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was all too aware of this fact, as his administration was the one that really kick- 
started telegraph diffusion. However, his operation lacked efficiency given his belief 
that it was better to do things badly, but get them done.50 After his tenure and until 
the end of the diffusion of the telegraph there were a further 11 serving presidents 
(1874-1916) who shared a desire to expand the telegraph network and induce 
diffusion (see appendix H for a full list of the corresponding administrations during 
these years). Despite this unity of purpose and the ‘monopoly’ position of the PAN in 
Argentina’s politics for much of the period in question (see chapter 1, section The 
PAN’s Political Machine and its Growing Opposition), inducing speedy telegraph 
diffusion was not easy to bring about.
When Sarmiento came to power, the telegraph network was small in scale, partly 
because of wars, but also because historically the government had been excessively 
cautious. For instance, in 1857, the administration at the time rejected Jacinto Febres 
de Rovira’s proposal to expand the telegraph line, and a year it later rejected the 
Societe Internationale de Telegraphie Electrique proposal. The administrations were 
suspicious of the proposer’s intentions and perhaps felt that their restraint was well 
based. Nevertheless, the end result was that the telegraph network experienced 
minimal development during the early years. From the mid 1880s to the early 1890s, 
during Juarez Celman’s second term in charge and Carlos Pellegrini’s tenure (1890- 
1892), they continually attempted to expand the Argentinian telegraph network. For 
instance, just before the 1890s depression, the federal government purchased 
Cordoba’s provincial telegraph line (one of the poorest constructed lines in the 
Republic) in an effort to improve the telegraph network. The aim was to avoid 
duplication of construction across the disintegrated grid, but the telegraph network 
still did not expand significantly and the situation worsened during the 1890s 
depression.51 Despite the seeming positive attitude of these presidents and the 
previous administrations, given the telegraph’s perceived importance (see chapter 1, 
section State Formation and the Telegraph and the Telephone in Argentina and 
Mexico), efforts were frustrated consistently. Although the dominant PAN party 
stayed in power for much of the relevant period, and acquired some political stability 
(although relatively lower compared to the level the Porfiriato achieved for some of
50 Ibid.
51 The depression actually forced Juarez Celman’s administration to halt any work for several years.
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these years), they lacked the necessary degree of autonomy from major interest 
groups to govern as freely. There were constant labour strikes, and the existing 
telegraph network was unable to handle increased usage. Furthermore, with the 
changes in administration, reforms were often inconsistent and/or delayed. 
Argentina’s build-out of the telegraph network was simultaneously and 
independently carried out by various groups, without any coordination until 1892. 
Indeed some argue that the telegraph challenge in Argentina was as much about the 
build-out of the infrastructure, as it was about the fact that so much of the existing 
system did not work.
This thesis argues that the Mitre Law played a very important role in allowing for the 
subsequent diffusion of the telegraph, in terms of increasing the number of telegrams 
sent by consumers. The Mitre Law was a government initiative that exploited the full 
benefits of the huge advancement in railway growth in Argentina. Chapter 3 showed 
that a huge shift in telegraph usage followed the introduction of this law (see chapter 
3, section The Role o f the State: The Impact o f New Laws). The rationale for the 
overall effect was twofold: first, the requirement for railroad companies to give a line 
for free to the national government coincided with a huge explosion o f growth in 
railway extensions and therefore positively impacted the course of the infrastructure 
build-out. Second, the further instruction to connect the railway network to nearby 
portions of the national network served to materially improve the network coverage 
and capacity for traffic, which in turn induced a sizeable growth in the number of 
telegrams sent. The regressions in the earlier part of this chapter add some sense of 
statistical validity to the argument as well. Indeed, by 1918 the federal government 
and the railway companies together controlled over 87% of the total telegraph 
network in Argentina. It is important to realise that although Argentina’s government 
was in favour of telegraph network expansion, encouraging consumer use was not 
the main priority. Obviously, greater public use increased the profits for the private 
companies expanding the lines, providing them with an incentive to continue to 
promote the growth of the network, but the government cared most of all about 
using the telegraph to govern. As well as facilitating control, the telegraph also 
enabled the government to remain informed in a timely fashion about what was
52 Hodge (1984).
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going on in the whole country (see chapter 1, section 1.2 The State and the Role of 
ICT in Latin America). This perception not only gained credence in Argentina, but in 
Mexico, as well as in much of Latin America. The ability to impose control and 
induce further diffusion conducive reforms was quite different in the countries, as 
explored below. At first glance, it would appear that a more dictatorial inclined 
regime (such as the Porfiriato) may have afforded Mexico an opportunity to develop 
and implement longer term policies in regard to boosting telegraph diffusion, but 
success was not guaranteed.
Mexico
Regardless of which of Mexico’s administrations was in charge, they all similarly 
endeavoured to play an active role in promoting fast telegraph diffusion, as they were 
well aware of its importance in protecting the country and their political supremacy 
(not surprising, given the continuous fighting and political chaos after independence). 
Mexico’s main administrations during the period of telegraph diffusion were led by 
Maximilian, by Juarez and by Porfirio Diaz. These were three quite different regimes 
with varying levels of effectiveness in power, but no greater individual range of 
authority was observed outside of the lengthy tenure of the Porfiriato (see chapter 1, 
section The Porfiriato: the Range in Authority Exercised). It is important to analyse 
how far their influence extended in assessing the state’s explanatory power, although 
it is not the focus here to assert which was the most successful administration in 
terms of promoting telegraph diffusion. The aggregated governmental influence is of 
more relevance given the fact that each ruler had to deal with his predecessors’ 
successes and failures.
In Mexico, the state’s influence over the telegraph was clear from the start, as they 
sought to develop and control what was, in their view, strategic infrastructure. It was 
immediately made state property under Maximilian’s Empire in 1865 and then again 
in 1867 by the Juarez’s administration.53 The administrations of Maximilian and 
Juarez also made important institutional improvements with respect to the workings 
of the telegraph despite the very different contexts of the two regimes. Although both 
were dedicated to the potential uses of the telegraph to their regimes, for Juarez this
53 Noyola (2004).
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was based on a more domestically orientated perspective, while Maximilian was 
concerned with establishing grounds to cement his ruling empire and replicate 
successful strategies from his homeland. It is also important to appreciate that Juarez 
was a liberal while Maximilian was supported by the conservatives, so even after 
Maximilian’s ousting, Juarez still faced the wrath of angry conservatives, which 
complicated his ability to control and expand the telegraph network. However, their 
combined efforts toward building out the network proved to be important in allowing 
for subsequent successful diffusion even if the actual line build-out was not very 
extensive under their tenures.54 Juarez, for instance, created the Lineas Telegraficas 
del Supremo Gobiemo in 1867, officially founding the public service of the telegraph 
from the very start of his administration. Indeed 1867 was the birth of ‘modem’ 
Mexico, and the development of ‘modern’ technologies like the telegraph, went in 
tandem with this. Juarez created the first telegraph regulation in 1869, which 
established fundamental legislation and the consolidation of the network, in an 
attempt to streamline and improve the service.55 This government driven policy 
meant that, although the telegraph network was built simultaneously by private, 
provincial government and railway companies in tandem with the government (as in 
Argentina), steps were taken from the start to ensure the growing network was not 
simply being enlarged for enlargement’s sake but rather that a more coordinated 
system was built. The early consolidation of the network, therefore, had an important 
effect on the further build-out of the telegraph network and aided faster diffusion as a 
more direct service encouraged more usage growth.
Once Maximilian and Juarez laid the foundations for the successful growth of the 
telegraph network, Porfirio Diaz carried on that good work and achieved real 
diffusion progress. Porfirio Diaz’s administration was in power for most of the 
period of 10-90% telegraph diffusion in Mexico (with the exception of 1880-1884, 
when his nominee Manuel Gonzalez ruled). The fact that Porfirio Diaz was president 
for most of this key period, however, does not necessarily mean it was any easier for 
him to implement longer term reforms. Not only have the very ‘merits’ of his 
dictatorship been challenged, but his power was not consistent across the nation, with
54 Maximilian destroyed all of the lines (except the two main ones) on his way to ruling Mexico.
55 Secretaria de Fomento, ‘Reglamento para las Oficinas Telegraficas del Supremo Gobiemo’ Document 5, 
Memoria 1868-1869 Mexico D.F. Note that network consolidation did not take place in Argentina until 1892, as 
mentioned
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most of his authority centralised in Mexico City.56 Although (much needed) foreign 
capital was available, this was not due to the positively recognised economic 
structures. Porfirio Diaz’s tenure was built on a political economy of mutual ‘back- 
scratching’ through vertical political integration. The significant investment inflows 
were a key source behind Mexico’s growth in the telegraph sector, as a large 
proportion of these funds were directed towards the expansion of the railways. 
Meanwhile Porfirio Diaz also ensured the parallel expansion of the telegraph 
network through legislation he imposed upon the railway developers. He controlled 
the fast process of the expansion of the telegraph network during the years of relative 
peace (1877-1910) by applying stringent policies and even using intimidation tactics 
with regard to ‘telegraph crime’. For instance, if a telegraph line were cut, the 
perpetrator would face the death penalty. The Porfiriato retained notions o f liberal 
democracy but these were typically subverted as it essentially ensured economic 
progress by largely imposing order. Although the means were arguably overly 
aggressive, Porfirio Diaz ensured that the telegraph network expanded by any means 
necessary, and in this respect he was largely successful: for instance by 1877 most of 
the lines destroyed during his accession to power only two years earlier, were
en
operational again. On a wider economic front, the sustained boom in 
investment/exports seemingly legitimised the regime, affording Porfirio Diaz 
time to consolidate his leadership even more, by protecting the cientificos and by 
dividing the country into military zones that would be run by his loyal
co
subordinates. Having said this, it is important to note that the Porfirian state did 
change with time, as it looked considerably more secure in the late 1890s than a 
decade earlier, but it was subsequently weakened by the events of the 1905/1907 
crisis in the U.S. However, through all of the varying stability and authority o f his 
regime, even during the four year period that Porfirio Diaz removed himself from the 
presidency, as mentioned he continued to sponsor the telegraph sector’s development
56 Buffington and French in Meyer and Beezley (2000).
57 Cardenas de la Pena (1987a). Also see Pavia L., Breve Bosquejo Biografico de los Miembros Mas Notables del 
Ramo Telegrafico, y  Reseha Historia de la Existencia y  Progreso de los Telegrafos de la Republica Mexicana 
volume I, Mexico D.F., Antigua Imprenta del Comercio (1893), Noyola (2004), Rodriguez J. A. O., El Telegrafo 
en Mexico: 150 Ahos, del Morse al Mouse Mexico D.F., Telecomunicaciones de Mexico (2000), Secretaria de la 
Presidencia, Mexico a Traves de los Informes Presidenciales Mexico D.F. (1976), Secretaria de Fomento, 
‘Reglamento para las Oficinas Telegraficas del Supremo Gobiemo’ Document 5, Memoria 1868-1869, Mexico
D.F. Secretaria de Fomento, Memoria 1877-82 Secretaria de Fomento, Mexico D.F.
58Lewis C. M. (2002).
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by remaining as Minister of Public Works hence was still in charge of expanding the 
telegraph network, demonstrating his dedication to the cause.
Overall, perhaps two of the factors that most negatively impacted telegraph diffusion 
in Argentina and Mexico were political favouritism and the states commitment to 
property rights. Private capital was necessary to the build-out of the network and, 
coupled with the state’s desire to consolidate their power, this brought about non­
efficient progress as friends of the regime, rather than promoters of efficient 
telegraph diffusion, often were allocated the contracts. This problem was perhaps 
greater in Mexico, where this type of behaviour was particularly engrained.59 With 
regards to the process of handing out private concessions, there was a lack of state 
commitment to property rights, as expropriation risk was rife. In the specific case of 
Mexico, although the government theoretically gave monthly payments to the private 
companies to build-out the network, even when they missed a payment the lines 
continued to be constructed and so the government had little incentive to pay.60 
Despite this, the telegraph was seen as a ‘good’ business and the government 
received numerous tenders for concessions.61 Irrespective of the perceived degrees of 
success of the government administration in charge o f promoting telegraph diffusion, 
it is, of course, important not to judge their individual effectiveness too harshly 
before analysing the situation they inherited, which often prevented them from fully 
implementing individual ideas and strategies. This brings us to the next variable: that 
of wars.
An Inherent Unstable Environment: The Role o f Wars and Uprisings 
The institution of war is an explanatory variable that had particular resonance in the 
diffusion of the telegraph in the two countries. Although much of this took place 
outside the actual period of telegraph diffusion (or during the very earliest years of 
diffusion), it is imperative to examine it since it had a meaningful effect upon the 
diffusion process that followed it. War is very much seen as having, in general, a
59 Rodriguez (2000).
60 Pacheco C. Memoriapresentada al Congreso volume. I, Mexico D.F. (1883-1885).
61 As an example: around the early 1900s, a private company laying a line from Chihuahua to Paso del Norte in 
Mexico would need to employ only 10 unskilled labourers and a supervisor. For the 3 months it would take to 
install the line, the concession would be worth $3,457 and, given the relatively small daily cost of the employed 
workforce, the concession owner would receive a handsome profit. Further, firms did not build just a single line 
at a time, so it is no surprise that private investors found the market attractive -  hence the demand for concessions 
and the reduced negative effect of weak property rights. See Noyola (2004).
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negative effect on the physical pursuit of speedy telegraph diffusion, in the sense that 
during war time, telegraph networks were often attacked, or the use of the telegraph 
service by the public was restricted as instead it was used to coordinate the war effort. 
It can, however, have an indirect positive effect, in shaping the post-war 
government’s attitude towards the importance of the telegraph. The situation in each 
country is now examined separately.
Argentina
Argentina was internally broken when the telegraph arrived, facing a period of 
confusion and anarchy almost since independence, suffering through civil and 
parochial wars during the 1850s and 1860s as it strove for constitutional order and 
political harmony. The ‘highlights’ of Argentina’s predicament included Rosas’ 
oppression, the proclamation of the Federal Constitution (1853), and finally its 
approval by Buenos Aires (1862). Argentina suffered badly during Rosas’ tyranny 
and the army’s ability to act had been crushed by the strains of the Paraguayan War 
(1865-1870). After independence, Argentina was terrorised by the powerful 
Ranqueles tribes and other sympathisers of Araucanians (of Chile). Argentina 
struggled for unity and therefore struggled to develop a national telegraph network 
that could induce strong telegraph diffusion (taking some 30 years after the 
telegraph’s introduction to do so). The unrest was made worse by Argentina’s sheer 
size and its underdeveloped transport infrastructure. In 1880 some genuine progress 
was made in the quest for national unity as the Federal District was formed and 
Buenos Aires was made the capital city, but although these were landmark events, 
Argentina still lacked constitutional order, given the deepening political and social 
unrest and the fact that the provinces had grown so segregated.
By 1875 the telegraph was integral to the government’s plight, as it facilitated 
territorial expansion across the Republic. In that year, Adolfo Alsina (Argentina’s 
Minister of War under Nicolas Avellaneda [1874-1880]) came up with an elaborate 
plan for congress to create a military telegraph network connecting the major 
command hubs on the southern frontier. Congress acted accordingly, providing the 
relevant funds and authority. This provided the necessary military unification against
62 Hodge (1984).
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revolts and subsequently the network strategically expanded to Rio Limay (1881), to 
the Andean cordillera and from Lake Nahuel Huapi to Chos Malal (1882-1883), 
which ultimately aided entry to, and exploration of Patagonia. Thus Argentina found 
the telegraph to be of great value in times of crisis and a key tool in exercising 
control throughout its territories. The telegraph progressed military occupation and 
eased contact between operations. It also aided diplomacy in the lengthy negotiations 
held at the Chilean frontier for some 20 years.63 Political stability strengthened and 
the telegraph was instrumental in delivering this by ensuring greater effectiveness of 
security at international borders. Indeed, the telegraph became symbolic of order and 
peace, while the pain that war and unrest had induced positively affected the 
authorities’ strategic view regarding the necessity of speedy telegraph network build­
out, which would then aid public usage through a larger existing network.
Mexico
When the first telegraph concession was handed out in Mexico in 1849, the country 
was already characterised by an unstable political and social climate, having only just 
signed a peace treaty with the U.S. in 1848. Mexico was severely fragmented, parts 
of the country wanted to become autonomous republics and in other areas there were 
continuous attacks from indigenous tribes who wanted to reclaim their land from the 
U.S. The country was divided both territorially and politically, and this was 
constrictive to Mexico’s potential prosperity at the beginning of telegraph diffusion. 
Although the country gained independence in 1821, the period that followed saw a 
continual succession of presidents, and numerous coups d’etats. From 1850, Mexico 
began a new era emphasising the integration and union of the population, striving for 
social and economic progress, and the telegraph was a way to achieve this, as well as 
providing much needed national security.64
Mexico faced further turbulent times during the Reform Wars (1857-1861) and the 
French Intervention (1862-1867) placing additional pressure on the expansion of the 
network given the telegraph’s vital role during wartime, as it aided official 
communication to organise strategy and also as a media tool to deliver news flow 
quickly, hence the lines were continuously sabotaged by the enemy. This, coupled
63 Ibid.
64 Baur (1994), Hodge (1984).
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with the delicate situation regarding the government’s finances during these years, 
meant that telegraph lines were not repaired particularly fast and were often quickly 
destroyed again. This situation was made worse by the fact that the state always had 
priority of usage and during wartime there was no telegraph revenue as the 
government forbid public usage. It was widely accepted that the telegraph’s main 
role was to serve the government’s needs and although in theory the government 
offered 80 pesos per day per km of line when it took sole control of the network, it is 
not surprising that this was rarely paid.65 In the period immediately before the 10-90% 
telegraph diffusion years, even when there were no major wars, Mexico was by no 
means at peace. For instance, during the Juarez administration, telegraph expansion 
was undermined by conflict and a barrage of line destruction. Proof of the 
detrimental effect of war in the context of telegraph diffusion can be found by 
looking at the relatively peaceful years of 1872-1875 (under Sebastian Lerdo de 
Tejada tenure) where the telegraph network expanded by a sizeable 2,600 km.66 This 
was of little significance, however, given that, as mentioned, Porfirio Diaz destroyed 
many of the lines. However, when Porfirio Diaz came to power he instilled a level of 
relative political stability (compared to the period before him) and in turn, an 
opportunity for more successful telegraph expansion. Conversely, although the wars 
had a direct negative impact on the physical destruction of the telegraph network, it 
was arguably then, just as in Argentina that the telegraph’s strategic significance was 
particularly highlighted. One could argue that a framework of fast telegraph diffusion 
in part was forced upon the government as a means to protect their power and people; 
if it had not been for the institutional coercion of war, the state could quite possibly 
have adopted a more laissez-faire attitude towards the telegraph.
Comparatively, an important difference between Argentina’s and Mexico’s 
respective struggles was the fact that Mexico had been under attack from a powerful 
threat (the U.S.), whereas Argentina’s woes were predominantly internal conflicts. It 
is thus likely that the impact of wars, although a decisive factor in the two countries, 
was relatively more important in the case of Mexico, as it faced further difficulties
65 Official figures suggest that between 1855 and 1863, according to this agreement the government and paid the 
telegraph a total of $58,540. See Rodriguez (2000).
66 Ibid. Indeed, during the course of Juarez’s and Lerdo de Tejada’s tenures, the telegraph network expanded from 
1,874km in 1867 to 8,000km in 1876, financed by public and private investment. See Mexico, Memoria de la 
Secretaria de Fomento de 1865 a 1891 Archivo General de la Nacion Galera 5 (various years).
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from developed foreign pressures and, having lost much of its territory already, it did 
not want to lose any more.
The Efficiency and Enforcement Power o f the Regulatory Framework 
The regulatory institutions were linked closely to, and influenced by, those in 
political power, as the state was the regulator and administrator of the telegraph 
services. Consequently, the regulatory institutions were not always able to act in a 
manner that was geared primarily toward the development and speedy diffusion of 
the telegraph system or the provision of universal service. The states’ ability to create 
stable and effective regulation was dependent to a large degree upon the institutional 
setting, since the institutions already in place restricted the available options.67 As a 
result the focus below is on the earlier period of telegraph diffusion since this period 
largely constrained what could be achieved in the remainder of the process.
During the relatively short period of telegraph diffusion, regulatory institutions 
tended to be vast organisations characterised by a high degree of bureaucracy and, 
although with varying degrees, insufficient autonomy. The telegraph system was run 
opportunistically, as the states excessive free use of the service not only reduced 
revenues but angered the public whose messages were frequently delayed. Theory 
suggests that, as a natural monopoly, telegraph provision is best provided under 
government control and this should protect the public from misuse, not cause it (see 
below for examples). Perhaps these institutions were less effective than theory would 
predict, but they still played an important role in the development of the telegraph. It 
was not just about the content of the regulatory framework and how that affected 
different private agents in the sector, but also the manner and freedom in which it 
was applied. The next section looks individually at the specific situation of the two 
countries.
Argentina
The evolution of telegraph regulation in Argentina began in 1862 with the creation of 
the Direccion General de Correos Nacionales which was to control the telegraph 
line build-out. Then in 1869 the Inspector General de Telegrafos de la Republica and
67 Cardenas de la Pefla (1987a), Baur (1994), Hill and Abdala (1993).
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in 1871 the Administration Central de los Telegrafos Nacionales were created to 
standardise practices, fix rates and set accounting procedures. However, until 1875 
lines were constructed without much national order, and although some 29 laws 
regarding telegraph rates were passed between 1872 and 1919, only two charters had 
any meaningful impact in terms of increasing efficiency (and in turn diffusion speed), 
before the twentieth century: the Telegraph Law (1875) and the Telegraph Code 
(1892).68 The 1875 Telegraph Law stated that the government had to give 
concessions for the construction of a telegraph line, and public service could not be 
provided until it was approved by congress.69 This law placed the Direction General 
de Correos y  Telegrafos in charge of all aspects of the telegraph, granting them the 
power to ask private firms to provide statistics on their operations. Such was the 
widespread acceptance of the telegraph’s importance in creating constitutional order 
that the regulatory bodies’ penalties for related infractions were doubled during 
domestic unrest and tripled in times of foreign disputes. The law codified and 
clarified the rules on telegraph network construction, and hence improved efficiency 
which would potentially promote diffusion. Telegraph plans were scrutinised in 
depth before any work began; lines could not interfere with traffic, and individual 
stations had to be at least 25 miles apart. Municipal authorities were given 
jurisdiction to oversee some uncomplicated matters and in the event of a domestic or 
external conflict, the state had special powers to take over the telegraph network 
exclusively in the affected region.70
Eduardo Olivera was the first director of the Direction General de Correos y  
Telegrafos in 1876, and in his four year tenure he reduced excessive state usage and
n I
standardised tariffs, improving overall operational efficiency. By 1890 the fragility 
of the regulatory institution became apparent as President Juarez Celman’s 
resignation marked the end of the incumbent Dr. Ramon Carcano’s tenure (because 
the directors were all handpicked by the president). Pellegrini became the new
68 Ministerio del Interior, Legislacion Postal y  Telegrafica. Convenciones, Reglamentos, Administracion, 1858- 
1900 Buenos Aires (1901). The Codigo Telegrafo was approved by the Minister of Interior on August 29, 1892. 
See Cartes C., Codigos Postales y  Telegraficos Dictados durante la Administracion del Dr. C. Carles Buenos 
Aires, Compafiia Sud-americana de Billetes de Banco (1895).
69 The railways were the only exception, as they could build lines for their closed system, i.e. for the exclusive 
use.
70 See Berthold (1921a), Hodge (1984), Lynch A. B. and Krause M., ‘Proyectos Para una Sociedad Abierta: 
Telecomunicaciones Para Comunicarse Eficientemente’ Revista Libertas 09 7, Instituto Universitario Escuela 
Superior de Economiay Administracion de Empresas (ESEADE), (1993), Reggini (1997).
71 Castro Estevez (1952).
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president and he oversaw a complete overhaul, making Manuel Bahia responsible for 
the telegraphs. Bahia inspected the entire network firsthand, submitting a report in 
1891 that addressed a catalogue of infrastructural and administrative shortcomings, 
and the resultant ‘Telegraph Code’ put forward in 1892, which ultimately clarified 
and augmented the Telegraph Law of 1875. The new code defined relationships and 
offered detailed descriptions of some technical aspects: interpreting exactly the legal
nogovernment powers during war times or periods of domestic unrest. The charter 
emphasised to a greater degree the public importance of the telegraph, and the 
necessity of its diffusion, prescribing in greater depth how telegraphic conferences 
were to be organised. Bahia was not looking to improve the system marginally; his 
proposals were made after he analysed many other models around the world to 
ascertain what system could drive diffusion most appropriately and efficiently in 
Argentina. However, Bahia’s original plans received little funding and even by 1918, 
his supporters were still demanding money from congress to repair the lines.73 This 
seemingly demonstrated the ‘free’ voice that regulatory institutions enjoyed (in 
continually drawing up improvement plans), but it simultaneously conveys their lack 
of effectiveness as they ultimately carried little influence over the government’s 
allocation of funds.
Argentina’s regulatory framework was arguably not as effective as it could have 
been, and the relatively bureaucratic system did not help. For instance, in early 1873 
comprehensive plans were made for the telegraph, which were formalised into a bill 
for the national chamber of deputies later that year, scrutinised in congress until 
August 1874, and only became law in October 1875.74 This grimly demonstrates the 
slow workings of the institutional regulatory process, reducing its effectiveness to act 
quickly when necessary. In general, the largest problem regulators faced was the fact 
that, despite the poor condition of the telegraph network, its usage continued to 
increase, making matters worse.75 This not only meant the quality o f service
72 For instance, if  the government took control of a strategic line it was to compensate the private owner 
appropriately.
7 Argentina, Fundacion Standard Electric, Historia de las Comunicaciones Argentinas Buenos Aires, Fundacion 
Standard Electric Argentina (1979).
74Argentina, Congreso Nacional Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados Republica Argentina (1873) 
pp.1242-1245. Argentina, Congreso Nacional Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados Republica 
Argentina (1874), p.639. Argentina, Congreso Nacional Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados 
Republica Argentina (1875).
75 Berthold (1921a).
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continued to deteriorate but, moreover, it did little to encourage additional state 
funding.
Mexico
Mexico’s telegraph regulatory landscape evolved from an ineffective Secretaria de 
Fomento in force until 1877 to an independently established Direccion General de 
Telegrafos Federales in 1878, which was a more streamlined, quasi-independent 
body, which the government hoped would speed up the expansion of the telegraph 
network. In 1891 the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y  Obras Publicas (SCOP) was 
established and took direct control of the telegraph.77 During almost the entire period 
of 10-90% diffusion in Mexico, there were just three directors of SCOP (Manuel 
Gonzalez Cosio, Francisco Mena and Leanaro Fernandez). This compared to as 
many as four changes in directors in just the first 10 years of Argentina’s equivalent 
period, potentially providing the regulatory body in Mexico with more continuity in 
its reforms and actions. Regardless of one’s view of the Porfiriato, the stability in the 
regulatory framework was testament to the fact that Mexico was governed by just 
one president during this period. Similarly, as Bahia had questioned how Argentina’s 
telegraph system had continued to operate, it was thought that the Mexican 
telegraph’s ‘...biggest merit [was] to have survived despite everything it had 
endured’.78
During Mena’s directorship, he tried to ensure some accountability for the provision 
of the telegraph by dividing the network up and appointing 20 zonal inspectors, 
thereby cutting administrative errors. 79 Mena sought to achieve sizeable efficiency 
gains and argued in his reports for 1896-99 that the Mexican people’s belief that the 
country’s telegraph provision was exemplary came about because they accepted that 
its primary function was to serve the state (and, as Mena argued, they had nothing to 
compare it against). Consequently the deficiencies went largely unnoticed.80 This
76 The five departments of the Direccion General de Telegrafos Federales covered those in charge of overseeing 
the build-out of the lines, those in charge of overseeing the service, the accounting, the correspondence and the 
administration. SCOP Memoria 1892-1896 p. V., with regard to the effectiveness of the Secretaria de Fomento.
77 Noyola (2004), Cardenas de la Pena (1987), Secretaria de Fomento, Memoria 1877-82 Secretaria de Fomento, 
Mexico, SCOP Memoria 1896-1899, pp.128-129,167-169, 172-177.
78 Rodriguez (2000), p.58.
79 Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas (SCOP), Memoria 1899-1900 Mexico D.F., p. 129.
80 For Mena’s comment, see Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas (SCOP), Memoria 1904-1905 
Mexico D.F., pp.202-3. Mena’s most notable improvement was to introduce wire transfers of payments in 1898 
(a reform still used today), updating the tariffs system. Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas (SCOP),
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was why Mena opened a registry in 1899 to record public complaints.81 By 1902 
when Mena left SCOP, he had overseen a doubling in investment (from 700,000 to 
1,500,000 pesos), the national network had almost 35,000 km of installed lines and
ft*)33 offices (out of 379) provided 24-hour service. It is likely that Mena was more 
successful than his predecessor not only as a result of the many changes he instigated 
but because of the greater diplomacy with which he went about his tasks, for 
example in not insisting that the government pay for their telegrams, which was a
O'!
sensitive matter. The issue of government payment and usage was a problem 
(although not just in Mexico), since making the government pay for their usage 
would only have improved profitability and in turn re-investment of the sector, 
therefore promoting its advancement and subsequent diffusion. Further it would have 
made the government use the service less, inducing more efficiency in public use.84
Fernandez took over from Mena and also quickly implemented some innovations and 
took full advantage of the railway expansion to drive the telegraph network to 
increase by 1,293km (1902-1903), of which 676 were built on the railway’s poles.85 
He also produced numerous reports demonstrating that the telegraph was a solvent 
business, which was imperative for further funding to drive diffusion. However, 
despite the great strides taken by Mena and Fernandez, the government simply 
desired the regulatory institution to pander to the state’s will and maximise its 
revenues.86 For instance, in 1897 it was discovered that the railways were allowing 
public use of the telegraph service on their lines and, rather than encourage this or 
broker a mutually beneficial arrangement (as in Argentina), the Mexican government 
squandered additional monies in building parallel infrastructure to recoup the
Memoria 1905-1906 Mexico D.F., pp.88, 175. See Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas (SCOP), 
Memoria 1907-1908 Mexico D.F. pp. 125-26.
81 Rodriguez (2000), p.63.
82 See appendix C for the size of the national network data.
83 Mena did not include any estimates for government telegrams in his official reported figures, unlike his 
predecessors, believing that these should be free of charge. See Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas 
(SCOP), Memoria 1902-1910 Mexico D.F.
84 For instance, in 1882-1892 the net deficit for the telegraph was $303,425, while if  one accounts for the revenue 
that would have come from the telegrams sent by the government, the surplus would have been around $235,567. 
See NewspaperrExce/s/or, 12 February (1933), p.l and p.8. Also Newspaper: Excelsior, 13 February (1933), p.5 
and 8; 14 February (1933), p.5; 15 February (1933), p.5
85 Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas (SCOP), Memoria 1896-99, Mexico D.F. Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas (SCOP), Memoria 1909-1910 Mexico. D.F. Noyola (2004).
86 Direccion General de Telegrafos Nacionales, Breves Apuntes sobre las Comunicaciones Telegraficas en el Pais 
Mexico, Talleres Graficos de la Nation (1924), Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas, SCOP Memoria 
1892-96, Mexico.
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revenue.87 On reflection, although the government did not always complement the 
work of the regulatory framework (by building duplicate lines, for instance), Porfirio 
Diaz assigned some very effective individuals to the task of taking some important 
long-term steps, which proved successful in promoting Mexican telegraph diffusion.
The qualitative section of this chapter revealed that the diffusion of the telegraph in 
Argentina and Mexico was shaped to a large extent by certain key political 
institutions. Factors such as the attitude of the administration in power towards the 
telegraph, ultimately determined to a large extent the degree of government 
involvement and intervention in the sector. The inherited unstable environment 
characterised by wars and chaos was also important as it shaped to a certain extent an 
environment that indirectly placed further emphasis upon the perceived importance 
of the telegraph to the government. Finally, the efficiency and enforcement power of 
the regulatory body were also important in determining the speed of telegraph 
diffusion. One could argue that the regulatory body was more wide-reaching and 
forthcoming in Argentina; but perception and action are two very different beasts, 
with the latter obviously setting the tone for speedier telegraph diffusion. It is true 
that in Argentina much work was done on analysing the failings of the process, but it 
seems the regulatory institution in Mexico was more effective in maximising the 
efficiency of the telegraph network build-out and service, which in turn induced 
greater relative telegraph diffusion. Although the regression analysis provided some 
tentative indications of the significance of the role of the state, it is only with 
appropriate qualitative analysis that a true reflection of the significance they played 
in driving speedy telegraph diffusion comes fully to light.
4.3.2 The Telephone
With regard to the diffusion of the telephone, there were two critical institutional 
reforms, the nationalisation and privatisation reforms. The impact of these two 
reforms was accounted for in the regression analysis above, but given the limitations 
of the data and the approach itself in using dummy variables to evaluate the impact 
of such complex institutional reforms, one needs to assess the results of the 
regression analysis in corroboration with the qualitative assessment. Having said this,
87 Note in 1901 the government already owned 47,828km the lines, provincial states had 6,917 km, private 
companies had 3,942 km, and the railroads had 12,036km. See Rodriguez (2000).
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it is still worth noting that the regression revealed that the privatisation reform was 
particularly important in driving telephone diffusion in Argentina. Meanwhile in 
Mexico, the regressions failed to show a significant relationship between telephone 
diffusion and Telmex’s nationalisation reform. By considering the institutional 
factors of the regression analysis in more depth and qualitatively interpreting a 
number of others, it is possible to create a sounder base from which to evaluate the 
argument regarding the key determinants of telephone diffusion. The main factors 
explored below include the degree of stability, the degree of autonomy and the 
characteristics of state power of the key different administrations, the state’s shift in 
attitude towards the telephone, and the degree of effectiveness of the regulatory 
framework. By exploring these factors, some consistency o f comparison across the 
two technologies in the two countries is possible.
Political Institutions: the Degree o f Stability and Characteristics o f  State Power 
The period of fastest telephone diffusion is characterised by both the nationalisation 
and privatisation reforms in Argentina and Mexico. Given the state’s role in the 
implementation of these reforms, it is widely accepted that their degrees of success 
were largely dependent upon the inherent characteristics of the countries’ executive 
branch.88 Consequently, factors such as the degree of stability within the state, the 
degree of its autonomy, and the extent of the level of power concentration within the 
state are some important factors to consider (see chapter 1, section 1.5.4 The 
Institutional Approach: The Role of the State). Theoretically a setting with higher 
levels of these should allow for faster technology diffusion, as there are fewer 
difficulties in implementing necessary reforms and policies can remain relatively 
more consistent throughout time.89 However, in practice there are many different 
forms (some overlapping) and degrees of these factors, which make them particularly 
difficult to define and assess. The task is made considerably more difficult by the 
sheer number of years under consideration here, in addition to the fact that the two 
countries not only had different political arenas, but the same administrations varied 
over time. Each country is explored individually below.
Argentina
88 Petrazzini (1995).
89 Evans P., Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation Princeton, Princeton University Press 
(1995), Haggard (1990), Smith (1979).
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As detailed in chapter 1, Argentina was characterised by a relatively higher degree of 
political flux than Mexico throughout much of the key telephone diffusion years (see 
section 1.1.3 The Politics of the Political Economy). Mexican politics were not 
without their problems, as explored below, but Argentina’s politics over the period 
were dominated by conflict. There were short intervals o f stability in the earlier 
period under consideration, but between 1930 and 1983 in particular, with few 
intervals of exception, Argentina was seemingly periodically plagued by military 
coups and generic conflict.90 The volatile political system was evidenced not only by 
the 25 changes of presidency from the 1930s to 1989 (some of whom were literally 
in power for a matter of days), but by the fact that the actual regime types shifted 
(some military, some democratic, etc). A given administration could never be certain 
how long they would remain in power, and so rather than promoting policy making 
that would be most beneficial to society, they were more concerned with pushing 
through reforms that might extend their tenure and consolidate their power (or at the 
very least quell potential new opposition that came from interest groups).
The effect of this political turbulence from the perspective of this thesis often 
translated into the disorderly running of the telephone company as the different 
governments pursued different goals.91 One must recall that during much of the 
period under consideration, the telephone company was a monopoly of the state 
(1946-1990). Consequently, the internal politics of the telephone provider were 
closely correlated with those of the state. As a result, it was common that with every 
new administration came the replacement of many o f ENTel’s employees whom the 
previous regime had appointed. Therefore, as governments came and went, so too did 
the top management of ENTel, along with their ‘long-term’ strategic plans.92 It was 
not only the replacement of personnel, but also the cancellation and replacement of 
supplier contracts . Further, as the management was appointed by the president, those 
in the executive and top positions often had very little (if any) experience in the 
running of a telecom company, and consequently, the problems that arose from a 
lack of consistency were exacerbated by a lack of experience. One must note that for 
the period 1940-1980, secretaries of state, ministers and governors lasted in power an
90 Noam (1998).
91 Rock D., Argentina 1516-1982: From Spanish Colonisation to the Falklands War Berkeley, University o f 
California Press (1985).
92 Kalathil and Boas (2003).
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average of 12, 13 and 14 months respectively. For state-owned companies and 
regulatory agencies during 1970-1990, the average tenure was even lower.
During the period of telephone diffusion, Argentina did not establish a dominant 
coalition administration and thus the nation never enjoyed continuity of leadership of 
any high degree, which resulted in a distinct lack of clarity and hierarchical order. 
The situation was very different in Mexico, where the structure was much more 
vertically integrated. By the early 1980s the effects of this lack of relative governing 
stability in Argentina were taking their toll on the power base of the presidency and 
something needed to change. In 1983, the restoration of democracy seemed 
promising, but the legacies of previous administrations made it difficult for the 
incoming democratic governments to bring in reforms to bolster the telephone sector. 
As explained in chapter 1, it is not clear what type of regime was most beneficial to 
telephone diffusion and indeed some would argue that it was largely irrelevant in 
regard to effective policy.94 The share of power in Argentina was relatively even 
across political parties and interest groups were generally quite strqng. This was 
obviously of concern to the incumbent governing power since decisions could be 
blocked more easily.95 Consequently, for much o f the period of 10-90% telephone 
diffusion Argentina struggled to implement reforms, clear evidence of which was the 
failure of the first two attempts to privatise ENTel.
Argentina’s first two attempts to privatise ENTel failed because the first 
administration lacked the necessary concentration of power, while the second did not 
have a sufficient degree of autonomy and was blocked by strong interest groups.96 
Indeed, it was not until Menem’s administration that the situation was significantly 
reversed as ENTel was successfully privatised. Part of the reason why it was 
successful was that Menem (unlike in the two previous attempts) gave himself 
sufficient insulation by leaving little power outside his hands to implement the 
reform. His approach was to pass new temporary laws which centralised the policy-
93 Petrazzini B., Restructuring Telecommunications Policy in Argentina: Issue Beyond Domestic Concerns 
Buenos Aires, mimeo presentado al XV Congreso de la International Political Science Association (1991).
94 See chapter 1, section 1.1.3 The Politics of the Political Economy. Also see Haggard S. and Kaufman R., 
‘Democratic Transitions and Economic Reform’ Paper presented at the Southern California Workshop on 
Economic and Political Liberalisation, University o f Southern California, Los Angeles (1993).
95 Oszlak (1990).
96 See chapter 3, section The Years o f  Privatisation.
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making process to his own inner circle, allowing the privatisation o f ENTel to be 
achieved more smoothly and effectively as it was carried out almost entirely by
Q7presidential decrees. In just two years Menem deployed over 100 ‘need and 
urgency’ decrees, an extraordinary power that the previous presidents collectively 
adopted just 23 times in 136 years. He also brought in reinforcing organisational 
reforms including the introduction of fiscal and administrative institutions in an 
attempt to protect this new mode of governing.98 The fact that he had to use more 
aggressive tactics and was finally successful goes some way toward illustrating the 
importance of the need for relative political stability and some sense of concentration 
of power in order to aid successful reform implementation.
Mexico
Mexico enjoyed, at least on the surface, a higher degree of political stability and 
institutional permanence over the relevant period of telephone diffusion. It is 
remarkable that for the whole of the critical period, (i.e. 10-90% telephone diffusion 
years) Mexico’s political milieu was dominated primarily by one party (in great 
contrast to the experience of Argentina).99 However, the fact that the same party was 
in power for so long did not mean that there was continuity of reforms nor did it 
ensure that a high level of autonomy was enjoyed seamlessly. In reality the power of 
the PRI varied significantly over time. The early years o f telephone diffusion were 
characterised by the growing power of the political party, while the middle part saw 
the PRI create and sustain their stranglehold over power and finally the end o f their 
uninterrupted tenure was characterised by a growing erosion of their authority (see 
chapter 1, sections The Evolution o f  PRI control o f  Mexico [until 1960 and from  
I960]).
Despite the rise and fall of the PRI’s power, the one party system in Mexico did 
bring about some significant advantages, in allowing for faster telephone diffusion 
(vis-a-vis Argentina). The Mexican state had a relatively higher degree of autonomy 
than its Argentinian counterpart and particularly by the second half of the century the
97 The Economic Emergency Law and the Public Sector Reform Law. See Petrazzini (1995).
98 Verbitsky H., Robopara la Corona Buenos Aires, Editorial Planeta (1991).
99 Petrazzini (1995), Cavarozzi M., ‘Political Cycles in Argentina since 1955’ in O’Donnell G., Schmitter P.C. 
and Whitehead L., Transitions from  Authoritarian Rule: Latin America Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University 
Press (1986), Hill and Abdala (1993), Cornelius and Craig (1991).
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PRI effectively bought political stability. The degree of autonomy within the PRI 
was fostered by the weak and highly fragmented opposition parties, which were 
typically small and non-threatening. At times the PRI achieved political stability by 
virtue of their overall economic successes, especially during the economic miracle 
years (although marred by the increased levels of income inequality). The Mexican 
state was insulated more at important development stages of the telephone sector 
than Argentina was, because, as Noam points out, the PRI had materialised out of the 
Mexican Revolution. The Revolution united the Mexican people and nullified pre­
existing arrangements -  socially and institutionally, offering the new leader an 
unprecedented opportunity.100 This is in line with Neher, who argues that political 
systems which form after a disruptive and radical social dislocation are typically 
more insulated from societal demands than states which emerge progressively, which 
in theory tend to be more vulnerable (such as Argentina).101
In the commentary on Argentina above, one point addressed the fact that the regime 
type is not necessarily the most important characteristic in determining effective 
policy, although many academics argue that authoritarian regimes do provide certain
1 fl?advantages over democracies. For instance, authoritarian regimes offer greater 
capacity to introduce certain reforms from the planning, implementation and 
mobilisation of resources aspect. Moreover, Gerschenkron, Kuznets and Hewlett 
emphasise the potentially problematic nature of democracies with regard to the speed 
and timing of development since they do not provide the state with the necessary 
level of insulation from various interest groups.103 Furthermore, it is argued that 
authoritarian regimes are equipped better to prepare and induce the masses to make 
sacrifices, as in regard to wage cuts, in order to achieve economic development.104 
Politically, plural regimes would be less able to instil such a national ideology o f 
sacrifice in the pursuit of economic development.105 The different structure of the
100 Noam (1998).
101 Neher C. D., Southeast Asia: In the New International Era Boulder, Westview (1991).
102 See for instance Lipset S. M., ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy’ American Political Science Review 53 (1959): 69-105.
103 Gerschenkron (1962), Kuznets S., ‘Economic Growth and Income Inequality’ American Economic Review 45 
(1955): 1-28, Hewlett (1979).
104 Johnson C., ‘Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Govemment-Business Relationship in 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’ in Deyo F., The Political Economy o f  the New Asian Industrialism U.S., Cornell 
University Press (1987).
105 Johnson C., ’The Developmental State: Odyssey o f a Concept’ in Woo-Cumings M., The Developmental State 
Itacha and London, Cornell University Press (1999).
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political systems was therefore a decisive factor. By global social standards perhaps 
Mexico’s political institutions were not admired, but as far as telephone diffusion 
was concerned, the stronger presence of the characteristics described above, namely 
in Mexico’s continuity of one political party and greater concentration of power 
seemingly afforded the regime, at least from a relative viewpoint, greater capacity to 
implement more effective diffusion enhancing reforms in the long-run.
The Government’s Attitude and its Impact
Largely, both Argentina’s and Mexico’s governments were uninvolved in the earlier 
development of the telephone. This contrasts markedly with the situation under the 
early years of telegraph diffusion. As explained in chapter 3, this was in fact 
precisely due to the governments in the two countries having invested heavily in the 
telegraph, and the telephone being perceived as a threat.106 Consequently, until the 
193Os/1940s the expansion of the telephone network depended on private investment 
by mostly foreign firms, in a market almost entirely devoid of state intervention, and 
generally faced very limited control. For example, Argentina had no sector regulation 
until 1904, and Mexico did not pass a telephone law until 1932. Neither country 
adopted a truly interventionist stance until the 1940s.107 At that point, the attitude of 
the two administrations toward the importance of the telephone changed and the two 
governments significantly increased their role and involvement within the sector, as 
they began to commit credibly towards the technology. A significant pick-up in 
diffusion followed. Indeed the government’s attitude towards the telephone had 
swung full circle, from the very limited interest in the technology’s early years to the 
realisation that the telephone deserved universal service given the resemblances to a 
public good. To this end, Argentina’s and Mexico’s government administrations not 
only increased their efforts in providing universal service, but generally placed 
further emphasis on redistributive policies, in alignment with accepted global 
standards. As a result, network provision improved, with the installation of new lines 
in non-urban areas which had until then been grossly underdeveloped due to the 
emphasis of the private providers on maximising profits. Both countries also 
implemented tariff policies, setting high long-distance taxes in order to subsidise
106 See chapter 3, section 3.2.1 The Initial Years of Telephone Adoption.
107 See Hill and Abdala (1993) and Petrazzini (1995).
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local service, which as a result remained fairly cheap.108 This shift in attitude 
coincided with a shift in the political economy, which resulted in a number of 
nationalisations for many enterprises including the telephone (see chapter 1, section 
The Period o f Import Substitution Industrialisation [1930s-1980sJ).m
Argentina
Argentina’s government decided to take a majority stake in the incumbent telephone 
operator very early on, and by 1948 it was entirely state owned. Peron described the 
telephone in 1946 as ‘...essential for the economy and defence of the country... [and] 
the nervous system of the nation’, thus, the new emphasis on the technology was 
already quite apparent.110 Further, the state’s strong commitment to the diffusion of 
the technology was indicative of an entire ideology shift and testament to much of 
the Argentinian population who no longer wanted their largest industries run by 
foreigners.111 The only problem was that this commitment was undermined by the 
relative tumult in Argentinian politics following nationalisation, as violence 
seemingly escalated with each new administration from the end o f Peron’s 
constitutional period in office in 1955, until 1983.112 This relative degree of political 
volatility over this period would see some 23 different administrators take control of 
the national telephone operator. In line with the stability of the given ruling 
government, the sector struggled to varying degrees to meet the needs of the public, 
often delaying infrastructure contracts and sometimes cancelling them all together.113 
Despite an outwardly positive stance from the government throughout, the broader 
economic volatility, political flux and many union issues during large portions of the 
critical period of telephone diffusion manifested themselves through waves of 
inconsistent telephone expansion.114 Even when there was an official ‘work plan’,
108 For instance ENTel’s tariffs were kept artificially low, to the point that the profits did not even cover the 
funding requirements of normal operations or planned expansion. However, the state was successful in increasing 
coverage to previously neglected areas, as well as ensuring that the service was affordable to the masses at the 
expense of their foreign providers’ profitability.
109 For example, under Cardenas’ administration, the process of nationalisation began by nationalising enterprises, 
such as the railroads, which passed from foreign into Mexican hands. Cardenas represents the promise of a 
‘Mexico for the Mexicans’. See Wright H. K., Foreign Enterprise in Mexico: Laws and Policies Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina University Press (1971), p.282.
110 Cook (1999), p.556. Also see Tuman (2007).
111 Donikian et al. (1990), Petrazzini (1995).
112 Noam (1998).
113 Argentina, Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, Memoria Empresaria 1985.
114 In regard to unionism, note that the first union strikes during nationalisation came in August 1956, yet the 
dispute was not resolved for some three months. See Argentina, Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, 
Memoria Empresaria 1957.
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execution of unplanned projects often totalled little more than half o f the overall 
planned works.115 There was a clear incompatibility between the fixed targets set for 
ENTel and what could actually be achieved.116 For instance, just over 10 years into 
nationalisation, pending requests for telephone installations went from 145,258 in 
1946 to 453,382 in 1958 and ENTel suitably made a financial loss for the first time
117under nationalisation in that final year. The inconsistencies with regard to network 
build-out were dramatic and in one particular example, over 30 times more lines 
were delivered in 1979, than just four years earlier (for further details see chapter 3,
11 Q
section The Progress Achieved during the Nationalised Era). Although the state 
clearly desired infrastructure expansion in order to increase the diffusion of 
telephone handsets among the population, the many directed efforts were hugely 
inefficient. Indeed, the hierarchical structure of ENTel became more and more 
convoluted right until privatisation, as each administration seemingly added to the 
complexity of its structure. As an example, there were some 15 primary 
roles/divisions listed in the 1965 official organisational chart of ENTel, compared to 
a sizeable 54 by 1983.119
Arguably, the privatisation of ENTel was a success in terms of significantly boosting 
telephone diffusion, which largely was because the nationalisation years had been so 
unfavourable. Although various Argentinian administrations had acknowledged the 
need for speedy diffusion, they were unable to follow through, often because of a 
difficult economic backdrop, relatively limited authority given the strength of 
opposition, and the shortness of their tenures. Despite the positive attitude of his 
predecessors, Menem demonstrated greater determination in his campaign in finally 
overseeing the successful completion of the privatisation reform, although it could be 
argued that his hand was slightly forced by material external pressures (see chapter 1, 
section The Debt Crisis and the New Economic Model [1982-1990s]). He was 
conscious of the need to complete a quick sale of ENTel, having recognised the 
threat of probable opposition to the reform. It is possible, therefore, that, despite the 
ultimate success of the structural shift of the national telephone provider into private
115 Noam (1998).
116 See Argentina, Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, Memoria Empresaria 1982-1984.
117 Argentina, Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, Memoria Empresaria 1958.
118 Also see Noam (1998).
119 See Argentina, Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, Memoria Empresaria 1985, pp.81-84.
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hands, the process could have been handled better if it were not for the need of a 
timely sale. For instance, a more appropriate regulatory framework could have been 
set up pre-privatisation (as discussed below). However, it was during privatisation 
(albeit in the relinquishing of direct state control) that a positive attitude of the state 
finally translated into meaningful telephone diffusion.
Mexico
As discussed in chapter 3, Mexico’s administration did not initially fully nationalise 
Telmex (as in Argentina). Indeed Telmex would never become fully government 
owned (see chapter 3, section Period o f Nationalisation). Instead, Mexico’s 
government implemented a measured increase in its influence. The succession of 
administrations from the 1940s were able to shape and direct telephone evolution, 
and as a result one can observe the fast and incremental growth of the telephone 
service, particularly during the 1960s-1970s, as the involvement of the government 
in the sector grew. This period coincided with the ‘Mexican economic miracle’ years 
as well as some of the PRI’s most authoritatively dominant years in power.120 The 
government quickly acknowledged in the mid to late 1940s that the existing 
infrastructure was insufficient and implemented the Aleman Valdes Plan (1947-1952) 
as hopes of expansion grew.121 The period of growth of telephone diffusion in 
Mexico arguably began to see some real improvement under Aleman Valdes whose 
views regarding nationalisation were at odds with those of Peron. The influence of 
state participation in the sector intensified as its importance continued to grow, 
advancing slowly but continually from the 1950s as the state sought to keep pace 
with Europe and the U.S. with regard to technology developments. During the Ruiz 
Cortines administration a significant increase in investment in the sector occurred, 
something which his successors would continue as nationalisation neared.
From the 1950s Mexico’s government also made some real attempts to increase 
universal service; in 1952 a tax imposed a 10% charge on long-distance calls, to
1 99allow for local rates to remain discounted to the real market price. Moreover in
120 See chapter 1, sections The Period o f Import Substitution Industrialisation (1930s-1980s) and The Evolution 
o f  PRI control o f Mexico (until 1960).
1 1 The Miguel Aleman plan was a scheme under which SCT would engage in the building of new lines, and the 
result was a significant growth in the number of federal telephone lines. See Noam (1998).
122 Indeed, until 1987, local rates in Mexico were some of the cheapest worldwide, although in contrast the long­
distance charges were among the most expensive.
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1954, a new government reform gave priority for line installation to those who had 
purchased Telmex shares, which helped to finance the telephone operator.123 This 
ensured that investment found its way to the sector, even if at times this was via 
unpopular means, and these revenues were reinvested in the company.124 The 
government also introduced a tariff freeze during 1954-1975 to make the telephone 
more accessible, although it reduced Telmex’s revenue by a massive 94% in real 
terms. Thus the state, like in Argentina, improved the accessibility of the technology, 
even at the expense of profits. In 1958 the Lopez Matteos administration implemented 
a number of populist gestures. Among them was the return of Telmex into Mexican 
hands, as he Mexicanised it, signifying the great importance that the state attached to
1 9^the sector. A significant expansion of telephone diffusion took place from then on 
and ‘by 1967 Mexico was the third fastest growing telephone system in the world’.126 
Indeed, between 1960 and 1976 the number of telephone handsets per households 
increased fourfold.127 During the 1960s the government remained heavily involved in 
Telmex and in 1972, under Echeverria, the government gained majority ownership of 
Telmex. It was from here onwards that the company’s development really took off, 
and expansion followed at a very rapid pace, aided by foreign loans to build-out new 
infrastructure.
At the time of privatisation, although external pressures were present, there was an 
acceptance that Telmex would not be able to continue to grow fast enough; the 
government knew the company needed to enter world markets in order to meet 
infrastructure requirements and to diversify in a manner that needed the sourcing of 
additional technological expertise and capital. As in Argentina, privatisation of the 
telephone company was also political, but the case o f  Mexico was quite different. It 
was a gesture of intent, whereby the Mexican government was trying to demonstrate 
that they themselves had changed and were willing to privatise a sector that was so 
valuable and important to them. The Salinas de Gottari administration admitted that 
telecommunications was ‘...the cornerstone of the programme to modernise Mexico’s
123 Szekely and Palacio (1995), Noam (1998).
124 Cardenas de la Pefia E., ‘Historia de las Comunicaciones y los Transportes en Mexico: El Tel6fono’ Mexico 
D.F., Secretaria de Comunicaciones y  Transportes (1987b).
125 Telmex was Mexicanised by coercing foreign investors to sell their :shares.
126 Petrazzini (1995), p. 108.
127 See data in appendix B.
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1 951economy’. This reinforced their positive attitude towards the telephone since in 
part the privatisation signalled their willingness to give up the revenue streams of the 
second largest company in Mexico, in favour of improving the telephone sector’s 
efficiency (and in turn the telephone’s continued diffusion). The privatisation reform 
was successfully implemented as a result o f two key factors; one, the government’s 
attitude towards the importance of the reform’s success, and two, the fact that, (even 
though the PRI’s power was diminishing) the administration still retained greater 
capacity, through relatively higher concentration of power (in implementing the 
reform smoothly) and autonomy (to develop the right strategy), with less significant 
opposition in comparison to Argentina.
Although it can be argued that the various administrations in the two countries could 
have done more, such as placing more emphasis on objective setting with regard to
19 0  *the telephone providers’ growth, in reality they achieved a great deal. This was 
particularly true in Mexico, where telephone diffusion grew at a steadily fast pace 
throughout the 10-90% diffusion period, while the fastest telephone diffusion growth 
in Argentina was very much concentrated in the latter part of the period (the years of 
privatisation).
The Degree o f Effectiveness o f the Regulatory Framework
It is essential to examine the degree of efficiency within the institutional 
arrangements concerning the regulation of the telephone sector. An effective 
regulatory framework is important for the successful diffusion of the telephone, 
particularly when under private provision, while under nationalisation, regulation 
was linked closely to the administrative power hence had limited ability to act 
independently or induce meaningful change (as described below).
Argentina
Argentina’s telecom regulator was the Secretaria de Comunicaciones (SECOM) 
since 1936. As per Mexico, the federal government controlled the sector. SECOM’s 
mandate was clear: to develop service provision and communications plans. Given 
the continual impermanence of Argentina’s political players, it was no wonder that
128 Noam (1998), p. 166. Also see Cook (1999) and Tuman (2007).
129 Petrazzini (1995), Hill and Abdala (1993), Tuman (2007), Noam (1998).
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similar shifts in the strategy and goals of the regulatory framework were just as 
aggressive. A further difficulty in regulating ENTel was the fact that the highest 
ranking officials were all directly selected by the presidential office, thereby closely 
integrating the managerial structure with politics, as explored earlier (see chapter 3, 
section The Progress Achieved during the Nationalised Era). To corroborate these 
issues, consider the following example of the second failed attempt to privatise 
ENTel in greater detail. In 1987, the new Minister of Public Works and Alfonsin 
decided to liberalise the telephone sector and partially privatise ENTel. Alfonsin first 
issued the necessary decrees that were inconsistent with the 1972 National 
Telecommunications Law (instigated by a previous Argentinian government), but 
then was unable to persuade congress to approve the privatisation reform.130 
Moreover, as Alfonsin’s tenure was coming to an end, the whole process of 
designing and implementing a successful strategy for the telephone sector’s growth 
(which would end up being privatised anyway) would be started all over again. This 
demonstrates how inadequate the system was in speeding up telephone diffusion. 
The implementation and assurance of adherence to regulation in Argentina was no 
simple task. On the one hand, dominant interest groups enjoyed much greater 
political clout than they did in Mexico and therefore potential resistance to reform 
was stronger. Further, the fact that ENTel was subjected to the policies of up to seven 
state agencies, all carrying their own agendas, resulted in typically opposing policies, 
which changed in tandem with every change of administration. For instance ENTel’s 
budget was determined by the Ministry of the Economy, salaries were set by the 
Ministry of Labour, equipment was purchased by the Secretary of Industry, public 
service and provision policy was drafted by the Ministry of Services and Public 
Works, and SECOM created generic sectoral policies. It is no wonder that policies 
were inconsistent and inefficient.
Argentina created the Pliego in 1990 in anticipation of the privatisation reform.131 
The decree established the basis and conditions for the sale of ENTel, and granted 
the two future telephone providers a monopoly until 1997 on the condition that they
130 Noam (1998).
131 Argentina, Pliego de Bases y Condiciones para la Privatization del Servicio Publico de Telecomunicaciones 
Executive Decree 62/1990 (5th January 1990). This document set out the terms and conditions for the 
Privatisation of the Telecommunications Services. Celani M., ‘Determinantes de la Inversion en 
Telecomunicaciones en Argentina’ CEPAL Serie Reformas Economicas 9 (1998): 1-45.
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followed certain expansion goals. Although the Pliego provided general regulatory 
principles and the establishment of a regulator, in practice next to nothing was done. 
The task was executed with limited urgency since the regulatory authorities had 
thought from the beginning that the privatisation reform would fail, as past attempts 
had. The policy making and regulatory functions were divided in the Argentinian 
system, in order to create a more autonomous framework. However, the Comision 
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (CNT), created in 1990, was in charge of almost all 
the regulatory functions. Like most equivalent bodies, CNT was not free from 
bureaucratic struggles since its commissioners were appointed by the president.134 
Until 1991, CNT acted very infrequently, creating a backlog of decisions over the 
regulatory process. CNT was ineffectual in various areas, but most unfortunate was 
its ineptness in dealing with customer complaints.135 CNT’s decision-making process 
was so vague and non-standardised that it unnecessarily increased the risk of 
investing in the sector. In its defence, CNT’s had no experienced staff to deal with its 
many responsibilities, and further, the commission had limited funding to source 
intellectual capital, nor did it have clearly defined reporting lines.136
Essentially, there was a general lack o f clarity regarding the specific roles and range 
of authority of the regulatory framework, which made the task of standardising
1 ^ 7regulation difficult. Pre-privatisation, the Argentinian government neglected to set 
up a regulatory framework and instead opted to wait until the entire process was well 
under way before designing anything suitable (in contrast with the Mexican 
experience where a regulatory framework was at least in existence). This was largely 
inefficient and meant that potential bidders were bidding blind in terms of knowledge
1 lO
of future regulatory requirements. An unsurprising consensus formed by the end of 
1991 that Argentina’s telecom sector required more effective regulation, and
132 Hill and Abdala (1993).
133 CNT would become CNC from 1996.
134 Petrazzini (1995), Noam (1998).
135 For instance, there was a six-month delay in CNT’s response to CAT’s simple tariff increase requests, and 
they also ignored gross rate disparities between call types, which culminated in much distorted usage patterns. 
Additionally, it artificially incentivised new firms to ‘cherry-pick’ from the long distance and international 
markets; regulation was so lax that American firms managed to sell international calling cards illegally in 
Argentina. Moreover, CNT was ineffective in developing suitable standards and processes for issuing licences, 
verifying whether the licensee companies had actually met their performance targets, or in not creating a pricing 
policy that made most services economically viable. See Hill and Abdala (1993).
136 Ibid.
137 Luxner L., ‘Dollars for Dialling’ Americas (English Version) 44 (1992).
138 This was a result of a speedy privatisation process forced upon Menem as indicated earlier.
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accordingly (and in large part due to the fact that the World Bank forced its hand) the 
government intervened in 1992 and reformed CNT. CNT’s mandate was reduced, 
and this induced a marked improvement in its efficiency.139 All along, CNT had been 
largely dependent on SECOM (despite its theoretical autonomy), and now many of 
the important executive decisions (e.g. the control and operation of the licensing) 
were officially handed back to SECOM.140 This transfer of regulatory power 
continued and by 1995/1996 SECOM had regained almost all o f its initial regulatory 
power over the sector.141 Although Argentina’s regulatory framework seemed quite 
inefficient and unfavourable to the telephone sector’s positive development, it is 
important to appreciate the explicit political implications surrounding the sector. 
Most importantly, it was not that there was no desire to appropriately regulate the 
telephone sector, but rather the sector was quite convoluted and subject to change.
Mexico
In Mexico, the telephone company was under the regulation of the Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y  Obras Publicas (SCOP). By 1936 a new law interconnected the 
telephone service providers, which resulted in a vast improvement in service 
provision and coverage, demonstrating early on how effective the regulatory function 
could be. In 1938 the Law of General Means of Communications was approved and 
this became central to the telecom industry in post-revolutionary Mexico. Indeed for 
50 years, Mexico’s telecom regulation would be based upon this very law, which 
granted the government extraordinary powers to interfere in corporate affairs. SCOP 
managed to significantly increase the development and access to the network. For 
instance, in 1947 SCOP arranged the merger of the two main telephone providers to 
avoid line duplication, improving the efficiency o f the overall service, and promoting 
further diffusion.
Some argue that by the late 1950s, the politics of Mexico’s telecommunications were 
based on three main agents, the constitution, the Law of General Means of
139Cook (1999), Noam (1998), Petrazzini (1996), Hill and Abdala (1993).
140 Ronchietto A. and Rozenwurcel G., Regulacion de las Telecomunicaciones en Argentina: Marco lnstitucional, 
Interconexion y  Servicio Universal Universidad de Belgrano, Instituto Nacional de la Administracion Publica 
(1999).
141 Abdala (2000).
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Communications and the Secretaria de Comunicaciones y  Transportes (SCT).142 The 
first two provided the governing and legal framework, while the task of the third was 
to stimulate the development of the technology efficiently.143 SCT, which was part of 
the Ministry of Communications, became Mexico’s new telecom regulatory body in 
1959.144 In the earlier part of the period, SCT proved to be relatively effective in 
advancing the formation of a modem telecom system through policy. SCT 
standardised technical aspects, controlled investment plans, and routinely re-set 
tariffs.145 By the 1960s Mexico had acquired an enviable telephone system and SCT 
continued to improve in terms of effectiveness through the 1970s, as it targeted 
telephone development in rural areas, which was essential in maximising diffusion. 
In fact, by 1973 there were an extra 2,680km of lines benefiting almost 700,000 
Mexicans in the rural areas, as the regulatory body was making a decisive effort to 
promote telephone access, increasing it from 770 to 1,500 towns in 1965-1970.146 
Soon afterwards, however, inefficient regulation by the state started to take its toll 
and Telmex’s regulation became more of a painful reflection of the government’s 
continual pursuit of self-interested goals over industry development. This meant 
profitability suffered and cross-subsidies of distance taxes worsened.147 The Mexican 
government began using Telmex’s profits to subsidise other sectors in the economy, 
and consequently re-investment to fuel growth and the quality of the service, 
deteriorated. This type of behaviour was testament to the economic backdrop, as this 
period also coincided with the end of the miracle years of growth and the growing 
erosion of PRI authority over Mexico.
142 Note that the Ley de Vlas Generates de Comunicacion was replaced by the Ley Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones in 1995. See Articulo 28 de la Constitucidn Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicano, the 
article that defined telecomunications as a strategic sector. Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Ley 
Federal de Telecomunicaciones Diario Oficial de la Federation, Mexico, SCT, (8 June 1995). The critical 
difference between the two laws was that when a provision of a line expired after the 50 year tenure, the 
government no longer had the line free of charge but had to pay for it and if  they refused to do so, third parties 
were allowed to step in. See Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Reglamento de Telecomunicaciones 
Mexico, SCT (1995).
143 For more details on the specific duties o f SCT see Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Reglamento 
de Telecomunicaciones Mexico, SCT (1995).
144 The federal government, through SCT, were responsible for the distribution of the telecom services, 
installation, maintenance, operations and the development of the telecom network, with the aim of providing a 
satisfactory public service.
145 Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Programa Nacional de Modemizacion de las 
Telecomunicaciones 1989-1994 Mexico, SCT (1994).
146 Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Programa Nacional de Modemizacion de las 
Telecomunicaciones 1989-1994 Mexico, SCT (1994).
147 Griffith K., ‘Mexican Tele-connectivity’ in Harms L. S. and Wedemeyer D. J., PTC ’89 Proceedings Pacific 
Telecommunications Connectivity: Users, Networks and Information Services: Proceedings Honolulu, Pacific 
Telecommunications Council (1989), Hill and Abdala (1993), Noam (1998), Casaus (1994).
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After privatisation and for the next five years, Telmex continued to be regulated 
solely by SCT. In 1995, the Federal Telecommunications Law (FTL) opened 
competition in the market and formalised the auction process for concessions to 
operate public communications. The law limited state involvement and allowed
14fttariffs to adjust freely. It also confirmed SCT as the telecoms regulator, which was 
to promote quality and efficient growth of the sector. However, given the nuances of 
the Mexican judicial system, the FTL actually achieved very little due to the 
existence of amparos.149 Indeed, given the slow turnaround speed of the legal system, 
this proved to be a successful form of defence for Telmex.150 In 1996 the Comision 
Federal de Telecomunicaciones (Cofetel) was created by a presidential decree. 
Cofetel was to be a new and autonomous regulatory body, ‘independent’ of SCT. 
The idea was for Cofetel and SCT to co-regulate the telephone sector (and split the 
functions). In reality, Cofetel’s power was limited, as its role was only to give 
recommendations to SCT, and it was not supposed to assert any authority, making 
the regulatory process supremely inefficient.151 Thus, although in theory they were 
autonomous; in practice they were not independent at all. Further, under this 
framework, Telmex also had input regarding its own regulation, and under certain 
circumstances it could even opt out of rules (as long as SCT did not oppose).152 Then, 
as supplementary firepower to the overall regulatory oversight, the Comision Federal 
de Competencia (CFC) was created to prevent anti-competitive behaviour in the 
market. CFC caused further conflict for Cofetel as it challenged Telmex in 1997, 
claiming it was a practising monopoly. Telmex filed an amparo against this 
resolution, and the federal court highlighted CFC’s limited influence and threw out 
its claims on grounds of insufficient evidence. It is interesting that Telmex faced no 
competition until 1998, and this highlights CFC’s lack of power and efficiency.
Overall, in terms of the regulatory framework, one could argue that Argentina’s 
regulatory framework did not thrive during nationalisation, and despite its lethargy in 
building a suitable framework before privatisation, during the post-privatisation
148 Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, ‘Ley Federal de Comunicaciones’ Diario Oficial de la 
Federacion Mexico, SCT (1995).
149 An amparo allowed any firm to demand a temporary suspension of regulatory action under various 
circumstances.
150 Mariscal and Rivera (2004).
151 Ibid.
152 Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Ley Federal de Comunicaciones Diario Oficial de la Federacion, 
Mexico, SCT (1995).
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period the balance of effectiveness started to shift. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of 
Mexico’s regulatory framework almost mirrored the strength of the country’s 
economic successes and height of political authority, for instance from the latter part 
of the 1940s and most of the 1950s Mexico experienced relatively stronger 
regulatory success. Nevertheless, the regulatory frameworks in both countries largely 
failed to achieve the goals that were set: while the policy framework said one thing 
(competition and liberalisation) the reality said something entirely different as the 
advent of real competition was delayed until the end of the 1990s. Although haste 
and a lack of long-term organisation were some of the reasons for reduced 
effectiveness, the regulatory function was efficient to a certain extent, as telecoms 
was one of the economic sectors receiving the highest gross fixed investment 
between 1991 and 1997.153 In reality the structures of the two regulatory agency 
structures, especially during privatisation, were undermined by state bureaucracy and 
institutional instability, and a lack of definitive governing criterion regarding the 
regulatory process.154 In Argentina, the regulatory framework was perhaps more 
clearly defined (by regulatory decrees) but implementation proved more troublesome 
than in Mexico. However, it is clear that the regulatory function -  whether the driver 
or perceived inhibiter of diffusion -  played some role throughout the history of 
telephone diffusion in Argentina and Mexico.
The qualitative assessment of the diffusion of the telephone in Argentina and Mexico 
highlighted the important role played by the different governing administrations. 
Theory contends that a higher degree of stability within the political system, greater 
autonomy and concentration of power, should indirectly have a positive effect on 
faster diffusion, as reforms can be more easily implemented. The case studies of 
Argentina and Mexico for the period under consideration show that this is not 
straightforward to measure. One could argue that for key periods of telephone 
diffusion, particularly during the 1940s-1980s, Mexico seemingly had an advantage 
over Argentina, as Mexico’s political arena was characterised by a one party system. 
Moreover, despite the fact that the administrations in the two countries were keen to 
diffuse the telephone, this willingness seemingly translated into the more efficient 
implementation of reforms in Mexico rather than in Argentina. Lastly, the regulatory
153 Celani (1998).
154 Baur (1994).
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framework that governed the process of diffusion suggests that although in theory 
and in planning, Argentina had a superior regulatory body, it was in Mexico that it 
proved to be slightly more effective (especially in the years just before privatisation) 
in governing and decisively acting to promote speedy diffusion.
4.3.3 Qualitative Analysis Summary
The qualitative section drew attention back to the central role played by the different 
governments during the periods of telegraph and telephone diffusion. This section is 
important since it allows for more meaningful interpretations to be made in the next 
chapter, in regard to the arguments concerning the importance of the political 
economy in explaining the given patterns of ICT diffusion under consideration. The 
qualitative analysis showed that the continuous influence of the government, whether 
directly in reform implementation or indirectly via its influence on the regulatory 
function, was present throughout the diffusion process. Although the lingering 
effects of war (during telegraph diffusion) and the (ineffectiveness of the regulatory 
framework (during telephone diffusion) played their part in explaining diffusion 
growth (or lack thereof) to some degree, the primary explanatory driver was arguably 
state action. The state’s positive attitude toward the diffusion of the technologies was 
reflected most clearly in their ever evolving structural views on the sector: for 
instance, in telephone diffusion it governed nationalisation and then implemented 
privatisation. Institutionally, despite the often more structured and methodical 
regulators in Argentina (admittedly in the face of greater political uncertainty), 
Mexico’s regulatory framework was seemingly more effective in governing the 
diffusion process (although not in all periods). Overall, despite the willingness on the 
part of Argentinian and Mexican leaders, the relatively greater political stability 
(during important periods for diffusion) and continuity of control in Mexico 
(especially during the PRI’s uninterrupted tenure) seemingly afforded their heads of 
state more opportunity to advance the diffusion of the telegraph and telephone 
technologies.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter applied a quantitative and qualitative analysis to assess the explanatory 
factors behind the observed rates of telegraph and telephone diffusion in Argentina 
and Mexico. An even balance between the quantitative and the qualitative analysis is
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generally preferred, but in light of the limitations of the underlying data and the 
indications offered by the regressions, the qualitative analysis took on even greater 
importance within this study. Given that the two countries diffused the two 
technologies at similar rates despite their different economic make-ups, it is 
interesting to analyse the unique set of variables behind this phenomenon. Guided by 
the literature review of chapter 1, a number of quantitative and qualitative factors 
were assessed, providing the basis for a better understanding o f the Paradox. In this 
assessment, the Paradox is explained by the apparent underperformance of the 
Argentinian administrations, and the outperformance of the Mexican ones, which 
seemingly made the most of key state reforms (an argument further expanded upon 
in chapter 5, section 5.2 Explaining the ‘Double Paradox’).
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Chapter 5
A Comparative Discussion of the Empirical Findings
This chapter examines and consolidates the findings of the previous chapters, to 
answer the main questions raised in the introduction of the thesis. Firstly, given the 
relative disparity in Argentina’s and Mexico’s respective economic settings, what 
were the main drivers behind the observed diffusion rates? This provides the basis 
for the primary focus of the chapter, that is, to address the second question of the 
thesis: what factors caused the Paradox? The answer to this lies largely in the role 
played by the government. Given Mexico’s relatively greater barriers to economic 
and social development in comparison to Argentina (especially at the beginning of 
the period under examination), this should in theory have hindered diffusion. To 
substitute for these economic shortcomings, the Mexican state exploited alternative 
factors to speed up successful technology diffusion. Ultimately at particular stages 
and in varying levels, the Mexican state’s relatively more positive attitude toward the 
need for diffusion, and perhaps more importantly, its greater strength of action 
(especially in the latter part of telegraph diffusion and first part of telephone 
diffusion), provided a diffusion-conducive setting for the two technologies. This 
success was fostered by the demonstration of particular traits, in addition to the 
relative benefits of a stronger sense of timing and the seeming underperformance of 
the Argentinian state function. The chapter finishes by assessing the third question: 
to what extent can the Mexican case study be considered a ‘Success Story’? In 
providing an answer to this, some lessons are highlighted.
Chapter 2 measured the rates of diffusion via the FLOG and linearisation techniques 
(see chapter 2, section 2.6 Applying the Flog Model), to demonstrate that the relative 
diffusion rates in Argentina and Mexico were similar for the telegraph (CRD = 25 
and 26 years) and for the telephone (CRD = 54 and 52 years), despite the presence of 
their significantly differing economic milieus (see chapter 1, section 1.1.1 The 
Economics of the Political Economy). Chapter 3 placed the development of the two 
technologies within the historiography of the two countries set up in chapter 1. After 
which, chapter 4 quantitatively and qualitatively assessed the main factors which 
could potentially explain the diffusion rates in the two countries, with the guidance
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offered by chapter 1 (see section 1.5 Review of the Approaches to Different Rates of 
ICT Diffusion). In consolidation of the contributions of chapters 1 - 4 ,  this chapter 
will determine more holistic findings.
5.1 The Rates of Diffusion in Argentina and Mexico
There are naturally some common themes present in the diffusion of the telegraph 
and the telephone in Argentina and Mexico, but there are also some idiosyncratic 
explanatory factors, which combine to underpin the entire analysis. Since the 
diffusion of the two technologies took place over two very different time periods, a 
given relevant factor in one setting may not affect the diffusion of the other. For 
instance, the post-independence chaos of the nineteenth century had a decisive 
impact upon the evolution of telegraph diffusion but clearly did not have anything 
like the same effect upon telephone diffusion. On the other hand, since the two 
technologies are in practice quite similar (and are substitutes for one another) they 
have a number of commonalities (e.g. characteristics of natural monopolies), which 
means that there are certain generic factors that commonly explained the diffusion 
patterns observed across the two technologies. The next section pinpoints these 
explanatory factors, in regard to diffusion speed, first in examination of the telegraph 
and then the telephone.
5.1.1 The Telegraph
Telegraph diffusion speed in Argentina can be explained partly by the somewhat 
inhibiting role played by the delayed implementation of some important reforms. 
Meanwhile, the telegraph diffusion rate in Mexico can be explained partly by the 
relatively more effective implementation of key government reforms. The findings 
therefore suggest that state action can have both a positive and a negative effect 
upon the diffusion process.
Chapter 4 highlighted the importance of the presiding government’s role and attitude 
in the two countries during telegraph diffusion. Argentina and Mexico suffered from 
a period of significant chaos and political instability when the technology first 
emerged; the opportunity provided by it to establish order and consolidation of 
power was very attractive at a time when the two regimes were obsessed with state- 
building. The telegraph also allowed for national integration and the advancement of
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economic development by facilitating trade and commerce. Given the political 
implications, it is evident why both governments were happy to drive the 
technology’s expansion. Proof of this is found in the fact that they quickly made the 
telegraph a monopoly of the state, and were keen to expand the network quickly, 
granting concessions to various groups, which also kept direct costs to a minimum 
(see chapter 1, section State Formation and the Telegraph and the Telephone in 
Argentina and Mexico and chapter 3, section 3.1.1 The Adoption and Early Years of 
Telegraph Diffusion).
Without the ‘right’ attitude, telegraph diffusion arguably would not have began when 
it did in either of the two countries and quite possibly might have followed an 
entirely different diffusion path (e.g. in terms of structural evolution), given the 
government’s vital role in the initial infrastructural development of such goods. This 
attitude also largely framed and pre-determined sector policy and the regulatory 
framework (as argued in the qualitative section of chapter 4, section 4.3.1 The 
Telegraph). Intuitively, if the respective administrations had not supported the 
diffusion of the technology or even ‘allowed’ (never mind facilitated) its initial 
adoption, all other explanatory factors would be largely inconsequential. Specifically, 
in the case of Mexico, the impact of the Porfiriato is believed to hold particular 
importance, as his regime dominated the vast majority of the key telegraph diffusion 
years (as highlighted in figure 5.1 below). In Argentina, the state’s passing of the 
Mitre Law is believed to hold particular importance (see chapter 3, section The Role 
o f the State: the Impact o f New Laws). It is also necessary to distinguish the specific 
effect that such factors had on diffusion, since the Porfiriato in reality expanded the 
telegraph network in all directions and an increase in usage followed largely in line. 
The Mitre Law, however not only generated an eventual large scale build-out of the 
network but also induced an immediate increase in usage of the system, by means of 
dramatically improving accessibility through the more efficient inter-connection of 
the existing telegraph network.
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Figure 5.1 Presidential Changes in Argentina and Mexico (10-90% Telegraph Diffusion)
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Source: Own elaboration. See appendix H. Note: PAN: Partido Autonomista Nacional, and Liberal: Partido 
Liberal. Note: The figure only displays the presidencies where the full term occurred in this period.
Figure 5.1 charts a timeline o f the changes in presidents in Argentina and Mexico 
during this key period o f  telegraph diffusion, with each box representing a new 
administration (and the thick black box representing the 10-90% diffusion period). 
During this period, Porfirio Diaz controlled the Mexican presidency, while Argentina 
was governed by seven different PAN-affiliated presidents. It is not intended to over 
homogenise Mexican politics or over ‘democratise’ Argentinian politics (since this 
was not the case), or to simplify what was a very complex political system (see 
chapter 1, section 1.1.3a. The Structure o f A rgentina’s and M exico’s Political 
System), but it simply illustrates the seemingly higher degree o f consistency in 
Mexico’s political arena, as the period was dominated by just one regime. In contrast, 
although Argentinian politics were now more stable (in comparison to the previous 
period) and indeed were governed by just one party, the continuous changes in the 
head o f  state naturally afforded them less continuity o f  strategy and action.
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The fact that Mexico was characterised by one administration during this period did 
not necessarily mean that Porfirio Diaz automatically possessed a higher degree of 
autonomy and centralism of power. Further, even with a higher degree of these 
political characteristics, the success of strategies or actions towards telegraph 
diffusion is not guaranteed, but it merely provides greater capacity to do so. 
Diffusion in Mexico was somewhat ‘luckily’ aided by the fact that Porfirio Diaz saw 
the telegraph as a strategic tool and was thus keen to emphasise its development. 
Moreover, since Porfirio Diaz took on a government role that directly oversaw the 
telegraph build-out even in the four years he was out of office (in between tenures), 
this served to accentuate the consistency of policy-making and execution. Then when 
he regained the presidency in 1884, Mexico was in an even more favourable position 
from which to induce further telegraph network expansion (and in turn diffusion) 
since the country was at relative peace.
In Argentina, although the political regime was relatively stable (indicated by the 
single political party), the regular changes in government administrations, at least in 
the telecom sector partly translated into a lack of consistency in the general running 
of the main telegraph operator. For instance in 1905, Quintana’s administration 
passed a statute that would allow for new mass construction of the network, 
connecting Buenos Aires to all the key commercial hubs. However, less than half of 
the projected build-out was completed in the first six years, as Alcorta became 
Argentina’s new president in 1906 and since this was not his project, it was not given 
the relevant priority. Again under Saenz Pena in 1912, a huge reconstruction and 
consolidation plan was proposed, but by 1916 little was achieved as yet another 
president assumed power half way through.1 Despite the good intentions of the 
different government administrations, their capacity to act meaningfully was 
weakened by the shortness of their tenures. Moreover, the political system in 
Argentina was relatively more open to different political actors and was perhaps a 
more socially inclined system than that of Mexico, which made the opposition 
stronger. In Mexico, although the ability to implement reforms varied through time 
and across regions (see chapter 1, section The Porfiriato: the Range in Authority 
Exercised), the regime of Porfirio Diaz continually sought to ensure that the
1 See Berthold (1921a).
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telegraph network would expand, even if at times, tactics were somewhat overly 
aggressive (e.g. ‘telegraph crime’, see chapter 4, section The Government’s Attitude 
towards the Telegraph). Indeed, as indicated in the Porfiriato section in chapter 1, 
there has been significant debate surrounding the extent of its achievements and 
whether it was a ‘dictatorship’ in the true sense, but a widely held view in regard to 
the telegraph is that one of Porfirio Diaz’s regime’s largest success was the 
significant telegraph network expansion achieved.
In Argentina, the importance of the role of the governing administration is 
particularly highlighted with the implementation o f the Mitre Law in 1907. This law 
ensured a sizeable expansion in network infrastructure especially in the first few 
years after its implementation, but it also had a more immediate effect (aided by the 
tariff unification scheme) by opening up network coverage by connecting more 
useful commercial hubs. This combined to generate a sizeable increase in the number 
of telegrams sent (i.e. diffusion growth) as it became easier to send telegrams due to 
the larger, wider reaching network (see table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Telegraph Diffusion (Telegrams sent per 100 people)
1880 1884 1888 1892 1896 1900 1904 1906 1908 1910 1912
Argentina 9.0 12.3 13.0 15.6 17.1 17.8 17.9 18.0 48.1 73.8 68.0
Mexico 0.9 0.6 3.1 5.6 9.1 16.7 22.2 25.7 25.4 27.4 30.8
Source: see appendix B.
As table 5.1 reveals, telegraph diffusion in Argentina significantly increased from 
1906 to 1908, around the Mitre Law’s introduction. It was at this point that the 
absolute level of telegrams sent in Argentina caught up with (and overtook) the 
levels in Mexico. As shown in appendix C, table C.l, in the three years before the 
introduction of the Mitre Law, year on year average network traffic usage was 0.4%, 
while in the three years immediately after this, the average rose to 52.5%. This 
seeming constriction of network build-out may well have restricted to some extent 
the usage of the telegraph, and hence its diffusion among consumers, as indicated in 
figure 5.2, which shows the partial telegraph diffusion s-curves of Argentina and 
Mexico.
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Figure 5.2 Argentina’s and Mexico’s Partial Telegraph Diffusion S-curve (3 Year Moving
Averages)
Argentina Mexico
25 ”
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Source: see appendix B.
Figure 5.2 neatly demonstrates the minimal growth in telegraph diffusion in 
Argentina before the introduction o f  the Mitre Law, and also shows that under 
Porfirio Diaz’s guidance, telegraph diffusion growth in Mexico was very continuous.
Overall, telegraph diffusion in Argentina and Mexico was driven seemingly, to a 
large extent, by various actions o f the administrations in power, actions, which were 
shaped by the government’s perception o f  the importance o f the technology. The 
success o f the diffusion-conducive reforms was also dependent on the 
administration’s ability to implement reforms effectively and at the appropriate time, 
which arguably was aided by the relative degrees o f  the administration’s autonomy 
and capacity.
5.1.2 The Telephone
Some o f the factors that explained the diffusion o f the telegraph also apply to the 
telephone diffusion speed in Argentina and Mexico. Once again the notion that the 
state mattered is a prevalent theme, but this does not necessarily mean that it always 
acted in the best way: the state was sometimes a promoter and sometimes an 
inhibitor to diffusion, but either way its impact was pivotal. The same broad state 
reforms at times seemingly served to constrain further telephone diffusion in one 
country (e.g. ENTel’s nationalisation), and boosted it in the other (e.g. Telmex’s
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nationalisation).2 As with the telegraph findings, the attitude of the administration in 
power, as well as their relative degrees of stability, of autonomy and the extent of the 
concentration of their power, were seen as having an important role. This was 
because these characteristics, to a relatively large extent, determined the ability to 
implement and sustain diffusion-conducive reforms and policies efficiently over time.
It is unquestionable that a large part of the success in the diffusion of the telephone in 
the two countries was due to the increased role of the government within the 
telephone sector. This was a result of the shift in the states’ attitude towards the 
importance of this technology (around the 1940s), and consequently from this point 
onwards one observes a significant growth in telephone diffusion. This is aligned 
with the study of Milner, where ICT diffusion was closely driven by the role of 
political institutions.4 Indeed, the important nationalisation and privatisation reforms, 
as well as the regulatory bodies, were driven directly, shaped and controlled by, the 
administrations in power, and thus it is logical that their attitudes and relative degrees 
of power to implement change would be of significance. The prominent role of the 
government administrations in Mexico within the sector especially began to intensify 
during the 1970s, at which point (having lagged Argentina for almost 80 years) the 
diffusion rate in Mexico actually surpassed that in Argentina (see table 5.2).
Table 5.2 Telephone Diffusion (Handsets per 100 households)
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1976 1980 1990 1997
Argentina 1.7 6.4 15.1 18.1 18.7 21.4 29.4 27.2 29.3 30.4 41.2 77.0
Mexico 0.7 2.2 2.1 2.7 4.6 5.4 8.3 18.3 32.0 41.6 64.4 83.6
Source: see appendix B.
Table 5.2 shows how diffusion started to gather pace as the years progressed and the 
attitude of the government administrations shifted; placing greater emphasis on the 
expansion of the network and the provision of the service. One must note that 
Telmex was not supremely efficient once the government took majority ownership; 
but rather what was important was that majority government ownership was in place 
for a relatively shorter period. Arguably, diffusion in Argentina during the
2 See for example, chapter 3, section The Period o f  Nationalisation.
3 See chapter 4, sections Political Institutions: The Degree o f  Stability and Characteristics o f  State Power and 
The Government’s Attitude and its Impact.
4 Milner (2006). Also see Andonova and Diaz-Serrano (2007), Bergara et al. (1998), Esfahani and Ramirez 
(2003), Henisz and Zelner (2001) and Levy and Spiller (1996).
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nationalisation years could have been potentially faster in relative terms, when 
compared to the diffusion experienced in Mexico (see figure 5.3).
F igure  5.3 A rg en tin a’s and M exico’s P artia l T elephone Diffusion S-curves (3 Y ear M oving
A verages)
Mexico
1941 1950 1959 1968 1977 1986 1995
Source: see appendix B.
Figure 5.3 shows the telephone diffusion s-curves in Argentina and Mexico for the 
period when the government administrations in the two countries began to increase 
their control over the sector. Seemingly in Argentina, the increase in the influence o f 
the government over ENTel during the nationalisation years had a relatively 
negative effect (this was not unique to Argentina, however -  nationalisation was 
often opposed precisely because state telecom monopolies in many other developing 
regions typically failed to meet even the basic service requirements).5 This contrasts 
to the situation in Mexico, where telephone diffusion increased relatively more 
slowly until the 1960s, before accelerating. In both countries, the important role 
played by the administration in power was fairly clear. Arguably, if  the 
administrations from the start o f Aleman Valdes (1946) to the end o f Diaz Ordaz 
(1970) in Mexico had not recognised the importance o f  the telephone, and had 
maintained its pre-1940s laissez-faire attitude throughout the rest o f the diffusion 
period, the rate o f telephone diffusion would have likely suffered. Meanwhile in 
Argentina, it is interesting that a positive attitude by the administration in power 
toward the need to diffuse the telephone was not the only pre-requisite to allow for 
fast telephone diffusion; it was merely the starting point.
5 See Petrazzini (1995).
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The Mexican administrations not only shared the relevant wish to promote telephone 
network expansion (and in turn diffusion) but also had the relative capacity and 
ability to implement the change necessary to do so. During the key period of 
telephone diffusion, and in particular during the years of Telmex’s progressive 
nationalisation, the Mexican administrations were characterised by a relatively 
higher degree of autonomy and continuity in their strategies and actions, since these 
years were characterised by the PRI’s relatively strongest grip on political control. 
As privatisation neared, however, this advantage would fade (see chapter 1, sections 
The Evolution o f PRI Control o f Mexico [until and from I960]). The political 
situation in Argentina was rather different; for much of the telephone diffusion 
period, politics were relatively more unstable; which meant that despite the positive 
attitude of the government, it was often more difficult to implement changes and 
sustain diffusion enhancing policies. Indeed, from 1930 to 1983 Argentina was 
‘characterized by numerous military coups, [the] legacies of 25 presidents, 22 years 
of military rule, and 13 years of Peronism’ (see chapter 1, section 1.1.3d. The Politics 
in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, and figure 5.4).6
6 Sullivan M. P., ‘Argentina: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations’ Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) Report fo r  Congress (2006): 1-6, p.2. Also see Waisman C. H. ‘Argentina: Autarkic 
Industrialization and Illegitimacy’ in Diamond L., Linz J.L., and Lipset S.M., Democracy in Developing 
Countries Volume Four: Latin America, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers (1989), p.63.
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F igure 5.4 P residen tial C hanges in A rgen tina and  M exico (10-90%  Telephone Diffusion)
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Source: Own elaboration. See appendix H. Note: PJ: Partido Justicialista, Mil: Military; VCR: Union Civica 
Radical, and PR1: Partido Revolucionario Institucional.
Figure 5.4 shows a timeline with the changes in presidents in each country during the 
10-90% period o f  telephone diffusion; each box represents a new administration (it 
also details the party they belonged to). Figure 5.4 visually shows that M exico’s 
government administrations were more consistent and the whole system was 
relatively more stable compared to Argentina. In Mexico there was an orderly 
change in president (but not political party) every six years (the sexenio). Meanwhile 
in Argentina, these years were characterised by a rapid succession o f  military coups, 
and the subsequent military or civilian regimes (and as mentioned some presidents 
remained in power for literally a matter o f days). Given that ENTel was a state 
monopoly from 1946 to 1990, a relatively higher degree o f political instability 
translated into the relatively more disorderly running o f ENTel, as its top 
management were appointed by the president (see examples in chapter 3, section The
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Progress Achieved during the Nationalised Era and in chapter 4, section The Degree 
o f Effectiveness o f the Regulatory Framework). Alternatively in Mexico, the PRI 
ruled for the whole period (although with differing levels of effectiveness and 
strength of governance), offered the telephone operator relative political stability 
through uninterrupted rule. This in part could be seen as providing a relative 
advantage over Argentina, since one could argue that it meant that Telmex enjoyed a 
more stable setting, where longer-term goals could be set and achieved more easily, 
which naturally facilitated faster diffusion. It could also be argued that just because 
there was seemingly greater capacity to enact reforms quicker and more efficiently in 
Mexico, this did not guarantee that the policy choices were good. For example, the 
introduction of the very unpopular 1960 long-distance tax initially priced many 
customers out of the market. Since the government decided to exploit these revenues, 
Telmex faced political pressure of a different nature.8 Some observers argue that at 
times, it seemed as if Telmex had become almost a private financing vehicle for the 
Mexican government.9 However, once government involvement increased in the 
sector, evidenced for example by an increased emphasis on universal service 
provision, one could argue that this promoted diffusion, as new lines were installed 
in non-urban areas, which had been mostly ignored under private provision (as 
occurred in Argentina too).10
One of the key facilitators for fast telephone diffusion in Mexico, as indicated earlier, 
was its unique nationalisation reform, due to the effect this had upon service.11 
Diffusion in Mexico benefited from the private sector’s running of Telmex, 
alongside increasing government involvement, which meant that government 
employees in Telmex were in a relatively better position to run the company than 
those in ENTel, and could provide relatively more efficient services. Even under 
majority government ownership, Telmex retained some private flavour (e.g. through 
its retention of staff and board members), offering further potential to learn and
7 The government raised the long-distance tax so aggressively that at one point more than 50% of Telmex’s 
revenues were coming from this tax. See Mote D. and Mancini C., Telefonos de Mexico S.A. de C.V 
International Directory o f  Company Histories 63 (1992).
8 Casaus (1994).
9 Mote and Mancini (1992).
10 For Argentina see Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, Memoria Empresaria, 1985, p. 10. For Mexico, 
see Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes (SCT), Programa Nacional de Modernizacion de las 
Telecomunicaciones 1989-1994 SCT (1994).
11 Note that the regression analysis failed to show statistical significance for this relationship due to the 
difficulties in measuring this factor.
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progress with the guidance and experience o f  the existing staff, which generated an 
all round more experienced and more cohesively run state entity. Meanwhile, the 
Argentinian officials placed in charge o f  ENTel had never run a telephone operator 
before. Relatively worse provision o f service naturally followed as the emblematic 
inefficiencies characteristic o f a state monopoly provider were more pronounced and 
this proved to restrict diffusion by inadequately dealing with the public’s 
requirements, especially when demand continued to increase (see figure 5.5).12
F igure 5.5 C om paring  A rg en tin a ’s and  M exico’s T elephone L ine W aiting  to be Insta lled : 1967- 
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Figure 5.5 compares the telephone lines waiting to be installed during the years o f 
nationalisation (for which data are available) in Argentina and Mexico. It shows that 
prior to the mid to late-1980s when there was a substantial problem across the two 
countries, the number o f people waiting to get a new line in Mexico was significantly 
lower than in Argentina (obviously this is a function o f demand, but consider that the 
population o f Mexico was at no point less than twice as large as Argentina’s from 
1967-1990). In 1989 waiting times for line installation in Argentina were between 12 
and 14 years compared to 3 years in M exico.13 Unfortunately, slow installation was 
just one o f  a long list o f inefficiencies, with first time connectivity rates on local and 
long-distance calls all below 50% in Argentina, versus equivalent rates above 90% in
12 For example, for details on the continuing increase in both the number o f people waiting to have their line 
repaired, and in the durations o f  the waiting periods, in addition to continual increases in demand for new lines, 
see Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, Memoria Empresaria, 1979, p .12. Also see Empresa Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones, Memoria Empresaria, 1981, pp.8-9.
13 Mairal (1994), Cook (1999), Ramamurti (1996).
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Mexico (see chapter 3, section The Progress Achieved during the Nationalised Era 
for more information on the quality of service).14
As a result of the poor service provided by ENTel during the nationalisation years, 
once the company was privatised in 1990 one observes a significant spurt in 
diffusion (figure 5.3). Clearly, one of the most important drivers of telephone 
diffusion in Argentina was its privatisation reform and, although it was also 
important for Telmex, one can argue that the impact of this reform was relatively 
more significant for ENTel. This was largely because telephone diffusion in 
Argentina had underperformed considerably in the years prior to privatisation. In 
Mexico, Telmex had performed relatively well (in the sense that telephone diffusion 
growth was already on a reasonably strong trajectory, as depicted in figure 5.3); 
hence there was relatively less room for improvement. Moreover, despite the success 
of two telephone providers in Argentina during the privatisation period, it proved no 
easy task. As described earlier, the privatisation reform was successfully 
implemented the first time around under the Salinas de Gotari’s administration in 
Mexico, while Menem’s success was the third attempt at ENTel’s privatisation in 
Argentina (see chapter 3, section The Period o f  Privatisation).15 This particular 
example highlights an instance where it was not necessarily that the given reform 
was superior in Mexico, but that the relative ease with which the Mexican 
administration (in comparison to their Argentinian counterparts and even at the point 
where PRI power had eroded substantially) were still able to force the reform 
through.
The importance of the privatisation reform in aiding further telephone diffusion is 
consistent with studies such as Wallsten’s .16 As argued, this was particularly 
important in the case of ENTel; for instance, the number of lines waiting to be 
installed fell from a peak of over 1 million to fewer than 20,000 in just 12 years.17 
Also, the cost of connection decreased significantly in Argentina from a massive 
US$2,165 in 1990, to US$250 in 1997, compared to a drop from US$494 to US$123
14 See Abdala (2000).
15 See Petrazzini (1995).
16 Wallsten (2001a, 2005).
17 Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU), ICT Statistics Database ICT Eye 
(http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteve/Indicators/Indicators.aspx) . Also see chapter 3, section The Progress Achieved 
during the Privatisation Era.
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in Mexico for the same period.18 The percentage of recorded telephone faults in 
Argentina fell from 42% to only 17% (1991-1997), compared to a drop from 9% to 3% 
in Mexico for the same period.19 Hence, although the privatisation reform was 
important for Telmex, as it boosted capital investment, improved productivity and 
cut inefficiencies, in relative terms the reform was more impactful and allowed for 
greater telephone diffusion (via improved provision) in Argentina. Significant strides 
were made in telephone service provision in Argentina, not only because it was no 
longer controlled by the government, but because it became a private duopoly 
providing for some element of competition, which translated into further 
improvements on installation o f infrastructure and the overall quality of the service, 
therefore boosting diffusion. In fact, telephone diffusion in Argentina experienced an 
aggressive increase during the privatisation period; having lagged telephone 
diffusion in Mexico for 20 years, it finally caught up.
Argentina’s telephone diffusion was dictated to a large extent by the role of the state, 
both positively during the privatisation reform and negatively during the 
nationalisation reform. Meanwhile in Mexico, the government’s attitude and 
relatively higher degree of stability in allowing for the successful implementation of 
Telmex’s unique nationalisation and privatisation reforms exerted a positive effect 
on telephone diffusion.
As explained in chapter 2, diffusion is a two-step process, with initial speed of 
adoption (dictated by the government’s willingness to promote it) followed by the 
actual speed of diffusion (which becomes a question of the government generating 
consumer accessibility and demand). The power of the governing administrations 
was determined largely by their respective ability to implement key reforms. The 
relatively greater degree of autonomy and concentration of power in the executive 
branch of the Mexican government during much of the critical period of telegraph 
diffusion enabled Porfirio Diaz to bring in various diffusion-conducive reforms. As a 
result of the sexenio’s introduction, the subsequent governments were not afforded 
the same luxury of such long individual tenures but they had sufficient continuity via 
their one party political system, which in comparison to Argentina offered them
18 Ibid.
19
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greater relative capacity to execute successful telephone nationalisation and 
privatisation reforms. Meanwhile in Argentina, it was the Alcorta administration that 
finally implemented the Mitre Law during the years of telegraph diffusion, and the 
much needed privatisation reform under Menem, during the years of telephone 
diffusion. These two events in Argentina, were so overriding that previous to their 
implementation, one can argue that further diffusion of the two technologies was 
somewhat restricted. In summary, throughout the fastest period of telegraph and 
telephone diffusion the role of the state was clearly the most important factor driving 
(or inhibiting) diffusion. Also of note was the tentative finding, which suggested that 
socio-economic variables played a limited role in explaining diffusion, which neatly 
brings us back to the Paradox.
5.2 Explaining the ‘Double Paradox’
Recall that the ‘Double Paradox’ refers to the fact that, given the relative socio­
economic disparity between Argentina and Mexico during the period under 
consideration, the diffusion of the telegraph and the telephone should have been 
relatively faster in Argentina than in Mexico. This circumstance was pronounced 
most of all during the fastest period of telegraph diffusion (see chapter 1, section The 
Period o f  Export-led Growth [1870-1930]). Whilst the literature presents a range of 
potential factors that can explain the difference in diffusion rates across countries, it 
is the relative level of economic development in one country compared with another 
that is cited most frequently. In light of this -  in terms of telegraph and telephone 
diffusion -  Argentina relatively underperformed, while Mexico outperformed.
5.2.1 The Economic Disparity
The extent of the economic divide for the period under discussion was addressed at 
various stages of chapter 1 (see section 1.1.1 The Economics of the Political 
Economy). To remind the reader, with regard to social development during the years 
of telegraph diffusion; before the First World War for instance, life expectancy in 
Mexico was 28 years compared to 46 years in Argentina. Similarly, Argentina’s 
literacy rates were double Mexico’s (see appendix A, table A.3 and A.4). It is also 
important to recall that, although the economic discrepancies were vast during 
telegraph diffusion they continued well into early telephone diffusion. For example, 
at a mid-point in telegraph diffusion, in 1900, Argentina had achieved a GDP per
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capita level o f US$2,756, versus US$1,366 in Mexico. At a similar mid-point in 
telephone diffusion, in 1960, Argentina had a GDP per capita o f  US$5,559 while 
Mexico still lagged notably, at only US$3,155 (see appendix A, table A .l). 
Furthermore, from 1900 to 1960, M exico’s HLSI grew from 0.13 to 0.50 compared 
to Argentina’s which grew from 0.34 to 0.65 in the same period, thus revealing a 
distinct lack o f comparative social advancement (see appendix A, table A.7). Figures 
5.6 and 5.7 show the differences in GDP per capita levels in Argentina and Mexico 
over the key diffusion periods to help to frame the scale o f the economic divide.
F igure 5.6 A rg en tin a’s and M exico’s G D P p e r  cap ita  fo r 10-90%  T elegraph  Diffusion (3 Y ear 
M oving A verages)
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Source: For consistency, all the data are sourced from Maddison (2006). Maddison used 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars as the base for GDP per capita (see appendix A, table A. 1 for data from 1900). Note: 
Although the start o f Mexico’s 10% o f telegraph diffusion occurred in 1881, the figure above begins from 
Argentina’s 10% level of diffusion due to data availability.
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F ig u re  5.7 A rg en tin a ’s and  M exico’s G D P p er cap ita  fo r 10-90%  Telephone Diffusion (3 Y ear
M oving A verages)
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Source: For consistency, all the data are sourced from Maddison (2006), Maddison used 1990 International 
Geary-Khamis dollars as the base for GDP per capita (see appendix A, table A. 1 for data).
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show that Argentina’s GDP per capita was consistently higher 
than that M exico’s and although the gap narrowed during the years o f  telephone 
diffusion (figure 5.7), it widened again through the 1990s. It is interesting that, 
despite this, the diffusion speed o f the telegraph and the telephone in the two 
countries was relatively similar - given that the literature places a lot o f importance 
on income as a key driver o f  diffusion. The logical argument follows that a certain 
level o f  income is necessary in order to diffuse the technology, but once a threshold 
is reached, further income growth does not necessarily translate into an increase in 
diffusion. Littlechild (in analysing telephone diffusion rates) provides further 
rationale: he argues that to some extent GDP per capita will play a relatively more 
responsive role in telephone diffusion when provision is private, as opposed to under
n  i
a government-owned system. Indeed, in the case o f Argentina, income growth was 
significant but only during the privatisation years, in line with Littlechild’s 
findings.22
To substantiate the revelations o f the Paradox, one must consider the following: 
arguably telegraph diffusion was relatively more successful in Mexico than in
20 For instance, see Rogers (1995), Antonelli (1993), Helsen K., Jedidi K. and DeSarbo W. S., ‘A N ew  Approach 
to Country Segmentation Utilizing Multinational Diffusion Patterns’ Journal o f Marketing 57 (1993): 60-71. 
Gatignon and Robertson (1985), Dekimpe et al. (1998, 2000a, 2000b), Ahn and Lee (1999), Gruber (2001), 
Gruber and Verboven (2001), Madden et al. (2004), Milner (2006), Wallsten (2001a), Griliches (1957) and 
Mansfield (1961, 1963a, 1963b). Also see chapter 1, section 1.5.1 The Economic Approach.
21 Littlechild (1983).
22 See the regression analysis in chapter 4, section 4.2.2 The Telephone.
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Argentina, to the extent that Mexico was first to build a telegraph line, and had a 
larger network in terms of density. For instance, in 1899 Argentina had 20,330 km of 
lines (spanning 2,700,000 sq km), while Mexico had 32,394 km across a much 
smaller area (over 1,900,000 sq km) - see appendix C, tables C.l and C.2. In absolute 
levels, telegraph diffusion in Mexico surpassed Argentina’s briefly in 1888, despite 
Argentina having the highest GDP per capita in all of Latin America. With regard to 
telephone diffusion, in absolute levels diffusion was higher initially in Argentina, but 
during Telmex’s gradual nationalisation process, telephone diffusion in Mexico 
actually took over the levels seen in Argentina. One could argue that, because 
Argentina was relatively wealthier than Mexico, telephone diffusion should have 
been faster, diffusion in Argentina therefore underperformed. Even if the Argentinian 
administrations had delayed nationalisation (or implemented it gradually as Telmex 
did), or privatised earlier (or been successful at the first attempt), perhaps diffusion 
would have been faster. An indication of this can be found in the fact that the change 
in GDP per capita was only a significant factor driving diffusion after ENTel was 
privatised. This suggests that ENTel’s nationalisation potentially acted as an 
inhibiting factor toward further diffusion.
As explained below, there are two sides to the Paradox, with the diffusion of the two 
technologies in Argentina having partly underperformed, coupled with the relative 
outperformance in the diffusion of the two technologies in Mexico.
5.2.2 The Theoretical Underperformance of Diffusion in Argentina 
This side of the Paradox refers to the inability in Argentina to diffuse the two 
technologies faster than it did (given its consistently superior economic setting), an 
underperformance, which ultimately made it ‘easier’ for diffusion in Mexico to catch 
up. The rationale for this was potentially due to the characteristics of some of the 
Argentinian administrations as well as the environment in which they operated. 
Within this context, telegraph and telephone diffusion was less successful because 
the Argentinian administrations did not make the most of key reforms; whether it 
was in part due to late implementation, or a result of the relative ineffectiveness of 
the reforms themselves. With regard to telegraph diffusion, one could argue that the 
delayed implementation of the Mitre Law seemingly acted as a barrier to further 
diffusion, irrespective of the country’s economic and social advantage. In other
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words, previous to the implementation of this law, diffusion was constrained to the 
extent, that network usage almost tripled between 1906 and 1908, while the length of 
the telegraph network increased 55% between 1907 and 1914 (see chapter 3, table
3.2 Argentina’s National Telegraph Network Size and Traffic [during 10-90% 
Diffusion]). One could therefore contend that if the Mitre Law was implemented 
earlier, perhaps telegraph diffusion in Argentina would have been faster than in 
Mexico.
With regard to telephone diffusion, during the majority of the years of ENTel’s 
nationalisation, the government administrations in Argentina drifted between those 
supporting deregulation, foreign capital, and free enterprise, and those who sought 
greater state regulation, the suppression of foreign capital and an expanded state 
economy. Unlike Mexico, where one political party largely dominated the 
nationalisation years, in Argentina, there were not only many more administrations 
over the period, but many regime types and many political parties, which served to 
disrupt consistency at ENTel. The years of ENTel’s nationalisation were particularly 
stagnant in terms of diffusion growth, as complete nationalisation turned ENTel into 
an inefficient monopoly, with deteriorating service, which arguably served to restrain 
further diffusion (for details see chapter 3, section The Progress Achieved during the 
Nationalised Era). As in telegraph diffusion, the socio-economic advantage that 
Argentina may have had, seemingly had little impact in driving faster telephone 
diffusion, due to the relatively negative impact of ENTel’s government ownership. 
Perhaps, if ENTel had imitated Telmex’s nationalisation process, telephone diffusion 
would have been faster. Whether this would actually have been the case is difficult to 
judge with any degree o f accuracy and would demand some sort of rigorous 
counterfactual analysis, which is beyond the scope of the thesis, but it is important to 
intuitively highlight the possibility. In reality, the various government 
administrations in Argentina did not introduce reforms particularly different to those 
in Mexico (e.g. the consolidation of the telegraph network, or the nationalisation of 
the telephone), but rather the Mexican administrations were seemingly more 
effective in positively impacting the subsequent diffusion rate.
The Paradox is built upon the economic disparity between the two countries, and it is 
interesting that while the economic backdrop during the 10-90% telephone diffusion
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period in Argentina and Mexico ranged in stability and success, both faced painful 
debt crises that in many respects dictated their all important privatisation reforms, 
which were especially important to the success of telephone diffusion in Argentina. 
Without such diffusion success during this period, it is likely that the diffusion of the 
telephone in Argentina would have been potentially far worse. To rationalise this, 
one may argue in line with the view of Evans and Amsden, citing the importance of a 
degree of ‘state capacity’ as a means to facilitate (rather than inhibit) economic 
development.24 One could argue that at various stages, the relatively lower degree of 
state capacity of the Argentinian administrations (versus Mexico), particularly during 
the rapid succession of presidents during ENTel’s nationalisation, meant that the 
administrations were less able to govern effectively. Moreover it affected their ability 
to deal appropriately with opposition from interest groups, which were already more 
powerful in Argentina and were often a hindrance to reform implementation. 
Therefore one side of the Paradox can partly be understood in terms of the seeming 
underperformance in the diffusion of the two technologies in Argentina, despite 
Argentina’s overall socio-economic advantages.
5.2.3 The Traits of the Government Administrations in Mexico 
The government’s role in allowing for successful technology diffusion in general 
tends to be more pronounced in developing countries (see chapter 1, section 1.5.4 
The Institutional Approach: the Role of the State). This thesis suggests that this was 
the case in Argentina and Mexico. Successful diffusion of the telegraph and the 
telephone in the two countries initially was dependent upon the incumbent 
government administrations, as opposed to consumer behaviour directly, since it was 
the government that provided the initial access to the new technology and that was 
responsible for shaping an environment that was conducive to the development of 
infrastructure and in turn diffusion growth. The political and social environment in 
which the telegraph, in particular, diffused in these ‘new’ countries was characterised 
by the need for national unification and state consolidation (as argued in chapter 1, 
section 1.2 The State and the Role of ICT in Latin America). This was true in both 
Argentina and Mexico, but perhaps was more pronounced in the case of the latter.
24 Amsden A., ‘The State and Taiwan’s Economic Development’ in Evans et al. (1985). Also see Skocpol T., 
‘Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’ in Evans et al. (1985), Haggard (1990) 
and Evans (1995).
25 Oszlak (1981, 1982).
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Mexico feared for the very borders of its national territory and indeed for its national 
integrity. Chapter 4 argued that this reinforced further the strategic need for the 
diffusion of the telegraph in Mexico, compared to Argentina. The Mexican 
administrations of Juarez and Porfirio Diaz (particularly the latter), were accordingly 
highly supportive of fast telegraph diffusion, and took a relatively prominent role to 
ensure this. Furthermore, Mexico (with 75 presidents in the 55 years prior to the 
Porfiriato) arguably had experienced a relatively acute period of political flux after 
independence, this is not to say that Argentina was politically stable either, but rather 
that in relative terms, the situation was more volatile in Mexico.26 Consequently, one 
can argue that although the two countries had administrations that were disposed 
positively toward diffusing the telegraph from early on, a partial differentiating 
factor that must have played an important role was that the Mexican administrations 
inherited an even higher degree of urgency in utilising tools, such as the telegraph, 
that could consolidate and unify the region.
As argued in chapter 1, the government controlled the entire diffusion process: 
through the provision of concessions, its commitment to property rights, and the 
implementation of reforms and regulations (see chapter 1, section 1.5.4 The 
Institutional Approach: the Role of the State). Consequently the extent of 
intervention and ability to implement reforms was important. Two factors that are 
particularly important within this context were: the government’s attitude toward the 
perceived benefits offered by the new technology, and the intrinsic characteristics of 
the government administration during important periods of telegraph and telephone 
diffusion. The findings of this thesis suggest that perhaps more critical rationale than 
the attitude, was the nature of the intrinsic characteristics of some of the ruling 
administrations. Such distinguishing traits (as explored below) provided for a certain 
comparative advantage in terms of strategising and implementing diffusion 
conducing actions. This draws somewhat on the developmental authoritarianism 
literature, which argues that such types of regimes were more prone to facilitate
9 7development in late industrialising countries. Gerschenkronian style catch up of
26 Haber etal. (2003).
27 See Johnson C., M/77 and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth o f  Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 Stanford, 
Stanford University Press (1982). Amsden (1989), Zysman J., Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial 
Systems and the Politics o f  Industrial Change Oxford, Martin Robertson (1983), White G., Developmental States 
in East Asia New York, St. Martin’s Press (1988).
297
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The 'Double Paradox’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
sorts seemingly ensued as the state became more important than the previously 
accepted pre-requisites, such as income or credible commitment to property rights in 
Mexico’s case in promoting diffusion growth.
The argument follows that from a relative perspective, Mexico’s governments had 
more centralised power structures, coupled with a seemingly more positive, or 
determined, attitude at critical junctures of the diffusion of the two ICTs (see chapter 
1, section 1.1.3 a. The Structure of Argentina’s and Mexico’s Political System). This 
created and shaped a setting in which the diffusion o f the telegraph and the telephone 
was relatively more incentivised to develop. One could argue that the keenness of the 
Mexican government to diffuse the two technologies originated for the ‘wrong’ 
reasons -  as the two were perceived as tools for the benefit of the state rather than 
consumer goods in need of universal supply -  but it nevertheless ensured that the 
necessary infrastructure was built, providing the fundamental basis for subsequent 
diffusion. In regard to the situation in Mexico (particularly during the period of 
telegraph diffusion), one could argue to some extent in line with Deyo; in that more 
authoritarian regimes can typically build-out the necessary infrastructure more 
efficiently in the initial stages of development, because of policy consistency and the 
like. However, there were obviously instances (such as the middle period of 
telephone diffusion) where Argentina’s administrations also revealed more 
authoritarian tendencies. Indeed, the decisive argument rests on the fact that 
identifying the need to develop and diffuse the two technologies (as Argentina and 
Mexico both did) was insufficient; the relative degree of ability to act was more 
important. And on the face of it, some of the administrations in Mexico were better 
equipped to do this. For instance, during the Porfiriato, telegraph diffusion was 
prioritised to such a high degree that even during the peaceful years of Porfirio 
Diaz’s tenure, he deployed stringent policies and intimidation tactics (e.g. ‘telegraph 
crime’) in order to promote the diffusion of the telegraph (see chapter 4, section The 
Government's Attitude towards the Telegraph). Similarly, during the diffusion of the 
telephone, the Lopez Mateos administration coerced foreign investors to surrender 
their shares in an effort to ‘Mexicanise’ Telmex in 1958. By no means is this trying 
to condone or even contemplate assessing the appropriateness of such courses of
28 Gerschenkron (1962).
29Deyo F., The Political Economy o f  the New Asian Industrialism U.S., Cornell University Press (1987).
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action. The point is simply that the relatively higher degree of capacity which some 
of the key Mexican administrations enjoyed, coupled with a largely positive attitude 
towards the need to drive the diffusion of the two technologies, translated into a ‘get 
the job done’ mentality. This was a mentality that the relatively economically 
superior Argentinian administrations did not have the appropriate characteristics to 
allow it to subscribe to, during the critical development years.
During the key periods of fastest diffusion the attitudes and government 
characteristics were not static. This line of thought was perhaps most imperative at 
the turn of the twentieth century when telegraph diffusion was in full swing and 
telephone diffusion was just starting. One observes that in Mexico, during the 
Porfiriato, the administration was characterised by relatively greater autonomy, 
which resulted from a greater notion of a ‘dictatorship’ that Porfirio Diaz had. This 
higher degree of autonomy was partly a result of Porfirio Diaz having hand-picked 
all the members of congress, yet this did not guarantee authority over a nation, he 
still relied upon the distrustful relationships that were arranged between himself and 
the local jefes politicos as argued in chapter 1. This situation, when at its strongest (in 
the middle of telegraph diffusion), allowed Porfirio Diaz to implement diffusion 
conducive reforms more effectively and in the face of much less resistance, in vast 
contrast to the Argentinian rulers of the equivalent period. During this period, 
Argentina also fostered a greater notion of political stability, as one political party, 
the PAN (and especially those associated with the ‘Generation of 1880’) retained 
control of politics for some time, but this stability was of a different nature. As 
described in further detail in chapter 4, the Argentinian administrations of this period 
(on the way toward quasi-democracy) were unable to free themselves from powerful 
interest groups, as efficient handling of increasing telegraph demand was blighted by 
labour strikes.
The evolution of the state’s attitude and characteristics continued into the years of 
expansion of telephone diffusion, with the one administration regime in Mexico 
giving way to the one political party system. Just like the Porfiriato, the PRI’s control 
of Mexico had a strong beginning, a cementing of power in the middle and a 
dwindling of power into some sort of crisis (the Revolution for Porfirio Diaz, and the 
debt crisis for the PRI). An important difference was that the combined PRI
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presidencies spanned a much longer period in Mexican politics. As a result political 
continuity in Mexico was sustained (especially during the 1940s and 1950s), which 
paved the way, to some extent, for successful diffusion, as policies could be 
sustained over the longer run. Meanwhile the case study of Argentina provides a 
stark contrast, since there was relatively more uncertainty over government rule, 
which had a stronger negative effect upon telephone diffusion during nationalisation, 
as almost 30 different presidents from various political dispositions governed. 
Moreover Argentinian administrative executive powers were relatively weaker, at 
least in constitutional terms, as they constantly had to confront congress (harshly 
evidenced in Alfonsin’s failed privatisation attempt, for instance), making policy 
making a comparatively more difficult task. It was only when Menem adopted a very 
different tack during ENTel’s privatisation that the desired reform was finally 
achieved (see chapter 1, section Peronism and Post-Peronism in Argentina).
Overall, while the period cannot be generalised for Argentina or Mexico, the 
observations are that the Mexican administrations (during critical diffusion periods) 
typically retained relatively greater notions of autonomy and capacity to act, which 
were, more often than not, fostered by the one administration regime or the one 
political party system. Further, the positive attitude of the state towards the need for 
promoting the telegraph and telephone infrastructure build-out (and therefore 
diffusion) was perhaps greater in Mexico at the very beginning, but it is unfair to 
conclude which nation’s administrations had the stronger desire in the latter part. 
These distinguishing characteristics of the given administrations at critical periods 
provide the rationale to the Paradox. The differences in rule between Argentina and 
Mexico throughout telegraph and telephone diffusion were not constant, and there is 
some support for the view that the periods where elements of democracy were more 
a notion than a practicality (PRI rule and the inability of an opposition party to win 
an election in the 1950s and 1960s), and where the relative degree of the 
concentration of power was particularly centralised (demonstrated in Menem’s use of 
urgency and necessity decrees during privatisation), stronger diffusion was invoked. 
For instance between 1950 and 1970, teledensity increased 3.4 times in Mexico, and 
in Argentina it almost doubled during the very short period of privatisation (see 
appendix B for data). Finally, although the economic divide between the two nations 
narrowed by the time of ENTel and Telmex’s privatisations, it was still material, and
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as the role of the state was still a central explanatory factor, the Paradox was 
therefore just as important as it was during the diffusion of the telegraph.
5.2.4 The Mexican Timing Effect
Indeed, while the government’s positive attitude and capacity to implement effective 
policies was important as explored above, their relative success to act in a timely 
fashion was just as key. Timing was another important factor that can partly explain 
the Paradox. As explored below, the administrations in Mexico were at times, 
relatively faster in implementing some necessary reforms, reforms which were also 
implemented in Argentina, but at a later date. Further, some administrations in 
Mexico also proved to have relatively greater acumen for timing, in terms of 
favourability and opportunism vis-a-vis some of the regimes in Argentina. Moreover, 
one can argue that throughout the diffusion of the two technologies the various 
administrations in Mexico seemingly made earlier efforts to promote diffusion. For 
example, in taking advantage of the railway companies’ ‘right of way’ before 
Argentina, or in the earlier consolidation of the telegraph network. Lastly, during the 
diffusion of the telephone, Telmex seemingly benefited from the Aleman Valdes 
government’s timely decision to implement a gradual movement toward 
nationalisation, which paved the way for greater relative success (see chapter 3, The 
period of Nationalisation).
As argued, the first telegraph line was introduced six years earlier in Mexico than in 
Argentina, as Mexican regimes became obsessed with state-building and establishing 
order. Administrations in Argentina could almost be described as having been too 
cautious in the early years of telegraph diffusion, refusing a number of early 
opportunities to expand the network (see chapter 4, section The Government’s
O A
Attitude towards the Telegraph). The telegraph became property of the state in 
Mexico 10 years earlier than in Argentina (in 1865 compared to 1875), and this 
provided a theoretical advantage in Mexico because it meant that the government 
was overseeing the construction of the network from earlier on. In Argentina, lines
30 For instance, as mentioned the Argentinian government rejected the proposal of Febres de Rovira and of 
Societe Internationale de Tetegraphie Electrique in the 1850s.
31 Although the government made the telegraph state property in 1865 in Mexico compared to 1875 in Argentina, 
in reality this would prove to be less important given the fact that many of the lines would be destroyed on 
Porfirio Diaz’s ascent to power, however it still serves to highlight the timing effect.
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were built without much definitive governmental policy for longer and as a result 
these ‘were not infrequently a menace to public service’ (see chapter 3, section 3.1.2
-JO
The Years of Telegraph Expansion).
The administrations in Mexico emphasised the expansion of the telegraph 
infrastructure from very early on, and the Juarez administration consolidated all the 
telegraph lines into a national network in 1869 (when telegraph diffusion had not 
reached even 1% diffusion). This was important because it made the network 
relatively more useful (to the consumer) and hence positively impacted diffusion, as 
it was easier and faster (in theory at least) to send a telegram given the 
interconnection of the provincial, state, private and federal telegraph lines. Without 
the consolidation of the network, its further build-out would have been less useful, as
- jo
in Argentina. The consolidation of the telegraph network in Argentina did not occur 
until 1892 (by which time telegraph diffusion had reached 19%), which meant that 
the administrations in Argentina consolidated the network 23 years after Mexico. As 
a result of this delay, the network was interlinked poorly and lines that were 
supposedly complementary to each other were competing for business. The earlier 
consolidation of the network in Mexico provided a relative advantage seemingly vis- 
a-vis diffusion in Argentina. Arguably it was not just the earlier timing of the reform 
in Mexico, but the opportunism of timing, whereby the lines were constructed and 
connected into one network, while in Argentina, by the time consolidation o f the 
lines was carried out, the country had amassed a large and messy network by then, 
thus consolidation was relatively more difficult.
The Mexican administrations also implemented a regulatory framework ahead of 
Argentina as argued in chapter 3. Mexico’s telecom policy began in 1855, and by 
1869 it developed the set of rules for the Telegraph Offices.34 Meanwhile, in 
Argentina, by 1862 little had been done to organise matters, and the first telegraph 
law was only passed in 1875. As mentioned the government in Mexico also took 
advantage of the railways’ right-of-way relatively earlier than in Argentina despite 
Argentina’s telegraph network having developed in tandem with the railway network
32 Berthold (1921a), p.8.
33 See chapter 3, section The Progress Achieved during 10-90% Diffusion, where it is argued that it was not so 
much about the expansion of the lines, but rather the fact that half of the system was unusable.
34 Griffith in Noam (1998).
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much earlier than in Mexico. The government in Mexico realised (through statute) 
the potential mutual benefits of this relationship much sooner (in 1881) compared to 
Argentina (1907).35 Despite the fact that the railways and the telegraph grew together 
in Argentina since 1857, the country waited 50 years to exploit this relationship fully, 
Mexico waited just six, as argued in chapter 3, section The Role o f  the State: The 
Impact o f New Laws. This example was perhaps the clearest testament to the 
Argentinian-Mexican divide in terms of government effectiveness. Since this law was 
introduced significantly earlier in Mexico, one perhaps could argue that there was no 
such restricting effect (as in Argentina). In other words, telegraph expansion in 
Mexico was relatively uninterrupted. One could argue that the administrations in 
Mexico were relatively more effective in coordinating efforts to implement critical 
reforms earlier than in Argentina.
With regard to the telephone, the governments in the two countries promoted 
diffusion and the move toward nationalisation at a similar time. In Mexico, the 
timing effect was about the favourability and the optimisation of timing, and less 
about haste and swiftness of action (although this was still a factor). The Mexican 
administrations’ opportunism of timing was particularly apparent in its progressive 
nationalisation reform of Telmex, which arguably was a better type of nationalisation 
thanENTel’s full nationalisation. The government’s gradual increased influence over 
Telmex and ultimate attainment of majority ownership, alongside the retention of 
much of its successful private structure (employees, board members, etc.) resulted in 
greater market knowledge (experienced learning), an opportunity that was arguably 
largely bypassed at ENTel. Moreover, the benefit of the ‘Mexican way’ resulted in a 
relatively more continuous diffusion process during the overall period, as well as a 
relatively higher quality of service in comparison to ENTel. Figure 5.3, earlier in the 
chapter, illustrated the diffusion of the telephone in the two countries. If one focuses 
on the years of nationalisation and the progressive movement toward nationalisation 
in Mexico (i.e. 1947-1989), it is clear that once ENTel was nationalised fully (in 
1948) diffusion increased at a relatively slower rate, as the period was characterised 
by a more inefficient system and at times by administrative chaos. Meanwhile,
35 Bare in mind that that by 1881, railroad telegraph lines in Argentina already accounted for over 20% of the 
total telegraph network also. See Berthold (1921a).
36 For a more detailed overview, see chapter 3, section The Progress Achieved during the Nationalised Era.
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during the period of gradual movement toward nationalisation, telephone diffusion in 
Mexico grew at a relatively fast rate.
Telephone diffusion in Mexico also benefited from better timing with regard to the 
events prior to Telmex’s privatisation, as well as the reform itself. Immediately 
before privatisation, Telmex was re-arranged and restructured, making the regulatory 
framework clear by setting out how it intended to govern the newly privatised sector. 
This avoided the confusion, which to some extent took place in Argentina, where 
limited restructuring took place prior to the reform and no clear regulatory body was 
set up until the bidding process began. Arguably this provided a potential advantage 
for telephone diffusion in Mexico compared to Argentina, since in the latter, the lack 
of clarity over the regulatory aspect at the time of bidding reduced the number of 
potential bidders for ENTel. Moreover, the new telecom regulatory agency created in 
Argentina in 1990, did almost nothing until 1992, partly due to its lower degree of 
autonomy and to some extent limited finances, further highlighting the problems 
caused by poor timing.
Ultimately, one can argue that this seeming advantage in speed and relative sense of 
better timing can partly explain the side of the Paradox that explains why Mexico 
outperformed. The Mexican timing effect can be summarised as a twofold argument: 
first, in terms of the relatively more proactive and relatively faster speed of action 
(e.g. introduction of Mexico’s Mitre Law equivalent many years before Argentina) 
and second, in terms of the favourability of timing (e.g. Telmex’s gradual 
nationalisation). By implementing key reforms before Argentina’s administrations, 
the telecom sector in Mexico was able to reap the benefits from these reforms 
relatively sooner (as well as avoid wasting time travelling down a less efficient 
diffusion path) and, through the gradual timing of other reforms, it arguably 
benefited from a relatively better reform.
5.3 Mexico’s Success Story
As explored, there are two sides to the Paradox. From a learning perspective, one 
could claim that the examination of the Mexican side of the story is likely to be 
relatively more useful for developing countries, as it provides some examples of how
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to potentially outperform in ICT diffusion relative to their economic means. It seems 
logical therefore, to ask at this instance whether the diffusion of the telegraph and the 
telephone in Mexico can be considered a ‘Success Story’, or was it merely a quirk of 
circumstance? In appreciation of the factors that explained the rate of diffusion o f the 
two technologies, it is believed that Mexico can be labelled as a relative success story, 
and this section explains to what extent this was the case.
The relatively similar speed with which the two technologies diffused in Mexico 
compared to Argentina does not necessarily mean the experience in Mexico was a 
success story. However, the various administrations in Mexico did achieve some 
sense of success in introducing timely reforms and in dealing more efficiently than 
Argentina with additional customer demand. Perhaps Argentina’s governments did 
not set their diffusion rate targets as high as they could have been, given the 
country’s relative advantage with regard to income wealth, but one cannot take credit 
away from the Mexican administrations. Mexico’s telegraph diffusion was 
particularly fast, since during the period of export-led growth from a socio-economic 
standpoint, the country significantly lagged not just Argentina, but the Latin 
American average (see chapter 1, section The Period o f Export-led Growth [1870- 
1930], and appendix A ).37 Indeed, the diffusion experience in Mexico can be 
considered a relative success story on two fronts. One, the positive attitude and 
overall capacity of the Mexican administrations at critical periods of telegraph and 
telephone diffusion, translated into reasonably effective implementation of diffusion- 
inducing reforms (as assessed earlier in section 5.2.3 The Traits of the Government 
Administrations in Mexico). Two, it was not only the decisions to implement these 
policies that were impressive, but the swift and timely manner in which plans were 
executed, in relative terms when compared to the situation in Argentina (as analysed 
earlier in section 5.2.4 The Mexican timing Effect).
Through analysis of specific examples from the Mexican experience it is possible to 
present some potential learning implications. For instance, the gradual approach to 
Telmex’s nationalisation (in retaining private flavour) adopted by the Mexican 
administrations after the Second World War in preference to ENTel’s full blown
37 Note that the most significant part of telegraph diffusion took place during export-led growth and this was 
when the economic divide with Argentina was at its largest.
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nationalisation, enabled a relatively higher quality of service provision by Telmex. 
The opportunity to learn from the expertise of the previous private provider, instead 
of simply appointing (perhaps capable but) inexperienced government officials to run 
the company (as with ENTel), incentivised relatively greater diffusion among the 
population. Therefore one lesson for other countries is to decisively and thoughtfully 
implement structural changes at critical stages of technology diffusion. Next, it 
would be wrong to consider the diffusion of the two technologies in Mexico an 
absolute success. Indeed, much of Porfirio Diaz’s ability to implement reforms and 
encourage the expansion of the telegraph network was at times carried out by overly 
aggressive means. The fact that if someone was caught breaking a telegraph cable 
they could face the death penalty, says a lot. This ‘got the job done’, as it were, but it 
cannot be deemed as ‘successful policy’ to be copied by other countries. Moreover, 
Porfirio Diaz’s positive attitude was not founded on the fact that the telegraph had 
characteristics of a public good in need of universal supply, but rather was driven by 
the fact that it was conceived as a primary tool for state consolidation. Despite the 
fact that it was an innovative technological breakthrough, a similar mindset was 
observed in Argentina, so by no means can one say that the Mexican administrations 
had a particularly distorted perspective. Hence, one could argue that, moral issues 
and motives aside, another lesson is that one must appreciate that an outwardly 
positive attitude toward the diffusion process is particularly important.
Further, without overly generalising, given the significant variation in rule even 
within the same tenure of a given administration (over the period under 
consideration), the generally higher degree of political stability fostered in Mexico 
during the height of the Porfiriato and the height of the PRI’s dominance over 
politics in particular (which coincided with the fastest portions of telegraph and 
telephone diffusion speed), allowed for a relatively higher degree of continuity in 
diffusion conducive reforms (see specifically chapter 4, sections Political Institutions: 
the Degree o f Stability and Characteristics o f State Power). Clearly, political 
stability is not necessarily a trait that every administration in power can necessarily 
influence greatly, but rather the message is to act in the interests of the long-term, for 
strong diffusion speed. A final lesson that can be drawn from Mexico’s experience is 
that an economic advantage is not seemingly a pre-requisite for successful diffusion 
of the telegraph and the telephone. Despite the theoretical advantage of Argentina’s
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socio-economic lead over Mexico throughout much of the period in question, which 
the conventional literature argues is key in explaining differences in diffusion rates, 
in this study this advantage did not necessarily ensure faster diffusion. Arguably, 
despite Argentina’s relatively higher income levels, the two technologies managed to 
diffuse at a relatively similar speed in Mexico. The thesis provides some support 
toward the argument that, rather, it was political players and institutional reforms that 
were relatively more meaningful drivers of the diffusion of the telegraph and the 
telephone. This in some ways alludes to Gerschenkronian concepts as the state to 
some extent was more important than the typical pre-requisite factors (e.g. higher 
income) in promoting diffusion.39
In evaluation of the whole telegraph and telephone diffusion complex, it is 
reasonable to argue that to some degree, and certainly in comparison to the 
experience in Argentina, the diffusion of the telegraph and the telephone in Mexico 
constitutes a relative ‘Success Story’. Moreover, the analysis delivered a number of 
potential learning implications, particularly for developing countries that may face 
similar uncertainty regarding the future diffusion of a given technology. One: certain 
Mexican administrations were successful in taking relatively decisive action in the 
implementation of reforms in a timely manner. Two: although the primary rationale 
for the state’s positive attitude toward diffusing the two technologies was primarily 
self-interested, the end-result was a success. The lesson here is that the government 
should aim to adopt a visibly supporting stance in promoting access to such 
technologies in order to drive diffusion. Three: a greater notion of political stability 
is favourable in implementing diffusion-conducive reforms. Since this is not always 
attainable, more importantly, where such technologies are concerned, the governing 
party must ideally put the public’s needs first and seek to implement long-term 
policies that can be maintained by future leaders, and not simply pander to short­
sighted populist choices. Indeed, the fourth lesson does not come in appreciation of 
the Mexican success story but rather indirectly in acknowledgement of the relative 
‘failings’ of Argentina. The fourth lesson is that the state should never restrict 
diffusion, which the Mexican administrations managed to avoid to a relatively higher
38 Chapter 4, section 4.2 Analysis of Diffusion -  A Quantitative Approach, provides some evidence for this. 
However the regression analysis must be read in conjunction with the qualitative assessment, given the issues 
surrounding the data.
39 Gerschenkron (1962).
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degree than in Argentina. In a process that is so uniquely shaped by the intrinsic 
traits of a country’s setting, it is important to be self-aware and ready to shift policy 
where necessary, at the very least so as not to inhibit diffusion. The final lesson is 
that an economic advantage is not essential to ensure successful diffusion.
5.4 Conclusion
From the platform set up by chapters 1-4, this chapter addressed the three questions 
posed at the start of the thesis, namely, what were the main drivers behind the 
diffusion rates of the telegraph and the telephone in Argentina and Mexico? 
Secondly, since both countries experienced very similar diffusion rates, despite 
significant income level differentials, how can the Paradox be explained? Third and 
finally, can the Mexican case study be considered a ‘Success Story’?
In response to the first question, the thesis found that the role of the government was 
crucial across the diffusion of both technologies in Argentina and Mexico. Telegraph 
diffusion in Argentina was ultimately most affected by the government’s 
introduction of the Mitre Law, while the implementation of privatisation drove 
telephone diffusion most of all. In Mexico, the relatively stronger desire and degree 
of autonomy, as well as the capacity of the main administrations in the early part of 
the diffusion period enabled the successful development of the telegraph, while the 
government’s gradual nationalisation approach of Telmex was the determining factor 
during telephone diffusion.
In answering the second question, the Paradox is best explained by both Argentina’s 
relative underperformance and Mexico’s outperformance in terms of diffusion speed. 
The diffusion of the two technologies in Argentina was not as fast as it theoretically 
could have been in regard to its economic advantage, ultimately making it easier for 
the diffusion of the two technologies in Mexico to catch up. In Argentina, the 
underperformance in diffusion speed seemingly was driven by the constraining 
impact of various factors that the state somewhat controlled (namely the delayed 
introduction of the Mitre Law and the inability of the nationalisation reform in 
meeting increased demand), since diffusion speed was rapid after the given situations 
were rectified. Meanwhile, in Mexico, the outperformance can be best understood
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through close examination of the various governments in power. This revealed that 
the particular traits of the most important government administrations in Mexico, as 
well as the timing of the implementation of reforms particularly conducive to 
diffusion, were the two comparatively key broad explanatory factors.
In appreciation of the Mexican side of the Paradox, the final question can thus be 
suitably answered. This chapter demonstrated that the Mexican experience can 
certainly be viewed as a relative ‘Success Story’ and moreover it provided five 
learning implications for developing countries looking to optimise ICT diffusion 
speed. These implications point to the need to: act decisively and carefully in 
implementing reforms, adopt a visible supportive stance in promoting access to such 
technologies, achieve a relatively higher level of state stability (or at least implement 
long-term policies), avoid acting in a manner that restricts the diffusion process and, 
lastly, understand that an economic advantage does not automatically pertain to 
successful diffusion. In conclusion, this chapter has served its purpose in providing 
reasonably sound answers to the three important questions raised at the beginning of 
the thesis.
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Conclusion
This thesis has set out to document and explain the diffusion of the telegraph and the 
telephone in two major Latin American countries, Argentina and Mexico. Since 
Argentina was considerably richer than Mexico in the eras in which the telegraph and 
telephone could become available, the expectation was for both technologies to have 
diffused more quickly in Argentina than in Mexico. This was not the case, and 
explaining this ‘paradox’ became the intellectual core of my thesis.
Overall, the thesis contributes to the surprisingly limited literature of comparative 
historical studies (of Argentina and Mexico) on the diffusion of traditional ICTs. The 
telegraph and telephone were revolutionary technologies that affected not only economic 
advancement, but also social behaviour.1 By examining the whole period of diffusion, 
the strength of the findings are improved and their scope enlarged. This approach 
contrasts with a great deal of the literature since most studies look at the diffusion 
process as a snapshot.2 Similarly, the work that has been done on ICT diffusion in Latin 
America has concentrated on the most recent period, after privatisation, and on the most 
modem ICTs, such as the internet. This thesis contributes to the literature not only by 
examining an earlier period of diffusion, but by focusing on ICTs which largely 
impacted the setting and arrival of future ones (e.g. the relationship between fixed-line 
telephones and the internet). Given the growing recognition that past technological 
achievements influence future ones, this thesis allows insights to be drawn for future 
ICT diffusion. It aids our understanding of a country’s given experience with modern 
ICT diffusion, and the thesis shows that ‘history counts’. The results of the thesis serve 
to redirect the focus toward the overwhelming influence of the state in determining the 
speed of technology diffusion.
1 Although some studies have focused on the history of the development of these technologies, particularly with 
regard to Argentina, they are largely historical accounts of the evolution of facts.
2 This is problematic because as a process, diffusion cannot simply be viewed at a moment in time, if one hopes to 
draw meaningful generalisations about the whole period of diffusion, or provide much insight regarding the primary 
drivers of a given diffusion rate over time.
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The first stage of the thesis was to document the increasing use of the two technologies 
in each country. Wherever possible I used standard, well respected sources, including 
the national censuses, data from INDEC and INEGI, or from official industry 
publications. The official data was also checked against parallel series and always 
subject to critical, sceptical scrutiny. Where primary sources were not available, it was 
necessary to merge various time series and cross-reference their consistency to complete 
the construction of consolidated telegraph and telephone diffusion series. Examination 
showed that telegraph and telephone diffusion were just as rapid in Mexico as in 
Argentina, as summarised in table 6.1 (for full details see chapter 2, section 2.6.2 
Linearisation of the S-curves):
Table 6.1 Summary Findings of the Diffusion Analysis
Data set Diffusion Speed 
(as measured by the CRD)
Saturation Point 
(years)
Inflection 
Point (years)
Argentina Telegraph 25yrs 83.5 35.6
Mexico Telegraph 26yrs 30.8 15.4
Argentina Telephone 54yrs 86.2 28.1
Mexico Telephone 52yrs 86.3 37.6
Source: See appendix B fo r  data sources. Note: CRD = Characteristic Rate o f Duration (see 
chapter 2).
Table 6.1 confirms the statistical closeness of the diffusion speeds as measured by the 
characteristic rates of diffusion.3 Throughout the research process, various challenges 
presented themselves. One of the most difficult proved to be plotting real diffusion 
against a theoretical model. The methodology required sufficient complexity to map the 
diffusion process, without overshadowing the simplicity of the conclusions. The Flexible 
Logistic Growth model and subsequent linearisation methods provided the necessary 
base from which to form the analyses. This gave rise to an interesting historical episode, 
which I called the ‘Double Paradox’ (‘the Paradox’ for short). Notably, relatively similar 
diffusion strategies were implemented in Argentina and Mexico, yet the degrees of
3 Note that the saturation and inflection points in Mexico are much lower for the telegraph.
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success were quite different.4 Although the period cannot be generalised in entirety, the 
distinguishing factors were seemingly the relative underperformance of the Argentinian 
administrations and the apparent outperformance of the Mexican administrations, at 
critical junctures of ICT diffusion. It is in the combination of these experiences that the 
dual nature of the Paradox is revealed.
Aside from conceptual issues, the most difficult obstacle to the research was the physical 
collection of historical records from Buenos Aires and Mexico City. There were often 
incomplete data sets or missing volumes and, although alternative data sets could 
sometimes be sourced from the archives, at times it had to be accepted that the data did 
not exist. For instance, as a result of a lack of data in the earliest periods under 
consideration, it was not possible to carry out a cross-sectional data analysis as initially 
planned in order to account for the intra-regional and spatial diffusion patterns. These 
challenges were mitigated as far as possible in the production of the consolidated data 
series (see appendix B). Indeed, the greatest challenge was arguably the fact that as the 
research evolved, the focus of the thesis shifted, and more emphasis was placed on the 
qualitative aspects, particularly the political economy and state capacity.
The implications of the Paradox are significant in providing some evidence that those in 
power hold the key, with the state having the power to both drive and constrain diffusion. 
Although these findings are somewhat contrasting to the conclusions of various 
academic contributions, this should not be taken as support for an argument that 
economic factors are not important. Rather, the findings suggest that an economic 
advantage was not a pre-requisite for successful ICT diffusion. In analysing these two 
developing countries and finding that the level of income had, at best, a weak impact on 
the rate of diffusion of these two technologies, this work is most closely aligned with 
Rouvinen’s hypotheses.5 On the other hand, the finding in the regression analysis that 
GDP per capita was a significant variable in explaining the telephone diffusion rate in
4 Chapter 3 demonstrated that the governments in Argentina and Mexico assumed similar positions regarding the 
diffusion of the telegraph (e.g. both made it a monopoly of the state, implemented the Mitre Law and its equivalent 
and consolidated the network) and in the diffusion of the telephone, (e.g. the nationalisation and privatisation reforms).
5 Rouvinen (2006).
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Argentina, but only after privatisation, is directly supportive of Littlechild’s work.6 
Moreover, the results of the thesis show that some of Mexico’s administrations acted as 
substitutes (Gerschenkronian style) for economic shortcomings in allowing for 
successful diffusion.7
The fact that the state played a crucial role in ICT diffusion is not surprising given a 
state’s capacity to affect the entire diffusion environment (and these findings are aligned 
with the work of Petrazzini, Milner, Rosenberg, Henisz and Zelner, among others).8 The 
extent of the state’s impact, however, is surprising. Indeed, initiatives for sector reform 
were often exogenous and associated with an economic crisis, making the state the key 
player in pushing the necessary reforms onto the political agenda. At the extreme, 
Argentina’s reform strategies actually served to constrain diffusion. Indeed, various 
Argentinian governments proved to be relatively inefficient at important moments in the 
implementation (e.g. nationalisation) or timing (e.g. the Mitre Law) of diffusion- 
enhancing reforms, and this was testament to the relative slow pace of diffusion. Clearly 
this was not the aim of government policy, but rather an unintentional consequence. In a 
comparison of some of the most important administrations during telegraph and 
telephone diffusion, the thesis provided evidence that a relatively more closed political 
system was seemingly more effective than a more open, decentralised and quasi- 
democratic one, in the implementation of telecom reforms. This is very much aligned 
with the conclusions reached by Petrazzini, but at odds with the work of Duch.9 
Moreover, it draws some parallels to the developmental authoritarianism literature, 
although this is not to say that a country that has an authoritarian regime is necessarily 
predisposed to faster diffusion.10
6 Littlechild (1983).
7 Gerschenkron (1962).
8 Petrazzini (1995), Milner (2006), Rosenberg (1970,1972), Henisz and Zelner (2001). Also see Bergara et al. (1998), 
Andonova and Diaz-Serrano (2007), Esfahani and Ramirez (2003), Levy and Spiller (1996), Brown (1981), Mokyr 
(2002), Wallsten (2001a, 2005), Bath and James (1979), Schuler and Brown (1999).
9 Petrazzini (1991), Duch (1991).
10 The advocates include Haggard and Kaufman (1993). Those opposing this include O’Donnell et al. (1986). Also see 
Johnson (1982,1999), Johnson in Deyo (1987), Amsden (1989), Zysman (1983), White (1988), Deyo (1987).
313
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The ‘Double Paradox’ o f Argentina and Mexico
The introduction to the thesis argued that a greater understanding of the factors driving 
the diffusion of traditional ICTs was necessary for an understanding of what can drive 
future ICT diffusion (and thus economic development), particularly in developing 
countries. The thesis is well placed to adjudicate on this matter and in turn supplied 
some learning implications for developing economies in the future. The examination of 
the Mexican ‘Success Story’ highlighted five specific lessons: first, the importance of 
swiftness and optimal timing. Second, the need for a government to adopt a visible 
supportive stance in promoting access to such technologies. Third, ensuring the 
implementation of diffusion-conducive reforms with longevity beyond the government's 
term in office. Fourth, in a process that is shaped by the unique traits of a given country, 
it is important to be self-aware and shift policy and strategy where necessary, at the very 
least to avoid hindering diffusion. Finally, understanding that an economic advantage 
does not necessarily ensure successful diffusion provided the given administration 
functions as an appropriate substitute. The wider implications of these lessons 
highlighted the fact that it is not only the choosing of the reforms that is imperative in 
inducing faster diffusion but it is down to the smallest of details that can make the 
decisive difference between outperformance and underperformance. Indeed, in light of a 
growing appreciation of the importance of ICTs in accelerating economic growth, it is 
increasingly more important to learn about their diffusion processes, especially for 
developing countries. In diffusing a technology after others have done so, there is an 
opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the innovators and to try to replicate their 
successes. Accordingly, the value of this thesis in comparing Argentina (the leading 
Latin American economy for much of the period) and Mexico is both fascinating and 
has proved usefUl.
In terms of further research, readdressing the key findings gives rise to a number of 
interesting questions about the balance between institutional factors and economic 
factors regarding the ICT diffusion process in developing economies. For example, we 
could ask under what circumstances do institutional players have a more significant role 
than economic factors in explaining ICT diffusion? Econometrically, it would be 
interesting to find the point at which additional income does not further diffusion.
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Indeed, more specifically we could ask whether governments often fail to perform as 
expected, or was this unique to Argentina? Lastly, is an authoritarian-inclined regime, a 
pre-requisite, or are there other ways to achieve a diffusion-conducive setting? Although 
beyond the scope of this thesis, these are potentially intriguing new directions the 
research could take.
The literature on technology diffusion recognises the importance of a plethora of factors 
in explaining differences in diffusion rates across countries, but economic factors are 
commonly asserted to play the crucial differentiating role. Historically, ICT diffusion 
often is explained as a function of wealth, urbanisation, etc. Theory would therefore 
predict that the telegraph and the telephone diffusion in Argentina should have been 
relatively faster than in Mexico given its (varying but material) inherent economic 
advantage throughout the period studied. One of the main contributions of the thesis is to 
demonstrate that this was not the case. These variables do not explain diffusion in either 
country independently, nor can they explain the differences in diffusion between the 
countries.11 This result alone is a contribution to the literature since the unexpected 
finding not only questions a purely economic rationalising but broadened the accepted 
complex of primary explanatory outcomes with regard to technology diffusion speed.
This thesis achieved its central aims of documenting and explaining the diffusion of the 
telegraph and the telephone in Argentina and Mexico. Both the summary statistics and 
the application of a more formal diffusion model show that, contrary to initial 
expectations, neither of the two technologies diffused faster in Argentina, despite 
Argentina’s greater wealth throughout the period under consideration. This thesis also 
demonstrates that the diffusion rates in each country cannot be explained using the sort 
of conventional economic modelling that have proven so successful for both 
contemporary, and historical diffusion processes. Instead, what explains the relatively 
rapid rate of diffusion in Mexico, relative to Argentina is essentially a matter of political 
economy. Through a range of interventions, ranging from the early implementation of a 
complementary railway statute in the case of the telegraph, to a gradual approach to
11 One must only accept these results, however, with due consideration of the issues raised with regard to the data.
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nationalisation in the case of the telephone, the Mexican governments arranged things in 
such a way as to be much more supportive of technological diffusion. This result is 
interesting for historians of technology, for those interested in the role of government in 
the development process in general, and above all for historians of Latin America. The 
primacy of politics in economics is embedded in the history of the region and is a 
recurring theme in the history of Latin America, and it is a theme that again proves to be 
extremely powerful in this case.
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APPENDICES
The appendices presented below provide a more comprehensive overview of the 
statistical data referred to in the thesis. The appendices elaborate further upon the data 
sets used and identify the sources and procedures employed. First of all, it is important 
to appreciate the evolution and nature of the data collection process in Latin America as 
a whole. Indeed, detailed widespread recording of national accounts did not really begin 
across Latin America until after the Second World War. Even then, the information 
gathered was relatively limited, typically including only GDP estimates by industrial 
origin and its structure by expenditure type. In the late 1940s, national income estimates 
for Latin American economies based on official publications were presented collectively 
by Dominguez.1 Further progress was made in the 1960s, by which point every Latin 
American country produced their own GDP estimates. Moreover, under the 
recommendations of the United Nations, some countries (with varying restrictions) also 
drew up a simplified system of accounts. However, as Noriega warns, due to the distinct 
absence of rigorous independent estimates of domestic product and income, a huge 
limiting factor was the inability to check the reliability of these official estimates.2
In light of the known inherent limitations of the official data, the appendices attempt to 
justify the decisions made with regards to the chosen data sources for Argentina and 
Mexico. Given the length of the period under concern and the fact that data are 
presented for more than one country, inevitably various methodological challenges with 
regard to consistency presented themselves and it must be accepted that the chosen 
approach will never be to every reader’s complete satisfaction. Despite this, and 
provided that the associated issues are made transparent, the extensive use of data sets 
are useful. In using data sets collected by various institutions and academics and in 
constructing four of my own, it is important to try to adhere to certain criteria. This 
includes striking the right balance between adopting databases with the longest data
1 Note that Dominguez produced this under the technical guidance of Simon Kuznets. Dominguez L. M., National 
Income Estimates o f Latin American Countries volume X, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research (1947).
2 Noriega C., ‘The Present State of National Accounts in Latin America’ Review o f  Income and Wealth 22.2 (1976): 
133-149.
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series available without overly forfeiting on reliability. Further, standardisation of 
definitions (or as proximate as possible) is important to aid comparability between 
countries. Taking all of this into consideration, occasionally, it is still necessary to make 
some generalisations about the raw data in order to ensure its accessibility and value. A 
full set of data are shown for appendices B and C, however due to a lack of space, the 
socio-economic data in appendix A is presented at regular intervals only over the period. 
When analysing Latin American averages for various data, the LA6 [or 8] grouping 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico and Venezuela [plus Peru and Uruguay]) is 
frequently used, since together these economies typically accounted for at least three 
quarters of economic activity of Latin America during this period and represent as much 
as 80% of the region’s entire population and territory. Therefore LA6 [or 8] data can be 
seen as a good proxy for overall Latin American development, at least in regard to 
socio-economic indicators.
For Argentina and Mexico the appendix considers generic data issues, before detailing 
various problems associated with specific data. In sourcing the historical data sets, the 
official sources were primarily used where readily available and consistent, however due 
to various gaps in the data sets, complementary sources were used as well. An excellent 
institutional source for both Argentina and Mexico from the second half of the period in 
question is the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). From 1950, ECLA 
estimated socio-economic variables such as real gross product (in constant prices) in a 
standardised fashion.3 It is interesting that policy makers (especially in the early part of 
the period in question) typically ignored aggregated economic indicators because of the 
wide range in data availability on important areas such as the nominal value of GDP. 
National income statistics in the first half of the century were used primarily to reflect 
the successes, or failure, of political administrations instead of as a basis for policy 
formulation.4 Consequently overestimation of these values in the official accounts seems 
unavoidable.
3 ECLA (1950a), and subsequent years.
4 Reynolds (1970).
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The Evolution o f Argentinian Statistical Data
In the second half of the nineteenth century Argentina underwent unprecedented 
demographic and economic changes whose appraisal and measurement were of 
particular interest to the ruling classes. Statistical research was aimed at increasing 
knowledge in regard to population growth, learning more about the consequences of 
immigration, as well as obtaining information on the conditions of economic production. 
This information became so central to the diagnosing and designing of government 
strategy and policy that in 1869, the first National Population Census was ordered.5 
There is a genuine lack of data on Argentina during the nineteenth century, and the 
existing data are sporadic and isolated. Even at the turn of the twentieth century, the data 
improved minimally and there are difficulties in connecting the data, as successive 
governments failed to use consistent methods.
Strong demand for national statistics came in the late 1920s, as a consequence of the 
new international economic landscape, as well as mass European immigration and 
domestic developments in Argentina’s social and productive structure. It is useful 
therefore to list the various governmental agencies (and their insertion in the state 
structure) that oversaw the production of public statistics over the relevant period. From 
1894: Direccion General de Estadlstica (General Direction of Statistics), an agency of 
the Ministerio de Hacienda (Ministry of Public Finances). From 1944: Consejo 
Nacional de Estadistica y  Censos (National Council of Statistics and Censuses), an 
agency of the Consejo de Defensa Nacional, Ministerio del Interior (Council of National 
Defense in the Ministry of Interior), and of the Secretaria Tecnica de la Presidencia de 
la Nacion (Technical Secretariat of the Argentine Presidency). From 1950: Direccion 
General del Sistema Estadistico Nacional (General Direction of the National Statistical 
System), an agency of the Direccion Nacional de Servicios Tecnicos del Estado, 
Ministerio de Asuntos Tecnicos (National Direction of the Technical Services of the 
State, in the Ministry of Technical Affairs). From 1952: Direccion Nacional de Servicio 
Estadistico (National Direction of Statistical Service), an agency of both the Ministry of
5 Republica Argentina, Comision Nacional del Censo, Primer Censo Nacional, 1869 Buenos Aires, Imprenta del 
Porvenir (1872).
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Technical Affairs and the Ministry of Public Finances. From 1956: Direccion Nacional 
de Estadisticay Censos (National Direction of Statistics and Censuses), an agency of the 
Ministerio de Economia (Ministry of Economy).
The Instituto Nacional de Estadlstica y  Censos (INDEC) was created in 1968, under the 
provisions of its founding act (the national Law No. 17622), which sought to align 
Argentina’s statistical economic data-keeping, with international standards. From 
INDEC’s inception, it was subordinated successively to various agencies and 
departments of the executive branch, preserving in all cases its independence regarding 
the production of public statistics. At present it is an agency of the Secretaria de 
Programacion Economica y  Regional, Ministerio de Economia y  Obras y  Servicios 
Publicos de la Nacion (Secretariat of Economic and Regional Planning in the National 
Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services). As well as drawing up the 
Annual Program of Statistics and Censuses, INDEC continuously develops the methods 
and standards that will ensure the comparability of statistical information across various 
sources. Through the 1990s, as Argentina progressed economically and was integrated 
further into global markets, there was an increased requirement for timely and reliable 
public statistical data to aid the decision making process and assess policy choices. 
Further, there was a greater need to update previous information gaps with regard to 
education and the impact of technological and economic changes. As a result INDEC 
diversified its production, accelerated its publication turnaround and ensured widespread 
information dissemination, however the reader must acknowledge that these changes did 
not take place until the very end of the century.
The Evolution o f Mexican Statistical Data
In Mexico, the official sources are often readily available, however there are so few 
independent estimates to cross-check against, that it is difficult to assess the reliability of 
much of the data. As a result, it becomes necessary to evaluate the official data on its 
own merits and attempt to determine the quality of the data and the potential biases from 
the known information. In appreciation of this task, a very brief review of the actors
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involved in the data collection process during the relevant period is also useful as 
presented above for Argentina.
One must note that statistical economic recording during the Porfiriato was relatively 
advanced for the period however, the Revolution abruptly ended this. Statistical data 
collection did not really get back on track until the late 1930s, and in 1938 the first 
estimate on national income appeared in the Direccion General de Estadistica.6 
Scholars from El Colegio de Mexico made attempts to fill in various gaps in this data.7 It 
was not until 1939, that Banco de Mexico began the arduous task of collecting real 
systematic data of economic indicators in Mexico. Banco de Mexico made a concerted 
attempt in the following years to prepare more reliable benchmark estimates for national 
estimates. In 1950, Enrique Perez Lopez compiled detailed estimates of gross national 
product (in constant pesos) from 1895 to 1964 (excluding the revolution years).8 These 
were revised further by Mario Gutierrez Requenes (as directed by Solis, Chief of 
Economic studies at the Banco de Mexico) and extended to 1967.9 Note that only the 
estimates for 1921-1939 were entirely re-estimated.10
The Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografla e Informatica (INEGI) was formed 
toward the end of the 1970s, from the merger of the statistics and geography bureaus of 
Mexico. INEGI assumed the role as Mexico’s primary provider of statistical economic 
estimates. The institute was (and is) integrated by a governing council, which is
6 Secretaria de la Economia Nacional. Direccion General de Estadistica, Mexico en Cifras Mexico D.F., Talleres 
Graficos de la Nation (1938). For an excellent account of national statistics pre-1930, refer to Mexico, Departamento 
de la Estadistica Nacional, Anuario de 1930 Tacubaya D.F., Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento (1932). For 
specialised references to historical estimates of national income pre-1950, see - Vargas Torres E., ‘Estimaciones del 
Ingreso Nacional de Mexico’ in El Trimestre Economico volume 27.4, Mexico D.F., Fondo de Cultura Economica 
(1960) and Aubrey H. G., The National Income o f  Mexico Washington D.C., Instituto Interamericano de Estadistica 
(1950). For a more recent study on the historical statistics of Mexico, see Peiia S. and Wilkie J. W., La Estadistica 
Economica en Mexico: los Origenes Mexico D.F., Siglo Veintiuno Editores (1994). Although it must be noted that 
most of this relies on Reynolds C. W., The Mexican Economy. Twentieth-Century Structure and Growth New Haven, 
Yale University Press (1970).
7 El Colegio de Mexico, Estadisticas Economicas del Porfiriato: Comercio Exterior de Mexico, 1877-1911 Mexico 
D.F., El Colegio de Mexico (1960).
8 Perez L6pez E., ‘The National Product of Mexico 1895 to 1964’ in Perez Lopez E., Mexico's Recent Economic 
Growth Austin, University of Texas Press (1967).
9 Note that all the numbers were revised up to 1939 and the weightings were changed between 1950 and 1960. Banco 
de Mexico, Informe Sobre la Revision Preliminar de las Estimaciones del Producto Nacional de Mexico para los 
Ahos de 1950 a 1962 Mexico D.F., Comercio Exterior (1963).
10 This comment can be located in Maddison A. and Associates, The Political Economy o f  Poverty, Equity and 
Growth. Brazil and Mexico New York, Oxford University Press (1992).
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controlled by a governing director, the President of the INEGI, a commissioner of the 
Secretary of Economy and three representatives from the Secretary of Tax and Public 
Credit (Hacienda). 11 INEGI is a public agency with technical and management 
autonomy, and retains its own legal entity. INEGI’s tasks include the coordination and 
promotion of development of the National Statistical and Geographic Information 
System, the drawing up and completion of the national census, integration of the 
national accounts system as well as the national summary of Industrial and Consumer 
Prices. Upon creation, one of INEGI’s first major contributions was the creation of the 
new official economic series from 1960 onwards.12 Also, INEGI since has built a 
historical GDP series from 1895 to the present.13
Although INDEC and INEGI are standard primary sources at the country level, I used 
Maddison for consistency across my country sample for various variables, like GDP per 
capita. Maddison naturally references INDEC and INEGI in various series but also 
importantly draws much of his data from independent bodies like ECLA and the World 
Bank, which means they are free from potential bias as explained. According to the 
evidence to be presented, Maddison is one of the more consistent and impartial sources 
available.
Appendix A examines the main socio-economic variables referenced throughout the 
thesis and most specifically in chapter 1. Appendix A focuses on providing the relevant 
data that makes comparisons across Latin American economies over a range of factors 
possible. For this reason, consistency of periodicity and definition across the data were 
favoured, whereas for the purposes of a single country study, the reader may have a 
preference for alternative sources in some instances. Appendix A most importantly 
allows the reader to observe the relative performance of Argentina and Mexico within 
the wider socio-economic landscape. Appendix B focuses on the telegraph and 
telephone data in Argentina and Mexico. This data provided the basis for the analysis in
11 Hacienda is Mexico’s equivalent to an internal revenue agency.
12 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico: 
Cuentas Consolidadas de la Nacion, Ofertay Utilizacion, Producto Intemo Bruto, 1980-86 Mexico D.F. (1987).
13 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Estadisticas Historicas de Mexico Mexico D.F. 
(1994).
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chapter 2 and allowed for the construction of the diffusion s-curves. Given the 
requirements of the data series in appendix B, sources with the fullest data sets were 
preferred (albeit with suitable accountability of its reliability). Appendix C shows the 
full data set used in the regression analysis in chapter 4 and details the sources for each 
series. The data sources in appendix C remain consistent with those of appendices A and
B, except for GDP per capita in Argentina. The reason for this is because Maddison did 
not have a full data set for the earlier period that was tested for in the regression 
analysis, and while consistency was important in appendix A, a greater accuracy of the 
year on year changes in the variables was more important for the purposes of appendix
C. Given the nature of the data presented in appendix C, a number of the sources relate 
to the official bodies, who were directly involved in the telecom sector. Appendix D 
(The Diffusion Curves), E (Determining the FLOG Formulae), F (Goodness of Fit Tests) 
and G (Transformations) provide the supplementary commentary to chapter 2 and detail 
various aspects of the theoretical modelling work. Lastly, appendix H lists the heads of 
state that served in Argentina and Mexico during the period under study, as well as the 
years in which they were in power.
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APPENDIX A 
Socio-economic Variables
As Thorp comments, at the beginning of the 1900s, Latin America was inhabited by 
some 70 million people, around 80% lived in the countryside, almost as many were 
illiterate and life expectancies were below 40 even in the richest countries. Latin 
America now boasts a combined population in excess of half a billion, around 70% live 
in cities, literacy rates are almost 90% and life expectancies have doubled in many 
countries. While their outright achievements seem impressive, their relative economic 
progress is certainly not. Average GDP per capita of Latin American economies were 14% 
of the U.S. in 1900, and are still around this level today.1 Detailed analysis of why this 
materialised is beyond the scope of this thesis but acknowledgement is very necessary. 
The main socioeconomic variables referred to throughout the thesis are detailed here, 
namely, GDP per capita, literacy, life expectancy, export growth, railways per capita and 
the Historical Living Standards Index (HLSI). The source of each variable is outlined 
and then explained, followed by a table of the data in the relevant period.
GDP per Capita Levels
The GDP data used in the present section corresponds to the publication of the historical 
series collected by Maddison. Maddison uses a range of sources, with a preference for 
independent international bodies where possible, such as ECLA or the World Bank in 
order to construct the fullest data set possible, hence his value to this study. For the 
period of 1900-1990, Maddison’s GDP per capita data sources for Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela can be found in Maddison (1995).2 For Argentina the 
estimates used were provided by ECLA/CONADE for 1900-1913, IEERAL for 1913- 
1980 (at 1960 market prices), and estimates from el Banco Central de la Republica 
Argentina for 1980-1990 (at 1986 market prices).3 For Brazil, the data from the period
1 Thorp (1998).
2 Maddison A , Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992 Paris, OECD Development Centre (1995).
3 ECLA (1959), - Instituto de Estudios Economicos sobre la Realidad Argentina y Latinoamericana (IEERAL), 
Estadisticas de la Evolution Economica de la Argentina, 1913-1984 Buenos Ares, Agentina (1986). Agentina, 
Banco Central de la Republica Agentina Estimaciones Anuales de la Oferta y  Demanda Globales: Periodo 1980- 
1990 Republica Agentina (1993).
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of 1900-1985 is from Maddison and Associates (1900-1950 estimates are based on 
sector weights for 1947; 1950-1985 are based in 1970 prices) and for 1985-1990 from 
the World Bank.4 Maddison used data for Chile for 1900-1980 from Hofman and for 
1980-1990 from the World Bank.5 For 1901-1912 for Colombia, due to a lack of data, 
Maddison applied interpolation based on the average GDP per capita movement in 
Brazil and Chile. For Colombia, for 1913-1929 he used data from Zimmerman, ECLA 
for 1929-1950, for 1950-1980 Urdinola and Carizzosa and the World Bank for 1980- 
1990.6For Mexico, data from 1900-1980 is from Maddison and Associates (primarily 
sourced from INEGI and Banco de Mexico) and from 1980-1990 from the World Bank.7 
In Maddison and Associates, it is commented that for 1900-1960s, Banco de Mexico’s 
official estimates are not adequately described in the official report.8 However upon 
cross-referencing of other sources it is clear that for 1900-1921, the GDP movements are 
identical to those of Perez Lopez.9 Note that these estimates assume that service output 
(in real terms) moved in line with commodity output and therefore there is potential that 
these estimates slightly overestimated growth. Banco de Mexico takes this into account 
to some extent by presenting lower growth than Perez Lopez for 1921-1939, however it 
is unclear why they have not restated the earlier period subsequently. During 1939-1960, 
the data are aligned again with Perez Lopez, who employs more sophisticated techniques 
in his calculations from 1939 onwards. Despite some of the issues described, Banco de 
Mexico remains the most detailed source of pre-1960 data and hence its use here. From 
1960 onwards, Maddison and Associates use the official figures from INEGI.10 INEGI’s 
series is now seen as the official source for national accounts and is much wider in 
coverage than the earlier Banco de Mexico estimates (indeed for the 1970 figure, it is
4 Maddison and Associates (1992), p.212. The World Bank, World Bank Tables Washington D.C. (1993).
5 Hofman A., ‘International Estimates of Capital: A 1950-1989 Comparison of Latin America and the USA’ Research 
Memorandum 509 University of Groningen, Institute of Economic Research (1992). The World Bank (1993).
6Zimmerman L. J., Arme en rijke landen: Een Economische Analyse (Poor and Rich Countries: An Economic 
Analysis) The Hague, Uitgerij Albany (1964), - Comisidn Econdmica para America Latina (CEPAL), Series 
Historicas del Crecimiento de America Latina Santiago, United Nations (1978), Urdinola, A. and Carizzosa M. 
Povery, Equity and Growth in Colombia Bogota, The World Bank (1985)., and The World Bank (1993).
7 Maddison and Associates (1992). Maddison uses Coatsworth’s GDP movements until 1910 and INEGI and Banco 
de Mexico thereafter. Coatsworth J. H., ‘The Decline of the Mexican Economy, 1800-1860’ in Liehr R., La 
Formacion de las Economias Latinoamericanos en la epoca de Simon Bolivar Berlin, Colloquium Verlag (1989). The 
World Bank (1993).
8 Banco de Mdxico (1963).
9 Pdrez Lopez (1967).
10 INEGI (1987).
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over 6% higher in absolute value terms). For further information on the differences 
between the Banco de Mexico figures and those of INEGI, refer to Reyes Heroles 
Gonzalez Garza and Sidaoui for a full reconciliation.11 For 1901-1912 in Peru, data are 
sourced as per Colombia above. Maddison used data from Seminario and Beltran for 
1913-1941, ECLA for 1942-1950, Webb for 1950-1980, and the World Bank for 1980- 
1990.12 For Venezuela, Maddison used Baptista for 1900-1970, and for 1970-1990 he 
used the World Bank.13 For Uruguay between 1820 and 1949 Maddison used Bertola 
and Associates, and for 1936-1990 he used Bertola.14As is clear, Maddison uses ECLA 
and the World Bank where possible and for the period of 1990-1998 Maddison used 
ECLA for all the countries.15
In order to make easy comparisons across countries, Maddison is an excellent source 
since he converted GDP per capita levels from their national currencies into Geary- 
Khamis dollars (using PPP) and used 1990 as the benchmark year. PPP measures are 
available from the International Comparison Programme (ICP) of the United Nations, 
Eurostat and the OECD. The 1990 cross-section level estimates in Maddison are merged 
with the time series for real GDP growth to show GDP levels for all other years. It is 
pertinent to point out that a major problem with the national accounts of Latin American 
economies was the assessment of activity in the informal sector. Recent official 
revisions for Argentina have been very substantial. Instead of a GDP totalling 2,840m 
australes in 1980, it is now estimated closer to 3,840m (nearly 36% higher). Maddison 
pointed out that the Mexican national accounts carry a very large imputation for 
informal activity also. For instance Maddison adjusted the Mexican GDP downwards in
11 Reyes Heroles Gonzalez Garza J. and Sidaoui J. J., Cuentas Nacionales y  Analisis Macroeconomico document 38, 
Mexico D.F., Banco de Mexico (1981).
12 Seminario B. and Beltran A., Crecimiento Economico en el Peru 1896-1995 Lima, Universidad del Pacifico (1998), 
Comision Econdmica para America Latina (CEPAL), Cuadros del Producto Intemo Bruto en Dolores de 1950 
Santiago, United Nations (1962), CEPAL (1978), Webb R., The Political Economy o f  Poverty, Equity and Growth in 
Peru 1948-85 Washington D.F., The World Bank (1988), The World Bank (1993).
13 Baptista A., Bases Cuantitativas de la Economia Venezolana 1830-1989 Caracas, Comunicaciones Corporativas 
(1991), The World Bank, World Bank Tables Washington D.C. (1993).
14 Bertola L., ‘El PBI Uruguayo 1870-1936 y otras Estimaciones’ Documento de Trabajo no. 43 Montevideo, 
Universidad de la Republica Montevideo (1998). For 1936-1990 GDP is provided by Luis Bertola, ECLAC (1999).
15 ECLAC (1999). ECLAC publishes estimates of annual volume changes in GDP for the current year the previous 9 
years in its annual Prelimenary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean.
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some years by almost 18% to correct for apparent exaggeration of output levels in 
agriculture, manufacturing and some other services.16
Table A.l shows Maddison’s GDP per capita levels from 1900-1997; while table A.2 
shows the average yearly growth rates in these GDP per capita levels for selected 
periods
Table A. 1 GDP per Capita, in Levels (1900-1997)
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela LA8
1900 2,756 678 2,194 973 1,366 686 2,219 821 1,206
1901 2,880 730 2,223 1,022 1,466 727 2,233 797 1,272
1902 2,717 715 2,293 1,020 1,348 757 2,572 856 1,237
1903 2,992 714 2,139 1,030 1,483 798 2,615 913 1,300
1904 3,191 713 2,287 1,039 1,492 815 2,640 876 1,333
1905 3,479 718 2,259 1,053 1,630 864 2,334 861 1,400
1906 3,518 770 2,408 1,103 1,594 921 2,533 799 1,434
1907 3,459 755 2,507 1,101 1,669 966 2,757 793 1,457
1908 3,657 734 2,743 1,096 1,649 972 2,973 841 1,488
1909 3,699 776 2,726 1,131 1,680 976 2,957 865 1,522
1910 3,822 769 3,000 1,162 1,694 981 3,136 886 1,562
1911 3,746 836 2,887 1,201 1,707 989 2,957 937 1,582
1912 3,904 809 2,968 1,236 1,718 1,012 3,508 962 1,617
1913 3,797 811 2,988 1,236 1,732 1,032 3,310 1,104 1,618
1914 3,302 780 2,497 1,163 1,744 1,013 2,654 956 1,498
1915 3,244 798 2,389 1,129 1,757 1,087 2,470 980 1,493
1916 3,091 804 2,895 1,222 1,770 1,185 2,508 921 1,518
1917 2,790 842 2,923 1,292 1,783 1,213 2,717 1,069 1,515
1918 3,248 808 2,926 1,252 1,796 1,205 2,828 1,057 1,558
1919 3,307 895 2,480 1,253 1,810 1,230 3,135 983 1,581
1920 3,473 963 2,768 1,255 1,823 1,226 2,674 1,173 1,644
16 For more information see Maddison (1995), p.166.
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3,471 963 2,370 1,255 1,836 1,257 2,751 1,214 1,631
3,636 1,009 2,426 1,255 1,850 1,345 3,078 1,241 1,692
3,898 1,046 2,885 1,255 1,884 1,415 3,170 1,420 1,789
4,055 1,024 3,062 1,255 1,825 1,524 3,397 1,630 1,822
3,919 1,007 3,152 1,255 1,908 1,540 3,188 2,081 1,837
3,994 1,008 2,850 1,340 1,991 1,670 3,398 2,487 1,887
4,156 1,060 2,760 1,424 1,875 1,674 3,797 2,761 1,929
4,291 1,158 3,332 1,490 1,857 1,754 3,906 3,057 2,039
4,367 1,137 3,455 1,505 1,757 1,908 3,847 3,426 2,053
4,080 1,048 2,859 1,474 1,618 1,663 4,301 3,444 1,913
3,712 1,004 2,218 1,448 1,643 1,504 3,500 2,754 1,762
3,522 1,018 1,844 1,511 1,373 1,423 3,196 2,613 1,657
3,621 1,076 2,236 1,577 1,501 1,558 2,750 2,831 1,752
3,845 1,142 2,655 1,526 1,574 1,740 3,221 2,995 1,866
3,950 1,150 2,761 1,677 1,660 1,873 3,356 3,181 1,937
3,912 1,235 2,847 1,744 1,768 1,931 3,459 3,449 2,013
4,125 1,250 3,181 1,751 1,796 1,926 3,462 3,896 2,086
4.072 1,276 3,161 1,843 1,794 1,925 3,676 4,144 2,108
4,148 1,263 3,169 1,905 1,858 1,905 3,692 4,305 2,136
4,161 1,250 3,236 1,895 1,852 1,911 3,661 4,045 2,122
4,304 1,307 3,141 1,877 1,949 1,880 3,682 3,903 2,168
4,284 1,229 3,226 1,832 2,032 1,807 3,338 3,347 2,116
4,182 1,368 3,256 1,792 2,051 1,804 3,331 3,575 2,166
4,579 1,386 3,256 1,863 2,159 1,926 3,705 4,309 2,294
4,356 1,390 3,471 1,899 2,134 1,964 3,764 5,102 2,304
4,665 1,501 3,699 2,017 2,211 2,005 4,083 5,948 2,465
5,089 1,518 3,240 2,042 2,221 2,027 4,313 6,894 2,550
5,252 1,596 3,712 2,050 2,248 2,059 4,405 7,394 2,656
5,047 1,659 3,569 2,107 2,304 2,177 4,504 7,544 2,682
4,987 1,672 3,670 2,153 2,365 2,308 4,659 7,462 2,696
5.073 1,702 3,731 2,150 2,477 2,426 4,955 7,663 2,765
4,717 1,752 3,893 2,214 2,504 2,487 4,957 7,992 2,774
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4,874 1,784 4,112 2,277 2,439 2,579 5,139 7,956 2,814
4,980 1,848 3,907 2,358 2,605 2,583 5,391 8,417 2,909
5,237 1,926 3,975 2,373 2,742 2,703 5,352 8,750 3,026
5,285 1,896 3,957 2,391 2,843 2,751 5,360 9,124 3,060
5,461 1,994 4,264 2,400 2,965 2,810 5,333 10,058 3,203
5,698 2,111 4,392 2,383 3,025 2,743 5,402 9,816 3,283
5,241 2,221 4,042 2,473 3,016 2,682 4,860 9,997 3,259
5,559 2,335 4,270 2,497 3,155 2,969 4,960 9,646 3,387
5,862 2,437 4,366 2,540 3,172 3,142 5,036 9,002 3,457
5,677 2,511 4,465 2,594 3,211 3,281 4,858 9,058 3,489
5,455 2,463 4,639 2,597 3,343 3,334 4,820 9,134 3,485
5,926 2,472 4,638 2,675 3,594 3,465 4,858 9,562 3,629
6,371 2,448 4,577 2,689 3,702 3,594 4,860 9,841 3,709
6,321 2,527 4,984 2,750 3,813 3,788 4,974 9,677 3,785
6,399 2,554 5,046 2,784 3,922 3,831 4,721 9,922 3,843
6,578 2,704 5,128 2,874 4,073 3,685 4,747 10,249 3,974
7,037 2,860 5,220 2,976 4,185 3,676 4,991 10,262 4,127
7,302 3,057 5,231 3,094 4,320 3,854 5,184 10,672 4,309
7,530 3,279 5,597 3,194 4,365 3,916 5,130 10,446 4,451
7,635 3,539 5,429 3,355 4,602 3,930 4,945 10,245 4,620
7,962 3,882 5,034 3,499 4,853 4,023 4,974 10,625 4,875
8,334 4,083 4,992 3,618 5,013 4,119 5,123 10,507 5,044
8,122 4,190 4,273 3,622 5,158 4,326 5,421 10,472 5,086
7,965 4,472 4,347 3,716 5,244 4,271 5,608 10,929 5,242
8,304 4,568 4,700 3,797 5,293 4,157 5,639 11,251 5,358
7,807 4,681 5,011 4,047 5,595 4,049 5,903 11,164 5,455
8,227 4,892 5,345 4,184 5,968 4,181 6,234 10,920 5,696
8,206 5,198 5,680 4,265 6,320 4,263 6,577 10,139 5,894
7,603 4,852 5,932 4,263 6,717 4,342 6,668 9,841 5,782
7,243 4,765 5,035 4,212 6,514 4,258 6,000 9,356 5,589
7,383 4,500 4,810 4,185 6,088 3,608 5,614 8,745 5,307
7,425 4,646 5,011 4,239 6,162 3,692 5,520 8,623 5,400
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1985 6,834 4,917 5,030 4,282 6,194 3,682 5,567 8,521 5,465
1986 7,224 5,205 5,228 4,446 5,834 3,963 6,023 8,725 5,592
1987 7,299 5,273 5,481 4,589 5,818 4,210 6,461 8,805 5,669
1988 7,056 5,158 5,781 4,682 5,771 3,782 6,422 9,080 5,596
1989 6,523 5,227 6,283 4,739 5,899 3,250 6,462 8,094 5,546
1990 6,436 4,923 6,402 4,840 6,085 3,021 6,474 8,313 5,465
1991 6,980 4,893 6,795 4,821 6,226 3,032 6,614 8,965 5,587
1992 7,497 4,802 7,506 4,909 6,333 2,943 7,055 9,373 5,676
1993 7,827 4,939 7,906 5,028 6,339 3,047 7,224 9,137 5,785
1994 8,367 5,163 8,400 5,240 6,504 3,391 7,567 8,620 5,999
1995 8,005 5,296 8,974 5,418 6,001 3,609 7,365 8,950 5,969
1996 8,253 5,366 9,505 5,428 6,209 3,623 7,679 8,747 6,082
1997 8,803 5,488 9,997 5,409 6,525 3,864 8,003 9,155 6,313
Sources: described above.
Table A. 2 GDP per Capita, Average Growth Rates (%), Selected Periods
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela LA8
1901-13 2.6% 1.5% 2.5% 1.9% 2.0% 3.2% 3.5% 2.5% 2.3%
1914-29 1.1% 2.2% 1.6% 1.3% 0.1% 4.0% 1.4% 7.9% 1.5%
1930-45 0.1% 1.4% 0.7% 1.5% 1.4% 0.4% 0.3% 3.1% 0.8%
1946-64 1.8% 3.1% 1.7% 1.8% 2.8% 3.1% 1.4% 3.5% 2.4%
1965-79 2.3% 4.7% 1.1% 3.0% 3.5% 1.3% 1.7% 0.9% 3.1%
1980-89 -2.2% 0.8% 1.9% 1.3% 0.0% -2.2% 0.5% -2.9% -0.2%
1990-97 3.9% 0.7% 6.0% 1.7% 1.3% 2.3% 2.7% 1.6% 1.6%
1901-45 1.2% 1.7% 1.5% 1.5% 1.1% 2.5% 1.6% 4.6% 1.5%
1946-97 1.5% 2.7% 2.2% 2.0% 2.2% 1.4% 1.5% 1.3% 2.0%
Sources: described above.
Literacy Rates
The data for literacy rates are from Hunt, and he sourced these from the national 
censuses (see Hunt for a detailed methodology).17 Hunt used interpolations between
17 Hunt S., The Human Condition in Latin America, 1900 -1995 Consultancy paper done in 1997 for R. Thorp (1998).
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censuses, and all the 1995 figures were taken from UNESCO.18 The data in table A.3 
represents illiteracy rates and refers to the population aged 15 and over who were unable 
to read and write.19 For Chile (in 1895, 1885 and 1875), Colombia (in 1928 and 1918), 
Mexico (in 1921, 1910 and 1900), Peru (in 1876), and Venezuela (in 1926), literacy data 
in these censuses was reported with a different minimum age and therefore they were 
standardised to 15 and over, by applying ratios found in other censuses demonstrating 
similar demographic and educational characteristics (see Thorp for a detailed 
methodology).20 Also of particular note is that for Peru and Uruguay there were large 
gaps in between censuses.21 As a result, estimates were derived by tracking the 
approximate size of specific groups that had known literacy rates, as per Thorp.22
Table A. 3 Illiteracy Rates (% of Population age 15 and over, 1900-1995)
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela LA 6 U.S.
1900 48.7 65.3 56.5 66.0 75.6 75.7 - - 29.0 11.2
1910 39.6 65.1 46.8 60.7 70.2 71.2 - - 31.0 8.2
1920 31.8 64.9 36.6 56.2 64.7 66.8 - 31.0 35.0 6.5
1930 25.1 60.5 25.3 48.1 63.6 62.6 - 32.0 37.0 4.8
1940 18.3 56.1 27.1 43.1 53.9 57.6 - 38.0 40.0 4.2
1950 12.4 50.6 21.0 38.2 39.5 48.7 - 51.0 48.0 2.6
1960 8.6 39.7 16.4 30.4 34.6 39.8 68.0 60.0 57.0 2.1
1970 7.4 33.8 11.0 21.8 25.8 29.6 69.0 65.0 61.0 1.0
1980 6.1 25.5 9.3 14.9 17.0 19.1 70.0 68.0 65.0 0.5
1990 4.2 20.6 6.3 10.3 12.4 14.1 72.0 71.0 68.0 -
1995 3.8 16.7 4.8 8.7 10.4 11.3 73.0 72.0 70.0 1.0
Sources: described above.
18 United Nations World Economic Trends New York, United Nations (1995).
19 For Argentina’s pre-1940, and for the U.S. post-1930 figures are taken as percentage of the population aged 14 and 
over.
20 Thorp (1998).
21 For Peru, between 1876 and 1940, and for Uruguay between 1908 and 1963.
22 Thorp (1998).
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Life Expectancy
Sources for the data on life expectancy rates (table A.4) can be found in Hunt (1997).23 
The only exceptions are data for Cuba and Uruguay pre-1950, which were taken from 
Perez Brignoli, while data for 1995 was taken from UNDP.24 Hunt primarily sources 
from CELADE, the United Nations Demographic Year books and Arriaga.25 However 
for the U.S. he uses the U.S. Bureau of the Census for all years.26
Table A. 4 Life Expectancy (1900-1995)
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela LA 6 U.S.
1900 39 29 29 - 25 - - - 29 48
1910 44 31 30 31 28 - - - 31 52
1920 49 32 31 32 34 - - 31 35 57
1930 53 34 35 34 34 - - 32 37 59
1940 56 37 38 38 39 37 - 38 40 64
1950 61 43 49 49 48 40 - 51 48 68
1960 65 55 57 57 57 48 68 60 57 70
1970 67 59 62 61 61 54 69 65 61 71
1980 70 63 69 66 67 60 70 68 65 74
1990 72 66 74 69 71 66 72 71 68 75
1995 72 66 75 70 72 67 73 72 70 76
Sources: described above.
Export Growth
Data on export growth is from Thorp.27 Thorp used export data for Argentina and Brazil 
from Hofman for 1900-1915 and from Wilkie for the period hence.28 For Chile, figures
23 Hunt (1997) consultancy paper for Thorp (1998).
24 Perez Brignoli H., ‘America Latina en la Transici6n Demogrdfica 1800-1980’ La Transici6n Demogrdfica en 
America Latina y el Caribe volume 1, Mexico D.F., INEGI (1993). Note that all Perez Brignoli’s data are based on the 
inverse projection method. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report New 
York, Oxford University Press (1997).
25 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribefio de Demografia (CELADE), Boletin Demografico 29.58 (1996): 55. United 
Nations Statistical Yearbook New York, United Nations (1951). Arriaga E., New Life Tables fo r  Latin American 
Populations in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of 
California (1968).
26 For U.S. Bureau of Census see: (http://www.census.gov./ipc).
27 Thorp (1998).
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are from Palma for 1900-1906, Hofman for 1907-1915, and Wilkie for the period 
thereafter.29 For Colombia, data are from Hofman for 1900-1915, Wilkie for 1916-1922 
and from Banco de la Republica for the subsequent period.30 Mexico’s data are from 
INEGI.31 For Peru, for 1900-1912 and 1914-1915, data are based on rate of growth of 
figures in gold soles (from Thorp and Bertram), PAU for 1913, and Wilkie for 1916- 
1929.32 For Uruguay, data are from PAU, and for Venezuela data are from Baptista for 
1900-1915, and Wilkie for thereafter.33 Wilkie is an excellent impartial source for this 
data, using a relatively consistent series constructed by the IMF pre-1937 and from 
several other primary sources for the period onwards.
Table A. 5 Export Value Growth (% Annual Rate), Selected Periods
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela LA 6
1900-13 9.0 5.9 6.5 8.6 5.9 7.1 - 5.6 7.0
1913-29 3.3 4.0 -0.4 9.8 3.0 5.2 -0.4 11.4 3.7
1900-29 6.4 3.2 0.9 9.6 6.6 8.2 - 7.2 4.7
Sources: described above. Note: data fo r  Mexico exclude the period o f 1913-19. For Uruguay, data starts in 1916.
Railways per Capita
In order to construct the data for railways per capita, two sets of data were used: railroad 
length and population, with the former divided by the latter to complete the series. The 
railroad length data were taken from Thorp.34 It is based on Mitchell until 1988 and from 
ECLAC from 1989 onwards.35 Meanwhile, the population data for all the countries are
28 Hofman A., Economic Performance in Latin America - A Comparative Quantitative Perspective Consultancy paper 
done in 1997 for R. Thorp (1998). Wilkie J. W. and Ruddle K., Quantitative Latin American Studies: Methods and 
Findings SALA Supplement Series 6, Los Angeles, UCLA (1977).
29 Palma J. G., Growth and Structure o f the Chilean Manufacturing Industry from 1830 to 1935 Doctoral thesis, 
Oxford University (1979). Hofman (1997), Wilkie J. W., Statistics and National Policy (supplement 3) Los Angeles, 
University of California (1974).
30 Holman (1997), Wilkie (1974), Banco de la Republica, Principales Indicadores Economicos: 1923-1992 Bogota, 
Banco de la Republica (1993).
31 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informdtica (INEGI), Estadisticas Historicas de Mexico Mexico D.F. 
(1990).
32 Thorp R. and Bertram I. G. Peru 1890-1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy London, Macmillan (1978). 
Pan-American Union (PAU), The Foreign Trade o f Latin America since 1913 Washington D.C., Pan American Union 
(1952), Wilkie (1974).
33 PAU (1952), Baptista A , Bases Cuantitativas de la Economia Venezolana, 1830-1995 Caracas, Ediciones 
Fundacidn Polar (1997). Wilkie (1974).
34 Thorp (1998).
35 Mitchell B. R., International Historical Statistics: The Americas, 1750-1988 Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan
(1993). Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook for Latin 
America and the Caribbean Santiago, United Nations (1996).
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from Maddison. The population data from 1900-1949 are from Maddison (1995), while 
the data after 1950 for all countries are based on official sources from the U.S. Bureau of 
Census, which provides annual estimates from then onwards.36 For the first half of the 
century, Argentinian, Chilean and Columbian population data are sourced from Hofman, 
Brazilian from IBGE, Mexican from INEGI (supplemented by Greer), Peruvian from the 
U.N., Uruguayan from Bertola and Venezuelan from Baptista.37 Maddison’s population 
data from 1950 onwards does not pose some of the problems that arise with other 
variables such as GDP, since population data does not require aggregation and therefore 
there are typically fewer gaps in the data set.
In light of the key role that demographic development plays in any country’s history, 
population data must be investigated with regard to the given conditions of national 
political socio-economic conditions of the period. At the start of the nineteenth century, 
there was a propensity for governments to overstate their country’s true levels and 
indeed the reverse happened by the 1960s, as populations were understated. Moreover 
population censuses were compiled on a count basis, and therefore often excluded 
adjustments for omissions and isolated Indian populations.38 As a result of the inflated 
estimates by governments in the early years, population change calculations are 
problematic since previously existing persons for instance are suddenly found, thereby 
distorting the real growth rate. Nevertheless, with due acceptance of these facts and 
suitable cross-reference of sources, the various sources give a solid approximation of 
estimated populations across different periods.
36 Maddison (1995), p.99. For U.S. Bureau of Census see: fhttp://www.census.gov./ipc).
37 Hofman (1992). Instituto Brasilero de Geografia y Estadistica (IBGE), O Brasil em Numeros Rio de Janeiro (1960), 
p.5. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Estadlsticas Historicas de Mexico volume I, 
Mexico D. F (1985), p.311. Greer R. G., The Demographic Impact o f  the Mexican Revolution 1910-21 Master’s thesis, 
University of Texas (1966). United Nations, Demographic Yearbook New York, United Nations (1960). Bertola L, ‘El 
PBI Uruguayo 1870-1936 y otras Estimaciones’ documento de trabajo no. 43 Montevideo, Universidad de la 
Republica Montevideo (1998). Baptista (1991).
38 Indeed with every updated population estimate (especially since 1920), there was seemingly a new revision to 
account for the omission of jungle Indians.
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Table A. 6 Length of Railroads (metres) per Capita (1900-1995)
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela LA total
1900 358.0 85.1 148.7 15.0 99.9 49.3 185.8 35.4 92.9
1913 437.7 61.7 236.1 21.2 136.9 76.8 220.9 31.3 128.0
1929 323.5 97.3 202.3 33.2 137.5 53.7 160.2 30.7 116.0
1940 291.5 83.4 170.1 36.0 112.8 45.0 152.7 26.4 100.7
1950 250.1 68.7 139.6 30.2 81.8 40.6 136.7 20.0 81.8
1970 166.5 33.2 88.6 15.9 46.4 16.7 106.2 1.9 44.7
1995 101.4 18.6 45.1 5.8 28.6 8.8 93.3 2.8 25.1
Sources: described above.
Historical Living Standard Index (HLSI)
The HLSI is a commonly used indicator for living standards, and data for this variable 
was taken from Thorp.39 The presentation of the HLSI data monitors any changes in the 
standard of living of a given country with respect to its own median value, making it 
similar to the U.N.’s Human Development Indicator. The index is based on giving 
appropriate weights to GDP per capita, life expectancy and rate of adult literacy, hence 
providing an estimate to a country’s standard of living. Thorp constructed the index with 
her own collected data using the methodology for the construction of the index set out in 
Astorga and Fitzgerald.40
39 Thorp (1998).
40 Astorga et al. (2004).
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Table A. 7 HLSI (3 Year Average Values, 1950 based), 1900-90
Year Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela LA 6 U.S.
1900 55 48 45 40 39 - - 31 45 65
1910 67 51 54 47 48 - - 33 53 71
1920 72 56 57 54 62 - - 38 60 76
1930 79 66 78 66 60 - - 51 69 82
1940 89 78 80 79 74 83 85 64 80 88
1950 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1960 108 140 118 119 125 129 105 122 124 107
1970 125 170 136 140 155 157 109 143 147 121
1980 136 231 151 162 187 182 118 159 177 135
1990 128 241 166 175 190 176 120 157 181 147
Sources: described above. Note: Mexico’s 1920figure corresponds to the average o f1921-1922.
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APPENDIX B 
Telegraph & Telephone Data
Given the large range of years under study in this thesis, the availability and quality of 
statistical economic data varied significantly over time. In the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and in reality until the 1960s, there were only three sources of official 
government primary data for Argentina and two for Mexico. In Argentina these are the 
population censuses of 1869, 1895, 1914, 1947 and 1960, the Anuario de la Direccion 
General de Estadistica between 1892 and 1914 and the Anuario Estadistico de la 
Republica Argentina from 1946 onwards. For Mexico the equivalent sources are the 
censuses of 1895, 1900, 1910, 1921, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960 and the Anuario 
Estadisticos from 1893 onwards. As indicated economic data collection after the 1960s 
was initiated from various regional and international independent bodies in order to 
augment (and verify) the individual country collection.
One must note that there are various data sets that monitor ICT trends in Argentina and 
Mexico over (at least) parts of the period under study, although these are typically 
dedicated to the second half of the twentieth century. The specific information required 
for this thesis are public domestic electric telegrams sent and the number of fixed line 
telephone handsets, information which many publications do not always present directly, 
preferring instead to concentrate on infrastructural data. Further some will present 
telegrams sent with no breakdown between public and official ones, or frequently just 
the length of the telegraph network, while others will present the number of telephone 
lines or the length of lines as opposed to the total number of handsets. It is important to 
appreciate that many additional sources were examined, but not necessarily mentioned 
below, as they were discarded even before one began to assess their reliability. Overall, 
preference was given to the sources with the greatest consistency and scope, given the 
demands of the thesis, and where possible primary sources were used or continually 
cross-checked against.
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This section lists the sources used for the construction of the telegraph and telephone 
diffusion data sets. Like appendix A, the sources used are explored first, with a brief 
overview of the rationale, an assessment of the quality of such data and then the 
presentation of the data in table form. A priori, it should be easier to gather data for the 
telephone than for the telegraph given the greater difficulties faced in collecting data 
during the nineteenth century.
Telegrams Sent per Capita
The data for the total number of telegrams sent for Argentina are from ICPSR for the 
years of 1877-1910 and for 1911-1930 the data are from Castro Esteves R., Historia de 
Correos y  Telegrafos de la Republica Argentina, Ediciones de la Direccion General de 
Correos y Telegrafos, which uses the official data from the Revista de Correos y  
Telegrafos} ICPSR data are based on the data collected from the Statesman's Yearbook 
for each individual year.2 The ICPSR studies used in this thesis were conducted by 
Banks and his staff at the Centre for Comparative Political Research in the State 
University of New York, Binghamton. Their ambitious work serves as a basic reference 
volume for a huge range of interests in the study of politicosocial economy and has been 
used by various notable academics. Indeed as Wilkie comments ‘although a number of 
political scientists have prepared handbooks of political indicators with times series data, 
the most important work has been undertaken by Arthur S. Banks’.3 In covering so much 
information, some problems arise, namely, specific sources are not always available to 
fill in war time gaps. This, however, is not a problem here since I only used ICPSR data 
until 1910. Further, Banks at times overly relies on interpolation to complete data sets
1 Banks A. S., ‘Cross National Time Series, 1815-1973’ ICPSR Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research: Producer and Distributor (1976), Castro Esteves (1952), pp.204-205. 
Bose, Walter B. L., ‘Los Origenes del Telegrafo en la Argentina’ Revista de Correos y Teldgrafos no.81 Buenos Aires, 
Direccion General de Correos y Telegrafos (15 Mayo 1944).
2 Scott Keltie J., The Statesman’s Yearbook Fourteenth annual publication, London, Macmillan and Co. (1900), 
various publications from 1900 onwards. The Statesman’s yearbooks draws the data from annual official sources; 
Memorias del Ministerio del Interior de la Republica Argentina presentada al Congreso Nacional, Memoria presentada 
por el Ministro de Estado en el departamento de Hacienda al Congreso nacional, Handbook of the Argentine Republic, 
Anuarios de la Direccidn General de Estadistica, and Boletin del Instituto Geografico Argentino. Also note that in 
observation of the saturation level of telegrams, it was clear that ICPSR was twice as large as other points of reference 
such as Castro Esteves (1952) or Mitchell (1993). This seems to indicate that ICPSR was accounting for total 
telegrams (sent and received) rather than just telegrams sent and although not perfect, it was decided to divide this 
total by two. Moreover given the smoothness of the data alignment with Castro Esteves this was seemingly a sensible 
course of action.
3 Wilkie (1974), p. 18.
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and while this is acceptable for population or ICT growth at least in the earliest stages 
(since they are typically on an upward trend), it is less relevant to literacy rates for 
example because educational development did not always grow. For these reasons, 
ICPSR data use has been restricted to only the early portions of the time series and only 
in regard to variables like ICT growth, in order to fill gaps that could not otherwise be 
suitably filled. Indeed, although Castro Esteves was the preferred source, since his 
Historia de Correos y  Telegrafos de la Republica Argentina (Direccion General de 
Correos y  Telecomunicaciones) data are directly sourced from the Revista de Correos y  
Telegrafos, there are insufficient and unsatisfactory data in the early years. For instance 
there was only sporadic and inconsistent sent and received figures in the years 1887 and 
1888 and between 1889-1898 (and 1900-1902) there is no data available whatsoever. It 
is only after 1910 that the data remains consistent, which is indicative of the level of 
accounting quality starting to improve and it is from this point onwards that I use this 
data. Arguably the third national census of 1914 should be the most useful source, but 
the problem with this is that it does not have any data until 1895.4 As for the period after 
that, the reason why I did not use this source is because it only displays the aggregated 
total number of telegrams sent, with no differentiation between public and official 
telegrams sent. Mitchell is also a useful source of information but it was not used in this 
instance primarily for a lack of a full data set.5 For example Mitchell is missing data 
from 1916-1923, and does not have any data at all before 1895 for Argentina. Although 
Mitchell directly presents INDEC’s official numbers, which is important, it is not clear 
what the breakdown of the telegram totals are. INDEC appears to account for 
government telegrams sent as well as public ones, as the series is consistently higher 
than ICPSR and Castro Esteves. Moreover, Mitchell rounds the data to the nearest one 
tenth of a million and so they are much less accurate, especially in the earlier period 
when the numbers are naturally much lower.
4 Republica Argentina, Comision Nacional del Censo, Tercer Censo Nacional, 1914 Buenos Aires, Talleres Graficos 
de L. J. Rosso y Cia. (1916-1917).
5 Mitchell B. R., International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2000 5th ed, New York, Palgrave Macmillan 
(2003b).
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It is important to accept that there are variations (even if small) across almost all of the 
main data sets that exist for this particular information in the two countries. The 
differences in size can sometimes be explained by the capture of domestic versus 
international totals or the slightly varied aggregation methods, but often the subtleties 
are not fully disclosed and cross-referencing data sets is therefore critical. For instance, 
ICPSR explicitly states that its totals are domestic telegrams, while in Castro Esteves it 
is not so obvious. Although not disclosed, it makes sense that an industry account of the 
telegrams would not include government ones since these were often not paid for and 
hence they may simply have been disregarded in the internal accounts. Further, Castro 
Esteves’ totals are in line with ICPSR and are typically slightly lower than other sources, 
it would therefore seem plausible that Castro Esteves totals also accounted for domestic 
telegrams only. In light of the evidence, this would indicate that Castro Esteves was the 
most appropriate source to use. The data were directly sourced from the official Revista 
de Correos y  Telegrafos, and this was a suitable authority on the telegraph sector, hence 
its adoption over other sources, for the part of the telegraph series in the latter period, 
where a greater range of sources were available to choose from.
The collection of data regarding total telegrams sent in Mexico was somewhat easier 
than in Argentina, since the whole period of 1877-1925 was available and collected 
directly from one official source, the 1940 Anuario Estadistico of INEGI.6 This is the 
most usefiil source because it provides data for every year, and it explicitly separates the 
number of telegrams sent by the public and those sent by the government, unlike any of 
the other available sources. Again, Mitchell is a reliable source for the telegram data as 
he only uses primary data, which is strongly preferred. However, as in the case for 
Argentina above, although a full data set is available, there is again no differentiation 
between telegraphs sent by the public, the state or from internal servicing. Mitchell only 
presents an aggregated total and there are some minor discrepancies due to rounding (to 
the nearest one tenth of a million).
6 Institute) Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos, 1940 capitulo XI ‘Comunicaciones y Transportes’, cuadro 386, Mensajes y Palabras Transmitidas por la 
red Telegrafica Federal, Mexico D.F. (1942), pp.588-589.
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Once the total numbers of telegrams sent were collected, these were divided by the 
country’s population to obtain telegrams sent per capita. The population data for 
Argentina was collected from Ferreres’ Dos Siglos de Economia Argentina for the years 
of 1877-1889, who sourced the earliest period of the data from the Argentinian 
population census data published in INDEC.7 For 1890 and 1900-1930 I used Maddison 
for Argentina’s population. Maddison sourced his data from Bethell’s Cambridge 
History o f Latin America for up to 1890 and Hofman for the other years as described 
above.8 For 1896-1899 I used Vazquez Presedo’s Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas? 
To complete the data set it was necessary to apply geometric interpolation for 1891-1895 
based on the 1890 and 1896 numbers. For Mexico’s population data it was possible to 
use Maddison for the whole period.10 Maddison used Rosenblat and Rosenzweig for the 
years 1877-1890, INEGI for 1895-1909 and 1921-1949, and Greer for 1910-1921, again 
as described earlier.11 The reason for using different sources in the case of Argentina 
unlike in the case of Mexico was because Maddison unfortunately did not have a 
complete data set for the years in which I needed to use Ferreres and Vazquez Presedo. 
Mitchell again is another valuable source for this information, however he only presents 
the official numbers cited in the censuses and does not present any of his own 
interpolations or accepted calculations of economists to fill the gaps in between 
censuses. As a result, Maddison was preferred in his presentation of a fuller yearly data 
set. It is pertinent to bring the reader’s attention to a point raised by Vazquez Presedo; 
who demonstrated that almost every new construction of a data time series for 
population causes estimates to be revised. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina’s 
figures for instance are different, for the very same year, in their 1964, 1966, 1971 and 
1975 estimates.12
7 Ferreres O. J., Dos Siglos de Economia Argentina 1810-2004 cuadro 2.1 ‘Poblacion Total, Urbana y Rural’ Buenos 
Aires, Fundacion Norte y Sur (2005), p. 128. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC), La Poblacion de 
Argentina Buenos Aires (1975).
8 Maddison A., The World Economy: Historical Statistics Paris, OECD Development Centre (2003). Bethell (1986a), 
Hofman (1992).
9 Vazquez Presedo V., Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas (Comparadas), Primera Parte, 1875-1914 Buenos Aires, 
Ediciones Macchi (1971), p. 16.
10 Maddison (2003).
11 Rosenblat A., La Poblacion Indigena de la America desde 1492 hasta la Actualidad Buenos Aires, Institution 
Cultural Espafiola (1945), Rosenzweig F., Fuerza de Trabajo y  Actividad Economica por Sectores, Estadisticas 
Economicas del Porfiriato Mexico D.F., Colegio de Mexico (1960), INEGI (1985), p.311, Greer (1966).
12 Vazquez Presedo V., Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas (Compendio 1873-1973) Buenos Aires, Instituto de 
Economia Aplicada (1988), p. 17.
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As described, since there are various data sets available for almost every economic 
indicator, there is no guarantee that the ones ultimately chosen will be the most accurate 
to one telegram sent or the best population estimate to the nearest one person. However, 
what I have attempted to do is to balance the requirements of the thesis with the 
perceived reliability and consistency of the available information in order to construct 
data sets that are clear and usable. The table below presents the final series of telegrams 
sent per 100 people.
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Table B. 1 Telegrams Sent per 100 People: Argentina and M exico (1877-1925)
Year Argentina Mexico 1901 17.8 17.7
1877 5.4 1.0 1902 17.8 19.9
1878 6.0 1.0 1903 17.8 21.5
1879 6.6 1.1 1904 17.9 22.2
1880 7.1 0.9 1905 18.0 23.8
1881 7.6 1.1 1906 18.0 25.7
1882 8.0 0.7 1907 33.7 26.1
1883 9.0 1.2 1908 48.1 25.4
1884 9.9 0.6 1909 61.5 26.6
1885 10.8 0.4 1910 73.8 27.4
1886 11.6 1.0 1911 62.0 29.9
1887 12.3 2.3 1912 68.0 30.8
1888 13.0 3.1 1913 79.3 24.6
1889 13.6 3.7 1914 64.3 14.2
1890 14.6 4.7 1915 65.3 19.1
1891 15.1 4.5 1916 68.8 15.1
1892 15.6 5.6 1917 74.1 11.6
1893 16.0 5.2 1918 75.5 24.5
1894 16.4 6.5 1919 80.1 24.3
1895 16.8 7.5 1920 83.5 26.3
1896 17.1 9.1 1921 76.2 29.0
1897 17.3 10.1 1922 75.8 26.0
1898 17.6 10.2 1923 76.3 26.2
1899 17.8 18.6 1924 78.5 26.0
1900 17.8 16.7 1925 78.2 27.4
Sources: described above.
Telephones per Households
It is important to appreciate that a number of international bodies now look at telephone 
data in some detail given its standing in economics. However most of these studies did 
not begin until the second half of the century and hence the data does not go back far
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enough for the purposes of this thesis. This means that the following construction of 
telephones per households is reliant upon less rigorous sources for the earliest period 
under consideration. This should not really pose much of a problem however, since this 
period relates to the flattish part of the s-curve and these data points are relatively less 
critical (since they do not contribute to the regression analysis, i.e. they do not 
correspond to the 10-90% period of diffusion). The quality of these statistics is naturally 
dependent upon a certain degree of culture, the civic spirit of the administrative directors 
who carried out the data collection and generically the leaders of the companies, who 
were forced to provide these numbers in an efficient, true and fair fashion (to a certain 
extent this holds for the telegraph too).
The data for the total number of telephone handsets in Argentina is from ICPSR for the 
years of 1897-1913 and from Ferreres for 1918-2000.13 ICRSR’s data are based on the 
Statesman’s Yearbook and the World’s Telephones by AT&T.14 Ferreres’ data for the 
years of 1918-1959 are estimated on the basis of the growth data regarding the number 
of telephones presented in ENTel’s Anuario Estadistico 1974.]S For 1960-1970 Ferreres 
used telephone statistics presented in INDEC’s Estadisticas Telefonicas, and for 1993- 
2000 those from INDEC’s Estadisticas de Servicios Publicos (various years).16 For the 
years of 1971-1990 he used Vazquez Presedo.17 Mitchell is also a very strong alternative 
source, as he only presents the official data from INDEC but after long consideration, I 
decided against it, again in preference for a fuller data set. For Argentina, Mitchell only 
has one reading before 1919, which came in 1913 and pleasingly this is exactly in line 
with the figure presented below (with respect to Mitchell’s rounding to the nearest 
thousand telephone handsets). As with much of the data collection of this ilk, full 
methodology disclosure and consistency of reporting is not always forthcoming. Even 
among official statistical publications, there are sometimes discrepancies from the same
13Banks (1976), Ferreres (2005), pp.393-394, cuadro 4.8.2 ‘Telecomunicaciones’.
14 Scott Keltie (1900), various publications from 1900 onwards. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, The 
World's Telephones New York, AT&T (1957), various years between 1957 to 1992.
15 Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTel), Anuario Estadistico 1974 Buenos Aires (1974).
16 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC), Estadisticas Telefonicas 1970 Buenos Aires (1970). Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC), Estadisticas de Servicios Publicos Buenos Aires (various years between 
1995-2004).
17 Vazquez Presedo V., Estadisticas Histdricas Argentinas (Suplemento 1970-1990) Buenos Aires, Ediciones Macchi
(1994).
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body across their own publications in different years, see for example the census data 
differences between 1980 compared to 1973, or Mitchell’s versus INDEC’s immediately 
after the Second World War. Although often citing the same primary sources, the 
rationale for revisions/updates are often not disclosed. A potential explanation for some 
of the variations may be the use of telephones handsets in service rather than telephone 
handsets effectively sold. To mitigate this issue I primarily used the most recently 
updated source.
Indeed, this specific data series is one that particularly highlights the difficulties in 
assessing the reliability of a given data set in countries like Argentina and Mexico, with 
discrepancies arising between sources that are theoretically referencing each other. For 
instance the data for the total fixed line telephone handsets in Argentina in the period 
between 1965 and 1973 (from various sources) is presented in table B.2.
Table B. 2 Telephone Handsets in Argentina (1965-1973)
Source 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Vazquez Presedo (1873- 
1973)18
1,498,000 1,527,000 1,553,000 1,600,000 1,668,000 1,746,000 1,826,000 1,952,000 2,065,000
INDEC (1973)19 1,498,000 1,527,000 1,553,000 1,600,000 1,668,000 1,746,000 - - -
Mitchell (1998) 20 1,498,000 1,527,000 1,554,000 1,600,000 1,668,000 1,748,000 1,828,000 1,952,000 2,065,000
INDEC, A n u a r i o  
E s t a d i s t i c o  (1979-80) 1,383,591 - * - - 1,591,312 1,661,431 1,776,750 1,877,061
Ferreres21 1,497,841 1,526,766 1,553,281 1,599,861 1,668,426 1,746,015 1,661,400 1,776,800 1,877,100
Average 1,475,086 1,526,942 1,553,320 1,599,965 1,668,107 1,715,465 1,744,208 1,864,388 1,971,040
Table B.2 shows some of the differences in telephone handset data across some of the 
main sources. Aside from a couple of readings, the discrepancies between the readings
18 Vazquez Presedo (1988).
19 INDEC, Anuario Estadistico de la Republica Argentina 1973 Buenos Aires (1974), using the primary source of 
ENTel and the private providers.
20 Mitchell, B. R., International Historical Statistics: The Americas, 1750-1993 New York, Palgrave Macmillan
(1998).
21 Ferreres (2005).
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are typically no greater than 2% from the average. However it is interesting to note that 
to the nearest thousand, the data between 1966 and 1969 is identical, yet in 1970 four 
out of the five readings are different. In reality the discrepancies are quite small but table 
B.2 neatly highlights the fact that assessing reliability and (or) methodology 
discrepancies can be an arduous and imperfect task.
For Mexico, the total number of telephone handsets also was compiled from ICPSR 
during the early period (1898-1934) and from INEGI’s Anuario Estadisticos for the 
majority of the period thereafter. The reason why I was unable to use INEGI for the 
whole period was again due to a lack of data availability. ICRSR’s data are based on the 
Statesman's Yearbook?2 The data for 1935-1940 are from INEGI’s Anuario Estadistico 
de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1940, for 1941-1952 I used INEGI’s Anuario 
Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1951-1952, for 1953-1961 1 used INEGI’s 
Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1960-1961, and for 1962-1971 I 
used INEGI’s Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1970-1971.23 For 
1972-1974 I applied geometric interpolation from the data points in 1971 and 1975 (due 
to lack of available data). For 1975-1980 I used INEGI’s Anuario Estadistico de los 
Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1980, for 1981-1989 I used INEGI’s Anuario Estadistico de 
los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1990, and for 1992-1994 I used INEGI’s Anuario 
Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1995?4 For the years between 1995-2000
22 Scott Keltie (1900), various publications from 1900 onwards.
23 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos, 1940 capitulo XL Comunicaciones y Transportes, cuadro 391. ‘Empresas telefdnicas, aparatos y 
subscriptores, por entidades federativas’ Mexico D.F. (1942), p.592. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e 
Informatica (INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1951-52 capitulo X. Comunicaciones y 
Transportes, cuadro 262. ‘Empresas telefonicas, aparatos y subscriptores’ Mexico D.F. (1954), p.715. Instituto 
Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 
1960-61 capitulo XU Comunicaciones, cuadro 12.10. ‘Empresas telefdnicas, aparatos y subscriptores’ Mexico D.F. 
(1963), p.465. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Inform&tica (INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, 1970-1971 capitulo XII. Comunicaciones y Transportes, cuadro 12.12. ‘Empresas telefdnicas, 
aparatos y subscriptores’ Mexico D.F. (1973), p.570.
2 Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos, 1980 capitulo II. Inffaestructura y servicios bisicos, cuadro 2.1.11. ‘Empresas telefonicas, aparatos y 
subscriptores’ Mexico D.F. (1982), p.35. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Anuario 
Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1990 capitulo II.I Comunicaciones, cuadro 2.1.9. ‘Localidades con 
Servicio Telefonico, Aparatos, subscriptores y demanda de servicio’ Mexico D.F. (1992), p.35. Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1995 capitulo 13 
Comunicaciones, cuadro 13.11. ‘Aparatos telefdnicos en servicio por tipo de subscriptores 1980-1994’ Mexico D.F. 
(1996), p.334.
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I used geometric interpolation based on the data of 1994 and 2005 supplied by ITU.25 
The interpolation during these years was necessary because the measurement of 
telephone growth changed, as telephone lines, rather than handsets, became the new 
main measure. Mitchell yet again is an excellent source for this type of data but as per 
INEGI, there is limited data in the earlier period. Indeed, there is only one reading 
before 1927, which was 1913 and this was again consistent with the data used in ICPSR 
(with respect to Mitchell’s rounding). Of further note, one must point out that the 
telephone data collected in Mexico by INEGI was collected from the Oficina de 
Reglamentacion y  Estadistica de la Direccion General de Correos y  Telegrafos. 
Meanwhile from 1935 onwards, data from the different small private telephone 
providers was provided directly by the companies in their reports to Direccion General 
de Estadistica.
To obtain the total telephones per households, the total number of telephone handsets 
was divided by the country’s total households. The data for Argentina’s total households 
are available from the censuses with the exception of the 1914 national census which did 
not include the total number of households. The household data until 1947 was collected 
from the first, second and fourth censuses.26 For the years from 1960 onwards, data are 
from INDEC’s Anuario Estadisticos.21 For the years in between the data points provided 
by the censuses, household data were geometrically interpolated, since no other reliable 
sources exist. In the case of Mexico, the total number of households was obtained from
25 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), ICT Statistics Database ICT Eye (http://www.itu.int/ITU- 
D/icteye/Indicators/Indicators.aspx). Data used are from INEGI, base on numbers provided by the Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y  Transportes, Direccion General de Politicos y  Normas de Comunicaciones.
26 The total number of households for 1895 is from Republica Argentina, Comision Nacional del Censo, Primer Censo 
Nacional, 1869 capitulo XXVI. ‘Edification’, Buenos Aires, Imprenta del Porvenir (1872), p.XIII. For 1895 it is from 
Republica Argentina, Comisidn Nacional del Censo, Segundo Censo de la Republica Argentina, 1895 vol III, capitulo 
VII. ‘Edificacion’, Buenos Aires (1898), p.XVII. For 1947 Republica Argentina, Comision Nacional del Censo, 
Cuarto Censo General de la Nacion 1947 Resultados Generales del Censo de Poblacion, cuadro 17. ‘Formas de 
Convivencia’, Buenos Aires (1947), Buenos Aires (1951), p.26. Note that the 1947 census did not show the total 
number of households, instead used the average number of persons living in a household. However for the purposes of 
this study, this posed no real problem.
27 For 1960 and 1970 household data I used, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC), Anuario Estadistico 
de la Republica Argentina 1979-1980 cuadro 9.7.1. ‘Viviendas particulares ocupadas’, Buenos Aires (1981), p.269. 
For 1980 and 1991 data are from Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC), Anuario Estadistico de la 
Republica Argentina 2000 volume 16, cuadro 2.2.1 ‘Total de hogares particulares y hogares con necesidades basicas 
insatisfechas’, Buenos Aires (2000), p.89.
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98INEGI’s Anuarios Estadisticos. For the earlier period under consideration, that is the 
years before 1929, Mexico’s household data were extrapolated by plotting a best fit 
through the data points, given the lack of reliable available information. This gave the 
equation function: Households = 3E-17 e (0 0274 x Year>. Household data were geometrically 
interpolated between the figures in the Anuarios. The table below presents the final 
series of telephone handsets per 100 people.
28 For the years of 1929 and 1939 data were obtained from INEGI (1996), cuadro 3.1 ‘Principales caracteristicas de 
las viviendas’. For 1950 and 1960,1 used INEGI (1963), capitulo IV. 'Edificios y Viviendas’, cuadro 4.1. ‘Tenencia 
de vivienda, por entidades federativas, datos censales’, p. 117. For data in 1970,1 used INEGI (1973), capitulo IV. 
Vivienda, cuadro 4.1. ‘Numero de viviendas segun tipo de tenencia, por entidades federativas’, p. 173. For 1990 I 
used INEGI (1992), capitulo IL cuadro 2.4.4 ‘Viviendas particulares y ocupantes por tipo de tenencia segun entidad 
federativa y clase de vivienda’, p. 155. For 20001 used - Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica 
(INEGI), Anuario Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 2006 capitulo HI. ‘Vivienda y Urbanizacidn’, cuadro 
3.2. ‘Viviendas particulares habitadas por numero de ocupantes’ Mexico D.F. (2007), p.66.
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Table B. 3 Fixed Telephone Handsets per 100 Households: Argentina and Mexico (1900-2000)
Year Argentina Mexico 1930 18.1 2.7 1961 29.7 8.6 1992 52.0 72.9
1900 1.7 0.7 1931 18.0 2.9 1962 29.5 9.2 1993 58.4 79.7
1901 2.3 0.9 1932 17.5 3.0 1963 28.9 9.6 1994 64.7 86.3
1902 2.9 1.1 1933 17.1 3.1 1964 28.7 10.3 1995 72.4 85.4
1903 3.5 1.2 1934 16.6 3.2 1965 28.1 11.4 1996 75.0 84.5
1904 4.0 1.4 1935 16.9 3.4 1966 27.6 12.5 1997 77.0 83.6
1905 4.5 1.5 1936 17.2 3.6 1967 27.1 13.7 1998 81.1 82.8
1906 5.0 1.7 1937 17.8 3.9 1968 26.8 15.0 1999 82.2 81.9
1907 5.4 1.8 1938 18.2 4.2 1969 26.9 16.5 2000 85.4 81.1
1908 5.7 1.9 1939 18.4 4.5 1970 27.2 18.3
Sources: described above.
1909 6.1 2.1 1940 18.7 4.6 1971 25.6 20.0
1910 6.4 2.2 1941 18.8 4.6 1972 27.1 22.7
1911 6.6 2.3 1942 18.9 4.8 1973 28.3 25.1
1912 6.9 2.3 1943 18.7 5.0 1974 29.2 27.3
1913 7.1 2.4 1944 18.5 5.1 1975 29.5 29.3
1914 - - 1945 18.3 5.3 1976 29.5 32.0
1915 - - 1946 18.2 5.4 1977 29.3 34.6
1916 - - 1947 18.7 5.7 1978 29.3 37.1
1917 - - 1948 19.2 6.0 1979 29.9 39.1
1918 15.3 - 1949 19.8 6.4 1980 30.4 41.6
1919 15.2 2.2 1950 21.4 5.4 1981 31.4 44.6
1920 15.1 2.1 1951 22.4 5.7 1982 32.5 46.8
1921 15.5 2.2 1952 24.0 5.8 1983 33.7 48.5
1922 15.1 2.2 1953 25.4 6.0 1984 33.9 50.3
1923 15.5 2.2 1954 27.0 6.2 1985 34.9 52.7
1924 16.0 2.2 1955 27.8 6.3 1986 36.2 54.0
1925 16.1 2.3 1956 28.0 6.6 1987 37.1 55.8
1926 16.4 2.5 1957 28.1 7.0 1988 40.1 57.2
1927 17.0 2.7 1958 28.6 7.4 1989 43.1 61.4
1928 17.3 2.8 1959 28.7 7.8 1990 41.2 64.5
1929 17.8 2.6 1960 29.4 8.3 1991 46.3 67.2
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APPENDIX C 
Data used in the Regression Analysis
As demonstrated in appendix B, the rationale for discrepancies between data sets is 
not always easily identified. Moreover, something which is more pertinent to the data 
listed below is that even where some series are higher or lower than others, the year 
on year changes (especially in macroeconomic variables) are often the same. This is 
sometimes explained by the individual’s presentation of the data and is not always 
necessarily due to the base (e.g. weather rebased on 1950 GDP per capita, versus 
1990 Geary-Khamis), but rather the actual construction of the series. The key point 
to highlight here is the fact that in the regression analysis, where year on year 
changes are used as the regressed figures, these will be unaffected by these 
discrepancies. The sources of the variables used in the regression analysis in chapter 
4 are listed below, followed by a table with the data.
Argentina’s Telegraph Regression Data (see table C.l):
- Telegrams sent per 100 people: data for the whole period were my own 
construction (see appendix B, table B.l).
- GDP per capita: for 1891-1899 data are from Cortes Conde R., Estimaciones del 
Producto Bruto Intemo de Argentina, 1875-1935 documento de trabajo no. 3 
(1994). For 1900-1916 data are from the Economic Comision for Latin America 
(ECLA), El Desarrollo Econdmico de la Argentina Santiago, United Nations 
(1959).
- Population (mid-year, in thousands): data for 1890, and from 1900-1916 are 
from Maddison A., The World Economy: Historical Statistics Paris, OECD 
Development Centre (2003). For 1891-1895 data were calculated using 
geometric interpolation based on data from 1890 and 1896. Data for 1896-1899 
are from Vazquez Presedo V., Estadisticas Historicas Argentinas 
(Comparadas), Primera Parte, 1875-1914 Buenos Aires, Ediciones Macchi 
(1971).
- Budget: budget data corresponds to the budget for the Administracion Nacional 
de Correos y  Telegrafos. Data for the whole period is from, Republica 
Argentina, Direccion General de Estadistica, Extracto Estadistico de la
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Republica Argentina Los Gastos de la Administration Nacional, Segun los 
Presupuestos Respectivos, en $ oro, Durante los ultimos 50 Anos, cuadro 
‘Correos y Telegrafos’, Buenos Aires (1916), pp. 281-282. The data are based 
on the original published in Argentina’s third and fourth national censuses.
- Urban population: urban population as a percentage of total population was 
collected for the whole period from Ferreres O. J., Dos Siglos de Economia 
Argentina 1810-2004 cuadro 2.1 ‘Poblacion Total, Urbana y Rural’, Buenos 
Aires, Fundacion Norte y Sur (2005). This source used interpolation from the 
data in the census from , Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC), 
La Poblacion de Argentina Buenos Aires, Series Investigaciones Demograficas 
(1973), recalculating the absolute value from the series of Poblacion. According 
to the 1973 census, urban areas are defined as the percentage of the total 
population living in cities of 2,000 or more people.
- Average cost per telegram: the cost of an average telegram is calculated as the 
total gross revenue divided by the total number of telegrams. Data for 1895-1916 
is from, Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), El Desarrollo 
Economico de la Argentina Argentine Postal Movement in 1918 According to 
Provinces and Territories, see table III. ‘Movement at the National Telegraph 
Offices from 1895-1918’, Santiago, United Nations (1959), p. 128. These data 
are based on the original published in Argentina’s third and fourth national 
censuses.
- Length of national telegraph lines (in km): data for the whole period are from 
Castro Esteves R., Historia de Correos y  Telegrafos de la Republica Argentina 
tomo V, Buenos Aires, Ediciones de la Direccion General de Correos y 
Telegrafos (1952). Castro Esteves used oficial data from Bose, Walter B. L., 
‘Los Origenes del Telegrafo en la Argentina’ Revista de Correos y  Telegrafos 
no.81 Buenos Aires, Direccion General de Correos y Telegrafos (15 Mayo 
1944).
- Usage of the national telegraph lines: this series was my own construction for 
the whole period, using the number of telegrams sent (see appendix B, table B.l) 
divided by length of national telegraph lines (sourced above).
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Table C. 1 Telegraph Regression Data Used: Argentina (1891-1916)
Year
Telegrams 
sent per 
100 people
GDP per 
capita
Population
(000)
Budget 
($ oro)
Urban
population
(%)
Aver 
cost per 
telegram
Length 
National 
Teleg Lines 
(km)
Usage of 
National 
Telegraph
1891 15.1 2,341 3,483 902,196 36.0 - - -
1892 15.6 2,711 3,593 1,218,326 36.3 - - -
1893 16.0 2,786 3,707 1,385,441 36.7 - - -
1894 16.4 3,116 3,825 1,394,085 37.0 - - -
1895 16.8 3,350 3,946 1,536,261 37.4 0.25 - -
1896 17.1 3,595 4,071 1,867,750 38.2 0.24 - -
1897 17.3 2,831 4,233 2,063,623 39.0 0.23 - -
1898 17.6 2,981 4,357 2,436,130 39.7 0.25 - -
1899 17.8 3,405 4,477 2,704,474 40.5 0.23 20,330 31.4
1900 17.8 2,918 4,693 2,686,614 41.3 0.23 20,844 32.0
1901 17.8 3,077 4,873 2,772,434 42.1 0.24 21,372 32.5
1902 17.8 2,932 5,060 2,869,703 42.9 0.23 21,912 32.9
1903 17.8 3,259 5,254 2,995,004 43.7 0.24 22,464 33.3
1904 17.9 3,507 5,455 3,382,272 44.5 0.23 23,237 33.7
1905 18.0 3,863 5,664 3,259,911 45.3 0.23 23,960 34.0
1906 18.0 3,878 5,881 4,075,368 46.2 0.21 24,757 34.3
1907 33.7 3,784 6,107 4,893,293 47.0 0.22 25,098 65.6
1908 48.1 3,971 6,341 4,893,240 47.8 0.23 25,335 96.4
1909 61.5 3,982 6,584 5,722,385 48.6 0.23 25,820 125.5
1910 73.8 4,082 6,836 6,633,950 49.4 0.23 26,173 154.2
1911 62.0 3,996 7,098 7,227,963 50.3 0.24 30,097 160.6
1912 68.0 4,156 7,370 8,521,102 51.1 0.25 33,477 149.6
1913 79.3 4,038 7,653 9,071,242 51.9 0.26 36,145 168.0
1914 64.3 3,481 7,885 10,151,962 52.7 0.24 38,674 131.2
1915 65.3 3,364 8,072 10,442,388 53.0 0.23 38,783 135.8
1916 68.8 3,212 8,226 10,500,000 53.3 0.28 40,492 139.7
Sources: described above.
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Mexico’s Telegraph Regression Data (see table C.2):
- Telegrams sent per 100 people: data for the whole period were my own 
construction (see appendix B, table B.l).
- GDP per capita: data used are from 1890 only due to the lack of consistent and 
comparative available figures for the earlier period. The data for 1890, 1895 and 
1900-1907 were collected from Maddison A., The World Economy: Historical 
Statistics Paris, OECD Development Centre (2003). Data for 1891-1894, and for 
1896-1899, were calculated using geometric interpolation based on data from 
1890, 1895 and 1900.
- Population (mid-year, in thousands): data for the whole period are from 
Maddison A., The World Economy: Historical Statistics Paris, OECD 
Development Centre (2003).
- Budget: budget data corresponds to the budget for the Secretaria de 
Comunicaciones y  Obras Publicas. Data for 1891-1900 are from Mexico, 
Penafiel A. Anuario Estadistico de 1893 cuadro ‘Resumen de los Presupuestos 
de Egresos de la Federacion en los anos Fiscales de 1868 a 1900’, Mexico D.F., 
Direccion General de Estadistica (1894), pp. 284-285. For 1901-1907 data are 
from the - Republica Mexicana, Direccion General de Estadistica, Tercer Censo 
de Poblacion de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1910 ‘Presupuestos de egresos 
de la Federacion en los anos Fiscales de 1901 a 1911’, Mexico D.F. (1920), pp. 
92-93.
- Urban population: data refers to the percentage of urban population. Data for the 
whole period are from ICPSR; Banks A. S., ‘Cross National Time Series, 1815- 
1973’ Inter-university Consortium fo r  Political and Social Research (ICPSR) 
Ann Arbor, MI: ICPSR: Producer and Distributor (1976). The definition used 
here is the percentage of the total population living in cities of 20,000 or more 
people.
- Length of national telegraph lines (in km): data for the whole period is from 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e Informatica (INEGI), Anuario 
Estadistico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1940 capitulo XI. 
‘Comunicaciones y Transportes’, cuadro 384, Oficinas y Longitud de las lineas 
Telegraficas, Mexico D.F. (1942), pp. 383-384.
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- Usage of the national telegraph lines: this series was my own construction for 
the whole period, using the number of telegrams sent (see appendix B, table B.l) 
divided by length of national telegraph lines (sourced above).
Table C. 2 Telegraph Regression Data Used: Mexico (1881-1907)
Year
Telegrams 
sent per 100 
people
GDP per 
capita
Population
(000)
Budget 
($ oro)
Urban
population
(%)
Length 
National Teleg 
Lines (km)
Usage of 
National 
Telegraph
1881 1.1 - 10,524 - 9.75 - -
1882 0.7 - 10,652 - 9.72 16,252 4.4
1883 1.2 - 10,781 - 9.59 16,820 7.6
1884 0.6 - 10,912 - 9.55 21,000 3.3
1885 0.4 - 11,044 - 9.52 16,629 2.7
1886 1.0 - 11,178 - 9.48 17,151 6.7
1887 2.3 - 11,313 - 9.36 19,288 13.4
1888 3.1 - 11,450 - 9.33 21,514 16.5
1889 3.7 - 11,589 - 9.28 24,119 17.7
1890 4.7 1,011 11,729 - 9.25 24,774 22.5
1891 4.5 1,034 11,904 4,399,346 9.39 25,401 21.2
1892 5.6 1,058 12,083 4,483,569 9.57 27,210 24.7
1893 5.2 1,083 12,263 3,922,142 9.75 28,935 21.9
1894 6.5 1,107 12,447 4,455,097 9.92 30,202 26.8
1895 7.5 1,132 12,663 4,669,516 9.99 31,547 30.3
1896 9.1 1,175 12,822 4,635,089 10.12 31,855 36.6
1897 10.1 1,220 13,014 5,450,217 10.29 32,137 41.0
1898 10.2 1,266 13,209 5,652,111 10.35 32,194 42.0
1899 18.6 1,314 13,406 6,294,936 10.49 32,394 76.9
1900 16.7 1,366 13,607 7,497,388 10.53 31,346 72.3
1901 17.7 1,466 13,755 8,699,840 10.59 31,824 76.3
1902 19.9 1,348 13,904 9,461,829 10.71 33,017 83.7
1903 21.5 1,483 14,055 9,743,724 10.73 34,165 88.5
1904 22.2 1,492 14,208 10,209,605 10.84 35,706 88.3
1905 23.8 1,630 14,363 11,346,645 10.85 34,841 98.2
1906 25.7 1,594 14,519 12,537,332 10.94 34,914 106.8
1907 26.1 1,669 14,676 14,573,854 10.94 35,153 108.9
Sources: described above.
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Argentina’s Telephone Regression Data (see table C.3):
- Telephone handsets per 100 households: data for the whole period were my own 
construction (see appendix B, table B.3).
- GDP per capita: data for the whole period are from Maddison A., The World 
Economy: Historical Statistics Paris, OECD Development Centre (2003).
- Population (mid-year, in thousands): data for the whole period are from 
Maddison A., The World Economy: Historical Statistics Paris, OECD 
Development Centre (2003).
- Urban population: data refers to the percentage of urban population. Data for the 
whole period are from Ferreres O. J., Dos Siglos de Economia Argentina 1810- 
2004 cuadro 2.1 ‘Poblacion Total, Urbana y Rural’ Buenos Aires, Fundacion 
Norte y Sur (2005). For 1943-1960 Ferreres used interpolation based on the data 
in the census from Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC), La 
Poblacion de Argentina Buenos Aires, Serie Investigaciones Demograficas 
(1975), recalculating the absolute value from the series of Poblacion. For 1961- 
1980 Ferreres used interpolation based upon the census data in Instituto Nacional 
de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC), Situacion y  Evolucion Social Sintesis no.4, 
Buenos Aires (1994), recalculating the absolute value from the series of 
Poblacion. For 1981-1997 Ferreres used interpolation based upon the census 
data in Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INDEC), Censo Nacional de 
Poblacion, Hogares y  Viviendas 2001 Buenos Aires (2001), recalculating the 
absolute value from the series of Poblacion.
- Waiting list for main telephone lines: data used are from 1975 onwards and were 
collected from ITU (www.itu.int). Data for 1985-1986 were calculated using 
geometric interpolations, based on the data for 1984 and 1987, due to lack of 
consistent reliable data.
- Total annual invest in telecom (US$): data used are from 1981 onwards and 
were collected from ITU (www.itu.int).
415
Economic Disparity Yet Resulting Similarity: The 'Double Paradox’ o f  Argentina and Mexico
Table C. 3 Telephone Regression D ata Used: A rgentina (1943-1997)
Year
Telephones 
per 100 
households
GDP per 
capita 
(1990)
Population
(000)
Urban
population
(%)
Waiting
lines
Total annual 
investment in 
telecom (US$)
1943 18.7 4,182 14,877 61.1 - -
1944 18.5 4,579 15,130 61.4 - -
1945 18.3 4,356 15,390 61.6 - -
1946 18.2 4,665 15,654 61.9 - -
1947 18.7 5,089 15,942 62.2 - -
1948 19.2 5,252 16,307 63.0 - -
1949 19.8 5,047 16,737 63.8 - -
1950 21.4 4,987 17,150 64.6 - -
1951 22.4 5,073 17,517 65.4 - -
1952 24.0 4,717 17,877 66.2 - -
1953 25.4 4,874 18,231 66.9 - -
1954 27.0 4,980 18,581 67.7 - -
1955 27.8 5,237 18,928 68.4 - -
1956 28.0 5,285 19,272 69.2 - -
1957 28.1 5,461 19,611 69.9 - -
1958 28.6 5,698 19,947 70.6 - -
1959 28.7 5,241 20,281 71.3 - -
1960 29.4 5,559 20,616 72.0 - -
1961 29.7 5,862 20,951 72.8 - -
1962 29.5 5,677 21,284 73.5 - -
1963 28.9 5,455 21,616 74.2 - -
1964 28.7 5,926 21,949 75.0 - -
1965 28.1 6,371 22,283 75.7 - -
1966 27.6 6,321 22,612 76.4 - -
1967 27.1 6,399 22,934 77.0 - -
1968 26.8 6,578 23,261 77.7 - -
1969 26.9 7,037 23,600 78.3 - -
1970 27.2 7,302 23,962 79.0 - -
1971 25.6 7,530 24,364 79.4 - -
1972 27.1 7,635 24,780 79.8 - -
1973 28.3 7,962 25,210 80.3 - -
1974 29.2 8,334 25,646 80.7 - -
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1975 29.5 8,122 26,082 81.1 584,000 -
1976 29.5 7,965 26,531 81.5 622,000 -
1977 29.3 8,304 26,984 81.9 698,000 -
1978 29.3 7,807 27,440 82.2 776,000 -
1979 29.9 8,227 27,902 82.6 863,000 -
1980 30.4 8,206 28,370 83.0 934,000 -
1981 31.4 7,603 28,863 83.4 894,000 409,090,912
1982 32.5 7,243 29,341 83.8 951,730 389,781,821
1983 33.7 7,383 29,802 84.2 1,026,203 371,384,119
1984 33.9 7,425 30,236 84.6 1,000,000 353,854,789
1985 34.9 6,834 30,675 85.0 794,300 337,132,000
1986 36.2 7,224 31,146 85.4 630,912 299,339,503
1987 37.1 7,299 31,621 85.8 501,046 265,783,545
1988 40.1 7,056 32,091 86.1 789,336 235,989,209
1989 43.1 6,523 32,559 86.5 780,000 209,501,680
1990 41.2 6,436 33,022 86.8 775,000 284,230,929
1991 46.3 6,980 33,492 87.2 312,336 385,614,912
1992 52.0 7,497 33,959 87.4 373,717 1,292,805,248
1993 58.4 7,827 34,412 87.7 448,000 2,036,777,856
1994 64.7 8,367 34,864 87.9 496,070 2,237,214,720
1995 72.4 8,005 35,311 88.1 110,566 2,061,515,392
1996 75.0 8,253 35,754 88.4 33,206 1,710,581,632
1997 77.0 8,803 36,203 88.6 19,476 1,347,673,856
Sources: described above.
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Mexico’s Telephone Regression Data (see table C.4):
- Telephone handsets per 100 households: data for the whole period were my own 
construction (see appendix B, table B.3).
- GDP per capita: data for the whole period is from Maddison A., The World 
Economy: Historical Statistics Paris, OECD Development Centre (2003).
- Population (mid-year, in thousands): data for the whole period are from 
Maddison A., The World Economy: Historical Statistics Paris, OECD 
Development Centre (2003).
- Urban population: data refers to the percentage of urban population. Data for 
1950 are from Oxlad, Poblacion Censaday Tasas de Crecimiento Medio Anual, 
Segun Cuidades, 1950-1990 Boletin Demograflco, Edicion Especial: 
Urbanization y Evolution de la Poblacion Urbana de America Latina (1950 - 
1990), Centro Latinoamericano de Demografia (2002). Data for 1951-1959 were 
calculated using geometric interpolations, based on the data for 1950 and 1960. 
For 1960-1979 data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(www.data.worldbank.org). From 1980 onwards data were collected from ITU 
(www.itu.int).
- Waiting list for main telephone lines: data used are from 1975 onwards and were 
collected from ITU (www.itu.int).
- Total annual invest in telecom (US$): Data used are from 1975 onwards and 
were collected from ITU (www.itu.int).
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Table C. 4 Telephone Regression Data Used: M exico (1945-1997)
Year
Telephones 
per 100 
households
GDP per 
capita 
(1990)
Population
(000)
Urban
population
(%)
Waiting
lines
Total annual invest 
in telecom (US$)
1945 5.3 2,134 23,724 - -
1946 5.4 2,211 24,413 - -
1947 5.7 2,221 25,122 - -
1948 6.0 2,248 25,852 - -
1949 6.4 2,304 26,603 - -
1950 5.4 2,365 28,485 42.5 - -
1951 5.7 2,477 29,296 43.30 - -
1952 5.8 2,504 30,144 44.08 - -
1953 6.0 2,439 31,031 44.87 - -
1954 6.2 2,605 31,959 45.67 - -
1955 6.3 2,742 32,930 46.49 - -
1956 6.6 2,843 33,946 47.32 - -
1957 7.0 2,965 35,016 48.17 - -
1958 7.4 3,025 36,142 49.03 - -
1959 7.8 3,016 37,328 49.91 - -
1960 8.3 3,155 38,579 50.8 - -
1961 8.6 3,172 39,836 51.6 - -
1962 9.2 3,211 41,121 52.4 - -
1963 9.6 3,343 42,434 53.3 - -
1964 10.3 3,594 43,775 54.1 - -
1965 11.4 3,702 45,142 54.9 - -
1966 12.5 3,813 46,538 55.7 - -
1967 13.7 3,922 47,996 56.5 - -
1968 15.0 4,073 49,519 57.4 - -
1969 16.5 4,185 51,111 58.2 - -
1970 18.3 4,320 52,775 59.0 - -
1971 20.0 4,365 54,407 59.8 - -
1972 22.7 4,602 55,984 60.5 - -
1973 25.1 4,853 57,557 61.3 - -
1974 27.3 5,013 59,123 62.0 - -
1975 29.3 5,158 60,678 62.8 145,000 310,244,480
1976 32.0 5,244 62,220 63.5 253,000 505,694,144
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1977 34.6 5,293 63,760 64.2 219,000 321,106,208
1978 37.1 5,595 65,296 64.9 241,000 407,850,880
1979 39.1 5,968 66,826 65.6 314,000 362,807,008
1980 41.6 6,320 68,347 66.4 408,895 394,340,224
1981 44.6 6,717 69,969 67.0 549,756 588,120,000
1982 46.8 6,514 71,641 67.7 609,736 400,464,288
1983 48.5 6,088 73,363 68.3 829,592 320,308,320
1984 50.3 6,162 75,080 69.0 917,302 504,202,368
1985 52.7 6,194 76,767 69.6 1,317,720 485,871,584
1986 54.0 5,834 78,442 70.2 756,800 410,323,520
1987 55.8 5,818 80,122 70.8 769,972 505,941,216
1988 57.2 5,771 81,782 71.4 863,061 598,184,768
1989 61.4 5,899 83,367 72.0 1,058,211 792,451,008
1990 64.5 6,085 84,914 72.6 1,111,000 1,397,456,896
1991 67.2 6,226 86,488 73.1 1,010,000 1,871,965,952
1992 72.9 6,333 88,111 73.7 662,533 3,054,393,088
1993 79.7 6,339 89,749 74.2 260,000 2,682,623,232
1994 86.3 6,504 91,338 74.8 196,850 2,500,552,192
1995 85.4 6,001 92,880 75.3 70,798 1,491,200,768
1996 84.5 6,209 94,399 75.0 69,000 1,779,847,296
1997 83.6 6,525 95,895 80.0 91,000 1,906,691,968
Sources: described above.
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APPENDIX D 
The Diffusion Curves
Technology diffusion was originally modelled by Roger’s theoretical two-step 
process: p, (the point of initial adoption), which is quicker for inexpensive 
technologies, and q (the diffusion speed or the rate of diffusion), which is higher for 
technologies subject to network effects. Hence:
Technology Diffusion = F (p, q)
Essentially the initial point of adoption ‘p ’ is known from the data, and by plotting 
the diffusion pattern one can determine the speed of diffusion ‘q’ from the plotted 
graph. The point of saturation (represented by M from here onwards), in addition to 
these variables, is then directly derived from the upper asymptote of the S-shaped 
distribution curve. Mathematically, the growth rate of adoption, i.e. the number of 
adopters over the time, N(t)  is proportional to the total number of adopters. The 
growth rate at time, t is then defined by the derivative dN (t)/d(t) and this 
relationship is then fundamentally represented by the exponential growth model (in 
differential form) as follows:
[1] ^  = aN(£)
This concept is based on the fact that the logistic curve (most common type of S- 
curve) maps that of the exponential curve. Equation [1] can then be solved by 
introducing e (the base of the natural logarithm). The familiar solution of which, is:
[2] N ( t ) = f i eat (where a = growth rate constant and p = coefficient of imitation)
The coefficient of imitation, p (internal influence) -  in regard to the potential 
adopters {M-N} that can adopt -  is the accepted behavioural theory of the population, 
implicit in the process of substitution. At this stage the exponential growth model in 
equation [2] must be modified for it to fit the S-curve shape. This is done by adding a 
‘negative feedback’ function in relation to the absolute saturation of the potential 
adopters (denoted by M), as in [3] below.
[3] [ l  — which applied to [1] now gives:
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(negative feedback)
Note that the feedback term is close to 1 when N(t) «  M and N(t) approaches zero, 
explaining the exponential element to the logistic curve. As N(t) tends to M, the 
growth rate decreases to zero as the maturity stage in the rate of adoption of the new 
technology is reached and the curve tends to the upper asymptote. Given [2], one is 
in a position to solve [4] through integration and then substitution. Since the 
diffusion is proportional to the amount of diffusion already achieved and the amount 
of diffusion still to come, the solution to equation [4] is:
Note that the two parameters a, p fully describe the logistic curve. Factually, at this 
point it seems prudent to consider that symmetric S-curves are rarely found in the 
diffusion of a new technology. Ordinarily, the resulting S-curve is actually positively 
skewed, with the final stage of the diffusion process transpiring at a much reduced 
speed than forecast by a typical symmetric S-curve.1 However, the fundamental 
problem materialises upon manipulation of the logistic equation in [5], which can be 
done simply to produce a form that will enable the calculation of a  and p from a 
simple linear regression method.
And various others, which is the key rigidity causing the need for a more flexible 
model. Because these models can be transformed into equations with a nonlinear 
function of N(t), being represented as a linear function of time, means that the point 
of inflection and the symmetric nature of the process are predetermined rather than 
being data-determined as in the FLOG model.
1 Dixon R., ‘Hybrid Com Revisited’ Econometrica 48.6 (1980): 1451-61.
[5] W > = 7 ^ 1
This result is also found to be the case with the Gompertz curve,
[7] -In  = = a t+  p  s
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APPENDIX E 
Determining the FLOG Formulae
First the data are subjected to the K-S and A-D goodness of fit tests to decide which 
specific curve, nestled within the Flexible Logistic Growth (FLOG) model 
specification the data most closely resembles. The tables below detail the results: 
The following calculations and notation use EasyFit 4.1 Professional Edition 
(Mathwave Technologies):
Table E. 1 Argentina Telegraph: G oodness o f Fit Tests for the Best-Fitting Curves
Model
Kolmogorov Smirnov Anderson Darling
Overall RankStatistic Rank Statistic Rank
Normal 0.2171 4 1.0792 3 4
Logistic 0.2389 5 1.3784 4 5
Log-Logistic (2P) 0.1906 3 0.9290 2 3
Log-Logistic (3P) 0.1717 2 0.8085 1 1
Weibull (3P) 0.1537 1 1.4239 5 2*
*The Weibull (3P) has been pushed down the ranking due to a very weak Anderson-Darling reading. 
Table E. 2 M exico Telegraph: G oodness o f Fit Tests for the Best-F itting Curves
Model
Kolmogorov Smirnov Anderson Darling
Statistic Rank Statistic Rank Overall Rank
Normal 0.1413 1 0.7076 3 1
Logistic 0.1639 4 0.8860 4 4
Log-Logistic (2P) 0.2331 5 1.4105 5 5
Log-Logistic (3P) 0.1469 2 0.6984 2 2
Weibull (3P) 0.1478 3 0.6231 1 3
Table E. 3 Argentina Telephone: G oodness o f Fit Tests for the Best-Fitting Curves
Model
Kolmogorov Smirnov Anderson Darling
Overall RankStatistic Rank Statistic Rank
Normal 0.1508 3 1.2213 3 3
Logistic 0.16832 4 1.5766 4 4
Log-Logistic (2P) 0.2065 5 1.7324 5 5
Log-Logistic (3P) 0.13714 1 0.90628 2 1
Weibull (3P) 0.14194 2 0.8633 1 2
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Table E. 4 M exico Telephone: G oodness o f Fit Tests for the Best-Fitting Curves
Model
Kolmogorov Smimov Anderson Darling
Overall RankStatistic Rank Statistic Rank
Normal 0.2540 3 2.5694 1 2
Logistic 0.2761 4 2.9866 2 4
Log-Logistic (2P) 0.2990 5 5.8692 5 5
Log-Logistic (3P) 0.1571 1 4.3813 3 1
Weibull (3P) 0.1644 2 4.8866 4 3
It is clear that Argentina’s telegraph/telephone and Mexico’s telephone curves should 
all be modelled to the FLOG by a three parameter log-logistic curve, whilst the 
Mexican Telegraph (due to its symmetry) is more closely fitted by a normal curve.
The relevant EasyFit parameters relating to the chosen curves must then be 
transformed1 to find the standardised a and p parameters. Since the other two 
parameters that parametise the FLOG are known: as p =0 and k  =1 for the log- 
logistic and p =0 and k  = 0 for the normal, one can fully parameterise the FLOG.
Table E. 5 EasyFit Param eters o f the Best-Fitting Curves
Model a  B Y A M
Argentina Telegraph Log-logistic (3P) 1.3609 0.31568 -0.00359 n/a n/a
Mexico Telegraph Normal n/a n/a n/a 0.3463 0.3862
Argentina Telephone Log-logistic (3P) 1.9529 0.4132 -0.0599 n/a n/a
Mexico Telephone Log-logistic (3P) 0.7916 0.11984 -0.00014587 n/a n/a
Table E. 6 Transform ed Param eters
Model A B M K
Argentina Telegraph Log-logistic (3P) -24.286 6.800 0 1
Mexico Telegraph Normal -5.354 0.213 1 1
Argentina Telephone Log-logistic (3P) -11.600 2.870 0 1
Mexico Telephone Log-logistic (3P) -34.255 7.800 0 1
Table E. 7 Final FLO G  Formulas
Formula T
Argentina Telegraph N  = { 1 +  e [24.286 -  6.8 In t]}"1 t(u , k )  =  In t
Mexico Telegraph N  =  {1 +  e[5.354 -  0 .21271]}"1
•UII3HU
Argentina Telephone N = {  1 +  e[11.6 -  2.87 In t]}"1 t(u , k )  = In t
Mexico Telephone N  = (1 +  e[34.255 -  7.8 In t]}"1 t ( u ,k ) =  Int
1 See Appendix G for details on transforming parameters.
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APPENDIX F
Goodness of fit Tests
Kolmogorov-Smimov Test:
Based on the empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF): assume that we 
have a random sample xi,..., xn from some distribution with CDF F(x). The empirical
Definition
The Kolmogorov-Smimov statistic (D) is based on the largest vertical difference 
between the theoretical and the empirical cumulative distribution function:
Hypothesis Testing
The null and the alternative hypotheses are:
• Ho: the data follow the specified distribution;
• Ha: the data do not follow the specified distribution.
The hypothesis regarding the distributional form is rejected at the chosen 
significance level (a) if the test statistic, D, is greater than the critical value obtained 
from a table. The fixed values of a (0.01, 0.05 etc.) are generally used to evaluate the 
null hypothesis (Ho) at various significance levels. A value of 0.05 is typically used 
for most applications; however, in some critical industries, a lower a value may be 
applied.
The standard tables of critical values used for this test are only valid when testing 
whether a data set is from a completely specified distribution. If one or more 
distribution parameters are estimated, the results will be conservative: the actual 
significance level will be smaller than that given by the standard tables, and the 
probability that the fit will be rejected in error will be lower.
P-Value
The P-value, in contrast to fixed values, is calculated based on the test statistic, and 
denotes the threshold value of the significance level in the sense that the null
CDF is denoted by: Fx(x) =  ^ x [number o f  observations < x]
D = max ( F(xt) --------isi<n V n n
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hypothesis (Ho) will be accepted for all values of less than the P-value. For example, 
if P=0.025, the null hypothesis will be accepted at all significance levels less than P 
(i.e. 0.01 and 0.02), and rejected at higher levels, including 0.05 and 0.1. The P-value 
can be useful, in particular, when the null hypothesis is rejected at all predefined 
significance levels, and you need to know at which level it could be accepted. 
EasyFit displays the P-values based on the Kolmogorov-Smimov test statistics (D) 
calculated for each fitted distribution.
The Anderson-Darling Test 
Definition
The Anderson-Darling statistic (A ) is defined as
n
A2 = - n  -  i Y ( 2 i  -  1 M ln F t f t )  + In (1 -  F(AV.,+1))]n t-ui=1
Hypothesis Testing
The null and the alternative hypotheses are:
• Ho: the data follow the specified distribution;
• Ha: the data do not follow the specified distribution.
The hypothesis regarding the distributional form is rejected at the chosen 
significance level (a) if the test statistic, A2, is greater than the critical value obtained 
from a table. The fixed values of a (0.01, 0.05 etc.) are generally used to evaluate the 
null hypothesis (Ho) at various significance levels. A value of 0.05 is typically used 
for most applications; however, in some critical industries, a lower a value may be 
applied. In general, critical values of the Anderson-Darling test statistic depend on 
the specific distribution being tested. However, tables of critical values are readily 
available only for several of the most widely used distributions. The Anderson- 
Darling test implemented in EasyFit uses the same critical values for all distributions. 
These values are calculated using the approximation formula, and depend on the 
sample size only. This kind of test (compared to the "original" A-D test) is less likely 
to reject the good fit, and can be successfully used to compare the goodness o f fit of 
several fitted distributions.
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APPENDIX G 
Transformations
In order to estimate the parameters o f the FLOG, a few intermediate steps need to be 
taken. Easyfit will generate the parameters in figure G.l ,  but the FLOG requires the 
parameters o f figure G.2.
Figure G .l______________________________  Figure G.2
Model Parameters Model Parameters
Normal cE Me Normal a 3 R K
Logistic Me Logistic a 3 K
Log-Logistic (2P) Oe 3e ----- ► Log-Logistic (2P) a 3 R K
Log-Logistic (3P) 3e Ye Log-Logistic (3P) a 3 R K
Weibull (3P) Qe 3c Ye Weibull (3P) a 3 R K
Note that the a, p o f figure G.l are not the same as those of figure G.2. Also note that 
some calculations must be carried out on the parameters in figure G. 1, before they can 
actually be transformed. So in reality the full process is as follows:
Figure G .l F igure G.3 Figure G.2
Model Parameters Model Parameters Model Parameters
Normal &S PE Normal Cm Pm Normal a P M K
Logistic 5= PE Logistic bw PC Logistic a P » K
Log-Logistic (21} o e  Re Log-Logistic (2P) O i l s  R c l 2  * Log-Logistic (2P) a P M K
Log-Logistic (31} o e  Re  Ye Log-Logistic (3P) O l l 3  R c J  Y U -3 Log-Logistic (3P) a R » K
Weibull (3P) a s  Re  y e Weibull (31} aw Rw yw Weibull (31} a P M K
To get from the parameters o f figure G.l to figure G.2 it is necessary to compare the 
formulae o f the Cumulative Distribution Function generated in EasyFit with the standard 
formula for the respective s-curve in question. In this study it has only been necessary to 
transform the parameters of the Normal and Log-Logistic, and thus these parameter 
transform actions will be demonstrated below.
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Transforming a Normal 
These are the Cumulative Distribution (where x is the function of time) and Normal 
Distribution formulae: 
F (x) = (1 + e -  [“ “ ]} 1 and N = (1 + e[—a — fit]} 
Through the appropriate manipulation and basic algebra it can be found that:
Table G.l
EasyFit Calculated FLOG ParameterParameter
- p / 5 a
1 / 5 P
Source: EasyFit
where: p  =  (1 -  [EasyFit Calculated Mean]) x (No. o f  yrs in the series)
(3 =  EasyFit Calculated Standard Dev (when StatAssist1 inputs are p. and 8 = no o f  yrs in the 
series /  p)
Transforming a Log-Logistic (3P) 
These are the Cumulative Distribution (where x is the fimction of time) and three 
parameter Log-Logistic Distribution formulae:
F (x) =  {1 + ' and N =  {1 + e[—a  — /? In t]}
Table G.2
EasyFit Calculated FLOG ParameterParameter
- In [ (P -  y) “ ] a
A P
Source: EasyFit
where: a  =  when [3 and y  are inputted in StatAssist such that ( [No. o f yrs in the series / EasyFit 
Calculated M ean] = a  ). N.B. a may have to be estimated where the EasyFit mean calculation is not 
accurately computable.
P = (1 -  [EasyFit Calculated Mean]) x (No. of yrs in the series) 
y = - P / a
1 StatAssist is the dynamic tool in-built in EasyFit.
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APPENDIX H 
Heads of State
A rg en tin a M exico
1862 Bartolome Mitre 1864 M aximilian I
1868 Domingo Sarmiento 1867 Benito Juarez
1874 Nicolas Avellaneda 1872 Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada
1880 Julio Argentino Roca 1876 Jose M aria Iglesias
1886 Miguel Juarez Celman 1876 Jose Porfirio Diaz
1890 Carlos Pellegrini 1880 M anuel Gonzalez
1892 Luis Saenz Pena 1884 Jose Porfirio Diaz
1895 Jose Uriburu 1911 Francisco Leon de la Barra, 25 May-6 Nov
1898 Julio Argentino Roca Francisco Madero, 6 N ov-18 Feb 1913
1904 M anuel Quintana 1913 Victoriano Huerta
1906 Jose Figueroa Alcorta 1914 Venustiano Carranza
1910 Roque Saenz Pena 1920 Adolfo de la Huerta, 21 May-1 Dec
1914 Victorino de la Plaza Alvaro Obregon, 1 Dec-1 Dec 1924
1916 Hipolito Yrigoyen 1924 Plutarco Elias Calles
1922 M arcelo Torcuato de Alvear 1928 Emilio Portes Gil
1928 Hipolito Yrigoyen 1930 Pascual Ortiz Rubio
1930 Jose Felix Uriburu 1932 Abelardo Rodriguez
1932 Agustin Justo 1934 Lazaro Cardenas
1938 Roberto Ortiz 1940 M anuel Avila Camacho
1940 Ramon Castillo 1946 M iguel Aleman
1943 A rturo Rawson, 5-7 June 1952 Adolfo Ruiz Cortines
Pedro Ramirez, 7 June -9 Mar 1944 1958 Adolfo Lopez Mateos
1944 Edelmiro Farrell 1964 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
1946 Juan Per6n 1970 Luis Echevarria Alvarez
1955 Eduardo Lonardi, 23 Sept-13 Nov 1976 Jose Lopez Portillo
Pedro Aramburu, 13 N o v -1 M ay 1958 1982 M iguel de la M adrid
1958 Arturo Frondizi 1988 Carlos Salinas de Gortari
1962 Jose M aria Guido 1994 Ernesto Zedillo
1963 Arturo Illia 2000 Vicente Fox Quesada
1966 Juan Ongania
1970 Roberto Levingston
1971 Alejandro Lanusse
1973 Hector Campora, 27 M ay-13 July 
Raul Lastiri, 13 July-12 Oct 
Juan Peron, 12 Oct-1 July 1974
1974 Isabel Peron
1976 Jorge Videla
1981 Roberto Viola, 29 Mar-22 Dec 
Leopoldo Galtieri, 22 D ec-17 June 1982
1982 Reynaldo Bignone
1983 Raul Alfonsin
1989 Carlos M enem
1999 Fernando de la Rua
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